Browsing by Author "Robinson, E. J. Z."
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Item Determinants of Effectiveness of the Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania(Tanzania Journal of Population Studies and Development, 2012) Lokina, Razack B.; Robinson, E. J. Z.Following the 1998 National Forest Policy and the Forest Act of 2002, participatory forest management is being introduced in Tanzania. PFM has been proposed as a way of both protecting Tanzania's forests and reducing rural poverty. In this paper we analyse villagers' perceptions of the effectiveness of PFM in Tanzania, using household and village level survey data collected from two regions. Preliminary findings indicate that men, larger households, and those households that have their own source of fuelwood are more likely to perceive a particular PFM initiative as successful.Item Efficiency enforcement and Revenue trade-offs in Participatory Forest Management: An Example from Tanzania(Environment and Development Economics, 2012) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Lokina, Razack B.Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collectionItem Implementing REDD through Community-Based Forest Management: Lessons from Tanzania(Natural Resource Forum, A United Nations Sustainable Development Journal, 2013) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Albers, H. J.; Lokina, Razack B.; Meshack, C.REDD (Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) aims to slow carbon releases caused by forest disturbance by making payments conditional on forest quality over time. Like earlier policies to slow deforestation, REDD must change the behaviour of forest degraders. Broadly, it can be implemented with payments to potential forest degraders, thus creating incentives; through payments for enforcement, thus creating disincentives; or through addressing external drivers such as urban charcoal demand. In Tanzania, community-based forest management (CBFM), a form of participatory forest management (PFM), was chosen as the model for implementing REDD pilot programs. Payments are made to villages that have the rights to forest carbon. In exchange for these payments, the villages must demonstrably reduce deforestation at the village level. Using this pilot program as a case study, we provide insights for REDD implementation in sub-Saharan Africa. We pay particular attention to leakage, monitoring and enforcement. We suggest that implementing REDD through CBFM-type structures can create appropriate incentives and behavioural change when the recipients of the REDD funds are also the key drivers of forest change. When external forces drive forest change, however, REDD through CBFM-type structures becomes an enforcement program, with local communities rather than government agencies being responsible for the enforcement. That structure imposes costs on local communities, whose local authority limits the ability to address leakage outside the particular REDD village. In addition, for REDD to lead to lower emissions, implementation will have to emphasize conditionality of payments on measurable decreases in forest loss.Item Insiders, outsiders, and the role of local enforcement in forest management: An example from Tanzania(Ecological Economics, 2014) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Albers, H. J.; Ngeleza, G.; Lokina, Razack B.Typically both local villagers (―insiders‖) and non-locals (―outsiders‖) extract products from protected forests even though the activities are illegal. Our paper suggests that, depending on the relative ecological damage caused by each group, budget-constrained forest managers may be able to reduce total forest degradation by legalizing ―insider‖ extraction in return for local villagers involvement in enforcement activities. We illustrate this through the development of a game-theoretic model that considers explicitly the interaction between the forest manager who can combine a limited enforcement budget with legalization of insider resource extraction and livelihood projects such as bee keeping, insider villagers, and outsider charcoal producers.Item Kibaha Tanzania’s Forest Protection, Poverty Alleviation Projects, NTFPs and Charcoal Production: Modelling Multiple Tools, Goals, and Actors(EDE, 2010) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Lokina, Razack B.; Albers, H. J.; Ngeleza, N.During the last 30 years, the number of protected areas worldwide established to protect natural systems grew dramatically. Coinciding with that expansion, many government agencies and conservation NGOs advocate for combinations of development/livelihood policies and conservation policies attempt to address rural poverty while conserving forests (Naughton-Treves, et al., 2005). For example, WWF’s policy on forest and poverty states that “national and international forest policies and the conservation movement should address both the sustainable management of natural forests and rural poverty alleviation; one should never be addressed at the other’ s expense” (Gutman, 2001; p.9, para 1). The economics literature discussing policies aimed at conservation and poverty, such as Community-based Forest Management (CBFM), Joint Forest Management (JFM), and their predecessor Integrated ConservationDevelopment Projects (ICDPs), emphasizes their failure to create incentives for conservation by rural people (see Hughes and Flintan, 2001, for a literature review; Behera and Engel, 2006; Ghimire, 1994; Johannesen, and Skonhoft, 2005; Ligon and Narain, 1999; Muller and Albers, 2004; and Shyamsundar, 1996). Despite the lack of well-established mechanisms to induce conservation through poverty alleviation projects in and around parks, many parks have managers or NGOs implementing such projects,often with an emphasis on compensation for lost access to resources, poverty alleviation, and generating goodwill.Item Protecting Forests and Forest Based Livelihoods: Modeling Multiple Tools, Goals, and Actors(Forest Policy and Economics, 2010) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Lokina, Razack B.; Albers, H. J.Item A Spatial-Temporal Analysis of the Impact of Access Restrictions on Forest Landscapes and Household Welfare in Tanzania(Forest Policy and Economics, 2011) Robinson, E. J. Z.; Lokina, Razack B.This paper explores the impact of the re-introduction of access restrictions to forests in Tanzania, through participatory forest management (PFM), that have excluded villagers from forests to which they have traditionally, albeit illegally, had access to collect non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Motivated by our fieldwork, and using a spatial-temporal model, we focus on the paths of forest degradation and regeneration and villagers' utility before and after an access restriction is introduced. Our paper illustrates a number of key points for policy makers. First, the benefits of forest conservation tend to be greatest in the first few periods after an access restriction is introduced, after which the overall forest quality often declines. Second, villagers may displace their NTFP collection into more distant forests that may have been completely protected by distance alone before access to a closer forest was restricted. Third, permitting villagers to collect limited amounts of NTFPs for a fee, or alternatively fining villagers caught collecting illegally from the protected forest, and returning the fee or fine revenue to the villagers, can improve both forest quality and villagers' livelihoods.