Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania

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dc.contributor.authorRobinson, E. J. Z.
dc.contributor.authorAlbers, H. J.
dc.contributor.authorNgeleza, G.
dc.contributor.authorLokina, Razack B.
dc.date.accessioned2016-03-24T13:34:44Z
dc.date.available2016-03-24T13:34:44Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.description.abstractTypically both local villagers (―insiders‖) and non-locals (―outsiders‖) extract products from protected forests even though the activities are illegal. Our paper suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may be able to reduce total forest degradation by legalizing ―insider‖ extraction in return for local villagers involvement in enforcement activities. We illustrate this through the development of a game-theoretic model that considers explicitly the interaction between the forest manager who can combine a limited enforcement budget with legalization of insider resource extraction and livelihood projects such as bee keeping, insider villagers, and outsider charcoal producers.en_US
dc.identifier.citationRobinson, E.J., Albers, H.J., Ngeleza, G. and Lokina, R.B., 2014. Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania. Ecological Economics, 107, pp.242-248.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/123456789/1373
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherEcological Economicsen_US
dc.subjectparticipatory forest managementen_US
dc.subjectlocal enforcementen_US
dc.subjectTanzaniaen_US
dc.subjectcharcoal productionen_US
dc.subjectnon-timber forest productsen_US
dc.subjectbee keepingen_US
dc.titleInsiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzaniaen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
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