Efficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania
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Date
2012
Authors
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
Environment and Development Economics
Abstract
Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’
patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest
resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using
an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have
alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement
and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal
collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy
makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation
through fine collection
Description
Keywords
Efficiency, enforcement, revenue tradeoffs, Participatory Forest Management, Tanzania
Citation
Robinson, E.J. and Lokina, R.B., 2012. Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania. Environment and Development Economics, 17(01), pp.1-20.