


THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CHANGE IN TANZANIA

Contestations over Identity, the Constitution and Resources



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ISBN 9976 60 325 8

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SECTION TWO

Chapter 5

Democratic “Reversals” in Tanzania: Revisiting Electoral Competition

Alexander B. Makulilo

1. Introduction

The Huntington wave thesis of democracy regards an expression of a process of democratising authoritarian regimes as a moment of advancement and retardation. Huntington notes at least three major waves in the modern world:

The first ‘long’ wave of democratization began in the 1820s, with the widening of the suffrage to a large proportion of the male population in the United States, and continued for almost a century until 1926, bringing into being some 29 democracies. In 1922, however, the coming to power of Mussolini in Italy marked the beginning of a first ‘reverse wave’ that by 1942 had reduced the number of democratic states in the world to 12. The triumph of the Allies in World War II initiated a second wave of democratization that reached its zenith in 1962 with 36 countries governed democratically, only to be followed by a second reverse wave (1960-1975) that brought the number of democracies back down to 30. Between 1974 and 1990, at least 30 countries made transitions to democracy, just about doubling the number of democratic governments in the world (Huntington, 1991:12).

It is important to note that the “wave thesis” is essentially based on electoral competition. While electoral competition is not a substitute for democracy, it is an indicator of democracy today. As such, the third wave (1974–1990) predicated the end of authoritarianism through the ballot box, but that has not happened yet. Brownlee (2007:16) contends that by 2001 five dozen authoritarian regimes had blended liberalism with repression and signified the durability of authoritarianism during a period when such regimes crooked global democracy.

In their *Democratic Experiments in Africa* Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:203) noted that the ouster of incumbents was more likely when elections were conducted honestly. The study established that the use of free and fair elections as a predictor variable had a very strong association with the defeat of sitting rulers. This correlation was also found in the electoral defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)¹ in Mexico in 2000. Greene (2007:29) maintains that this defeat has been attributed to the fair electoral market for votes. To him, this was possible through the introduction of market economy and strong oversight

¹ This party maintained power longer than any non-communist party in modern history has done. The PRI and its predecessors won every presidential election from 1929 to 2000; held the majority in Congress until 1997; won every governorship until 1989; and controlled the vast majority of municipalities.

institutions. These two variables created a level playing field. However, this fact is not uniform across the board as Makulilo (2009:125) argues that Tanzania was one of the countries which introduced a market economy in the 1980s through the IMF/World Bank-sponsored Structural Adjustment policies, and yet the ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), has continued to enjoy landslide victories (Greene, 2007).² On the other hand, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* revealed a very strong relationship between fraudulent elections and incumbent victories (Bratton, 1998).³ Of the fifteen incumbents who retained office between 1989 and 1994, twelve did so in elections that fell short of internationally accepted standards. The study observed that the incumbents had calculated correctly the interests of the international community which had been inclined more towards political stability than democracy and that they knew the international community would turn a blind eye to flawed elections (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997:204).

In their “competitive authoritarianism”, a concept which has become dominant in the contemporary democratic discourse in the third world, particularly in Africa, Levitsky and Way (2010) maintain that this kind of authoritarianism proliferated after the Cold War ended. They suggest that after the war ended the world witnessed the influence of the West on the democratisation of authoritarian regimes. However, they hold that some of the regimes could not democratise, and thus they became “competitive authoritarian regimes” which exhibited a hybrid of both democracy and authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way (2010:7) posit that a competitive authoritarian regime is distinguished from democracy in that “incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of [the] three defining attributes of democracy: (i) free elections, (ii) broad protection of civil liberties, and (iii) a reasonably level playing field.” Notwithstanding the foregoing, elections may still generate considerable uncertainty and autocratic incumbents must therefore take them seriously (Levitsky & Way, 2002:55). It appears that while elections are often “free” in a competitive authoritarian regime they are always “unfair”. Levitsky and Way propose three trajectories useful in understanding competitive authoritarianism, namely democratization, unstable authoritarianism and stable authoritarianism. Tanzania is classified as “a stable authoritarian regime”, in which the incumbent autocratic government has remained in power through electoral manipulation and violation of civil liberties. As can be noted, the centrality of this description is based on the assessment of elections along the “free and fair” scale.

2. Free and fair elections reconsidered

A competitive authoritarian regime often holds “free” elections that are always “unfair” (Levitsky & Way, 2010). This is the essence of the “non-level playing field”. Yet, the literature on democracy considers elections to be “free” if there is universal suffrage and if “citizens” are not prevented from participating in an election. Levitsky and Way (2010:7) posit that elections are free in the sense that there is virtually no fraud or intimidation of voters. Elections are therefore considered to be free if voters participate in them (Goodwill, 2006:73). If a free election is one that “assures” that those with the required qualifications participate in it as voters, it is imperative that this restrictive definition of a free election should be extended from “legality” to “systemic values” that prevent eligible voters not only from registering for the purpose of voting in a particular election but also from making

² See the National Election Commission reports for the 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010 elections in which CCM won 61.8%, 71.7%, 80.28% and 61% of the popular votes.

³ The late founding elections in Africa were characterised by boycotts of the opposition (11 elections out of 15 were boycotted). Concomitantly, election observers couldn't state that such elections fully met international standards.

a choice as rational voters. In their seminal work, *Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba (1963) provide a category of participants as “citizens” when they are both input and output of a political system, that is, when they are able to participate influentially in a political system. In that case, citizens know their rights and obligations. “Subjects”, on the other hand, are considered in *Civic Culture* as passive beings who are only receivers of orders. They are obedient and therefore are unable to actively participate in the political system. From *Civic Culture*’s perspective, democracy is compatible with “citizens” because the people are active participants in their respective political system. Mattes and Shenga note that:

Extremely low rates of formal education, high levels of illiteracy and limited access to news media strike at the very core of the cognitive skills and political information that enable citizens to assess social, economic and political developments, learn the rules of how societies and governments function, form opinions about political performance, and care about the survival of democracy (Mattes & Shenga, 2007:2).

It is along this line of thinking that Dahl (1992:45) argues that “[i]f democracy is to work, it would seem to require a certain level of political competence on the part of its citizens. In newly democratic or democratizing countries, where peoples are just beginning to learn the arts of self-government, the question of citizen competence possesses an obvious urgency.”

Recognising the problem of citizens’ participation in political systems, the African Charter on Democracy, Election and Governance (ACDEG) puts citizens at the core of democratic and development processes and in the governance of public affairs. Almost all the provisions of the charter have voice as its ultimate goal. Thus, the tenth objective of the ACDEG is to “[p]romote the establishment of the necessary conditions to foster citizen participation, transparency, access to information, freedom of the press and accountability in the management of public affairs.” It is on this basis that Article 4 of the ACDEG provides that “[s]tate parties shall commit themselves to promote democracy, the principle of the rule of law and human rights. State parties shall recognize popular participation through universal suffrage as the inalienable right of the people”. While in a few African countries the legal restriction is imposed on people so as to disfranchise eligible voters, the limitation imposed by the “value system” is not overt. Yet, it is critical in denying systematically the people the right to make a free choice. Normally, the ruling regimes perpetuate such values as long as they seem to support them to acquire and maintain power. It is important to note here that, since the majority of people in Africa live in the rural areas and since they are best described as “subjects”, the problem is very critical. In short, their ignorance of the political processes becomes the political capital of the ruling regimes, with which they win and sustain power. In their study on Mozambique, Mattes and Shenga (2007:1) found that Mozambicans were “uncritical citizens”. They contend that “cognitive factors [political information, formal education and an interest in politics] have an important impact, even after taking into account the considerable values, on Mozambicans’ abilities to provide opinions and form preferences, and their perceived supply of and demand for democracy” (Mattes & Shenga, 2007:1).

On the other hand, elections are considered “fair” if there is equality of participation in them and if they are impartial and non-discriminatory (Goodwill, 2006:73). Levitsky and Way (2010:7) see the “fairness” of elections “when opposition parties campaign on relatively even footing: They are not subject to repression or harassment, and they are not systematically denied access to the media or other critical resources.” When there is no

fairness, competition is said to be skewed. Indeed, this is the essence of what Levitsky and Way call a “non-even playing field” in the following quotation:

We consider the playing field uneven when (1) state institutions are widely abused for partisan ends, (2) incumbents are systematically favoured at the expense of the opposition, and (3) the opposition’s ability to organise and compete in elections is seriously handicapped. Three aspects of an uneven playing field are of particular importance: access to resources, media, and the law (Levitsky & Way, 2010:10).

Broadly, a free and fair election implies respect for human rights at large and the absence of coercion. In a more elaborate way, the Inter-Parliamentary Council⁴ stipulates international standards for a free and fair election as follows:

- The voting rights in which every adult citizen has the right to register and vote in elections, on a non-discriminatory basis.
- Everyone has the right to take part in the government of their country and shall have an equal opportunity to become a candidate for election either as an independent candidate or through an organization for the purpose of competing in an election. In that case every candidate and every political party shall have an equal opportunity of access to the media; and that they shall respect the rights and freedoms of others. Besides, every candidate and every political party competing in an election shall accept the outcome of a free and fair election.
- The state should take the necessary legislative steps and other measures, in accordance with their constitutional processes, to guarantee the rights and institutional framework for periodic and genuine, free and fair elections, in line with their obligations under international law.
- The state should establish an effective, impartial and non-discriminatory procedure for the registration of voters; provide for the formation and free functioning of political parties; ensure the separation of party and state; establish the conditions for competition in legislative elections on an equitable basis; and initiate or facilitate national programmes of civic education, to ensure that the population are familiar with election procedures and issues.
- Moreover, the state should put in place the progressive framework of a neutral, impartial or balanced mechanism for the management of elections.
- And finally the state should ensure that violations of human rights and complaints relating to the electoral process are determined promptly within the timeframe of the electoral process and effectively by an independent and impartial authority, such as an electoral commission or the courts.

It should be borne in mind that free and fair elections do not necessarily guarantee the defeat of ruling parties, just as non-free and unfair ones don’t guarantee their success. Hartmann (2007:144–6) correctly observes that elections in most African countries have not only become more competitive but also they have been organised in a more professional and transparent way to the extent that the blatant and crude rigging of elections that was common ten years ago is now considered a thing of the past. Increasing international

⁴ On 26 March 1994 the Inter-Parliamentary Council, at its 154th session in Paris, unanimously adopted the Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections. Visit <http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm>

attention and “better” electoral governance have led to situations where electoral fraud has to be more sophisticated and where it has been shifted to the manipulation of legal and constitutional rules, often in procedurally impeccable ways, especially where dominant parties have super-majorities in parliament.

Superficially, one may easily find that the quality of electoral processes in Africa has significantly improved. It is this fact which has made election observers regard most elections as free and fair. For example, although the 1991 Zambian election was hailed as free and fair, the election was held under a state of emergency, a condition that is suitable for an authoritarian regime to win an election (Adejumobi, 2000:66). Bratton and Van de Walle (1997:114) argue that in Zambia, Kaunda retained power by maintaining a state of emergency throughout the election campaign. They further observe that the election campaigns of incumbent leaders in Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia were funded by the national treasury, with an obvious negative impact on the government’s budget.

It is important to understand that Tanzania has been described as a stable authoritarian regime (Levitsky & Way, 2010), an electoral democracy (Freedom House, 2010) and an ambiguous democracy (Bratton & Walle, 2007). These signify the problem of democracy. To be sure, there is a lot of literature on electoral competition on Tanzania. Yet, the literature shows that there is limited political competition during elections in the country. The literature is categorised into four main strands: a transition path, a legal and institutional framework, a political culture and weak opposition. To start with, the transition path literature is quite dominant. Tanzania experienced a top-down transition (Hyden, 1999), an imposed transition (Bakari, 2001; Pinkney, 2003) and a CCM-controlled “democratic” transition (Baregu, 2003). This transition path gave CCM the monopoly of the process of determining the transition from a one-party system to a multi-party system, of designing the rules of the game and of owning and benefitting from the rules. An imposed transition suffocates political space for other actors. Sansa (2004) concludes that Tanzania adopted a wrong transition path, which was weak, for building competitive democracy.

The second strand of literature focuses on the legal and institution framework. Building on the transition path literature, the scholars in this category posit that the de-linking of the party from the state of the previous authoritarian regime is yet to happen. The power of the state in Tanzania remains closely linked to that of the ruling party. Evidently, the state is in the pocket of the ruling party (Hyden & Mmuya, 2008:111). Along this line of reasoning, other observers posit that one of the major problems of the transition from a one-party system to a multi-party system is to untangle, both practically and in people’s minds, the link which was so carefully forged between the party and the state property, functions and personnel (Huntington, 1991; Bratton, 1992; Mushi, 1995; Lange, 1999; Makulilo, 2008). The point being made here is that the value, pace and prospects of democratizing countries as well as their sustainability in the hitherto authoritarian regimes largely hinge upon the de-linking of the state from the party at both the institutional and behavioural levels. Levitsky and Way emphasize that:

Uneven playing fields tend to emerge under conditions that facilitate incumbent control over key and societal resources. Such conditions often exist in cases of incomplete transition from single-party rule. Single-party regimes tend to fuse the state and ruling party, creating a highly politicized state in which bureaucrats are also party cadres, state properties (businesses, media outlets) are also party

properties, and resources from various state agencies are systematically deployed for partisan use. Transitions to multiparty rule—often accomplished via a simple constitutional change or the calling of elections—do not necessarily alter these patterns (Levitsky & Way, 2010:64).

The above quotation indicates that the end of the single-party system hasn't led to the de-linking of the party from the state. And therefore the multiparty system arising from this situation has the following features: State institutions are widely abused for partisan ends; the incumbent party is systematically favoured at the expense of the opposition political parties; and that the opposition's ability to compete in elections is seriously handicapped. It is not uncommon to find that the multiparty system of the day is characterized by disparities in terms of resources between the ruling party and the opposition political parties, unequal access to the media and unequal access to the law. The ruling party is usually favoured. While this kind of regime holds regular multiparty elections at all levels of government, the violation of basic democratic standards is done in serious and systematic ways (Schedler, 2010:69).

The third strand is about civic competence. There is a correlation between the level of civic competence and democracy. In principle, the quality of democracy increases with the increase in the level of civic competence. Almond and Verba studied five countries from both developed and developing democracies and established this fact (Almond & Verba, 1963). They note that a competent citizen is able to demand his or her rights and acts as an input and output of a political system. In contrast, a subject develops a culture of requesting his or her rights. This culture does not question the existing system, and as such, the government of the day may enjoy it. In 1994, the Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET) conducted a comprehensive study on Tanzania's political culture. This was only two years after the restoration of the multiparty system and after over 30 years of one-party rule. The study established that Tanzanians were exhibiting a "subject" culture, a culture which seemed inimical to democracy (Mushi et al., 2001). In 2002, an Afrobarometer study revealed that Tanzanians were "uncritical citizens" (Chaligha et al., 2002). In 2012, one observer concluded that CCM would not lose power due to the legacy of the single-party system (O'Gorman, 2012). Yet, the state of civic competence is still unknown. No major study on the state of civic competence in the country in the last ten years has been carried out.

The last strand of the literature indicates that CCM is strong because the opposition is weak. Kiragu and Mukandala (2005:217) argue that "[t]he CCM position has been strengthened by the existence of a weak and disorganized opposition." However, Hoffman and Robinson (2009:122–123) raise one important question: "What explains the chronic weakness of opposition parties in Tanzania?" They respond to it by arguing that:

The easy explanation is a combination of uninspiring leadership and little popular demand for change, a line of reasoning that also defines the CCM as a relatively benign hegemony acceptable to the vast majority of Tanzanians. Although this argument is based on a significant amount of truth, it overlooks the CCM's deliberate attempts to suppress those who contest its near-monopoly of power, including its willingness to resort to coercion when other methods fail... Many of the hurdles that CCM opponents face are self-imposed, but that explanation alone does not suffice. Instead, the marginal status of rival parties results in large measure

from the CCM's intentional methods of silencing them. The CCM employs three strategies to impede its competitors: 1) regulating political competition, the media, and civil society; 2) blurring the boundary between the party and state; and 3) the targeted use of blatantly coercive illegal actions (Hoffman & Robinson, 2009:122-123).

All the above explanations are plausible. It is therefore important to revisit them in order to understand the extent to which reforms and intervention by various stakeholders after two decades of the multiparty democracy have constrained or promoted political competition in Tanzania. There are also two new trends relating to low voter-turnout and electoral violence which may have a bearing on political competition. These two phenomena will be examined alongside the four clusters mentioned above.

3. The factors inhibiting electoral competition in Tanzania

Multipartism was re-introduced in Tanzania in 1992 due to intense pressure on the Tanzanian regime. There was pressure from Western donor countries that threatened to cut aid unless the country was democratized. There was also the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and poor performance at home and the ever-growing agitation of Tanzanian civil and political groups (Mhina, 1999). It was also the result of the recommendations of the Nyalali Commission (URT, 1991). In 1992, Political Parties Act No. 5 was enacted to allow for the establishment of the multiparty system in Tanzania. Currently, there are 22 political parties, but only seven of them are active. They include CCM, CUF, CHADEMA, ACT-Wazalendo, TLP, NCCR-Mageuzi and UDP.

The first General Election under the multiparty system was held in October 1995. A number of by-elections were held in 1993 and 1994 and CCM won all of them.⁷ Since 1992, four General Elections have been held, that is, in 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The results of these elections indicate that the number of CCM's parliamentary seats rose from 186 in 1995, 202 in 2000 to 206 in 2005. But they dropped to 186 in 2010. It should also be noted that in these elections there were unopposed candidates⁸ fielded by CCM. The number of unopposed candidates was, for example, 25 in 2000 and 8 in 2005, respectively. The number of unopposed candidates rose to 17 in 2010. The above results are reflected in the political parties' ability to field candidates countrywide. Table 1 below indicates that it was only CCM that fielded candidates in all the constituencies for the parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010, respectively. There is no doubt that the political parties' ability to field candidates has an implication for the nature and degree of electoral competition in the country. For example, one of the explanations given regarding CCM's unopposed candidates is that all the opposition political parties are not able to field candidates in all the constituencies. In that case, Table 5.1 also indicates the competitiveness of the political parties in Tanzania. Indeed, it confirms the fact that, while the ruling party has managed to spread countrywide, the opposition political parties are largely based in urban areas.

⁷ The first by-election was held in 1993 at Kwahani in Zanzibar followed by Ileje and Kigoma on the Mainland in 1994. See Tanzania Affairs at www.tzaffairs.org

⁸ An unopposed candidate is one for or against whom no votes are cast but is declared to have won an election.

Table 5.1: Number of candidates fielded in parliamentary elections

S/No.	Political party	Election year	
		2005	2010
1.	AFP	-	15
2.	APPT-MAENDELEO	16	16
3.	CCM	232	239
4.	CHADEMA	144	179
5.	CHAUSTA	61	13
6.	CUF	213	182
7.	DEMOKRASIA MAKINI	16	17
8.	DP	45	35
9.	FORD	11	-
10.	JHAZI-A	55	21
11.	NCCR-MAGEUZI	71	67
12.	NLD	29	23
13.	NRA	27	19
14.	TADEA	34	32
15.	TLP	115	42
16.	UDP	38	45
17.	UMD	21	23
18.	UPDP	42	36
19.	SAU	52	32
	Total	1222	1036

Source: REDET & TLS (2012)

As for the presidential candidates, CCM's support is still high and has increased over the years. In 1995, the party got 61.8%; in 2000, the figure rose to 71.7 % and in 2005 it was 80.28%. In 2010, CCM's support dropped to 62.84%. It is very interesting to note that Augustino Lyatonga Mrema, who got 27.8% through NCCR-Mageuzi in 1995, got 7.8% through TLP in 2000 and 0.75% in 2005 through the same party. Even Professor Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba of CUF, who got 16.3% in 2000, dropped to 11.68% in 2005 and 8.28% in 2010. Table 5.2 shows the percentage of votes the parties got:

Table 5.2: The percentage of votes obtained by presidential candidates in 2005 and 2010

Political party	Percentage of votes obtained in the elections		Gained (+)/lost (-)
	2005	2010	
APPT-MAENDELEO	18,783 (0.17%)	96,933 (1.15%)	+78,150 (0.98%)
CCM	9,123,952 (80.28%)	5,276,827 (62.84%)	-3,847,125 (-17.44%)
CHADEMA	668,756 (5.88%)	2,271,941 (27.05%)	+1,603,185 (+21.17%)
CUF	1,327,125 (11.68%)	695,667 (8.28%)	-631,458 (-3.40%)
DEMOKRASIA MAKINI	17,070 (0.15%)	-	-

DP	31,083 (0.27%)	-	-
NCCR-MAGEUZI	55,819 (0.49%)	26,388 (0.31%)	-67,419 (-0.54%)
NLD	21,574 (0.19%)	-	-
TLP	84,901 (0.75%)	17,482 (0.21%)	-67,419 (-0.54%)
SAU	16,414 (0.14%)	-	-
UPDP	-	13,176 (0.16%)	-
Total	11,365,477 (100%)	8,398,414 (100%)	

Source: REDET & TLS (2012)

The above figures signify that the degree of electoral competition in the country is small. This state of affairs is due to the following:

3.1 The legal framework for electoral competition

One of the highly contested aspects of Tanzania's political system relates to the legal and institutional framework. The legal framework is the property of the ruling party, which is its main architect. To begin with, the constitution, which is the mother law of the land, was written during the single-party era, and therefore carries with it the philosophy and values of the one-party system. To ensure this, CCM's committee of twenty people that wrote CCM's constitution in 1977 was also the committee that wrote the country's constitution in the same year. Indeed, the party's and the country's constitutions were deliberately aligned with the single-party system. The amendments that have been made to the country's constitution since 1992 are cosmetic and cannot make democracy flourish in Tanzania. In 1992, just three years before the first General Election under multipartism took place, TEMCO noted that the ruling party had unilaterally defined all the rules of the game in its favour. TEMCO (1997:18) observed that "[t]he government sent a bill to the parliament (sic) (which was '100%' CCM) when it wished and the opposition parties were kept guessing, not knowing what would happen next. This strategy enabled the ruling party to monopolize the process of defining new rules of the game, including changes in election laws." TEMCO noted that the new pluralist system inherited "a wrong constitution suited to a monolithic system" and that "the writing of an entirely new constitution rather than patching up the one-party constitution as the CCM government has been doing" was necessary for reinvigorating democracy (TEMCO, 1997:12). On the eve of multipartism, the Nyalali Commission (URT, 1999) recommended the writing of a new constitution in the spirit of the multiparty system. The CCM government refused to implement this recommendation; instead, the party used the CCM-dominated National Assembly to amend the constitution. The same thing is being done in the current process of writing a new constitution, that is, CCM and its government dominate not only the content but also the process itself.¹⁰ Some of the problematic aspects of the current constitution are: Firstly, Article 9 provides for *Ujamaa* as the national ideology. Interestingly, the selfsame ideology

¹⁰ In 2011 Tanzania began the process of writing a new constitution. The process is not yet over. However, the ruling party and its government have monopolised the content of the constitution and the entire process.

is stipulated in Articles 4(3) and 5(3) of CCM's constitution of 1977. In 1999, a report by a presidential commission (JMT, 1999) revealed that 88.8% of the respondents wanted *Ujamaa* to be retained in both constitutions. This figure implies that CCM still enjoys the support of the majority of people in the country on account of its ideology. The same kind of conclusion was also made by the Afrobarometer survey that was conducted in 2002 in Tanzania (Chaligha et al., 2002). In that case, CCM can use the country's constitution to popularize its ideology and mobilize support from the people.

Secondly, the constitution does not allow for independent candidates. Articles 39(1) (c) and 67(1) (b) of the constitution require that presidential and parliamentary candidates be nominated by their political parties. For the presidential post, Article 41(6) of the constitution also requires that both the presidential candidate and his or her running mate be sponsored by the same party. In the case of the *Attorney General v Rev Christopher Mtikila*,¹³ these clauses were declared unconstitutional by the High Court of Tanzania. Interestingly, in the case of *the Attorney General v Rev Christopher Mtikila*,¹⁴ following the appeal by the government, the Court of Appeal ruled that the High Court did not have the mandate to declare an Article of the constitution unconstitutional. It held further that the issue of independent candidates was a "political matter" which couldn't be entertained in any court of law. The court noted further that the matter should have been discussed in the National Assembly.¹⁶ After a series of unsuccessful battles over the same issue, in 2011, Rev Mtikila as well as local civil society organizations separately took the issue to the African Court of Human and People's Rights (ACPHR) for further consideration.¹⁷ The court ruled in favour of Rev Mtikila and the organizations. Thirdly, the constitution vests unlimited powers in the President. When addressing members of the National Assembly on 21 August 2008, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete said, "*Mheshimiwa Spika, ndiyo maana nasema mamlaka ya Rais ni makubwa sana. Rais akiwa na papara ataonea kweli*" (Mr Speaker, the President has unlimited powers, and if he or she is not wise, he or she would misuse the powers vested in him) (JMT, 2008). Being the chairman of the ruling party, the President may use this constitutional weakness in the interest of his party. The new constitution is expected to address, among other things, the powers of the President. This was one of the issues, on which many people expressed their opinions (JMT, 2013).

One of the other laws that are inimical to democracy and the opposition political parties is Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992. This law does not allow political parties to form alliances during elections. It also stipulates stringent requirements for members of a political party to assemble. It requires a party to inform the police not less than 48 hours before a rally is held so that the police can provide security. Practically, however, since the advent of multipartism, the police have used this power to stop the opposition political parties from holding rallies (TEMCO, 2001, 2006, 2011). Besides, Election Expenses Act No. 6 of 2010 affects the parties, particularly the opposition ones. It makes it very difficult for them to mobilize resources and to cooperate with civil society organizations.

¹³ Civil Case No. 5 of 1993, High Court of Tanzania.

¹⁴ Civil Appeal No. 45 of 2009. The judgment was delivered on 17th June 2010.

¹⁶ For more details, read Makulilo (2011).

¹⁷ For more details, read Makulilo (2013).

4. Election management authority

Effective management of electoral activities requires institutions that are inclusive, sustainable, just and independent. Indeed, it requires, among other things, electoral management bodies (EMBs) that have the legitimacy to enforce rules and to ensure fairness in electoral activities (UNDP, 2000; Elklit & Reynolds, 2005). As the main election referees, EMBs should be impartial and autonomous. It was from 7th to 10th April 2003 that the benchmark for measuring the independence of EMBs in Africa was set by the African Conference on Elections, Democracy and Governance in South Africa (ACEDG). It demands that the independence of EMBs should be secured constitutionally; that their budgets should be voted for or against directly by legislative bodies; that the procedures for selecting and appointing commissioners should be inclusive; that EMBs should conduct themselves impartially; that EMBs should independently appoint their secretariats; and that EMBs should be subjected to public scrutiny. These are also the requirements of most international bodies or organizations.

In Tanzania, the impartiality and independence of the National Electoral Commission (NEC) has been questioned by the key stakeholders since 1993. In assessing NEC, we use the following criteria: the procedures for appointing commissioners, the mode of funding the commission, the security of commissioners' tenure and its location inside or outside the government (Mozaffar, 2002). Writing about the debate on whether or not NEC is independent, Makulilo evaluated the arguments advanced by scholars and practitioners and concluded that NEC's independence was highly compromised. The commissioners are unilaterally appointed by the President of the United Republic and can be dismissed by the same person (JMT, 1999; URT, 1991; 1998).²² The President has always been the national chairperson of the ruling party and a presidential candidate during elections. In its report on the 1995 General Election, TEMCO (1997:137) posed the following question: "Is NEC independent?" In answer to this question, it argued that "[i]deally, Articles 74(7) and 74(11) of the Union Constitution purports (sic) to accord an independent status to NEC at least at national level... Practically, however, NEC does not pass the basic tests of an independent institution." TEMCO advanced four reasons to support its position. Firstly, the appointment of NEC's commissioners is done by the President, who is also the national chairman of the party in power; secondly, the security of the appointees' tenure is not guaranteed since the President can revoke their appointment at any time; thirdly, neither the constitution nor the Election Act secures funds for use by NEC; and fourthly, NEC does not have its own staff at the regional level and the constituency level. It relies on the staff in local governments who, in most cases, are CCM cadres. TEMCO (1997:193) asks, "And how could the National Electoral Commission (NEC) delink itself from CCM given its composition, manner of its appointment (sic), reliance on CCM government discretionary funding, and even more compromising, reliance on borrowed government personnel, most of whom were believed to be (or to have been in the immediate past) CCM members." The report of the Commonwealth Observer Group (2010) stresses the importance of an independent and impartial electoral commission. It states:

According to Article 74 of the Constitution the Electoral Commission of the United Republic shall be appointed by the President. Further, the Director of Elections is also appointed by the President on recommendation of the Commission. There is no

²² Several government reports recommended a participatory appointment procedure and a guarantee of security of tenure for commissioners; however, the government has yet to accept them.

requirement for such an appointment to be supported by a decision of Parliament and no requirement for the President to seek input from parliament with regard to potential appointees. Such a provision does not reflect good practice because it does not adequately provide for consultation and political confidence in a vital body which needs to be impartial and inclusive. Further, the ability to continually renew a Commissioners' mandate can impact on the independence of the body. This concern is compounded by the fact that on the mainland election officials are drawn from among government officials. Further, the Regional Election Coordinator, appointed by NEC, is marginalised and lacks authority vis-a-vis the Returning Officers.

In 2009, CUF and CHADEMA wanted NEC to be disbanded and called for the establishment of a new independent and impartial electoral authority prior to the 2010 elections (*The Citizen*, 9th June 2009). Yet, on 17th December 2009, NCCR-Mageuzi filed suit (Miscellaneous Civil Petition No. 84 of 2009 against the Attorney General), questioning the independence and impartiality of NEC (*The Guardian*, 2009). During an interview, Bonifacia Mapunda said, "NEC is the ruling party's instrument."²⁴

In the 2010 elections, NEC appeared to be incompetent, especially with regard to voter registration and declaration of election results. For example, in Mbeya urban constituency, there were three different figures relating to the number of registered voters: (a) 174,854, (b) 177,402 and (c) 177,468 (TEMCO, 2010C). Similarly, delays in announcing election results in many constituencies culminated in riots in Mwanza, Mbeya, Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Kigoma. On 15th November 2010, CHADEMA did not recognise President Jakaya Kikwete as winner of the presidential election on the grounds that the election was rigged by NEC, which had allegedly tampered with the voter register. It boycotted the President's inauguration of the National Assembly on 18th November 2010 by walking out of the Parliament building soon after he started giving his speech. Moreover, CHADEMA revived the old demand for a completely new constitution and an independent and impartial NEC.

5. The role of state personnel in elections

This is the most critical aspect of Tanzania's political system. The ruling party deploys state machinery and resources in its own interest. State personnel such as regional commissioners (RCs), district commissioners (DCs), division secretaries (DSs), division officers (DOs), ward executive officers (WEOs) and village executive officers (VEOs) are supposed to serve all the political parties. The RCs, DCs, WEOs and VEOs are members of CCM's executive committees in their respective areas.²⁶ Besides, they are appointees of the President, who is also CCM's national chairman. This arrangement adversely affects the impartiality of these officers. Since the advent of multipartism in Tanzania, these government personnel have been critical to the survival and victories of the ruling party. In all its reports, TEMCO has shown that they play a partisan role in electoral activities in the interest of the ruling party. There are no signs that things have changed. They force government heads of department, returning officers, the Police Force and citizens to vote for the ruling party (TEMCO, 1997:192-5; TEMCO, 2001:86-8; TEMCO, 2006:168). In its report on the 2005 elections, TEMCO noted that regional and district commissioners as well as division secretaries played a partisan role in elections in favour of CCM. I quote: "They

²⁴ Interview with Bonifacia Mapunda, CUF, 24th July 2014.

²⁶ CCM's Constitution of 1977.

are “politicised” public servants whose appointment by the President is based on demonstrated loyalty to the ruling party. Thus these people cannot avoid acting in a partisan way during elections and even in the inter-election period. They mobilize voters on behalf of the ruling party and in many different ways facilitate campaigns of candidates of the ruling party using state resources (vehicles, security personnel). This area was controversial in 1995 and 2000, and remained unchanged in 2005. This is a systemic problem, and it will be difficult to have a level political playfield in Tanzania without finding a way of making these powerful people in the regions, districts and divisions act impartially ” (TEMCO, 2006:168). In relation to the ward and village executive officers, TEMCO said, “These are supposed to be appointed on “merit” rather than [on the basis of their] “loyalty” to the ruling party. However, in 1995, 2000, and again in 2005 general elections TEMCO observers confirmed that they had been engaged in vote solicitation on behalf of CCM. This is a result of the weight of the incumbent party, the one-party heritage and the fact that parties have not alternated in power since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992. CCM continues to make use of the sub-district local government personnel as it did during the days of the one-party system” (TEMCO, 2006:168–169).

The same thing happened in 2010. TEMCO states that “[r]egional and District Commissioners have placed state resources (vehicles etc) in campaign processions of the presidential candidate defending his position (sic)” (TEMCO, 2010b). Specifically, the United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) report of June 2010 summarises the duties of these officers as follows: allowing CCM to use public facilities (stadiums, schools) for campaigning, but denying such use to opposition parties; having tax collectors target opposition supporters as well as business owners who fail to support or vote for CCM; threatening to revoke the licenses of business owners who do not support CCM; ordering police to shut down businesses during CCM rallies to boost attendance; telling public school teachers to encourage their students to attend CCM rallies and to discourage them from going to opposition gatherings; telling citizens that basic services are contingent on a ruling-party victory in their area; threatening civil servants with firing if they fail to mobilize the electorate for CCM; and placing civil servants on fundraising committees for CCM candidates.

6. Politics of intimidation

This concerns national security. CCM considers itself to be a party that preaches peace, unity and tranquillity. It regards the opposition political parties as agents of violence (Makulilo, 2008). During election campaigns, CCM has consistently and persistently argued that the opposition political parties should not be elected because they are agents of violence. For example, it did so openly during the 1995 General Election. CCM leaders told the general public that if the opposition political parties won the election, there would be wars in the country like in Rwanda, Burundi and Angola. For example, in the case of the *Attorney-General and Two Others v Aman Walid Kabourou (1996)*, CCM’s tendency of threatening people was mentioned. In this case, the former CCM chairman and President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the former CCM Secretary-General, Horace Kolimba, the former CCM National Publicity Secretary, Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru and Augustino Lyatonga Mrema (MP), the then Minister of Home Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, said that if the opposition political parties won the election, there would be wars in the country like in Rwanda and Burundi. The court ruled that such statements were made against the opposition political parties but in favour of the ruling party. It should be noted that the people mentioned above held high positions in the party

and the government. CCM used rumors on the genocide in Rwanda and Burundi to threaten Tanzanians so that they would not vote for the opposition parties (TEMCO, 1997), as the following quotation shows:

Election campaigns, both presidential and parliamentary, were characterized by threats and scare mongering. Unfortunately, CCM took the lead in this regard. The strategy combined speeches at public and the screening of video tape films depicting ethnic massacres in neighboring Rwanda and Burundi. The message was once in power the opposition was going to create a situation of grave insecurity culminating in bloodshed. The underlying misinformation and distortion was aimed at exploiting perceived popular ignorance about the interplay of forces in Tanzania on the one hand and Rwanda and Burundi on the other hand (TEMCO, 1997:100).

In the 2010 elections, CCM's chairman and its presidential candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, also told the people not to vote for the opposition. On 25th August 2010, in Bukoba, he said, "*Mkituchagua tena nchi hii itakuwa baridiii kushinda maji ya mtungi*" (If you vote for us again, this country will be peaceful) (TBC, 2010).

Also, CCM uses the security forces to intimidate the people. This is not surprising, since in 1990 the founder of CCM and the first President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, said, "*Jeshi letu ni jeshi la wanachama wa CCM; limefunzwa sana mambo ya siasa; lina mwamko sana wa kisiasa, na linashiriki kikamilifu katika mambo yote ya siasa*" (Our army is CCM's army; it has been trained in political issues and participates fully in political activities)" (CCM, 1990). It should be pointed out that during the heyday of the one-party system the security forces were highly integrated into the party. Indeed, they were affiliated to the party. On the eve of multipartism, the de-linking of the security forces from the party was symbolic rather than real. CCM has strong links with the security forces (Kamata, 2006), links which it enjoys during elections.

To strengthen our argument, let's discuss the President as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. The powers to command any force in the country are vested in him or her and his or her order is final and must be respected (Article 148, sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 of the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977). As pointed out earlier, being the chairperson of the ruling party, the President is likely to be faced with a conflict of interest, and hence can use such powers in favour of the party. Article 15(1) of CCM's constitution requires all the members of the party to be firm and advance party interests before anything else. As a way of implementing his party's constitution, during his speech on 21st August 2008 to the members of the National Assembly, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete said that if he ordered the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Said Mwema, to arrest any person he would do so. He said, for example, that, if the President ordered the IGP to arrest Dr Slaa,³² he would arrest him. Similarly, Mwalimu Nyerere once said that he had powers like a dictator (cited in Shivji, 1993). Indeed, the President in Tanzania is omnipotent. This problem was also revealed in the report by the commission formed by the President in 1999 to review the constitution. At the lower level, security matters are handled

³² Dr Slaa was a member of the National Assembly (2005–2010) on CHADEMA's platform. He has always been very critical of the CCM government. He was a presidential candidate for CHADEMA in the 2010 General Election. As can be seen, the statement by the President shows the behaviour of CCM presidents towards the opposition political parties.

by security committees³⁴ which are chaired by RCs and DCs. As already noted, these officers are by and large CCM cadres. In the 2010 elections, RCs and DCs favoured CCM in dealing with security issues.

In the context of elections, these powers are problematic. In the 2005 elections, the then President of Tanzania, Benjamin W. Mkapa, while campaigning for Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (CCM's presidential candidate in 2005), said that in his capacity as CCM's chairman he would not allow democracy to breakdown under his administration. He pledged to deploy the state security apparatus to ensure that CCM got a landslide victory (JMT, 2005). He did so. On the eve of the 2005 elections, the then Inspector General of Police (IGP), Omar Mahita, told Tanzanians that the opposition political parties intended to shed blood (TEMCO, 2006). To date, it has not been proved if what he said was mere propaganda. During the 2000 elections, Mkapa (the then incumbent president and CCM's presidential candidate) used a police helicopter to campaign for himself in remote areas. Similarly, Retired President Ali Hassan Mwinyi used the same helicopter to campaign for CCM in Coast Region and Kigoma (TEMCO, 2001).

In the 2010 elections, this method was also used. As usual, CCM started saying that the opposition, if elected, would shed blood. The security forces intervened in the matter. The Tanzania People's Defence Force's Chief of Staff, Lt General Abdurrahman Shimbo, the Deputy Director of Criminal Investigations, Peter Kivuyo, and the Head of the Police Special Operations Unit, Venance Tossi, threatened people during a press conference. They said that no blood would be shed by any political party since they were fully prepared for any eventuality. General Shimbo said, "There have been signs of disrupting peace and tranquility in the ongoing campaigns ... some politicians have even dared threatening to shed blood. Let them be warned that we are firmly prepared to make sure that no single drop of blood will be shed during the ongoing campaigns, the Election Day and after that (sic)" (*Daily News*, 2010). Although many political parties participated in the elections, this statement was aimed at frustrating CHADEMA, CCM's major challenger. In response to the threat, on 4th October 2010, CHADEMA sent a letter with reference No. C/HQ/ADM/SG/02/79 to the Dean of Diplomatic Corps, international organizations and all the political parties, asking them to condemn what the officials were doing (*The Citizen*, 2010). The head of the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM) to Tanzania, David Martin, described the security threat as a disappointment and frustration to democracy (*The Citizen*, 2010). After politicians, activists and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) said that the security forces were being used to further CCM's interests, proper authorities, particularly the National Electoral Commission (NEC), maintained that there were no threats to peace (*The Guardian*, 2010). Surprisingly, on its meeting of 10th October 2010, CCM's Central Committee also said that there were no threats to peace both in Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar.⁴⁴

7. Civic competence

Civic competence is crucial for people's effective participation in democratic processes. Since the advent of multipartism, the ruling party has been reluctant to provide civic

³⁴ The committees were appointed during the single-party era to advise the party on matters of peace and security in their respective areas. Although these committees were "de-linked" from the party and became government instruments after the introduction of multipartism into the country, practically they are still fused with the party, albeit in the "new" law (The National Security Council Act, 2010).

⁴⁴ CCM's statement on election campaigns in 2010.

education to the people. Studies have shown that Tanzanians exhibit a subject culture (Chaligha et al., 2002). This culture prevents them from demanding their basic rights and questioning the national leadership. This problem is very critical in the country, particularly in the rural areas. It is argued that the ruling party benefits from the inability of the Tanzanian citizens to hold the government accountable and to join alternative parties. Mallya says, "For the majority of Tanzanians in the rural areas, the only political party they know is CCM. They also know the founders and would like to allow them continue (sic) in office" (Mallya, 2006). This partly explains why the CCM government has been reluctant to provide civic education to the people. It also explains why CCM is still dominant in the rural areas, where about 70% of Tanzanians live.

The Research for Education and Democracy in Tanzania's (REDET) survey of 2001 indicated that Tanzanians exhibited a "subject" culture. This is a result of the values which were imparted to them during the single-party era (1965–1992). This situation was strengthened by the general African culture of respecting authority. Hyden correctly observes:

Perhaps equally important, however, has been the emphasis on consensual decision making, social harmony, and civic peace. The fact that the country had only one political party for more than 30 years after independence helped to institutionalize these values, even if it was often done at the expense of other values, including those associated with liberal democracy. In the 1990s, the latter gradually emerged to occupy a more prominent position, side by side with the old hegemonic values. Political culture in Tanzania today is characterized by frequent tradeoffs between these values; none reigns supreme. Liberal democratic values may be compromised if they are seen to threaten social harmony or civic peace... Tanzanians still often tend to be deferential and prefer to keep quiet rather than to challenge authority in public (Hyden, 1999:151–152).

The Afrobarometer survey results of 2002 consolidate this observation. They indicate that Tanzanians do not demand their rights. Verba and Almond (1963) note that when a political system is devoid of citizens an "authoritarian regime" may emerge. Riutta (2007) observes that civic education enables citizens to participate actively in political activities and to make "rational" decisions and choices. The argument being made here is that ruling parties in Africa have been so allergic to civic education. They think that providing civic education to people means empowering the opposition. On the eve of the multiparty system in Tanzania, the Presidential Commission recommended the provision of massive civic education countrywide. This was rejected by the ruling party and its government. It is now about 20 years since the re-introduction of the multiparty system in Tanzania, and yet civic education is not provided to the people. It is correct to conclude that the ruling party still benefits from the "ignorance" of the majority rural dwellers. In her work *Why CCM won't Lose?*, O'Gorman (2012:314) stresses the importance of the people in rural Tanzania being informed. She maintains that lack of such people enormously benefits the ruling party. The Afrobarometer survey of 2013 found that education was important for democracy to thrive. In its report, it notes that Tanzanians with at least primary school education are more likely to support a constitutional review. Likewise, Tanzanians who own radios are more likely to want to review the constitution than those who don't. Perhaps this shows the impact of national information dissemination campaigns on the Tanzanian people.

8. The media

Tanzania has a young, freewheeling, critical media industry. Article 18 of the constitution safeguards freedom of expression and the right to seek, impart and receive information on important societal issues as well as on the lives and activities of prominent people. The opening of the media industry in Mainland Tanzania was accompanied by the demise of the single-party system during the 1990s. There is no control over access to information on the Internet and in major cities there is easy access to international news via television, the Internet and radio (Freedom House, 2014). However, the 2008 Afrobarometer survey indicates that less than 40% of the people in the rural areas have access to newspapers and television.

Moreover, the laws enacted during the colonial era and the single-party era gave the state much leeway to set the limits on media practices. For example, the National Security Act of 1970 empowers the government, rather than the judiciary or an independent tribunal, to decide what information is classified. It also allows government officials to declare parts of the country “protected areas”, thereby restricting journalists’ movement. Another law which was enacted during the single-party era, the Tanzania Newspaper Act of 1976, gives discretionary powers to the Ministry of Information, Culture and Sports (MICS) to suspend newspapers for a specified period of time (Freedom House, 2014).

Notwithstanding the fact that the Elections Act of 1985 requires that the public media give equal airtime and coverage to all the political parties and candidates, this law is not followed. It is crystal clear that, since the re-introduction of the multiparty system in the country, CCM has enjoyed a considerable amount of airtime and coverage in the public media such as the National Television (TVT), Television Zanzibar (TVZ), Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam (RTD), Radio Zanzibar (STZ), the *Daily News* newspaper, the *Sunday News* newspaper and the *Zanzibar Leo* newspaper. In the case of *the Attorney-General v Aman Walid Kabourou*⁴⁷ after the Kigoma by-election, the Court of Appeal of Tanzania held that “CCM was given more air-time on Radio Tanzania Dar es Salaam than were given other political parties, and its broadcasts generally were biased in favour of the CCM candidate, such that it must have influenced the by-election results in favour of the CCM candidate (sic).” The same thing happened during the 1995 elections. It was noted that CCM had a lion’s share of airtime and coverage in the public media. The situation did not change in the 2000 elections. In its report on media and election, the Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) reports that the media was biased in favour of CCM. For example, in October 2000, RTD gave CCM and its candidates 91% coverage and STZ gave CCM 67% coverage. Furthermore, in September 2000, TVT gave CCM 96% coverage; and between 17th and 30th September 2000, it gave CCM’s presidential candidate, Benjamin William Mkapa, 100% coverage (MCT, 2000). With regard to the 2005 elections, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA, 2005) shows that RTD and STZ allotted 105,971 seconds to CCM and 31,557 seconds to CUF. Similarly, TVT and TVZ allotted 114,475 seconds to CCM and 22,287 seconds to CHADEMA. More or less the same thing was done during the 2010 elections (SYNOVATE, 2010). In its report (TEMCO, 2011:151) states that “[a]nalysis on the performance of the media as provided by Synovate (Tanzania), an independent media monitor commissioned by [the] UNDP with the tasks of assessing media coverage of the 2010 elections, reveals some interesting findings. At the very top is the fact that the ruling CCM enjoyed total monopoly coverage in both print and electronic media throughout the

⁴⁷ [1996] T.L.R 156.

campaign period compared to [the] other political parties that fielded presidential candidates.” TEMCO further states that:

What the Synovate (Tanzania) findings reveal is the fact that even after two decades since the dawn of multiparty democracy, the media has so far failed to insulate itself from state power. Part of the problem is the legacy of single party journalism carried forward from the single party political hegemony. The integration of state-owned media into civil service was part of the process of political socialization that the party-state adopted in order to guarantee total loyalty and subservience of state employed journalists. No wonder state employed journalists find it difficult to reconcile with the new political dispensation (TEMCO, 2011:151).

The worst case of bias by the state-owned media was a defamatory editorial that appeared on the front page of the *Daily News* newspaper on 24th September 2010 (usually editorials appear on page 4). The editorial stated that “Dr. Slaa will not be the fifth president of Tanzania. The CHADEMA candidate has a lot of issues to settle, beginning at family level, from which he will need to practice leadership upwards. He will, indeed, garner some votes in October, just like Augustine Mrema in 1995, but that will be it, and the media behind the former priest can quote us on that” (see TEMCO, 2011; Makulilo, 2012, 2014). Equally important is the fact that the government has ensured that the journalists employed by the state-owned media continue to perceive themselves as part of the government, rather than as a separate professional institution (TEMCO, 2011:152).

9. Election-related violence

Electoral competition in Tanzania has been marred by incidents of violence. These events happened at the beginning of multiparty elections as well. With time, the magnitude, nature and scope of election-related violence have increased so much that they are a threat to the process of democratizing the country (Henry, 2013). In the 2000 elections, incidents of violence were reported in various places. The situation was worse in Zanzibar than in other places, as acts of violence were committed by political parties, the police as well as government officials such as *Shehas* in Zanzibar. The violence in Zanzibar reached its peak on 26th and 27th January 2001, when, according to government reports, 23 people (60 people, according to CUF reports) were killed by the police. The deceased were CUF supporters who were protesting against the electoral results of 2000. Also, 2000 people fled to Kenya, where they became refugees (URT, 2002; Bakari, 2002).

Acts of violence increased in the 2005 elections. They ranged from fighting, intimidation to the killing of people (TEMCO, 2006; LHRC, 2006). TEMCO (2006:64) notes that “[i]t would appear that the 2005 general elections were marred by more violent events than in (sic) both the 1995 and 2000 general elections.” However, the by-elections which were conducted between 2005 and 2010 signified the turning point of election-related violence in Tanzania. In the Tarime by-election of 2008, there were more incidents of electoral violence than ever before. The violence involved the destruction of property, the killing of people and the inflicting of physical harm on human beings and animals (LHRC, 2009, 2011; CASS-UDSM, 2011). For example, two CCM supporters were attacked by allegedly CHADEMA supporters. The next day, CCM supporters attacked CHADEMA supporters with machetes and sticks. Related to this was the stoning of Rev Christopher Mtikila, the chairman of Democratic Party (DP). He was stoned as he campaigned for his party’s

candidate (LHRC, 2009). Acts of violence were also committed during the Busanda and Biharamulo by-elections of 2009.

In the 2010 elections, electoral violence was very high (EU, 2010; Commonwealth, 2010; TEMCO, 2011; CASS-UDSM, 2011). Violence was high in Mbeya, Mtwara, Arusha, Mwanza and Shinyanga. By the end of the 2010 elections, 6 people had been killed.⁵⁰ In Maswa East, a CCM cadre was allegedly killed by CHADEMA supporters when the two groups clashed (TEMCO, 2011). The study conducted in 2011 by CASS-UDSM on incidents of election-related violence in the 2010 elections showed that 83% of its respondents had heard about electoral violence, that 58.5% had witnessed election-related violence and that 31.7% had experienced it (see Figure 5.1).




Figure 5.1: Heard about or witnessed or experienced election-related violence
Source: CASS-UDSM (2011)

Moreover, more incidents of violence occurred in the post-2010 by-elections. In these by-elections, the incidents of election-related violence that occurred were different from those which had happened in the other elections in terms of form and magnitude. The Igunga by-election of 2011 was marked by riots and physical attacks among supporters of different political parties and on government officials and the killing of people (TCTS, 2012). The worst incident was the abduction of a CHADEMA supporter on Election Day. Later, he was found dead. Moreover, the then Igunga District Commissioner was physically abused by CHADEMA leaders and supporters. CHADEMA attacked her for campaigning for CCM. Moreover, the house and livestock of a CCM leader were burnt and CCM alleged that CHADEMA supporters were responsible for that. Furthermore, a CCM cadre claimed that CHADEMA supporters had thrown acid on to his face. The Arumeru East by-election of 2012 was regarded as the most violent. In this by-election, 4 people were killed (TCTS, 2012; *The Citizen*, 27th March 2012; Philemon, 1st April 2012; TACCEO, 2012).

In the 2013 by-elections held in various parts of the country, a number of violent events were reported. They included fights, physical harm, destruction of property and intimidation of people by the security forces. However, the explosion which occurred during a

⁵⁰ This is after the computing of the number of deaths relating to electoral violence from TEMCO, 2011; LHRC, 2011 and TACCEO, 2012.

CHADEMA rally in Arusha on 14 July 2015 and which killed three people and seriously injured many others attracted the attention of the local community and the international community. The CASS-UDSM study also indicated that 100 per cent of the respondents had said that acts of violence might be committed in the 2015 elections (see Figure 5.2). The respondents' views signify that there may be more acts of violence in the 2015 elections than they were in the previous elections.




Figure 5.2: Possibility of violence in the 2015 elections
 Source: CASS-UDSM (2011)

Election-related violence has a profound impact on competitive politics in Tanzania. The fear of attacks prevents candidates and potential candidates, especially women, from participating in electoral activities.⁵¹ This state of affairs also affects political parties. This is due to the fact that elections are an arena in which political parties promote their policies, and hence mobilize supporters. This partly explains why the opposition political parties in Tanzania have remained weak. Their leaders assert that “electoral violence is one of the reasons why they are weak.”⁵² The presence of heavily armed police officers in electoral activities scares away potential voters. It is surprising that they are mainly deployed in areas where the opposition enjoys support, not in the areas where the ruling party is popular. The ruling party is said to be the beneficiary of this state of affairs.⁵³ This situation causes conflicts between the police and the people, especially those who support the opposition. The police portray the opposition parties as violent organizations that will cause chaos in the country when they are in power. This is done so that the electorate don't vote for them (TACCEO, 2012; LHRC, 2011).

In addition, these events have partly contributed to the low voter-turnout referred to earlier (Henry, 2013). People decide not to go to polling stations for fear that violent events such as

⁵¹ Interview with Getruda Pwila of NCCR-Mageuzi (Women's Wing) in Dar es Salaam on 7th July 2014.

⁵² Interview with Bonifacia Mapunda of CUF in Dar es Salaam on 24th July 2014; Mwitwa W. Mwikabe, CHADEMA-Publicity Officer, in Dar es Salaam on 28th July 2014.

⁵³ Interview with Shaweji Mketi, CUF-Deputy Secretary General, in Dar es Salaam on 24th July 2014.

those they experience or witness during campaigns may happen. Oswald (2010) has concluded that there is low voter-turnout in Tanzania because the people are afraid of violence, among other things. Democracy is the rule of the people. In a society, election-related violence ruins peace and security, which are a sine qua non for democracy (Laakso, 2007).

10. Voter-turnout

Voter-turnout affects both the level of electoral competition and the political legitimacy of a government. Normally, if there is high voter-turnout, then the degree of electoral competition and the political legitimacy of a government in a country will also be high. In Tanzania, there was very low voter-turnout in all the by-elections and the 2010 elections. Table 5.3 shows the level of voter-turnout in the country:

Table 5.3: Voter registration and voter-turnout in the presidential and parliamentary elections in Tanzania from 1965 to 2010

Year	Presidential election				Parliamentary election			
	Number of registered voters	%	Voter-turnout	%	Number of registered Voters	%	Voter-turnout	%
1965	3,373,089	-	2,600,040	77.1	3,373,012	-	2,579,040	76.4
1970	5,051,938	49.8	3,649,789	72.2	5,051,908	49.8	3,647,101	72.1
1975	5,577,566	10.4	4,557,595	81.7	5,577,566	10.4	4,555,992	81.6
1980	6,969,803	25.0	5,986,942	85.9	6,969,793	25.0	5,960,121	85.5
1985	6,910,555	-0.9	5,181,999	75.0	6,910,535	-0.9	5,181,576	74.9
1990	7,296,553	5.6	5,425,282	74.4	7,296,544	5.6	5,425,282	74.3
1995	8,929,969	22.4	6,846,681	76.7	8,928,816	22.4	6,831,578	76.1
2000	10,088,484	13.0	8,517,598	84.4	10,088,484	13.0	7,442,798	73.8
2005	16,401,694	62.6	11,875,927	72.4	15,705,223	55.7	11,389,530	72.5
2010	20,137,303	22.8	8,626,303	42.8	20,137,303	28.2	8,626,303	42.2

Source: REDET & TLS (2012)

There are very few studies that explain this state of affairs (see Oswald, 2010; Shumbusho, 2012; REDET & TLS, 2012). These studies observed that there were a number of factors for this phenomenon, including the following: People's dissatisfaction with the performance of the leaders and the government, inadequate civic and voter education, a fear of violence, insecurity and intimidation at polling stations, CCM's new method of nominating candidates as well as the issue of unopposed candidates, people's low trust in the ruling party and their little confidence in the opposition parties' ability to lead the country, the loss, misplacement or sell of voter IDs, anomalies in the PNVR, long distances between where polling stations are and where voters' residences are, voter IDs obtained for other purposes, socio-economic obligations and other priorities on Election Day, the

postponement of parliamentary elections in some constituencies and the migration of voters to other places.

11. Conclusion

Electoral competition in Tanzania is very low. This state of affairs has caused the country to be described as a stable authoritarian regime. It is a result of the fusion of the ruling party and the state. The process of de-linking the state from the ruling party hasn't been completed yet. Moreover, the ruling party managed the transitional politics, and thus designed the rules of the game in its favour. All the political reforms that have been made cannot lead to the development of a competitive democracy in Tanzania because they are cosmetic. In addition, the ruling regime has weakened the existing political parties and civil society organizations.

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