Efficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania

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dc.contributor.authorRobinson, E. J. Z.
dc.contributor.authorLokina, Razack B.
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-24T13:32:02Z
dc.date.available2016-03-24T13:32:02Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.description.abstractWhere joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collectionen_US
dc.identifier.citationRobinson, E.J. and Lokina, R.B., 2012. Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania. Environment and Development Economics, 17(01), pp.1-20.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/S1355770X11000209
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1355
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEnvironment and Development Economicsen_US
dc.subjectEfficiencyen_US
dc.subjectenforcementen_US
dc.subjectrevenue tradeoffsen_US
dc.subjectParticipatory Forest Managementen_US
dc.subjectTanzaniaen_US
dc.titleEfficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzaniaen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
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