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Embedding co-management: Community-based Fisheries Regimes in Lake Victoria, Tanzania

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses fisheries management reforms through involving local level institutions (LLFI). It is based on studies which were undertaken on Tanzania's Lake Victoria fishery where LLFIs were established through the formation of Local enforcement Units, later named Beach Management Units (BMU), between 1998 and 2002. The paper takes the view that the overfishing problems that confront Tanzania's fisheries management authorities are best understood from a social science perspective. The argument is that most communities' values and institutions are embedded in their societies. The same is however, not true for externally originated management tools and systems as is the case with BMUs. This paper shows that the BMUs established between 1998 and 2002, were not sufficiently grounded in their socio-cultural environment and this led them to be unsustainable and ineffective. The paper demonstrates that this mismatch by examining the different historical and social contexts in which livelihoods such as fishing emerged and was carried out. These social contexts generated social values that explain the individual behaviour of community members. It is such values that communities always strive to maintain in any activity including fishing. Thus, when confronted with situations that threaten these values, communities strategize or negotiate ways to cope. The coping strategies of two communities riparian to the lake are discussed. The paper therefore proposes a framework for making these units 'fit' local conditions in order to make them effective and sustainable so as to reform fisheries management.

Key Words: Fisheries Management, Co-management, Institutions, Lake Victoria, Socio-cultural values and Embeddedness.

INTRODUCTION

In their quest to address the problem of overfishing world wide (Pauly et al. 1998), social scientists have argued strongly for the inclusion of fishers in the management process (c.f. Kooiman et al 2005; Wilson et al. 2003). Social scientists view fishers as social beings whose behaviour is embedded within a set of socio-cultural values, norms and knowledge defined by the community in which they belong and where they attain their identities, beliefs and actions (Granovetter 1985; Kurien 2001). These values define their power structures and guide their actions as they relate to natural resources such as fish. Capturing these values by involving the fishers in the management of their own resource leads them to take more responsibility for sustainable fisheries exploitation. Central to the participation of fishers in fisheries management is the issue of institutions[1]. It is through institutions that behaviour is defined and order is achieved.

One strategy of trying to address the issue of social forces in management structures has been the development of co-managerial strategies. That means incorporating the 'civil society' (Jentoft and McCay 2003) in fisheries management. But it is not just a matter of bringing the civil society into the management process per se, but a proper design of such participation is required to enable effective community-based

[1] In this paper, institutions are defined as regularized pattern of behaviour that emerges from underlying structures

fisheries management. The design has, among other things, to deal with issues of legitimacy (Jentoft, 1999) and property rights. Share out of management responsibilities among stakeholders is essential here which requires an understanding of institutions operating within the stakeholder community. These include institutional histories and social context (Jentoft and Mikalsen 2003). This is to say that institutions operate within a particular socio-cultural context. Whether they are created or built on old ones, institutions must correspond with their local environment. The argument is that institutions if they are made to operate within a given social and cultural context, they will work well. Fisheries cooperatives are given as an example of such institutions that have often been unable to adjust to the institutional forms at the community level (Jentoft 1986).

This paper discusses the formulation of a co-management regime in the Lake Victoria fishing (Tanzania) communities. The paper examines the set up of the regime which occurred during the period 1998 – 2002 by forming Beach Management Units (BMU). These BMUs are here referred to as local level fisheries institution (LLFI). The premise is that the principles of co-management are not necessarily new to local communities but have been operative as of the local institutional fabric. However, co-management was set up with very minimal recognition of the institutional forms that exist at the community level and this led to their poor performance that warranted their reformation. The challenge for advocates of co-management therefore is to design it in a way that its structure is sensitive to the local cultures.

The paper begins by a theoretical perspective of understanding communities. This is then followed by a discussion on community values and how these values were studied. A discussion on how these values originated and are used in community activities is then presented, this is then discussed in the light of the established BMUs, we discuss the pitfalls of the BMU regime based on the use of the community values. We finally draw a conclusion and lessons for co-management.

EMBEDDED INSTITUTIONS: SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The notion of embeddedness (Polanyi, 1957 Granovetter, 1992) is used here to understand the local social set-up. Embeddedness has been presented as the contextualization of economic activity in on-going patterns of social relations (Granovetter 1985). This notion seeks to show that economic exchange is embedded in and defined by complex social processes. Thus, from this perspective economic behaviour such as fishing is embedded in wider social relations. In fact Coser and Rosenberg (1957) argued that the maximization of favourable attitudes from others would thus be the counterpart in sociological theory to the maximization of profit in economic theory. When relating to others or the environment, individuals will not act to safeguard their individual interests but to safeguard their social standing, claims and assets, which the individual acquires through his/her membership of a community or group. It is this group or community that defines his or her social standing, claims and assets. The community or group has designed a behaviour pattern and so by living in the community or group the individual acquires the pattern or way of doing things of the community and this is internalized (Durkheim 1974) and becomes an individual's behaviour. So, the way an individual

actually behaves and what others see in his/her behaviour is in essence the community in him/her (Ibid).

More generally Berger and Luckmann (1972: 72)., when discussing the origins of institutions, argue the same with regard to institutions: "Institutions …by the very fact of their existence control human conduct by setting up predefined patterns of conduct, which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that would theoretically be possible."

This argument does not negate or oppose the idea of an individual being responsible for what he/she does, in fact what happens is that as an individual socializes in the community or group to which he/she belongs, the individual becomes conscious of the 'me' in him/her through expressions and appraisals of his/her community or group members (Mead 1934). He/she is motivated to achieve a positive image of him/herself by winning the acceptance and status of the group or community.

People are profoundly sensitive to the expectations of others so all actions are inevitably guided by these expectations (Coser and Rosenberg 1957). It is further argued that this is a constant component of personality (Ibid). For this reason, an individual will internalize behaviour patterns that make his/her group or community appraise him/her favourably. But he/she can also choose to internalize behaviour that causes him/her to be appraised negatively and in this case the community or group will exercise negative sanctions such as blame and punishment. In this case, an individual is considered un-socialized, and or a deviant. For fisheries this means that the individual becomes a fisher from primary groups -in this case the ethnic community. Fishing activities practiced are a reflection of what the community has defined for fishers. The type of fishing gear, seasons, areas and types are a reflection of the community to which an individual belongs. When out fishing he/she is in another group, the 'fisher's group', in this group he/she acquires the characteristics and behaviour that depict the fishers group.

This means that the behaviour of fishers is based on internalized values and norms of their community that guides them on how to respond to various situations. To individual community members who are exposed to a proto-realistic world in which they can afford the luxury of at least a modicum doubt (Berger and Luckmann 1972), the demands of community behaviour are of a higher priority than any other demands on behaviour (for instance fisheries authorities behaviour demands). Therefore fisheries regulations will in essence be complied with in as far as they do not interfere with the "voice" of the community. Compliance to government fisheries laws and regulations is based on how a community perceives them to be legitimate (Gezelius 2004). In addition to this, the community will view participation in a co-management regime as a means of perpetuating the way a community does things rather than introducing new patterns. As a consequence, if the fisheries regulations imposed from the outside are contrary to the way a community do things, the community will try to diffuse it by designing a method of presenting their efficiency in executing the government fisheries regulations to the fisheries authorities in a manner that the latter wants to hear while in reality the opposite is true.

Thus, in order to understand how LLFI's work as management institutions, it is important to understand the traditional and cultural environment in which they

operate. Local communities have different histories on what their existence depends. The manipulation of the natural resources and systems to provide for such needs generated varied meanings and the value communities place on them. Such meanings and values have been reflected in the way communities have interacted with the environment, with each other and with others external to their community. Communities have enacted rules and regulations through which they have interacted with the environment (Bromley, 1991). Bromley argues that these rules present property rights regimes and include rights and rules. These rules and regulations are nested within a larger unit (Hanna and Jentoft, 1996, Kurien, 2001). Individual behaviour, also those of communities, is therefore well understood from a larger unit of reference in which it is embedded (Kurien, 2001).

COMMUNITY VALUES

In order to understand the values of these communities, a study was undertaken in 2003 to 2004. The fishing communities studied were the Wakerewe and Kakseru. The Wakiseru and Wakerewe are Bantu speaking communities. The Wakerewe currently live in the Ukerewe Island[2] on the lake whereas the Wakiseru presently live on the eastern side. Qualitative methods were used to study these communities. The specific study tools used included: Observation, In-depth interview, Historical analysis, Kinesics, Focus group discussion, Semi-structured interviews, Venn diagrams, Wealth ranking. Data was generated in two phases. The first phase involved gathering as much information as possible on the social set up of the selected communities, patterns of behaviour and the meanings of such behaviour. During this phase, information was generated in understanding traditional institutions and how they operate within the cultural milieux of these communities. The second phase involved generating information on the current LLFI's. This involved interviews with the members of the communities, leaders of the LLFI's as well as other members of the communities, especially opinion leaders.

The history of these communities reveals that there was a value placed on land and cultural and social relations. The value of land led the members of these communities to migrate from several places to where they are presently settled. Land was very important because it was mainly used for agriculture to produce food and for settlement. Cattle were yet another capital which became valuable especially for the Wakiseru during their migration. One possible reason could be that as they migrated they met the Nilots who were pastoralists and in order to create harmony with them, cattle played an important role as giveaway resource in exchange for ending hostility and violence. Cattle were also used for marriage between them and the Nilots. Just like land, cattle were very valuable because it guaranteed that there was food from its meat, milk for children, and blood for the youth and skin for clothing for the adults.

On cultural and social[3] values, community members adopted distinctive experiences while they migrated and mingled with people from other communities and these experiences gave them a unique status or reputation. Such experiences created

[2] This is the biggest Island on the lake. It is actually administratively a district.
[3] In this paper social values referred to have the same meaning as social capital coined by Lin (2001) and Putman (1993, 2000) and cultural values as cultural capital as used by Bourdieu (1993 and 1984).

values which have been deeply rooted in the community or clan institutions. Their life's perspective tended to be channelled into a limited number of alternative patterns.

Each alternative was embedded in local institutions which channel behaviour into predictable alternatives. Some consistence of the value choices can thus be detected by observing institutionalized practices. For instance each of these communities is a location of several social institutions and hierarchies. Each institutional setting of importance has a tendency to create a cultural totality with distinctive aims and values and each cultural and social sphere has its own capital[4] (Seppällä 1998). Such values would for instance include holiness for a religious hierarchy which is acquired through a command of memory and interpretation of verses from the Bible or Koran and an appropriate behaviour. The social capitals are those that are vested in social relations and enable people to correlate. Such capitals include trust and respect which are expected to be reciprocal in social relations. It is this level of values that have created a socio-cultural environment through which community members live and all institutions (economic and natural) rooted. In this paper we concentrate on this level of values.

The two communities therefore present themselves as relatively stable locations where continuous interaction moulds members in similar direction. Thus members of the community are not directly seen or categorized as a homogeneous mass but this is the impression one gets with individual members exhibiting shared norms, values and behaviour. Within the Wakerewe and the Wakiseru, what comes out is a complex value system based on a mixture of their past diffused with values brought by colonialists. This value complex is further influenced by the values of the present brought by the state and the global community within the realm of sustainable development.

In the following we locate seven of these values from the past namely co-operation, respect, wisdom, traditional authority, order, continuity of lineage/kinship and trust. The values brought by the colonialists state and global community include education, competition and religion. The coming of the colonialists gave a new meaning to the past values and is slowly changing the values placed in them. These values are briefly discussed below.

Co-operation

Holding of this value implied agreeing to work together with the others. This was evident in marriages, families, and agricultural practices and in fishing. It was considered a moral value where everybody was expected to exercise without being forced into. In fact it was desirable because as these communities and clans migrated and settled in a place, they realized that holding on to one another was necessary especially during deaths, wars and farming. These are also some of the ways in which co-operation has been maintained to date. This value was also seen to provide direct benefits to community members for instance in agriculture; - the weeding and harvesting together ensured that each family in the clan got food when it was ready. Co-operation during the fishing trip ensure that members of the group came home alive and happy. During arrival from fishing trip, the welcome offered to

[4] Capital as used here refers to resources used to advance in social interaction.

those who went fishing was an indication of a joyous community or clan to receive back their sons.

Traditional authority
This was universally recognized as a value base. It was exercised by elders who possessed knowledge of history on the community, wisdom (busara), age, elders coming from the chiefs clan, family heads (mostly considered to be men), the chief and clan leaders. Historically, influence by individuals with this value was limited by the scope of belonging to the community. It demanded respect and the holders were expected to exhibit behaviour of a role model in the community where the young members of the community could learn how to exercise all other values.

It was a desirable value to hold. It was also a required value to enable one to be appointed, selected or elected to position of leadership. This value has been maintained through behaviour where young people consult those possessing this value on a variety of issues such as marriage (including counselling), land, family relations, and community conflict resolution mechanism and even by those aspiring to be politicians consulting to receive approval.

A new meaning has been given to this value, for instance in Ukerewe where the District Commissioner is considered to hold this value, community members can listen to him. Any member of the community who exercises calmness, self respect and a champion of community interests is also seen to hold it. Elders are still highly seen to hold it regardless of whether they exercise the above-mentioned factors. Within the Wakiseru, generosity, which was an important factor for being recognized as leader in their clan, plays an important factor for one to be considered to hold this value. A generous person is considered to be one who is able to feed, give free help to people and is hospitable.

Respect
This was a state of being regarded with high honour or esteem. In the traditional set up, to posses this value one had to be able to relate to others in a way that did not create anger, animosity, hatred and disunity in the society. It is a value that had no boundary of age, group, sex or clan in possessing it.

There was however a difference among various clans. Within the Wakerewe, individuals who came from the chief's clan enjoyed a higher level of respect than individuals from other clans. For instance an individual from the former clan was received with full attention if he visited any family within the clan. Activities that were being undertaken on that day in the family would temporarily come to a standstill as they pay attention to the visitor. He could be offered a chair to sit and fed extremely well, entertained and seen off honourably. But an individual from a clan other than the chief's would be welcomed when he visits, offered a chair to sit. Other activities would continue as usual, he would be fed if he found those he visited eating. But to both communities, all members of the family had a right to be respected regardless of one's possession of other values. This was a value that to a great extent controlled people's behaviour, it was highly cherished and nobody wished to be termed disrespectful. It was a value that if one lacked, then he/she would be negatively sanctioned through blame, punishment and at times end up in a perpetual curse. Behaviour expected to show respect was exercised differently to different

categories of groups, for instance behaviour to elders, youth and strangers was clearly distinct. One could joke, play or argue with peers but not elders.

Wisdom
Considered as calmness, clear mindedness, being able to give good advice and exercising self-restraint. This is slightly different from other types of values because it does not form its own type of hierarchies. In the traditional society it was a privilege for the elders and the aged family heads regardless of their possession of other values. But slowly it degenerated to only being a privilege for a certain group of people such as the wealthy or men only.

The wealthy were a source of help to many people and the fact that they could understand their needs and offer the needed help showed that they possessed it. It could be shown to all people, even the poor who were carefully listened to when they expressed their opinion. In other words, wisdom was and is still being considered as having knowledge of the past and being able to use it to confront the present challenges and make good judgments and decisions. Today knowledge is not only considered a preserve of the old but also to those who go to school who are able to use the school knowledge to confront today's problems. Nevertheless, a difference still exists between the school knowledge and the old knowledge. The former is considered not to be deeply rooted in the latter but only to an external authority. Those who possess school knowledge and are able to integrate it with the latter have been considered to be wiser.

Order
This is a value which is twofold. Order exists both at the individual and community or clan level. At the individual level, it was considered as the ability to avoid violence and cherish peace, and harmony and being able to reach agreement with others. At the community level, it was considered as a state in which community regularized pattern of behaviour that was a moral obligation for all members. In fact it was the value in which all other values were directed to, it was like the ultimate goal of the community or clan.

Being able to keep a promise as in marriage, exhibiting behaviour as is required of one and carrying out activities as has been the practice of the community or clan were all considered as being in possession of this value. But with time, interests have not remained static, there have been different interest groups emerging due to in and out migration to these communities in the wake of globalization and nationalization. Thus this value is now perceived to be the ability to hold to your group interest and remain united with other groups holding different interests.

Continuity of lineage/kinship
This was and still remains a very important but silent value. It simply meant ability to reproduce. Women were disadvantaged because they were easily exposed in case one did not have this ability because it was easy to note they were not able to conceive and give birth. Men on the other hand although they suffered from this inability, they were always covered by having another man with this ability to father children with his wife in his name, this was made very secret.

This value is still held with high esteem and it is seen during funerals when an old man or woman dies all his/her offspring would be counted and publicly announced with pride during the funeral. This is taken as a consolation that although he/she is gone, he/she has left a 'big' community to carry his name forward. In addition to this there is also extreme joy when a woman gives birth; this has escalated to even births outside wedlock involving schoolgirls which was considered as a disgrace during those days. Although in principle birth outside wedlock is not encouraged, when it occurs it is never condemned but received very positively. Some young men who are intending to marry would prefer to marry a girl he knows will bear children and the only way they confirm this is whether the girl has a baby or not.

Education

This is a new value brought by the colonialists. In the traditional society, it was considered in terms of knowledge acquired through having lived for a long time and gone through different experiences. Such experiences included clan or community migrations, conflicts with other communities, negotiations during marriage periods and identification and decision making on best areas to feed animals, fish and hunt. But now it is acquired through going to school and receiving a certificate which is believed to show that you possess it.

In Ukerewe, this value was not a major influence except when the holder uses it in the village context. In fact many of those who posses this value and come from the island are not residing here, some have moved out completely and others only come for short visits. The group which is visible are the teachers in several schools, both primary, secondary and one teacher training college, some of these teachers are actually from outside the district and they have been posted here by the government. They do not have any significant leadership in the community.

There are also other government officers working at the Village level such as the Village Executive Officers and Ward Executive Officers. Their responsibilities are vital but salaries are so meagre that they face the same livelihood conditions as the rest in the community. At the District level however, there are more educated people some with university degrees and others with college certificates.

This is also true within the Wakiseru but the difference here is that, possessing this value yields some extra status; elders who are opinion leaders in the community lend a listening ear when a holder of this value speaks. However, when such a person uses this value in a way not to support local prevailing ideas, then the locals isolate him and gossip is used as a social control mechanism to alienate him. Gossip is silently prominent in these communities such that it can be considered as an important value to marshal support for activities.

Trust

This was a value assumed to be possessed by all members of the community. It was considered to be the ability to have complete confidence in and believe in the honesty and reliability of other community members. This value was assumed to be cultivated through interactions within the community. It was so crucial that one could consider it as the basic value that held the community together. It is this value that has kept the Wakerewe unique and cohesive to date. The idea of keeping secrets

and factors considered in being elected to BMU membership by the local community are good examples of holding this value.

Within the Wakiseru, this value was compromised for other values such as land when they decided to give their daughters for marriage. They could never keep their secrets such as war weapons, traditional charms to overpower opponents among others to themselves. This was because their daughters would reveal them to their husbands where they got married. Within the community this has further been compromised by school education which advocates academic objectivity, openness and honesty. In Ukerewe those with education have found it very difficult to compromise their new way of life and have responded by keeping away from the community and only paying short visits.

Competition
This can be considered as a completely new value introduced by the colonialists and global community. In fact it can be traced as far back as the time of the Arab traders who used ivory to win the support of the chiefs. It is a value in which the holder expresses by acting in a way to outdo another, or take advantage of the inability of the other person to get something more than him.

It is evident in the society by people building better houses than others, having more certificates than others, and having a control of more people and more land. It has created divisions of people in the community. This value is considered as an impediment to social cohesion but is it highly cherished. It is a value which is considered as useful in an economic sense but it is disembedding the society.

Religion
Religion is not very recent to these communities although in their history the concept existed totally in a different form, for instance Kalungu who was a fishing god was only useful during fishing time. Going to him happened only during times of need and not a regularized weekly or daily practice. The coming of colonialists gave a new meaning to this value, holiness which is interpreted as being able to memorize verses in the Bible or Koran and an accompanying appropriate behaviour was an evidence of possessing this value.

There are two religions within these communities, Islam and Christianity. Christianity is the dominating religion whereas Islam comprises of a small minority. The Christian churches have relaxed their rules to accommodate even those considered to be Biblically not appropriate to qualify as full members. For instance the churches except preach against polygamy but accept polygamists to attend their services. In both communities this value can be easily used to acquire other values such as political authority.

Based on these factors, when individuals met for discussion or activity, one ensured that these values were upheld. This was so crucial when talking or doing anything. To these communities, it is not only the activity being talked about that was perceived to be important but to ensure that these values were not diluted and that the activity being undertaken was not given opportunity to erode these values. This

required that all behaviour towards each other should reflect possession of these values.

Social relations were considered to be important above all other things. This is why the youth had to carry an elders' luggage when the latter came across the former, the decision of the Chief Mkuru had to be complied with at all times in the community. Possession of natural value such as land and being able to control a big labour force was of no consequence if one did not uphold the community values. Each one therefore strived to show behaviour that ensured he/she maintained his/her social standing in the community. Fishing, hunting and agriculture were all penetrated and customized by social relations, which dictated any outcomes from them.

THE MAKING OF INSTITUTIONS

The values discussed above created a perception on what these communities considered to be morally right and on this basis rules were formulated reflecting their subjectivity (cognitive) on the rules. Thus the morals of these communities were founded on their social relations. To these communities harmony, unity and peace were the primary goals for social relations and constituted what was moral. Thus when rules were formulated, they considered whether such rules would promote harmony, peace and unity, or in other words social cohesion.

Elders, who were in most cases the rule makers, would observe during various occasions what activities and behaviour promoted social cohesion and when they identified one, they would approve of it and promote it in all possible ways to be regularized as the way of doing things. In this way institutions were created. In fishing, the gears used were not necessarily designed with the purpose of dependence on fish as the only way to live, but what could be seen from the use of such gears was that the community could get food, fish together and maintain the morals (harmony, peace and unity).

The rules which were enacted such as avoiding sex by both partners during the fishing period, sharing responsibilities while out fishing were all a reflection on upholding the community's values other focusing on the fish. One may argue that this was so because getting fish was not a problem and fish trade had not become so important.

However this cannot be true when for instance the Wakerewe took two full moons to be out fishing. Moreover interpersonal relations and networks have been found to be more important in trade than just prices and costs (Westerdahl 2001). Thus all institutions had a history and a reason for it. In most cases the history was linked to an occasion or event that the community went through. During this period, there was only one way of perceiving things, the elders' way.

Institutions were created based on a socio-cultural environment in which the society sought to be socially cohesive. But to maintain this cohesiveness, the various cultural practices which gave birth to these institutions had to proceed, these were the marriages, the family, the festivities such burial practices and harvest among others.

However, when outsiders such as the Arabs and colonialists came, a different environment was created. Local communities were compelled by the fear of the gun to succumb to the whims of the colonialists and as a consequence lost their freedom to practice their life the way they had created it. This loss of freedom was fought vigorously. This fight extended to these communities and had great impact on them.

To these communities, freedom meant that they could not continue enjoying the harmony, peace and unity that they had already created and so they had to fight to regain it. This fight enabled the late Mwalimu Julias Nyerere[5] to rally all ethnic communities in Tanganyika to fight. This rallying also implied dismantling the individual community strength and forming a bigger unit comprising all. But they also realized that in order to fight the white colonialists, they had to acquire literacy (reading and writing). Initially the colonialists had used literacy as a way to win the support of the locals, but now it was a useful tool in the fight for freedom. Through this, education was introduced and the value of knowledge to account for wisdom given a new meaning.

The fight for independence gave a new meaning to the values discussed above. Their new meanings did not differ so much from their original meaning except that if put on a scale, they were applied to a larger group beyond the clan or community level. The different communities in Tanganyika became a community where these values were exercised. But given that they were being used to fight for independence, the gaining of the independence in 1961 did not allow for the independence of the ethnic communities but for the whole country and so the communities remained under one big community.

Nyerere tried to suppress the local communities by trying to copy what was a practice in these communities especially on authority structure. He created villages under the Ujamaa socialism system. The head of the village was to assume the role of the chief (Mkuru), and he was to govern by a council of elders elected by the village members. Thus the culture which was already prevailing on the authority of the elders did not die but given a new meaning.

The transfer was made easy because a social cultural environment was already created based on these values. These communities still sought harmony, unity and peace not only among themselves but also with all others in the whole country. And because they coincidentally found that they shared these values it became much easier to adjust to one another. But there were factors affecting the values as institutions were being transferred, these were globalization and nationalization processes.

The industrialization and the accompanying technology, the fast changing information technology, and bureaucracy all brought in a new society which is the bureaucratic society. This society had to be introduced in the traditional society. As the two societies co-existed, a completely new society has emerged. A society which is here referred to as Tradi-rocratic society. This word is coined from traditional (Tradi) and Bureaucratic (-rocratic) making Tradi-rocratic. The meaning of

[5] He was the first president of Tanzania

it is that this is a society in which the local people have accepted bureaucratic authority brought by the globalization. But at the same time traditional society has not been done a way with. It is within this Tradi-rocratic society that the two communities studied were found to be living. But local individuals still hold on to what their community demands from them.

Existence of Tradiro-cratic society is crucial for the survival of the local communities. Local people have been relegated to either being crew members in fishing camps owned by people who have connections with the Fish Processing Plants or by those who are able to invest heavily in the industry. Because these locals cannot invest to this level, they have to find a means of surviving and one such way is to become crewmembers. This implies that they have lost control of the fisheries resource as it used to be. Therefore their clinging to the Traditional society guarantees that they can continue to trust and co-operate with their fellow community members to gain access to the fish although through illegal means.

To them they believe that they have free access to the fish but they are being driven out by the technological changes which they cannot cope up with both in the catching and marketing sectors. They also accept that the traditional fishing organization in which they confined themselves to either traditional gears or beaches or fishing periods as no longer valid. They however, do not have any alternative through which they can improve their traditional practice except to cling to the traditional values. Their traditional leaders remain very useful and important but they have been ignored when the Fisheries Division introduces new institutions. This has left them to negotiate silently with these new institutions.

THE PITFALLS OF BEACH MANAGEMENT UNIT

In 1998, the FD organized one-day meetings with local fishers living in selected beaches in the Mwanza Gulf of Lake Victoria. These meetings sought to involve local fishers in fisheries management. Several Local Enforcement Units (LEUs) were formed in the gulf as a result of these meetings. The LEU format reflected the FD perception of what and how co-management should operate in Tanzania.

The successful establishment of these LEU's in the Mwanza gulf encouraged the FD to establish them in the whole Tanzanian part of the lake. The LEUs were later renamed Beach Management Units (BMU). In 2000 the FD formed 57 of these units in Ukerewe island and 32 in Tarime districts among other districts. The BMU regime was formulated and implemented under such an unclear understanding of the operations of the Tradi-rocratic society.

The formulators assumed that having been working with these communities as a government gave them an automatic knowledge on how to implement a co-management regime with the variations it has acquired. The concept of legitimacy and compliance was understood from the angle of enacting laws in parliament and enforcing them. This was a complete contrast to what legitimacy and compliance was in the traditional society. In this traditional society, anything approved by elders and regularized, as 'our way of doing things' was considered legitimate.

Although parliament could be considered as the ultimate 'elders', its members are seen to be town dwellers who are detached from the reality of community conditions or have taken a different position once they have been elected. It is therefore here that the mismatch originates and the BMU regime ended up being an external model brought without much considerations of the local institutional fabric. That is to say, the BMUs were brought in on an understanding of a bureaucratic society principles developed and defined by a western culture of democracy, empowerment, legitimacy and equality. These principles have different meanings, understanding and value in a different culture like the Wakerewe and Wakiseru.

The BMU regime as established exhibited the following drawbacks:

The BMU are established with an emphasis on economic capital
In its interpretation, the Tanzania Fisheries Policy seeks to maximize income from the sale of fish, maximize foreign currency earning, maximize employment and maximize food supply. These to a great extent are emphasising economic capital. The major reason for this emphasis is the Nile perch fisheries which have earned the country a substantial amount of money (URT 1999, Kulindwa 2001) and so the FD wishes to sustain this income. This therefore means that the policy must address those issues which will not jeopardize it. When increases in the use of illegal fishing gears were noted, community participation was thought to be a good way to address this. These illegal gears were a threat to the incomes which were being generated. Thus by introducing the BMUs the whole idea was simply to improve conditions necessary for the earnings from the fishery. This has left out the community institutional fabric.

Conflict resolution mechanisms followed the court system which has a number of weaknesses as opposed to local resolution of conflict which could be more effective
The fisheries of the lake face a number of conflicts (Medard and Okeyo-Owuor 2002), among them are conflicts between gillnet owners and long liners in the lake. Normally the gillnet fishers allows their nets to drift (Tembea) and while drifting, they collect long- lines along their way, this causes a lot of problems between them. Those who can afford the Tembea fishery are the ones who have connections to the FPP. When such conflicts are taken to the courts they take a long time and in addition Tembea fishers manoeuvre their ways to win the case and even come out unrepentant.

Whereas this paper does not question the functions of the court system, it is however appropriate to point out that it is faced with a lot of challenges in its efforts to administer justice and it is a place that some people go to for winning rather than to reconcile. A reform is needed for this system. But an inherent problem which will have to be dealt with is that so long as there are multiple sources of authorities in the BMU regime where the BMUs, Village Government, District Government and the Fisheries Division are involved, conflict will always arise. It is therefore necessary to think of other means that can compliment the court system. One possible way could be the traditional authority which has been quicker in conflict resolution (Viswanathan 2003).

The structure of the BMU fails to assign specific duties to individual BMU members.
Each BMU was formed with a membership of twenty members. This was further subdivided into an executive committee (5 members) and other members who could be called when there is some work or visitors to attend to. Among the other members themselves, there was no specific responsibility assigned to each one and so no one could be held individually responsible when things were observed to be going wrong.

BMUs are an extension of the FD
The FD still has the authority to make all decisions and the BMUs are there to enforce the decisions made by the FD. This therefore makes them an extension of the FD. In fact a demand for payment has been made by members of these units for them to work effectively. The FD also started these groups on a wrong foot by issuing them with items that in principle were part of what they used to see Fisheries staff at the beaches use when they are on patrol. It therefore appeared from the start that they were going to be such an extension.

BMUs hijacked by Fish Processing Plants once given the mandate by law
When BMUs were formed in 2000, there was no clear Act that recognized them as being part of the Monitoring and Control and Surveillance (MCS) system of the FD. The latter therefore started preparing such an Act, and it was likely to be taken to Parliament in late 2003. Such an Act would empower BMUs to undertake the MCS with the full authority of the law. Once the process of the law is complete, it has been even said that the BMUs will assume the responsibility of inspecting vehicles collecting fish from the beaches to the Plants to ensure that some level of quality is achieved.

These vehicles are owned by FPP's and have been loaned to Agents, some of whom have fishing camps. While efforts to legalise BMUs is going on, the catching sector is slowly drifting into the hands of the Fish Processing Sector through advancing loans in form or gears, boats and engines. But the operators of the vehicles are actually the owners of the fishing camps employing local fishermen. Given their influence over the local fishermen, they will change the BMUs by either becoming members or sponsoring their candidates for elections to become members and thereby take control of the BMUs. Through this way the FPP that are in the hands of foreigners (Abila and Jansen 1997) will eventually be controlling this sector.

Potential of BMUs curtailing access rights to the resource by the local fisheries
Since late 1990s a new privatization process was introduced in Tanzania where even beaches were tendered to those who are able to collect taxes for the Local Authorities (local district governments). What happens in this process is that local government authorities have authority to design ways and means through which they can generate incomes from their local district resources for their operations.

This authority has led to the identification of several sources among them is fisheries. Incomes include taxes levied on traders who use local markets to sell their goods, fishers who use beaches to land their fish. In this system, beaches have been very lucrative because they have attracted so many business people. In most

beaches, there are several businesses going on. The Local Authorities therefore thought that these beaches could give them good money and so they started to privatize them.

Individuals and even BMUs were free to tender for them. Each beach has a price tag per month. When one wins the tender, what the local authority requires is that one pays the Local Authority the monthly price. How one gets this amount is by one's own design. This has seen those who have won such tenders charge literally everyone who does anything at the beach. A few local fishers who have gears and use loaned boats have been charged the same as the big fishing camps. But as these fishing camps are also growing bigger and bigger there is a potential that they will soon declare beaches their territories where if one wants to use then one has to belong to the camp or pay dearly. In this way local fishers loose access rights. In addition to this, if BMUs get into the hands of the fishing camp owners and they implement the regulations as required, then access rights will be greatly curtailed.

At BMU formation, inadequate time was spent in socially preparing the local committees

One of the greatest outcries on the BMUs by those who were concerned about their effectiveness was the short time spent on their formation. As pointed out in chapter five, a one-day meeting with local communities was thought to be enough according to the FD. There were no proper preparations as to what implementing this regime should comprise besides just going straight in forming them at the beaches. The idea of pre-implementation, implementation and post implementation process proposed by Pomeroy and Harkes (2000) never found any consideration. This therefore led to incorporating people who were less socially ready for such a task. The result of it has been poor performance.

The push of this regime is one sided

The FD first thought up the whole idea of the BMU system. They sat and planned for what should be done in order to have it established. They sought for funds and mobilized themselves to talk to the fishers. Once it was established, FD personnel have been leading the process. One notable thing has been the fact that this move is one sided. The fishers themselves have not come up to make their input felt, they have fallen to the move already created by the FD.

They wait until the FD instructs them on what to do. In fact during this study it was reported that one of the BMUs visited in Ukerewe had just been called to participate in an MCS organized by the FD in the Island. The one sided push on this regime creates a question on their support by the other side and therefore their sustainability. Could it be that the fishers are not in support of them despite having agreed to form the BMU? Could it be that these units did not address the fishers' expectations and therefore fishers' developed less interest in them? These are some few questions among many others that should be of concern.

Unclear structure and unequal distribution of incentives

When these units were formed, there was unclear definition of incentives to the members. Later on they were asked to come up with byelaws, which could help them in introducing fines on certain petty offences such as taking a bath in the lake. Incomes generated from fines initially seemed welcome but in actuality it became

very difficult to implement such regulations let alone people caught being able to pay the fines. Thus generating incomes through fines presented a great challenge. In response to this challenge, the FD started campaigning for these units to get tenders to collect taxes at the beaches, the campaign still continues. While the campaign continues, the incentive structure still remains unclear.

BMUs are socio-culturally insensitive

As already argued, the institutions which were created for fisheries had a social relations bearing, but the BMUs are directed more towards economic and natural resources. Based on this bearing, the local communities whose life is based on social relations had to negotiate their way on how to make these BMUs address their morals.

This is why they accept their formation but they choose members to these units who will promote community cultural values. This points to the fact that socio-cultural sensitive institutions have a high performance probability and can lead to successful natural resources management. This is where the fisheries management reform should zero in. The reasons for this are numerous, such institutions are useful in: facilitating flow of information among the communities; exert influence on those who make critical decisions in the fisheries; certifying an individual's social credentials by creating social networks and relations to enable community members to access the fish; and finally, they are able to reinforce identity and recognition. That is to say that they have not been able to recognize one's worthiness as an individual and a member of these communities sharing of resources, which is crucial in providing emotional support and public acknowledgement to claim the resources (Lin 2001).

A miscalculated entry point to the communities.

At formation, the FD planned for the establishment of these BMUs and then asked the District Fisheries Officers of Local District Governments to identify people who could be called for a meeting to discuss issues already prepared by the FD. In other words the FD entry point was through the District Councils (here referred to as organization entry point). Other options such as village elders, opinion leaders, churches and Non-governmental Organizations could have been explored. This organization entry point only sent a message of government authority to the local communities.

While they filtered how this would affect their lives, disapproval was already in the offing when they demanded working equipment, a physical office to operate from and an incentive package. However one other option could have been to enter through community activities or festivities (here referred to as local Institution entry point). Here they could have used fishers to identify problems of the fisheries and ask them to suggest on solutions. Such an entry point has been useful and very successful in Babati Forest management in Tanzania (Alden-Wily 2001)

With these drawbacks, the only outcome for the BMUs is poor performance. In fact an evaluation of these units three to four years later found out that less than half were actually performing as expected (Onyango, Medard and Mahatane, 2002; Abila, Odongkara and Onyango-in press). In a similar manner some studies using the argument have also raised similar concerns. Westerdahl (2001) in his study on

Jämtland and twenty European co-operatives discovered that small organizations with local roots were becoming more prominent at a time when values such as size, capital returns and global presence were dominant.

The pitfalls do not imply that models or regimes which are implemented with consideration of socio-cultural conditions will not experience any challenges. The challenges will be there but at a different scale and type. Nevertheless studies elsewhere reveal that in most cases such models or regimes are successful. A few successful examples include Japanese human resources development. Robinson (2003) documents that American firms have been forced to adapt themselves to the Japanese recruitment process which is so firmly embedded in Japanese social structure and norms. Powerful American firms have had no success in bringing about change to this job market and they are only forced to conform. Those that have conformed have had good success.

Westerdahl (2001) quoting Ylva Hasselberg Swedish article Den Sociala ekonomin of 1998 where the latter writes about the Swedish Ironworks notes that ironworks survived the 19th century threats to the iron manufacturers of international competition and insufficient cost controls. This survival was because the owner of the Furudal used social capital especially his extensive network of contacts he had developed over time to increase value to the products. Therefore, BMUs would probably have experienced success if they had adopted the socio-cultural conditions of the local communities.

DISCUSSION: LESSONS FOR CO-MANAGEMENT

To make BMUs fit local socio-cultural environment, there is a need to work towards a combination of embeddedness and autonomy of social ties both at the fishing community and government levels. At the fishing community level, embeddedness translates into integration implying bonds that are upheld within a certain community. Autonomy translates into linkage; that is up keeping of bonds with non-community members. At the government level, embeddedness translates into synergy meaning official representatives are connected to other actors in society such as FPP (State – Civil society linkage).

State-civil society relations need to be clear and dynamic for BMUs to make any economic impact. Autonomy translates into integrity meaning that government representatives and civil servants are governed by a professional ethos committing them to negotiate and pursue collective goals as opposed to narrow group interests.

For the design of co-management this implies:

- The concept co-management focuses on building relationships among stakeholders. Sharing responsibilities which is key issue in co-management is more inclined to building social relations. It is therefore important that co-managers understand this perception and build a regime that promotes it.
- A co-management regime requires a pro-target group perspective. Co-management regimes normally target fishers who are faced with difficult challenges ranging from poverty to livelihood related issues such as social services and welfare. Such challenges require socially oriented policies. It is

therefore important that co-management regimes be established on pro-target group concerns. In addition to this, co-management must encompass empowerment and improve the voice of the target group. If the voice of the group is not heard then they will unlikely not comply with what is decided.

- Co-management requires a socio-cultural fit. For co-management to be successful, it needs to be part of the fabric of community and way of doing things in the lives of individual community members. Towards this end, fisheries authorities should direct their efforts to understanding socio-cultural aspects of communities such as Tradiro-cratic society and how co-management can fit in it.
- Co-management should bridge the gap between traditional and bureaucratic systems. The dilemma that faces co-management is that it has to be implemented in such a way that it empowers the local fishers and not the power elites who already have a domineering character in the fisheries. But at the same time, these power elites must not be left out otherwise they will fight co-management and not allow it to operate.
- Co-management should not be perceived as an entirely new regime. The problem with co-management has been on implementation. The way it has been implemented has made it look like a new regime which is being introduced to these communities and therefore needing new techniques. This perception is erroneous and may only lead to unsuccessful implementation. Co-management existed in these communities although not with the same name.

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