Do Hegemonic-Party Regimes Reward or Punish Voters? ATale of Distributive Politics in Tanzania
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Date
2022
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Publisher
SAGE
Abstract
Does resource allocation by the central government to local governments in Tanzania
favour opposition or the ruling party’s strongholds? The literature advances two opposing
theories – electoral competition and hegemonic party hypotheses. We use unique
data on fiscal transfers and human resource allocations to investigate the effect of electoral
support on government allocations. Contrary to the two hypotheses, we find no
political bias in fiscal resources transferred to local governments. Similarly, we find no
strong evidence to suggest any political bias in human resource allocation. On the
whole, neither does the evidence confirm nor conclusively disconfirm the two hypotheses.
The findings imply that hegemonic-parties do not necessarily opt for a discriminative strategy in intergovernmental resource allocations even after facing a threatening
opposition. Flexibility in autocratic menu and the path dependence of government’s
social policy are likely to explain this kind of hegemonic party’s allocative behaviour.
Description
Keywords
Tanzania, distributive politics, fiscal transfers, human resource allocation, political economy, local government