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THE PARADOX OF VOTER TURNOUT IN THE 2010 TANZANIA GENERAL ELECTIONS

The Case of Three Constituencies

Respicius Shumbusho Damian

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THE PARADOX OF VOTER TURNOUT IN THE TANZANIA 2010 GENERAL ELECTIONS

The Case of Three Constituencies

By

Respicius Shumbusho Damian

A Dissertation Submitted in (Partial) Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts (Political Science and Public Administration) of the University of Dar Es Salaam

University of Dar es salaam
October, 2012

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certifies that he has read and hereby recommends for acceptance by the University of Dar es salaam a dissertation entitled: **The Paradox of Voter Turnout in the Tanzania 2010 General Elections: the Case of Three Constituencies** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (Political Science and Public Administration)



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(Supervisor)

11/11/2012


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DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated with love to my mother, Gaudencia Kokushubira Damian. She is the only woman on earth who did a great thing than just bringing a man to the world. The only wonderful she did was; she was a housewife in a poor peasantry family, but let the family live thrifty life to let her son go to school. It is rare to find such a woman in most of the peasantry families.

ABSTRACT

This study examined the causes of low voter turnout in the Tanzania 2010 general elections. The focus was on the general causes of low voter turnout and the influence of voter education and voter mobilization by political parties on voter turnout. The study adopted a case study strategy where Karatu, Ubungo, and Igalula constituencies were purposely sampled. Data was generated by conducting structured interviews with 150 respondents from voters who had registered for the 2010 general elections and in-depth interviews with 32 stakeholders, including candidates, political party leaders, election officials and leaders of CSOs.

The findings revealed that low voter turnout was caused by a combination of factors. These factors include voters' concerns about economic hardship, low political efficacy among voters, the belief that individual vote can not make significant change, loss of confidence in the democratic value of elections, and the lack of significant competition within the elections. The findings also demonstrate that voter education was not effective enough in terms of influencing higher voter turnout due to the weakness in planning and implementation. The government left financing attention in hands of Development Partners. Political parties, instead of mobilizing voters to vote, concentrated on advertizing their policies and candidates as well as attacking their opponents. The role of achieving higher turnout to support them on Election Day was in most cases skipped.

The study recommends that there should be a permanent government fund for voter education, a well planned and sustainable voter education programme, a review of election laws, establishment of a permanent fund for mobilizing finance for Voter Education. In addition, psephologists should conduct intensive studies on the effect of civic competency and the behavior of institutions such as political parties on voter turnout in Tanzania.

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

CBOs:	Community based organizations
CCM:	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CHADEMA:	Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CHAUSTA:	Chama cha Haki na Usitawi
CSAE:	Conference for Study of African Economies
CSOs:	Civil Society Organizations
CUF:	Civic United Front
DC	District Commissioner
DDTP	Deepening Democracy Tanzania Project
DP:	Democratic Party
DPs	Development Partners
EMB	Election Management Body
EUOM:	European Union Observer Mission
FBOs:	Faith Based Organizations
FGD:	Focus Group Discussion
FORD:	Forum for Restoration of Democracy
IDEA:	International Institute for Democracy and Election Assistance
IDEA:	Institute for Democratic and Elections Assistance
LHRC:	Legal and Human Rights Centre
MP:	Member of Parliament
NCCR-MAGEUZI:	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi
NEC:	National Election Commission
NGO:	Non Governmental Organization
NLD:	National League for Democracy
NRA	National Reconstruction Alliance,
PNVR:	National Permanent Voter Registrar
PPT-MAENDELEO:	Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo
REDET:	Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania
RO	Returning Officer
SAU:	Sauti ya Umma
SPSS:	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
TEMCO:	Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee
TLS:	Tanganyika Law Society
UNDP:	United Nations Development Program
VE	Voter Education
VESP:	Voter Education Strategic Plan
YUNA	Youth of the United Nations Association

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CHAPTER ONE

THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND ITS CONTEXT

1.1. Background and Context

From 1961, when Tanganyika obtained independence, there have been several efforts to replace the discriminatory colonial system of elections with a more inclusive electoral system. The reorientation of the electoral system involved several initiatives, including changes in the electoral laws, procedures and the general institutional framework for managing elections. During the early 1960s, repressive colonial laws that placed certain qualifications (such as payment of tax) for voting eligibility started to be addressed. Equally, the change in law included the removal of the property qualification in 1962 and the plural voting system, which was completely abolished in 1965.

From 1965 to 1992, Tanzania was under a single party political system. As a result of the national building project that emphasized unity and discouraged competitive politics, Tanzanians had no chance of voting under plural competitive politics. Despite the lack of competitive politics, Tanzania maintained a system of peaceful regular elections every five years. All the one-party elections received a sufficiently high participation of voters, whereby the averages of voter turnout for the six general elections during the one-party period stood at 77.6 percent for both presidential and parliamentary elections. The candidates were screened by the party, and the top two candidates voted for were only distinguished on basis of party selected symbols, such as the hoe and hammer. Where there was a candidate who was unopposed within the party, the voters could just

vote assuming that the unopposed candidate was competing with a ‘shadow’ and thus the ballot papers printed asked the electorates to choose between the only one existing and the shadow. The lack of competitive political parties between 1965 and 1992 did not become a substantive issue in terms voter participation and voter turnout. Voter turnout rates continued to be satisfactorily high, whereby voter turnout for the last one-party election, which was held in 1990, recorded 74.4 percent for both presidential and parliamentary elections.

The introduction of the multiparty system in 1992 gave room for the establishment of different political parties, which brought about different political and economic policy orientations. The assumption was basically that increased competitiveness of the political system would increase public awareness of the existence of choice for ensuring broader economic and political opportunities. However, this was only realized in terms of increasing the number of political parties, the expansion of voter mobilization initiatives, and more empowerment of civil society organizations, which mobilized their members and different groups to be considered in the decision-making process. The shift from single party to multiparty politics had no significant effect on voter turnout. Despite the fact that the population was growing rapidly, the difference in the number of registered voters between 1990 and 1995 was just 1,633,161 (22.3 percent), which was actually no different from the increment in the number of voters after every five years of the single party elections era. The trend in voter turnout in Tanzania’s presidential and

parliamentary elections under both the one-party election and multiparty elections shown in Table 1.1 is a clear reflection that Tanzanian voter turnout was regularly high.

Table 1.1: Trend in Presidential and Parliamentary Voter turnout in Tanzania (1965 - 2010)

Year	Presidential Elections			Parliamentary Elections		
	Registered Voters	Voter Turnout		Registered Voters	Voter Turnout	
		Turnout	Percent		Turnout	Percent
1965	3,373,089	2,600,040	77.08%	3,373,012	2,579,040	76.46%
1970	5,051,938	3,649,789	72.25%	5,051,908	3,647,101	72.19%
1975	5,577,566	4,557,595	81.71%	5,577,566	4,555,992	81.68%
1980	6,969,803	5,986,942	85.90%	6,969,793	5,960,121	85.51%
1985	6,910,555	5,181,999	74.99%	6,910,535	5,181,576	74.98%
1990	7,296,553	5,425,282	74.35%	7,296,544	5,425,282	74.35%
1995	8,929,969	6,846,681	76.67%	8,928,816	6,831,578	76.51%
2000	10,088,484	8,517,648	84.43%	10,088,484	7,341,067	72.77%
2005	16,401,694	11,875,927	72.41%	15,705,223	11,389,530	72.52%
2010	20,146,119	8,626,283	42.83%	20,398,394	8,626,283	42.29%

Source: *African Elections Database*

The data in table 1.1 show that voter turnout in Tanzania was relatively higher in all previous elections than in the 2010 general elections. Tanzania has maintained high voter turnout even under one party election, which are sometimes criticized being a factor for narrowing the chance for voter participation (Kambona 1968, Cliffe 1967, Hofmeier 1997) as well as the three multiparty elections that preceded the 2010 general elections.

The other important lessons may be learnt by examining the trends of voter turnout in the other Sub-Sahara African countries in the process of democratic transitions. Voter turnout in the other countries in Sub-Sahara Africa has not always been regularly high (except for Botswana), but the context under which elections were conducted in different countries could aid in characterizing voter turnout as well as explaining the factors that

influenced a specific pattern of voter turnout. Taking a few of these countries including Botswana, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, their voter turnout trends for their last five elections are presented in table 1.2 below.

Table 1.2: Voter Turnout Trends in other Selected Countries in Democratic Transitions.

Country	Year of election	Presidential	Parliamentary	Year of election	Presidential	Parliamentary	Year of election	Presidential	Parliamentary	Year of election	Presidential	Parliamentary
Botswana	1994		76.5%	1999		77.1%	2004		76.20%	2009		76.71%
Kenya	1992	66.8%	58.8%	1997	83.8%	65.4%	2002	57.18%	57.18%	2007	69.09	69.09%
Zimbabwe	No	No	No	1996	32.3%	30.8%	2002	54.3%	47..5%	2008	42.3%	40.8%
Uganda	1996	72.6%	59.3%	2001	70.3%	70.3%	2006	69.19%	68%	2011	59.29%	59..29%
Rwanda	No	No	No	2003	97.5%	96.4%	2008	-	98.5%	2010	97.5%	-
Burundi	No	No	No	No	No	No	1993	97.31%	91.38%	2010	76..98%	66.68%

Source: Website of International Institute for Democracy and Elections Assistance (IDEA)

Taking the experience of Kenya, Uganda, and Botswana, the data for voter turnout trends provide different lessons. First, each country has a relatively predictable pattern of voter turnout. For example, the voter turnout for Botswana is regularly high. Voter turnout for Kenya is regularly satisfactory, though not as high as that of Botswana. Voter turnout for Zimbabwe is regularly low and no-one would be surprised that voter turnout recorded below 40 percent in Zimbabwe.

The second lesson that may be learnt from voter turnout trends in these countries is that it is possible to correlate the economic and political contexts of a given country and its

regular pattern of voter turnout. For example, voter turnout in Botswana is always foreseen to be relatively good due to economic stability and relatively consolidated democracy, in which the concern of the state and its institutions is no longer preventing democratic breakdown, but rather is providing better services to the people. Zimbabwe and Uganda have a relatively low and gradually declining voter turnout. The reasons that may be associated with this pattern of voter turnout include the long experience of elections that do not bring about change, unhealthy civil society, and specifically for Zimbabwe the economic instability of late 1990s and 2000s. In the case of Rwanda and Burundi, the elections were held after years of tribal wars and unrest. Thus, voter turnout was very high probably due to voters' optimistic desire to use democratic elections as a means of choosing democratic leadership that would restore peace and strongly promote economic recovery.

Something important to note is that, unlike these countries, the sudden decline in voter turnout during the 2010 general elections was unforeseen and unprecedented. However, the lesson that Tanzania had to take from these countries is that higher turnout in a single election as a result of mobilization and educational initiatives may not necessarily guarantee a high turnout in the next elections. This is proved by the high voter turnout during the 1997 general elections in Kenya (which was actually a result of intensive strategic initiatives to increase voter turnout) and the reversal in voter turnout that happened in the 2002 general elections in Kenya.

Since the reintroduction of multiparty elections in 1992 there have been several initiatives to improve voter turnout and voter participation in Tanzania. The efforts included the development and use of the Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR) that started during the 1995 general elections, but came to be effectively implemented during the 2005 general elections. Along with the initiative to develop a voters' roll, formal voter education programmes started during the 1995 general elections. The provision of voter education was taken up by the National Elections Commission (NEC) as an important part of election management that should be well coordinated to increase voter awareness and higher turnout during elections. During the 2005 elections, voter education became a major project that included a broader range of stakeholders including the NEC (and the Zanzibar Elections Commission (ZEC) for Zanzibar), the mass media, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Faith-Based Organization (FBOs).

During the 2010 general elections, achieving higher voter participation and voter turnout was articulated as the central aim of voter education. The voter education strategy was developed by the NEC in consultation with different stakeholders. The strategy identified the key stakeholders, which would provide voter education, as CSOs, the mass media and political parties. The implementation of this comprehensive voter education project, which was officially known as the Voter Education Support Project (VESP), was financially and logistically supported by different stakeholders, including the United Nations Development Program and other development partners like the European Union, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and the United Kingdoms. 43 CSOs and FBOs

were financed to provide voter education to targeted groups with low-voting behaviour, such as women, the youth, people with disabilities, and people living in remote areas.

Political parties on the other hand were also supported through different means, including capacity building, the amendment of laws such as enactment of the Election Expenses Act No. 6 of 2010 and the introduction of the Code of Conduct for political parties, to ensure fair campaigning by political parties and their candidates. The aim of supporting political parties was to make them capable of conducting effective voter mobilization campaigns before Election Day.

The selected and financed volunteering CSOs and FBOs were able to extend their outreach into rural and remote areas to educate voters to participate in the 2010 general elections as in previous elections. Political parties on the other hand used multiple strategies and technologies to campaign and mobilize voters' support during the elections. Presidential candidates of some political parties used sophisticated transport technology to reach more voters than in previous elections. For example, the CHADEMA candidate held more than 900 campaign meetings while the CCM candidate held more than 700 campaign meetings. The Tanzania Elections Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) long-term election observers reported that most campaign rallies were attended by many people. Better still, compared with previous elections, most of the rallies were attended by women and the youth who were the main target of voter

education and voter mobilization programmes. Despite all these efforts, voter turnout dropped to 42.8% during the 2010 general elections.

1.2. Research Problem

In 49 years of independence (1965-2010), the United Republic of Tanzania has held eleven general elections and sixty-six parliamentary by-elections from 1965 to 2010. Throughout this period, voter turnout in the general elections has been very good and impressive. Voter turnout remained high for the general elections held under both the one-party political system (from 1965 to 1992) and the multiparty political system (from 1961 to 1965 and from 1992 to 2010). The average voter turnout rate in previous elections stands at 77.7percent. This is a relatively high turnout rate for countries in democratic transition such as Tanzania. Unexpectedly, the voter turnout rate in the 2010 general elections dropped sharply from 72.4 percent in 2005 to 42.8 percent and 72.5 percent to 42.2 percent for the presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively. This unprecedented low voter turnout that happened while there had been concerted efforts to increase voter participation through voter education programmes and intensive voter mobilization by political parties attracted the attention of responsible citizens and other stakeholders of electoral politics, including the government, political parties, CSOs, the media and independent analysts.

Concerted efforts to educate voters on the importance of exercising their political rights to elect their leaders were made before the 2010 general elections. 43 CSOs and FBOs were financed to deliver voter education to different targeted groups. Many CSOs and

FBOs volunteered to provide voter education in different areas. Voters' access to electoral information increased, whereby Synovate, an organization, sponsored by the UNDP to monitor voter information outreach via the media, reported the presence of more than 70 radio programmes, 50 television programmes and 150 local and national newspapers providing votes with electoral information.

Political parties and their candidates used different creative and innovatively advanced initiatives to reach and mobilize more voters in rural and urban areas to vote for them. For example, the use of a helicopter allowed the CHADEMA presidential candidate to hold 900 campaign rallies and CCM presidential candidates to hold 700 rallies. Political parties, candidates and their supporters used web technology such as websites, blogs and social networks as well as short text messages to mobilize and sensitize voters to vote for them. Thus, political parties and their candidates were able to reach more voters than before. Taking into account the outreach strategies used to provide voter education and mobilize voters, it was expected that voter turnout for the 2010 general elections would be higher than any of the previous multiparty general elections, but surprisingly voter turnout dropped sharply from 72.4 percent in 2005 to 42.4 percent in 2010.

Following the 2010 general elections, different reasons for low voter turnout were identified by different observers and stakeholders. TEMCO identified reasons for this including, first, legal provisions that limited voters from voting in their registration stations and those that prevented some voters like higher education students and

nomadic people from voting. Second, many voters had lost their voter registration identity cards. Third, inaccurate management of the PNVR resulted in many voters not being on the list used at specific polling stations. Fourth was the lack of adequate voter and civic education, and the last reason was the purchase of voter registration cards by candidates and their followers as a way of preventing voters from voting for their opponents (TEMCO, 2011: 102).

The European Union Elections Observer Mission (EUOM) observed that the key cause of low voter turnout was the typical 'voter apathy', which was due to the strong belief by the population that CCM, the incumbent party, was going to win regardless of voter turnout. It was also due to the lack of capacity of the opposition to convince voters, the lack of interest in a country historically dominated by one party, the long campaign period dominated by the ruling party, and lastly inadequate voter education (EUOM 2011:37). These findings were also highlighted in the reports of other observers, including the Tanzania Law Society (TLS), which attributed such a turnout to lack of confidence in the democratic process and thus recommended that research should be immediately conducted on the cause of such low voter turnout. (TLS 2010:37). Most of the above reasons do not differ much from the reasons provided by other observers like the Commonwealth Observers Group, which emphasized that the restriction that higher education students were supposed to vote at the polling stations where they had registered contributed greatly to low voter turnout in Dar es Salaam. Voter education as

a concern was mentioned in all the observers' reports as well as in the print and electronic media that published the information shortly after the elections.

The literature shows that no comprehensive studies have been published about the causes of voter turnout in Tanzania. Even the studies that raised issues relating to voter turnout were not able to examine in detail how the widely agreed factors like voter and civic education influenced voter turnout, and the study by Oswald (2010) was based on secondary sources only. In this case, the question is why did this unprecedented decline in voter turnout happen in the 2010 general elections where there well supported initiatives for educating and mobilizing voters to participate in the elections?

1.3. General and Specific Objectives

1.3.1. General Objective

This study aimed at examining the causes of the unprecedented low voter turnout in the 2010 Tanzania general elections.

1.3.2. Specific Objectives

Specifically, the study sought to:

(a) Identify the causes that stakeholders associate with low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections.

(b) Examine the contribution of Voter Education to voter turnout on Election Day.

(c) Explore the role played by political parties in mobilizing their members, supporters, and the general public to vote on Election Day.

1.4. Research Questions and Research Tasks

To achieve the research objectives, the study raised three research questions.

Research Question 1: What were the views of stakeholders regarding low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections?

Tasks

i. *To ask stakeholders to identify the causes of low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections*
ii. *To rank the causes of low voter turnout in order of how frequent they are given by stakeholders*
iii. *To collect the views of stakeholders on the key factors associated with low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections*
iv. *To analyze the views of stakeholders on the causes of low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections.*
v. *To provide a brief account of the Variation in voter turnout across the electorate*

Research Question 2: To what extent did voter education facilitate or hinder the voters from turning out and vote on Election Day?

Tasks

i. *To review the organization of voter education during the 2010 general elections*
ii. *To identify the providers of voter education during the 2010 general elections*
iii. *To explore the methods and strategies used by voter education providers*
iv. *To analyze the common messages conveyed by different voter education providers*

v. *To assess the efficacy of voter education in terms of increasing voter turnout*

Research Question 3: To what extent were political parties able to mobilize the voters to turn out and vote on Election Day?

Tasks

i. *To identify the strategies used by political parties to mobilize voters*

ii. *To explore the common messages conveyed by political parties*

iii. *To assess the effectiveness of the Mobilization Strategies used by Political Parties*

1.5. Significance of the Study

This study, being the first broadest study to examine the causes of low voter turnout by looking specifically at the influence of voter education and political parties on the mobilization of the voters, will provide first-hand detailed information that will be useful for researchers and elections stakeholders in Tanzania and other countries in democratic transition. Specifically, the study shall be significant in the following ways:

First, the study will contribute towards an understanding of the root causes of low voter turnout in Tanzania. Second, the study will serve as a starting point for revealing political behaviour, which if left unaddressed could pave the way for voter apathy in Tanzania. Third, the study shall provide recommendations that are useful for designing strategies for combating political incompetence, which may culminate in, among other things, lack of participation in political processes including elections. Fourth, the study

will be useful for stakeholders who are interested in preventing voter apathy, which may undermine the consolidation of democracy in Tanzania and other countries in democratic transitions.

1.6. Key Terms used in the Study

Concepts may be used to mean different things by different people. In the context of this study, considering the main objective of the study, the following concepts are used to denote specific meanings as explained below.

i. **Civic Culture:** civic culture refers to a set of traditional orientation of the citizens of a nation toward politics, which affect their perceptions of political legitimacy. Civic defines how citizens interact with and how they relate with politics, and how their attitude and confidence towards participating political decisions. It is part of a wider political culture (total pattern of citizen orientation towards politics in a nation).

ii. **Civic Education** refers to a broad range of knowledge and educational interventions that are aimed at creating knowledgeable and responsible citizens. It is generally conducted so that citizens are informed about their rights and responsibilities and the role of government and its institutions in terms of how they interact with citizens.

iii. **Political Efficacy** refers to the amount of faith and impact that citizens feel or believe they have on their government and political institutions. Political efficacy has two key dimensions. The first is internal efficacy, which implies the extent to which citizens feel that they have the power to influence and control the political process, and the second is external efficacy, which implies the extent to which the

government and its institutions are flexible and responsive to citizens' wishes and needs.

iv. **Voter Apathy** is used to refer to the perceived lack of interest in the electoral process among the voters. It also denotes the feeling of lack of personal responsibility, passivity and indifference towards the electoral process.

v. **Voter Education** refers to formal and informal programmes designed to ensure that voters are aware of and informed about the electoral process and are confident to participate in it. It is a planned initiative that aims at providing election literacy and confidence to make the electoral process appropriate and efficacious in the sense that elections result in the formation of governments and the promotion of policies that will benefit the individual voter.

vi. **Voter Mobilization** is used to refer to all initiatives aimed at sensitizing and emancipating voters to support candidates and political parties so that they can win elections. It is also associated with the activities through which parties, party supporters and candidates inform the candidates that their policies and promises will serve their interests and thus they should show up to vote for them on the date and at the time and place identified.

vii. **Voter turnout** in this study refers to the percentage of registered voters who vote in a specific election that they were registered to vote in. In a more specific way, it is used to denote the number of voters who shown up to vote on Election Day and is expressed as the percentage of voters who were registered to vote in the 2010 general elections in Karatu, Ubungo and Igalula Constituencies.

1.7. Organization of the Study

This study is organized in five chapters. Chapter one presents the context of the problem including the background and definition of the problem and its objectives. Chapter two reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that informed the study. Chapter three summarizes the core methodological aspects of the study and provides the conceptual framework that guided the study. Chapter four is a central chapter that presents and analyzes the data on the causes of low voter turnout, the contribution of voter education to voter turnout, and the extent to which political parties were able to mobilize voters to participate in the 2010 general elections. Chapter five summarizes the findings of the study and provides a conclusion and recommendations.

CHAPTER TWO

KEY THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES ON VOTER TURNOUT DISCOURSE

2.1. Introduction

This chapter provides an analytical discussion of the existing literature about the determinants of voter turnout, the influence of civic and voter education on voter turnout and the role of political parties in influencing voters to participate in voting. The chapter also highlights the factors that different studies and sources had associated with low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections. The conceptual framework that guided the study is presented at the end of the chapter.

2.2. Concept of Voter Turnout: What is it? And what is not?

The central discourse that dominated voter turnout studies has been to establish clearly what voter turnout denotes. The debate concerning the meaning of voter turnout includes conservative scholars such as Crew, Fox and Alt (1992), who argue that voter turnout should be defined by considering the number of people who vote in a given election as a percentage of those of voting age. Related to this position, Green and Garber (2004) developed a more confusing conception through introducing the concept of eligibility. In this sense, they argue that voter turnout refers virtually to the number of voters who, when expressed as a percentage of the population of eligible voters, were supposed to vote in a given election. However, the point of disagreement comes because the criteria

used to determine eligible voters differ, since eligibility criteria differ from country to country and may also differ from election to election within a single country.

The more recent and largely agreed on conception of voter turnout is the one that is used by Worcester and Mortimore (2001), who argue that voter turnout means the voters who vote in a given election when expressed as a percentage of voters registered to vote in that particular election (Whiteley, 2001; Rukambe, 2009). This conception of voter turnout has become more consensual since it is also supported by credible global election partners such as the International Institute for Democracy and Elections Assistance (IDEA), African Elections Database, and the Electoral Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA). It is evident that all the competing conceptions of voter turnout try to define the extent to which 'the voters' participate in the final stage of an election, which is casting votes. The noticeable difference arises from the lack of agreement on who exactly is the potential voter under different electoral regimes. Taking the context of the Tanzanian electoral regime, the consensual conception of voter turnout remains the one that takes voter turnout as the percentage of registered voters who show up to vote on Election Day.

2.3. Voter Turnout as an Ingredient of Democratic Consolidation

Scholars have identified higher voter turnout as an ingredient of democratic consolidation. According to Mukandala (1996), who takes a mature democracy as a polity in which the majority of people themselves decide who must rule them, voter

participation becomes a defining feature of a consolidated democracy. Similarly, Plano (1985) holds that higher voter turnout creates democratic government, while lower turnout leads to a government whose democratic status is questionable. Political scientists such as Powell (1982), Blais et al (1990), and Blais et al (1998) go further by stating that voter turnout is not necessarily a condition for democratic consolidation, but rather a defining feature of democracy. From such a standpoint, it can be seen that low voter turnout in Tanzania has some critical implications. First, voter turnout can be taken as a hurdle preventing democratic consolidation. Second, it can explain voters' rejection of undemocratic political authority. Third, low voter turnout may subject Tanzania to democratic questionability, especially by taking democratic citizenship and democratic authority as two complementary conditions for democratic consolidation.

There is a close relationship between voter turnout and the democratization process, especially at the stage of democratic consolidation. Democratic consolidation is a stage of democratization that comes after successful democratic transitions (replacing authoritarian regimes with a system of free and fair participatory elections), whereby democratization efforts shift from installing democratic institutions to avoiding democratic breakdown and democratic erosion, to institutionalizing democracy, completing democracy and finally deepening democracy.

It must be noted that higher voter turnout alone cannot be used as a criterion for asserting consolidated democracy. Some scholars like Maudeni, Mpabanga, Mfundisi,

and Sebudubudu (2007) look at democratic consolidation as being associated with the development of a common vision by a diversity of stakeholders, an active executive that is accountable to parliament, a judiciary that can hold all other institutions accountable, a longstanding government that seeks more powers, and an active civil society that holds state institutions accountable (see also Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2005; ibid 2006; Maudeni et al 2006; Scheduler 997).

Other scholars like Dalton (1988) suggest that the involvement of citizens in the political process is essential for democracy to be viable and meaningful (the same as democratic consolidation), which requires changing democracy into a culture that allows all the citizens to participate in all the political decisions that affect their lives including deciding who is going to rule them. Thus, higher voter participation is by any means an important aspect of democratic consolidation. If a consolidated democracy is a combination of both democratic citizenship and democratic government, then low voter turnout in Tanzania may be taken as a sign of deficiency (and a threat) to the aspired journey towards consolidating democracy. For a country in transition to democratic consolidation like Tanzania, voters are expected to consciously show up during elections and cast their votes as a way of deciding the kind of leaders and political institutions they entrust with political power and authority.

2.4. Determinants of Voter Turnout from Theoretical Perspective

Different theories explain why voters decide to cast votes in elections while others refrain from voting. Broadly, existing theoretical explanations may be grouped under the public choice theory, the rational choice theory, and the political efficacy theory. Public choice theorists like James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962) attribute non-voting behaviour to the individual voter, who is perceived as self-interested and instrumental, with no incentive to vote in national elections since he has little belief that his vote will alter electoral outcomes. The information-seeking motivation of an individual is regarded as limited (Downs 1957, Brennan and Lomasky 1993) and thus individuals remain *'rationally ignorant'* of public affairs.

From the public choice perspective, it is suggested that weighing the benefits that an individual expects to get from the voting against the cost that individual voters attach to voting is the best way of answering the question as to why not many voters voted during the 2010 general elections. However, some scholars such as Aldrich (1997) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) criticize the public choice theory for neglecting the fact that individuals can have a greater commitment to civic duty including voting and sometimes have the incentive to be informed. Thus, the public choice theory in isolation can explain the incentives that make voters participate in voting at the individual level rather than the community level. In the case of Tanzania, the theory may not be entirely useful since the decision by a large number of voters to neglect the polls seems to be a shared decision rather than one based on individuals' instrumental and self-centered decisions.

From the Rational Choice perspective, scholars like Hogarth (1987) and Green (2003) propose that a better understanding of voter turnout could be reached by looking at an individual decision maker as a utility maximizer who makes the best choice to achieve his best objective in any given circumstance. Individual voters in this respect weigh up the costs and benefits of participating in polls. Voters decide to vote on the basis of information they have on what they lose and what they gain by voting. Voters in this respect vote to support or overcome policies and economic decisions on overarching problems. In this view, both voting and non-voting are the result of rational calculations. Voters opt not to vote if they find that refraining from voting does not negatively affect other options that they would have opted to do at that particular time.

The rational choice theory in the context of Tanzania can help to explain variations in the voting propensity of different demographic groups (such as business people, women, youth, and rural voters) in relation to the alternatives different groups have to work on. The theory is also informative as it requires that the decisions taken by the individuals (to vote or not) should be understood in relation to their socio-economic circumstances. The implication when it comes to Tanzania is that issues like economic stability, income, political stability, and general access to social services should be seriously considered when studying the causes of voter turnout and the environment that discourages higher turnout. However, the weakness of the rational choice theory lies in the way it exaggerates the ability of an ordinary individual voter to obtain and deal with

information. In this regard, political scientists such as Crew et al (1992) suggest that the benefits that each individual voter gets from voting are insignificant compared with the costs, which may not be great but are not insignificant for many potential voters.

From political efficacy perspective, scholars like Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954), Lane (1959), Almond and Verba (1963), Karp and Banducci (2006) and Karp and Banducci (2008) suggest that voter turnout is concerned with political efficacy, which determines both civic culture and political participation. Political efficacy as a cognitive concept is made up of a set of beliefs about one's citizenship role in relationship to the functioning of government institutions. Related to voter turnout, the theory suggests that voter turnout depends on the extent to which voters feel capable of exercising control over the political process and political decisions (internal efficacy) on the one hand, and the amount of faith and impact citizens feel or believe they have on their government, political institutions and their processes on the other. Therefore, low voter turnout is a result of a cognitive feeling among voters that they have no power or influence over political processes and decisions (including who should rule them) and the extent to which the government and its institutions are trusted and are responsive enough to respond to their interests and wishes as voters (Blais 2002). Thus, lower voter turnout and voter apathy is attributed to lower political efficacy, while higher turnout is attributed to higher political efficacy.

In relation to voter turnout in Tanzania, without doubt many events have led to reduced trust in the government, its institutions and elected officials since the beginning of multiparty elections in the 1990s. These events have included grand corruption in the government, entering fake contracts, rent seeking in public procurement and deterioration in social services such as electricity, water and sanitation. Therefore, the political efficacy perspective caught the researcher's attention concerning the issue of trust in the government, political institutions and political leaders that may have had an impact on voter turnout in the 2010 general elections. However, the study had some reservations about the political efficacy theory with because, in some circumstances, those voters with lower political efficacy may be more likely to vote in support of reform candidates (though they may not actually vote due to the feeling that their actions do not actually affect the political process). However, it must be noted that this study is not bound by a single theory, although most of the assumptions of the study were informed by the political efficacy theory. The conceptual model that was used for classifying the causes of low voter turnout and for examining how the selected factors (voter education on the one hand and voter mobilization by political parties on the other) influenced voter turnout considered other important causes from the general theory and literature on voter turnout and voter apathy. From the above discussion, table 2.1 classifies the theoretical determinants of low voter turnout as discussed in this section.

Table 2.1: A summary of theoretical determinants of Voter Turnout

	General Factors	Description of Key Determinants
1	**Political and Civic Culture**	Political and culture range from participant, passive, to parochial cultures. Voter turnout is low in a society with parochial civic culture; it is unpredictable in a society with passive political culture, while it is always high in societies with participant civic culture (Almond and Verba 1963, Welzel 2005, Schaffer 1998).
2	**Political Efficacy**	The levels of both internal and external political efficacy affect voter turnout. Low internal political efficacy discourages higher voter turnout since voters feel that they cannot individually (and their votes) affect political decisions and the changes they desire. Low external political efficacy equally discourages higher turnout since voters feel that the political system, government and political leaders are unresponsive and are not concerned for their interests.
3	**Contextual Factors**	**Political Context:** the political context includes o Environment of political insecurity and threats discourages voter participation (Norris 2000) o Negative campaigning discourages and threatens voters (Franklin 1996) o Poor competition among parties discourages voters since they learn who is likely to win/lose (victory margins) o Party system - two strongly competing parties are more likely to encourage higher voter turnout than many small fragmented political parties (Rokkan 1967). **Economic Context**: the economic context includes o Poor and deteriorating economy encourages alienation and apathy. In some cases, it can encourage voters to vote out the government. o Higher cost of living, inflation and lack of access to basic needs may cause voters' active rejection of the political process including voting. o Segregative economic policies may lead to increased non-voting behaviour among certain demographic groups in society.
4	**Election logistics/System**	o Electoral System discourages or encourages voters' participation depending on how they represent voters' choice in the formed government. PR encourages higher turnout since it better represents voters' choice than majoritarian systems (Blais et al 1990: 174) o Single day voting discourages higher turnout compared to two-day voting o Alternative voting technologies encourage higher voter turnout.

		o Polling stations in remote areas and distant areas discourage higher turnout o Laws that impose many voter qualifications discourage higher voter turnout (Franklin 1996:22) o Elections that are held on work days attract few voters.
5	**Individual/Demographic Factors**	o Age: In countries where the majority of the voters are young, voter turnout is more likely to be lower than that of middle aged voters (IDEA 2006) o Occupation: The unemployed are unlikely to vote, while employed people have more voting propensity than the business community o Women, urban voters and voters in the Diaspora constitute the low voting population.(Franklin 2004)
6	**Social Attachment**	o Belonging to a family and other social institutions builds moral obligation which encourages people to participate in voting (Franklin 1996) o Participating in social networks encourages higher turnout since it increases the chance of getting election information and builds a sense of responsibility (Murray 2006).
7	**Facilitative Factors**	o **Voter and Civic Education**: Increases knowledge and awareness, creates conscious, determined and enlightened voters to gather information about candidates and make decisions through voting on Election Day. o **Political Parties**: Play an important role in mobilizing, sensitizing and encouraging their followers, potential voters, and the general public to support them and their candidates. Victory of an individual party depends on its capacity to mobilize voters to turn out and vote on its side.

Source: Compiled from a review of theories

The factors above have tried to point out what influences voter turnout in different contexts. Each factor focuses on an interrelated set of factors, which may be very influential in one country, but not in another. However, these factors have not been able to explain exactly who is a bad or good voter in all contexts. From these factors, a review of the empirical literature on the causes of low voter turnout in specific political settings is required.

2.5. Empirical Studies on the Causes of Low Voter Turnout

2.5.1. Studies from out of Tanzania

Studies not from Tanzania have identified different causes of voter turnout in relation to the contexts of specific countries. Everson (1981) conducted a study on the causes of the drastic decline in voter turnout in the United States of America during the 1970s and 1980s. The study identified that the participation of citizens in important policy decisions had decreased during the 1970s. In connection with limited political participation, he identified that there was a growing belief among voters that they government was not making decisions on the basis of what the people want, but rather what the political leadership wants. In relation to the Tanzanian policy-making models, whereby important policies and decisions are reached without consulting the public, voter turnout may be attributed to the use of top-down policy-making models, which make citizens believe that they do not have a chance of influencing political decisions. Thus voters believe that even though they participated in elections it had little impact on policies and so things would remain the same if they did not vote. However, these findings have one limitation; they cannot explain why some authoritarian regimes like Indonesia, which did not give room for citizens to have an input into policy decisions, had higher turnout than the USA during the 1980s.

A comparative study on voter turnout by Powell (1982) provided an alternative explanation for the growing concern about voter turnout during the 1970s and 1980s.

The findings of this study attributed low voter turnout to the lack of strong linkages between social groups and political parties. His study revealed that in societies where political parties had no strong networks with voters in their communities, voter turnout suffered greatly. If one examines the Tanzania 2010 general elections, it is hard to draw a generalized conclusion that no political party had links with voter groups. Different observer reports including that of Tanzania had associated specific political parties with closer links with voter groups, whereby CCM was more associated with women while CHADEMA was associated with the youth. However, one lesson to take from this finding is how and to what extent the political parties succeeded in convincing the groups with which they had closer links to participate in the elections.

The study by Jackman (1987) suggested that the findings by Everson (1981) and Powell (1982) could not apply to some specific contexts, and based on their findings he suggested that where the number of political parties was small in a democracy, voter turnout was low, but wherever the number of political parties was large, voter turnout was high. Although these findings may explain the importance of competitiveness in elections, it is hardly applicable in the context of the Tanzania 2010 general elections, where there were as many as 18 political parties, but only three showed determined competition. Equally, practical experience has shown that single party elections have always received higher turnout in countries including Tanzania.

Jackman and Miller (1995) did further research and found that electoral systems to a large extent affect voter participation and voter turnout. They argued that single-member district constituencies did not motivate voters to participate in elections since voter choices are constrained. He also argued that the formula used to convert votes into positions affects voter turnout since it determines representation of voter choice. The findings of Jackman have been supported by cross-national studies, which found that the Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system is associated with higher turnout than plurality systems (Blais and Carty 1990; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Jackman 1987; Jackman and Miller 1995; Powell 1986). These findings stimulated the need to examine the effect of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system used in Tanzania, since it is one of the electoral systems which researchers associate with low voter turnout in divided societies, including Tanzania during the 2010 general elections. However, actual experience has not proved that democratizing countries using the PR electoral system like Angola, Namibia, South Africa and Mozambique have always had higher voter turnout than countries using the FPTP electoral system like Tanzania, Malawi, Swaziland, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia.

Radcliff (1992) in his empirical study on the relationship between welfare, economy and voter turnout came up with a quite distinctive explanation. His findings associate voter turnout with government spending on welfare, investment and supporting the economy. He suggests that economic downturns increase turnout at high and low levels of welfare spending, but depress it at intermediate levels. While there is a poor economy, voters can

identify that too much or too little has been spent by the government to boost the economy and welfare and so they are likely to vote in big numbers, but if the spending is not too low or too much, voters are likely to refrain from voting (probably since they can neither aim at voting out the government, nor voting to retain it). However, his findings are criticized for not being replicable (Blais 2000; Jackman & Miller 1995). The findings are useful in the context of Tanzania when considering the state's ongoing withdrawal from spending on public goods, such as education and health services during the 2000s.

Franklin (2004) conducted a study on voter turnout and electoral competition in established democracies. Among important findings, the study emphasized that government performance determined the chances of voters turning out and voting in a given election. Drawing on the cases of Malta and Swaziland in 1960, the findings proved that the extent to which the legislature was able to work on matters of greater public concern determined participation in the electoral process, whereby Malta had high turnout while Swaziland had low turnout in the parliamentary elections. In the context of Tanzania, several public outcries have indeed been associated with the irresponsibility of elected leaders including ministers. Cases of irresponsibility and unsatisfactory government performance have even grown into cases where ministers resigned close to the 2010 general elections. Thus, it is generally agreed that voters were actually concerned about the deteriorating performance of government. However, a big question that remains difficult to answer is whether the voters and other stakeholders

associate low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections with the performance of the government, or any other systemic, contextual, demographic or facilitative factors.

2.5.2. Role of Voter and Civic Education

Many studies have focused on voter education as having a great effect on voter participation. Bringle and Games (1999), in their study, found that colleges and universities where civic education was emphasized, 'the engaged campuses', their graduates demonstrated a greater sense of civic responsibility including voting. De Simone (2001) came up with an opposing conclusion that voter and civic education had no significant impact on voter turnout, but instead it was democratization of knowledge itself whereby the decision to engage in political voting greatly depended on the character of existing institutions (government, parliament, and political parties). Guarasci and Comwell (1997) argued that civic and voter education builds civic responsibility and improves the sense of civic involvement for the betterment of the community.

Branson (1998) found that civic and voter education was important for cultivating the confidence of citizens to participate in the public life of a democracy, to use their rights and to discharge their responsibilities with the necessary knowledge and skills. From this angle, he concluded that a voter with adequate civic and voter education participates in voting, since he feels he is being a responsible decision maker in the polity. Not only these studies, but also comparative studies by Print and Milner (2009) and Everson

(1981) concluded that there is a positive correlation between the provision of voter and civic education and voter turnout. It is probably on this assumption that efforts to increase voter turnout and voter participation in Tanzania during democratic transition focused primarily on the provision of voter and civic education.

Putnam (2000) found that in the USA, while concerted efforts were growing to provide civic and voter education, the participation of the youth and general population in elections was declining. From this study, he concluded that voter education was just an auxiliary factor that could be used to prepare the environment for increasing voter turnout. To him vote education was a strategy rather than a cause. The extent to which voter education can be effective greatly depended on the type and quality of voter education itself. Whereas most studies show that there is positive correlation between voter education and voter turnout, the situation in Tanzania is controversial. The increasing number of voter education initiatives between 1995 and 2010 had not been able to make voter turnout better for the 2010 general elections than for the 1995 general elections. This nature of this relationship calls for the need for an in-depth study on how voter education was organized and provided so as to be able to find out how voter education influenced voter turnout on Election Day.

2.5.3. Role of Political Parties in Voter Mobilization

According to Pomper (1972), political parties have four major functions relating to civic participation. These are aggregation, promotion and defense of demands and interests,

conciliation of competing conflicting interests of groups in society, empowerment of voters to question and control government institutions, and the promotion of political stability by which increased participation can be achieved. Despite the lack of strong political parties in new democracies, studies have established that political parties increase the control of the electorate over elected officials, thereby creating a conducive environment for political participation. Strong and stable political parties in a polity may therefore play a major role in empowering voters, thus making them eager to control political officials through voting them in and out of government.

A more distinctive role of political parties in increasing voter participation is explained by Broder (1971), who suggested that political parties may be instrumental in helping the electorate to retain their preferred candidate in office. However, this should not be taken as a usual case since in some African countries political parties have been used to retain candidates who have not been the voters' choice (Norman 2009, Massoi 2005). Related to the importance of political parties in mobilizing voters, Msekwa (2006) claims that insufficient competition between parties discourages voters. Therefore, it may be cautioned that not all political parties in all countries can encourage voters to participate in voting.

Generally stated, as in the views of Aldrich (1995), political parties are significant actors that determine the participation of voters in voting since they are closer to the voters. Political parties are not only closer to the people, but they also mobilize their members

to take part in elections as both voters and candidates. They further supply election-related information to voters, educate and sensitize them to consciously support the candidates sponsored by the political parties as well as their policies. Therefore, political parties can be regarded as instruments for mobilizing voters and empowering them to hake part in elections.

Before concluding that political parties may always empower voters to turn out and vote, some important questions need to be considered. First, what if the existing political parties convey electoral information to the voters, but instead of encouraging voters to turn out and vote they inform them of their policies? Secondly, what if political parties play their role of mobilizing the voters to turn out and vote, but still the voters themselves do not see the importance of voting (due to low political efficacy)? Probably, the theoretical functions of political parties may not be achieved if they do not specifically deliver the message that all the voters should turn out to support the candidates they like or to oppose the candidates and parties they do not like.

From the theoretical factors reviewed in this section, there is no single factor that can satisfactorily explain the causes of low voter turnout. Each of the factors that have been identified might suitably explain the causes of low voter turnout in one context but may not be able to explain the root causes of low voter turnout in other places, considering the prevailing social, political and economic environment that surrounds elections. Therefore, to ascertain the causes of voter turnout in the 2010 general elections, there is

a need to examine the factors relating to the socio-economic context that surrounded the Tanzania 2010 general elections.

2.5.4. Studies on the Causes of Low Voter Turnout in Tanzania

The existing literature shows that there have been no comprehensive studies on the causes of low voter turnout in Tanzania before the 2010 general elections. Available explanations for the causes of low voter turnout were based on a small sample of studies from the 1960s to the 1990s, which focused on constituencies with lower than average voter turnout rates, such as Mbeya (73 percent), Songea Rural (67 percent), and Linda (65 percent). However, none of the studied constituencies had voter turnout of less than 65 percent. Legum (1965) identified the late opening of polling stations as a major reason for low voter turnout. Hall and Lucas (1974) identified locating polling stations far away from people's dwellings as the main cause of low voter turnout in regions such as Songea and Lindi. Mpangala (1994) identified lack of awareness, long distance from voters' residences to polling stations, opening polling stations late and allocating insufficient voting materials (especially ballot papers) to some polling stations as the main factors that affected voter turnout in the 1990 Tanzania general elections.

The identified factors seemed to be greatly associated with election administration logistics. It should also be noted that problems such as opening polling stations late during the 1990 election might be associated with poor infrastructure, which was a problem for almost all rural constituencies. Despite the fact that the problems associated

with infrastructure were obvious, none of the constituencies identified had voter turnout as low as 64.5 percent, which was recorded in Karatu constituency as the highest voter turnout in the 2010 general elections. Therefore, most factors used to explain voter turnout from the studies from 1960 to the 1990s may have little validity when trying to explain the causes of low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections.

The latest study by Oswald (2010) focused on the multiparty elections and the by-elections held between 2007 and 2010. The study identified different causes of low voter turnout in Tanzania, which included fear of violence that has always surfaced in most elections in Tanzania (mostly in Zanzibar) where police used violence to suppress voters. The second factor was the fear that the election results were going to be rigged as it had become a common claim among opposition parties that CCM usually allied with the NEC to manipulate the election results. The third factor is the failure of successful candidates to fulfill their promises. The fourth factor concerns economic performance and poverty, while another was the discouragement created by unequal advertising of political parties by the media. The findings of this study may be useful since the 2010 general elections were held recently. However, the shortcoming of this study is that it was entirely based on secondary sources and thus it analyzed factors on the basis of what had been reported by stakeholders. It is highly questionable whether one can study what caused low voter turnout without going to the field and asking the key stakeholders what they thought, including the voters themselves, and why they voted or they did not vote,

as well as other stakeholders like candidates, leaders of political parties and election management officials.

From both the theoretical and empirical literature, there is a consensus that voter turnout is a critical for achieving consolidated democracy. Different theories were reviewed, but the study is most informed by the political efficacy theory. The literature shows that there are different theoretical causes of voter turnout, but factors including the political culture, political efficacy, demographic factors and social attachments in society are the major determinants of voter turnout and voter participation. Contextual factors including economic status and stability, economic policies, access to basic needs and services, government performance, trust in decision-making institutions, popular policy decisions and security at any given time are secondary factors; however their impact is more sensitive than primary factors. At the third level of the determinants of voter turnout there are strategic determinants including voter and civic education initiatives as well as the role of political parties in mobilizing voters.

From the literature several lessons can be learnt. First, voter turnout is contextual and there is no single universal set of causes of low voter turnout. Second, voter education and mobilization are strategies that are crucially important for raising voter turnout or keeping voter turnout high. However, the effectiveness of voter education and mobilization may depend on the extent to which contextual factors affect voters as well as the quality and type of voter education provided.

CHAPTER THREE

STUDY METHODOLOGY AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Introduction

This brief chapter provides a summary of the research design that was adopted by the study. The chapter describes how the study was designed, planned and carried out including the design used, the study area, sampling techniques and procedures, data collection methods and processes, and finally the analysis of data.

3.2. Research Design

For the purpose of accomplishing this research, the case study design was considered to be the most relevant. The case study was preferred to other field research designs since the aim of the study was to gain detailed insights into what was happening rather than establishing a representative sample from which conclusions could be drawn. This study employed a case study design, whereby three cases are comparatively used to describe, understand and explain the issues happening in the cases relating to voter turnout, its determinants and the context in which these determinants affect voter turnout. The aim of this study was not to make generalizations, but to describe the phenomena as they occur and interpretively explain why they occur in relation to the context of the case constituencies (Karatu, Ubungo and Igalula).

The case study design was adopted since, as put by Jankowiez (2000), the case study meets the three basic requirements of qualitative research, which are description, understanding and explanation. The interest was to get detailed information about voter

turnout. That is why the researcher decided to concentrate on three constituencies only, but to broaden the study beyond answering the question as to why to include contextual issues like the economy, lifestyles and political orientation as well as processes like voter education and mobilization.

3.3. Study Area

The study area chosen for this research included three different constituencies. These are Karatu in Arusha, Ubungo in Dar es Salaam, and Igalula in Tabora. The choice of these constituencies was decided purposely considering the nature of the problem and the information required. Our target was basically voters (who differ across the country) whose proper location is at the constituency level.

Karatu and Igalula were chosen as extreme cases, whereby Karatu had the highest turnout rate (64.4 percent) while Igalula had the lowest turnout rate of 22.2 percent. Ubungo was also selected as it falls in the middle of the voter turnout strata of constituencies where the majority of voter turnout rates fall. The study targeted the three constituencies since the crucially required data providers were electoral stakeholders (mainly voters), who have relevant information and experience relating to elections in the selected constituencies. As shown in Table 3.1, all the constituencies selected have maintained a specific pattern of voter turnout. For example, voter turnout in Karatu has always been relatively high since the 1995 elections. Similarly, Igalula has always been one of the constituencies with the lowest voter turnout in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 general elections.

The trend of voter turnout in the two constituencies may be useful for answering the question as to why there was a difference between the voter turnouts of the constituencies, with voter turnout in Karatu being 20 percent above the national voter turnout rate while Igalula was below it by 20 percent. Ubungo was taken as an area where efforts to educate and mobilize voters have been great since the 2000 general elections, but voter turnout has not changed much in terms of increasing. Therefore, Ubungo may be more useful in terms of studying the contribution of voter education to increasing voter turnout. Table 3.1 shows the voter turnout trends in the selected constituencies for the past three presidential elections.

Table 3.1: Voter Turnout Trends in Karatu, Ubungo, and Igalula Constituencies (1995 - 2010)

Constituency	**Year 1995**	**Year 2000**	**Year 2005**	**Year 2010**
Karatu	86.7%	85.4%	87.5%	64.4%
Ubungo	63.4%	59.1%	48.6%	30.5%
Igalula	68.9%	63.7%	61.3%	22.2%
Average (All Constituencies)	**73.0%**	**69.4%**	**65.8%**	**39.0%**

Source: Compiled from NEC, TEMCO 1995, and TEMCO 2000.

From table 3.1 above, the trends show that the choice of the case constituencies as the area of study was due to the voter turnout trends that the three constituencies have maintained since the introduction of multiparty politics as well as the extremes of their voter turnout rates during the 2010 general elections.

3.4. Study Population and Sampling

3.4.1. Sample Size

The target study population was basically the voters who registered to vote in the 2010 general elections regardless of whether they voted or not. The assumption was that from the list of registered voters there would be respondents who voted and those who did not. Thus, apart from getting views on why non-voters did not vote, the researcher would get views on why those who voted decided to do so. However, it was also crucial to obtain the views and experiences of other election stakeholders like the candidates, party leaders, returning officers and leaders of CSOs.

The study was based on a small sample, which was drawn from the three case constituencies. The total population of registered voters for the three constituencies was 679,849 voters. Due to time and financial limitations, a manageable sample size was set at 183 respondents, assuming that each respondent represented 1,238 voters (0.03 percent). Out of 183 respondents, 33 were election stakeholders other than voters. 11 of the 33 non-voter stakeholders were selected purposefully from each of the three constituencies. The sample size of voter respondents of 150 was equally divided among the three constituencies to obtain 50 respondents from each constituency. The final sample included 61 respondents from each of the three constituencies making a total of 183 respondents. Table 3.2 below summarizes the respondents taken from each of the three constituencies.

Table 3.2: Respondents' categories and number from each constituency

	Constituency				
Respondent Category	**Karatu**	**Ubungo**	**Igalula**	**Total Planned**	**Total Actual**
Voter respondents	50	50	50	150	150
Political Party Executives	1	1	1	3	3
Constituency Returning & Election Officers	2	2	2	6	6
Ward Returning Officers	1	1	1	3	3
Parliamentary Candidates (3major parties)	3	3	3	9	9
Councilor Elections candidates	3	3	3	9	9
CSO/ FBO which participated in voter education	1	1	1	3	2
Total	**61**	**61**	**61**	**183**	**182**

3.4.2. Sampling Techniques

The study used three types of sampling techniques, namely purposive sampling, stratified sampling and systematic random sampling. Purposive and stratified sampling techniques were used for the selection of the case constituencies. Stratification was done so as to classify constituencies on the basis of voter turnout strata, beginning with the highest to the lowest voter turnout. From the identified strata of voter turnout, purposive sampling was used to select the highest voter turnout, which was Karatu, the lowest voter turnout, which was Igalula, and the moderate turnout, which was Ubungo.

Purposive sampling was also used for the selection of non-voter respondents, due to the fact that all the respondents in this category were specifically targeted since they possessed crucial information that could not be obtained from alternative sources due to the role they played at different stages of elections, including voter education, mobilization and the management of elections. Simple random sampling was used in stages to select the wards, village and respondents from the roll of registered voters.

Instead of using household criteria, which are used for most surveys, the study used the voters' register at village level. After sampling the respondents randomly, they were traced through identifying the polling station and household in which they were found.

3.4.3. Sampling Stages and Procedures

This study adopted a four stage sampling procedure that applied different techniques at different stages. The first stage was done before going to the field while the other three sampling stages were conducted in the field at the constituency, ward and village, respectively. A detailed description of the sampling stages and the procedure at each stage is provided below.

Stage 1: The data on registered voters and voters who voted in the 2010 general elections by constituencies were obtained from the NEC Information Technology (IT) department. The mainland constituencies were sorted according to voter turnout from the highest to the lowest voter turnout. The highest and lowest voter turnout constituencies were taken as extreme cases. The constituencies were sorted according to voter turnout rates assuming that 100-85 percent constitutes 'very high turnout', 84-70 percent (high turnout), 69-50 percent (satisfactory turnout), 49-30 percent (poor turnout), and 29-0 percent (very poor turnout). All constituencies ranged between extremely poor and satisfactory turnout. We selected the highest in the stratum of satisfactory turnout (Karatu with 64.4 percent) and the lowest in the 'very poor turnout' stratum (Igalula with 22.2 percent) as extreme cases and one case in the 'poor turnout' stratum as a typical case where the majority turnout rate was 30.5 percent.

Stage 2: The names of all the wards in each of the three constituencies were obtained from the returning officer's office. One ward was randomly selected by using a table of random numbers. This procedure culminated in the random selection of three wards, one from each of the three constituencies. These wards were Karatu in Karatu, Ubungo in Ubungo, and Kigwa in Igalula.

Stage 3: All the villages or streets in the ward were listed. From each ward, the researcher used a table of random numbers to select two villages from which respondents were to be drawn. This procedure led to the selection of 6 villages/streets, which were NMC and Mjini Kati in Karatu, Msewe and Kibo in Ubungo, and Mbuyuni and Kigwa B in Igalula.

Stage 4: A list of registered voters for each village/street was obtained and the researcher used a table of random numbers to select 25 respondents from the list. The researcher randomly selected 13 female respondents and 12 male respondents from the first village and 12 female respondents and 13 male respondents from the second village. The researcher used the polling station criteria to trace the respondents' neighborhoods and households, since most of the polling stations were located near voters' residences. Table 3.3 below shows the number of selected wards, villages, and voter respondents in the three constituencies.

Table 3.3: Number of sampled wards, villages, and voter respondents

Constituency	No. Of Wards	Sampled Wards	Villages/ Streets	Sampled streets	No. Of Voters	Sampled Voters
Karatu	17	1	7	2	712	50
Ubungo	11	1	5	2	4611	50
Igalula	14	1	4	2	467	50
Total	**43**	**3**	**22**	**6**	**5790**	**150**

3.5. Data Gathering Methods

3.5.1. Primary Data

Primary data in this study included direct responses that show the reasons different stakeholders provided for low voter turnout, their descriptions and explanations of how voter education and mobilization were conducted, their views on how voter education and mobilization were conducted, and the role of actors who provided voter education and were engaged in voter mobilization. Primary data also included information obtained first hand from official documents like the election files. Three major methods were used to collect primary data.

3.5.1.1. Structured Questionnaire

A simple structured questionnaire standardized questionnaire was administered to over 150 voter respondents, whereby the researcher asked questions and personally filled in the questionnaire. All the questions in this questionnaire were closed, except three questions that allowed the voters to give their reasons for voting or not voting, or what they thought was the reason for many people not voting during the 2010 general elections. The aim of using this method was to capture similarities and differences of views on different propositions and the relationship between variables such as causes of

law voter turnout, voter education, and the mobilization initiatives of political parties. The interest was to quantify the views of voters and examine the divergence and convergence of their responses.

3.5.1.2. In-depth Interview

In-depth open-ended interviews were conducted with 32 stakeholders who were involved in administering elections, and designing and implementing voter education and mobilization programmes at constituency level. These respondents included the secretaries of political parties, especially CCM, CHADEMA and CUF, the Returning Officers at district and ward level, Election Officers, parliamentary and council candidates from the three strongest parties in the constituency, and the leaders of CSOs and FBOs who participated in voter education provision.

The researcher designed a set of guiding questions as shown in appendixes and made appointments with the interviewees. The interviews were flexibly conducted so that some new questions could be added, depending on the interviewees' responses to the questions. In-depth interviews were preferred for this category of respondents since the researcher had assumed that the respondents were well informed about how voter education programmes were implemented, how voter mobilization was conducted, and some had participated directly in setting strategies for achieving greater participation of voters in the 2010 general elections. To be specific, the researcher wanted to gain insights, learn from them, see past scenes through the respondents' eyes, and in some cases use the respondents to attest to the accuracy and validity of the claims made by

other respondents. In-depth interviews were relevant since they allowed the researcher to learn from the respondents' experience and they enabled them to bring new insights, give their views, and clarify what they had said in a more flexible way. Through in-depth interview the researcher was able to elicit rich and detailed information concerning past events that was used in the process of data analysis.

3.5.1.3. Use of Primary Official Documents

The researcher used primary documents in offices as primary data. The documents, which were mainly during elections for recording data and not for any other purposes, were regarded as primary sources since, as in the criteria of Storey (1999), they were documented by individuals who directly observed scenes, witnessed the event or were directly involved in it. Official documents that were used to obtain information, which was treated as primary, include the records of meetings of political parties, campaign reports, election officers' spot check report forms in the elections files, and election results sheets. These documents were used since in most cases they enabled the researcher to visualize the context of the elections and voter education and mobilization programmes, and they were considered to be more objective, unbiased and authentic than secondary sources.

3.5.2. Secondary Data.

3.5.2.1. Documentary Review

The secondary data required for the purpose of this study included voter turnout trends in past elections internationally, nationally and specifically in the constituencies. The

study also needed the findings of other documented sources including reports of observers and researchers, and information disseminated online by different stakeholders on what caused low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections.

Along with the primary data, the study used secondary data from its initial stages. This involved collecting published materials like books and journal articles, research reports and documents from credible sources including physical libraries and the websites of organizations such as NEC, IDEA, UNDP, TEMCO, ESP, and the African Elections Database. Secondary data were very useful for the study since in most aspects missing data from primary sources were obtained from secondary sources. These include data on previous voter turnout trends and the population. Also, in some instances, documents like economic surveys and government development plans were useful for cross-validating the information provided by respondents on issues relating to government promises versus economic standards and how they affected voter turnout. However, before using secondary data sources, great care was taken over the quality of data by using the criteria suggested by Scott (1990) of the authenticity, credibility, typicality and comprehensibility of a document in relation to the direction of analysis planned for the study.

3.6. Data Analysis

Since the study was largely qualitative, most of the data generated through both primary and secondary data collection methods were mostly qualitative. They were mostly the

views, comments, explanations, descriptions and text describing certain views or scenes that can favor or disfavor specific conclusions on the relationship between variables. However, the views and facts generated through closed questions were subjected to quantitative analysis.

3.6.1. Analysis of Quantitative Data

Closed questions were aimed at generating data which could quantitatively segregate the responses and views of respondents and develop statistical evidence to support relationship between variables. Constituencies, wards, villages/streets, and respondents' gender classifications were assigned numerical codes. Each response in such questions was given a code (for example Yes=1, No=2, and I don't know=3). The same variable in each question was given a numerical code compatible with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences. Questions requiring two choices were analyzed as if there were 300 respondents (N) instead of 150 respondents so as to avoid statistical confusions arising due to the incompatibility of SPSS with multiple responses. The data were run to generate tables of frequencies and percentages including cumulative and actual percentages. Descriptive statistics were presented using frequency tables to support specific assertions. Wherever descriptive statistics were presented in tables, they were accompanied by textual explanations and discussion of what they imply regarding the research objectives and tasks.

3.6.2. Analysis of Qualitative Data

Qualitative primary data were generated using both open-ended questions in the interviews and textual extracts, which were taken from primary documents such as speeches and text in the elections officers' spot-check and field visitation reports. The data from interview conversations were recorded in a field notebook in accordance with the specific research objectives and tasks. Most of the data were in the form of direct verbatim extracts the interview, while some were paraphrased. The analysis of interviews and abstracts from documents began with open coding, which generally dealt with finding what the recorded text meant. The interviews were broken down into discrete parts, closely examined, and compared in terms of convergence and divergence. The concepts which could accommodate related data were developed and all closely related reasons, events and processes were grouped under their relevant concept. For example, the reasons that emphasize that voters had no knowledge, were illiterate, or did not know their rights, were placed under the concept of awareness. The concepts relating to awareness were also located under the category 'voter education'.

A broader and more inclusive code for a category (such as voter education) was identified and all the reasons and views that could be grouped under it were listed one after another. The codes for different categories were compared and each view or reason provided was located under its specific code, taking care that repetitions were avoided and each listed reason did not include or was not part of the reason already mentioned. The tables of reasons and views on specific relationships were developed so as to

discuss how strongly each of the views could answer the research question regarding the context. The specific interview abstracts and text from documents were re-examined so as to find out where their concepts fell within the context of the study and how they were linked with the research objectives, tasks and the codes developed to accommodate different relationships, views and perceptions. The related concepts were cross-examined to develop a series of narrative presentations that describe and discuss the relationship in relation to the way in which the researcher interpreted the information generated from different sources.


3.7. Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework that guided the study is based on the civic culture theories of Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba (1963), which were enriched and extended by using the theoretical assumptions that explain the determinants of voter turnout. The framework classifies the determinants of voter turnout at three levels. The first level includes factors which are primary and long-term determinants of voter turnout in society. These include the political and civic culture (which includes specific traditional orientations of citizens that affect their political perceptions, how they relate to political institutions, and their confidence in political institutions). It also includes political efficacy, which is actually determined by civic culture. Political efficacy deals with the cognitive feeling of control over political processes that depends on how voters define their capacity to control the political system and the perceived responsiveness of the political system and government to citizens' wishes and interests. The other primary

determinants of voter turnout are the election administration logistics and procedures, voter population demography, and the social attachments and cohesion of voters.

The second level of determinants of voter turnout consists of contextual factors, which are associated with the economic, political and social environment, which may encourage voters to support the political system and its processes. These include the level of economic stability, income distribution, employment, access and affordability of social services, the performance and responsiveness of the government, and peace and political stability during the election. The third level of determinants requires strategic initiatives and actions so as to increase or keep voter turnout high. These are voter and civic education on the one hand, and voter mobilization on the other. The assumption of the framework was that low voter turnout in developing countries undergoing democratic transition may not be strange, since the political and economic context is always characterized by things that threaten voter participation. However, the effective voter education and mobilization of voters by political parties is expected to result in increased voter turnout or keeping voter turnout high, as shown in figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model for Studying Voter Turnout in Countries in Democratic Transitions



Source: Own formulation, but greatly informed by Almond and Verba (1963)

From the conceptual framework in figure 3.1, voter mobilization and voter education were taken as crucial and immediate factors influencing voter turnout. In this respect, the study started by identifying all the factors that stakeholders identified with low voter turnout. After identifying and analyzing them, the study concentrated on exploring how voter education was provided, how it influenced voter turnout, and how political parties were able to emancipate voters to vote on Election Day.

3.8. Study Limitations and Delimitation

The study faced several constraints. The first constraint was that some official respondents were not cooperative mostly due to the sensitiveness of the topic and the belief that the researcher was a spy. To reduce the impact of this limitation, the researcher had to show his identification, and ensure confidentiality and the anonymity of informants. The second limitation was limited accessibility of election documents. To address this, the researcher built a network that provided alternative sources of accessing documents. For example, some documents could not be released by NEC, but could be released by UNDP; some could not be released by the ruling party, but could be availed by opposition parties. The fund provided by the University for the study was enough for collecting data in one constituency. To make the study doable in three constituencies, the researcher had to find private means of getting funds to complete data collection in the remaining two constituencies.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents, analyzes, and discusses the data which were collected from different sources. Different stakeholders including the voters, the leaders of political parties, the representatives of CSOs involved in facilitating Voter Education, and the officials entrusted with the management of the 2010 general elections in Ubungo, Karatu, and Igalula constituencies. The views and comments of leaders of political parties, candidates, representatives of CSOs, and election management officials were captured through detailed unstructured interviews while the data from voter respondents were captured by using a structured questionnaire.

The chapter begins with identifying the reasons for low voter turnout as identified through the questionnaire administered to voter respondents, after which it pays specific attention to the interviews. After identifying the reasons, the data generated through the use of both the questionnaires and interviews are examined, together with the supplementary data generated through the use of official documents so as to find out where they converge or diverge. The chapter addresses three core questions. First, to what did the stakeholders attribute the low voter turnout during the 2010 general elections? Second, how did Voter Education affect voter turnout during the 2010 general elections? Third, what role was played by political parties as key actors in voter mobilization?

4.2. The Causes of Low Voter Turnout

The data on the causes of low voter turnout were collected from two different categories of respondents; these were the potential voters who were expected to vote in the 2010 general elections on the one hand, and other stakeholders including elections management officials, Voter Education facilitators, and the candidates and party leaders on the other.

4.2.1. Reasons according to Voter Respondents

The 150 respondents in the voter respondent category included 99 respondents who voted in the 2010 general elections, while 51 respondents did not vote during the 2010 general elections. The respondents who voted provided the reasons that they thought influenced potential voters not to turn out and vote on Election Day. Out of the 99 respondents who did not vote, the responses are presented in table 4.1 below

Table 4.1: Causes of low voter Turnout according to respondents who voted

		Constituency				
	Reasons	**Karatu**	**Ubungo**	**Igalula**	**Total**	**Percent**
1	Loss of trust in elections and resulting institutions	5	6	6	17	17.2%
2	Lack of sufficient Voter Education	5	5	5	15	15.2%
3	Voters could predict who was going to win	2	5	7	14	14.1%
4	Wanted to punish government for poor performance	3	6	3	12	12.1%
5	Many names were missing from the PNVR	2	4	5	11	11.1%
6	Polling Stations were far from homes	1	4	5	10	10.1%
7	Fear of violence at polling stations	1	2	6	9	9.1%
8	Buying voter registration cards	3	3	1	7	7.1%
9	They did not like candidates who were vying for election	1	0	1	2	2.0%
10	Other reasons	0	1	1	2	2.0%
	Total	**23**	**36**	**40**	**99**	**100%**

Source: Field Data, 2011

From table 4.1, the majority of the respondents who voted thought that those who did not vote had lost confidence in the elections and resulting institutions. Apart from that, 15.2% of the respondents who voted thought that those who did not vote had not been given sufficient Voter Education. Other reasons, which were given weight, included the claim that the voters had known who was going to win, the voters refrained from voting as a way of punishing the government due to poor performance, and the fact that some names of registered voters did not appear on the PNVR list on polling day.

On the other hand, the voter respondents who said that they did not vote during the 2010 general elections were asked to give reasons as to why they did not vote. The responses of voter respondents who did not vote in the 2010 general elections are presented in table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2: Reasons for Non-Voting according to Non Voters

		Constituency				
	Reasons	**Karatu**	**Ubungo**	**Igalula**	**Total**	**Percent**
1	My vote would not bring change/loss of anything	4	3	4	11	21.6%
2	My name did not appear in the voter register/PNVR	3	4	2	9	17.6%
3	I do not have confidence in voting process/and its role	2	3	4	9	17.6%
4	My voter registration card got lost/destroyed	1	2	3	6	11.8%
5	I had travelled/transferred	2	2	1	5	9.8%
6	I did not like the candidate (s) for some positions	0	1	2	3	5.9%
7	I knew who was going to win/even if I vote or not	1	0	2	3	5.9%
8	The polling station was far from my home	1	0	1	2	3.9%
9	I was not registered to vote	0	1	0	1	2.0%
10	I did not like candidates who were vying for election	0	0	1	1	2.0%
11	I was afraid of violence at polling stations	0	0	0	0	0.0%
12	Other	0	0	1	1	2.0%
	Total	14	16	21	51	100.0%

Source: Field Data, 2011

From table 4.2, like the respondents who voted, a good number of the respondents who did not show up to vote (21.6 percent) said that they did not vote since they thought that their individual votes would not bring change. Another significant percentage (17.6 percent) said that their names did not appear on the PNVR, while another 17.6 percent said that they did not vote since they did not have confidence in the democratic role of elections. The other reasons, which non-voters provided regarding refraining from voting, included loss of voter registration card, traveling and transfer from their original registration area, the belief that certain candidates were going to win even if they vote or not, and the distance between residences and polling stations. While Voter Education was emphasized by those who voted as a significant cause of low voter turnout in the sense that those who did not vote did not know about the importance of voting, those who did not vote showed that they knew the importance of voting, but they had intentionally decided not to vote since they saw no reason why they should vote.

Apart from identifying the causes of low voter turnout by comparing the views of those who voted with those who did not vote, an open-ended question that required all the voter respondents to identify the causes of low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections was put to all the 150 voter respondents. Each of the respondents had a chance to mention any three causes of low voter turnout. More than 300 interrelated reasons were mentioned. The reasons were compared in relation to the predetermined causes of low voter turnout. Table 4.1 presents 27 answers provided by the respondents in the three cases in order of how frequently they were mentioned.

Table 4.3: Ranking of Causes by Voter Respondents

S/N	Identified Reasons	Constituency				
		Karatu	**Ubungo**	**Igalula**	**Total**	**Percent**
1	My vote would not bring change	61	81	31	47	10.4%
2	People concentrate on business that enables them to survive.	61	91	21	47	10.4%
3	Elections do not create any change (loss of confidence in elections)	18	21	41	44	9.8%
4	Unsatisfactory performance of government	71	41	21	43	9.6%
5	People wanted to punish the government for poor performance	61	31	01	39	8.7%
6	Voting is a waste of time, it is a cost, people have avoided it	41	31	01	37	8.2%
7	Even if votes are cast, the policies would not change anything	8	9	01	27	6.0%
8	People see no need to vote while they are getting poorer	11	5	6	22	4.9%
9	No reason to vote for people who don't represent us	6	01	5	21	4.7%
10	Fear that the elections would be rigged	1	9	5	15	3.3%
11	Laws prohibited voters from voting out of registering stations	5	6	0	11	2.4%
12	Some potential voters were not found on the list of voters.	4	1	6	11	2.4%
13	People knew that CCM was going to win, no need to waste time.	0	0	9	9	2.0%
14	No need to vote since politicians are concerned for their own survival	2	2	4	8	1.8%
15	Fear of violence at polling stations	1	2	4	7	1.6%
16	Polling station too far from residences	2	0	5	7	1.6%
17	Many people took cards not for voting purpose (M-Pesa, introduction etc)	2	2	3	7	1.6%
18	Voters were not given proper information to verify their records	1	2	4	7	1.6%
19	Experiences of negative campaigns threatened voters	2	2	2	6	1.3%
20	The campaigns signaled that elections would be corrupt /unfair results	1	3	1	5	1.1%
21	They knew that the candidates they supported would lose	1	1	3	5	1.1%
22	The queues were too long at most polling stations	2	2	1	5	1.1%
23	People do not know about importance of voting	1	1	3	5	1.1%
24	Opposition parties are weak, people see no alternative to CCM	0	0	5	5	1.1%
25	Lost voter identification card	2	2	1	5	1.1%
26	Political parties threatened that if they lose they would use violence	1	1	1	3	0.7%
27	The polling day was not convenient for some voters	0	1	1	2	0.4%
		150	**150**	**150**	**450**	**100%**

Source: Field Data, 2011

As table 4.3 shows, there were reasons which were emphasized by voter respondents in all the three cases. The best reasons which were prominently emphasized in the three cases included the belief among voters that their individual votes would not bring change, valuing income-generating activities more than the political process (probably due to economic hardship), loss of confidence in the democratic role of elections, unsatisfactory government performance, voters unaware of the importance of voting. Equally, data from

all the three case constituencies demonstrated that some potential voters did not appear on the PNVR list of voters. The other factors which appeared in all constituencies included the poor performance of government, the claim that elections have not demonstrated any effect in terms of policy change, and the fear created by political parties among the voters during election campaigns. Some factors were mentioned in two constituencies only. These were negative campaigns and the use of voter ID cards for purposes other than elections (Ubungo and Karatu), fear of violence at polling stations and lack of proper election information during the run-up to elections (Karatu and Igalula). Other reasons were particularly identified in specific constituencies. These were weak competition among political parties in Igalula, the effect of laws that prohibit voters from voting out of their registration centers in Ubungo, and the effect of CCM intra-party nomination procedures that divided voters and made some voters believe that the elections were over and thus they would not be needed to vote for the second time.

4.2.2. Classification of the Reasons

In order to develop a systematic pattern of explanations, the reasons identified by the voter respondents in the three cases were examined in relation to the broader conceptual factors that determine voter turnout so as to find out where each of the factors fits. The codes that were developed to consistently classify the causes as provided in table 4.4 below included inadequate Voter Education, diminished political efficacy, loss of confidence in the democratic role of elections, economic concerns of the voters, election administration logistics, weak competition, and other reasons that include issues like security and violence

in the electoral process. Table 4.4 presents the reasons that were saliently stated by the voter respondents in relation to the factors to which the reasons can be categorized. The symbol "√" in the table shows the broader reason in the columns under which the specific statement of reason fits best.

Table 4.4: Classification of causes according to voter respondents

		Category of Cause						
S/N	**Identified Reason**	**Inadequate Voter Education**	**Low Political Efficacy**	**Lost Confidence In Elections**	**Economic Concerns**	**Elections Logistics**	**Weak Competition**	**Other Reasons**
1	Lost voter identification card							√
2	Elections do not bring change			√				
3	Elected leaders do not represent my will/of voters		√					
4	I knew that CCM was going to win as usual, no need to waste time.	√						
5	My vote could not bring change	√						
6	Fear that the elections would be rigged			√				
7	Fear of violence at polling stations							√
8	Polling station too far from residence					√		
9	The queue was too long					√		
10	People concentrate on business that enables them to survive.				√			
11	What do I get; they are being voted for to get money.	√						
12	People wanted to punish the government for poor performance		√					
13	People do not know importance of voting	√						
14	Many people took cards not for voting purpose, but as IDs for services such as M-Pesa, introduction							√
15	Many people were not found on the list of voters.					√		
16	The campaigns and nominations demonstrated that elections would be corrupt /unfair results			√				
17	Poor performance of government		√					
18	Voters were not given proper information so that they could verify their records early						√	
19	The polling day was not convenient for some voters					√		
20	Even if votes are cast, the policies would not change anything		√					
21	Wasted time people have to spend on polls is a cost, we avoided it				√			
22	People see no need to vote while they are getting poorer				√			

23	They knew that the candidates they supported would lose the election						√	
24	Opposition parties are weak, people see no alternative to CCM						√	
25	Political parties threatened voters that if they lose they would use violence							√
26	Laws prohibited voters from voting out of polling stations where they were registered						√	
27	Experiences of negative campaigns threatened voters							√
	Frequency of appearing	4	4	3	3	4	4	5

Source: Field Data, 2011

From table 4.4 above, 27 reasons were identified and established in relation to the voter respondents' views. Despite the fact that reasons in a specific category could be mentioned by many respondents in one constituency while mentioned by very few respondents (or not mentioned) in other constituencies, all 27 reasons related to explanations provided by both the theory and research on voter turnout. Four of the reasons, which account about 14.8 percent, were associated with the inadequacy of Voter Education. Four reasons, equal to 14.8 percent were associated with low political efficacy. This implies that people did not vote since they felt that they had little control over the political process and that the government is not responsive enough to consider their interests. The four reasons (14.8 percent) provided by respondents in all cases were associated with the weakness of competition between political parties in the electoral process. The other four reasons for low voter turnout are directly associated with the election administration logistics including long distances between polling stations, big numbers of voters per polling stations, long queues, inconvenience of the polling day for some voters, and names of voters missing from the PNVR. In this regard, from the views of voter respondents there is no single stand-alone reason that could dominantly be used to explain the problem of low voter

turnout in the 2010 general elections. Three of the reasons (11.1 percent) out of the given 27 reasons were associated with the loss of confidence in the democratic role of elections; three reasons (11.1percent) were associated with economic hardship among the electorate, while five reasons, but which are not related had no common category. These include reasons relating to the fear of violence, divisions and conflicts within political parties, using voter ID card for non-election purposes, and the loss of voter ID cards.

4.2.3. Key Stakeholders' Views on Low Voter Turnout (other than Voters)

The other stakeholders involved in the interviews included three party district secretaries (CCM, CHADEMA, and CUF), two leaders of CSOs and FBOs, the Returning Officers at constituency and ward level, three Elections officers, one from each constituency, 9 parliamentary candidates from the three constituencies including three winners and three losers in each case, and 9 council candidates including two losers and one winner from each of the sampled wards. The different reasons pointed out by the interviewees in the different categories of the key election stakeholders are listed in table 4.5 in order of how frequently they appeared.

Table 4.5: Causes of low voter turnout according to key Election stakeholders

Respondent Category	Party Leaders	CSOs/ FBOs	Returning Officers	Election Officers	Parliamentary Candidates	Council Candidates	Frequency	Percentage	Rank
Thinking that individual vote could not bring change	3	2	5	3	6	7	26	5.9%	1
People concentrated on business that enables them to survive.	3	2	5	2	7	6	25	5.7%	2
People do not know the importance of voting	1	1	6	2	7	8	25	5.7%	3
Elections do not bring any change	2	2	5	2	6	7	24	5.5%	4
Poor performance of government officials	2	2	5	1	6	7	23	5.3%	5
Even if votes are cast, the policies would not bring change	2	2	4	0	7	8	23	5.3%	6
Showing up to vote implies a cost, people must avoid it	3	2	5	2	5	6	23	5.3%	7
People wanted to punish the government for poor performance	2	2	4	0	6	6	20	4.6%	8
People see no need to vote while they are getting poorer	2	2	4	3	4	5	20	4.6%	9
From campaigns voters could learn who would win, thus not to vote	1	2	5	3	3	5	19	4.3%	10
They knew that the candidates they supported would lose election	1	1	5	2	4	6	19	4.3%	11
Opposition parties are weak, people see no alternative to CCM	1	2	5	2	4	5	19	4.3%	12
No reason to vote for people who don't represent my wishes	1	2	4	1	5	5	18	4.1%	13
Fear that the elections would be rigged	2	1	3	1	5	5	17	3.9%	14
Many people took cards not for voting purpose, but as IDs for services such as M-Pesa, introduction	3	1	2	2	3	5	16	3.7%	15
Fear of violence at polling stations	3	0	2	2	4	3	14	3.2%	16
Many voters lost their voter ID cards	1	1	4	2	2	3	13	3.0%	17
Voters were not given information to verify their records early	3	1	2	0	4	3	13	3.0%	18
The campaigns and nominations demonstrated that elections would be corrupt /unfair results	2	2	1	0	4	3	12	2.7%	19
Laws prohibited voters from voting out of polling stations where they were registered	1	1	1	0	6	3	12	2.7%	20
Many people were not found on the list of voters.	1	0	3	2	2	3	11	2.5%	21
Experiences of negative campaigns threatened voters	3	0	1	2	2	3	11	2.5%	22
Polling station too far from residence	1	0	3	1	3	2	10	2.3%	23
Political parties told voters that if they lose they would use violence	2	1	2	1	2	2	10	2.3%	24
The queue was too long	0	0	3	1	2	1	7	1.6%	25
Experiences of negative campaigns threatened voters	3	0	1	2	2	3	11	2.5%	26
Total	**46**	**33**	**90**	**37**	**112**	**119**	**437**	100.0	

Source: Field Data, 2011

According to the data in table 4.5, the respondents were not limited to how many responses they should provide. Thus, the analysis focused on how many times the same reason was mentioned by a specific group of respondents. The overall findings showed that most of the

stakeholders in all categories agreed that the voters did not cast their votes since they thought that their votes would not count. 26 salient reasons were provided by stakeholders. If the 8 top reasons with the highest scores are taken, the reasons that appeared most as causes of low voter turnout were the following. First, there was a predominant belief among voters that their individual votes would not bring change (5.9 percent). Second, people concentrate on business to enable them to survive instead of voting because of economic hardship (5.7 percent). Third, the voters do not know importance of voting (5.7 percent), which may also be related to inadequate Voter Education. Fourth, there is a growing belief that elections do not bring any significant changes in terms of policies (5.5 percent). Fifth is the poor performance of government, its institutions and officials in terms of irresponsibility and failure to fulfill its promises (5.3 percent). Sixth, some voters believe that even if votes are cast, the policies would not change at all (5.3 percent). Seventh, there is a growing belief that polling is becoming a useless cost and thus voters are trying to avoid it (5.3 percent). Last, the voters believe that non-voting is a way of punishing the government and leaders for their inadequate performance (4.6 percent).

Noting that about 40 percent of the 26 provided reasons try to ascertain that low voter turnout was due to the above eight reasons, if the remaining percentage of responses is allocated to the remaining 18 responses, each would receive an average of 3.3 percent.

4.2.4. Analysis of the Causes

As presented in the foregoing sections, different respondents addressed different causes of low voter turnout. In this sub-section, the key causes are examined in detail considering the views of different categories of respondents. The major factors that are examined are the loss of confidence in the conventional democratic role and value of elections, the deteriorating economy and living conditions, insignificant competition between parties, the effect of the electoral system, diminished internal and external political efficacy, and lack of adequate Voter Education. The other factors included fractures and divisions within the strongest political parties mainly CCM and CHADEMA, and the problems arising from management of the election logistics. It is to these factors that we now turn

To begin with voter and civic education, both the voter and non voter respondents said that Voter Education affected the level of voter turnout. Despite data gathered from the voter respondents show that Voter Education was the fifth in rank out of the seven main causes, there are other specific factors, which can be directly associated with lack of awareness among voters. Specifically, this is to suggest that voters did not have sufficient knowledge related to the role and importance of votes in shaping the changes they desire. Such specific expressions were those in which respondents claimed that they would protest against the government through refraining from voting, lack of knowledge that a single vote is significant, and the preconception that some candidates would win the elections even if they do not show up to vote. According to the Returning Officers in Igalula, there were incidents where voters who voted in support of certain candidates spoilt votes by writing on

the ballot papers words to show that they highly supported the candidates. Such actions may suggest that Voter Education was not only a problem to those who refrained from voting, but also to those who had appeared for polls, but they spoiled their votes. Related to Voter Education, one voter respondent argued confidently that she refrained from voting since she wanted to penalize CCM since they had nominated the candidate who was not her choice (instead of voting against that candidate). The same in Karatu, a young voter respondent who was a supporter of CCM said that he did not vote since he knew clearly that CHADEMA would win. In one way or another, these expressions suggest that the voters were not well informed and well enlightened on why voting was important for them. Informed voters are expected to work on other existing alternatives such as voting on opposition side or sensitizing others to support candidates of their choice rather than abandoning the polls.

The second major factor which dominated the views about the cause of low voter turnout was related to the connection between the state of the economy and low voter turnout. Official economic statistics show that Tanzania was achieving economic growth between 2005 and 2009. The GDP was 2.9 percent in 2006. In 2008 it grew to 11.3 percent. In 2010 the GDP went down to 9.2 percent. The controversy was that, more than 80 percent of the respondents who provided data attributed low turnout with the changing life standard. One of the CHADEMA candidates at Ubungo argued that the people have lost interest in politics due to the increasing poverty, lack of assured access to clean and safe water, insufficient income, unemployment, and the raising cost of basic goods and services. To put it straight, one voter respondent in Ubungo constituency said that the concern of most

of the potential voters has shifted from seeking political solutions for economic problems to the struggle to use all the available time to make income that would allow them to sustain their daily needs. This expression supports the view of another respondent in Ubungo constituency whose words could be translated unofficially from Kiswahili as follows:

> *Look at all those 'machinga' (meaning the matching guys), those who work in garages, canteens, bars, 'Mitumba' (means used clothes) sellers, and so many others. They do not have week days and weekends. They cannot stop their business and go to polling stations to cast votes because they are not sure that they will afford their evening meal. Even if voting is important for them and their kids, what is more crucial is how they can earn their daily living. I can assure you that if such persons are given 200 Tshs to leave the queue at the polling station many can surely leave.*

The expression above shows that changes in economy has direct impact on the participation of the people in political process. Indeed, it is also convincing to argue that economic hardship and the rise in cost of living has significant impact on voter turnout due to the evidence of higher voter turnout in Karatu where most of the people have sufficient incomes compared to Igalula where most of the people have low income.

The other inclusive explanation which was commonly associated with the views of respondents regarding low voter turnout was the feeling of powerlessness and little control over the government and political process among the voters (low political efficacy). To start with the internal political efficacy, the data gathered trough interviewing voters suggested that voters felt that they had little interest and capacity to influencing the government decisions. Instead, they felt that once the rulers have taken a decision (including nomination of leaders) nothing can change its direction. This was first realized

when the respondents were asked if they thought they have powers to compel the government to decide according to their wishes. To prove this, one respondent during interview in Igalula explained that "*the country and the government belong to the "wakubwa*" (big persons). In other words, this expression may suggest that voters refrained from voting since they had lost hope that the elections meant exercising their own choices.

In terms of external political efficacy, many respondents had view that the voters did not show up to vote since the government is not responsive enough. One of the interviewees in Karatu commented that the government and its institutions are not in most cases responsive and friendly except the times closer to elections only. In the time between elections, the government hardly listens and works on peoples' needs and interests. In this context, many respondents, 125 (83.3 percent) out of 150, who generated data for this study believed that the government is not ready to listen and respond to the voters' needs and interests while only 25 (17.7 percent) respondents believe that the government is ready to listen and respond to the voters' needs and interests. From this angle, some respondents argued that voter turnout was partly low since many voters did not vote believing that voting does not help anything in making the government respond to their needs.

Another important factor that was commonly raised in the stakeholders' views was that; during the 2010 general elections there was observable change in the way the voters define the role and value of elections. Following experiences of little competition in the multiparty elections of 1995, 2000, and 2005 some voter respondents said that they no longer see elections as a true means of democratic participation. The perception of voters on the role

and value of elections was explained by the voter respondent at Karatu who said that "*having elections today does not differ from not having them*". Such expressions suggest that voters had little faith in the elections. Based on these views, the study was able to identify that the conventional democratic value and role that the voters attach to multiparty elections had changed, which was also leading into declining voting propensity among voters. From this point of view, it is convincing to argue that little confidence regarding the democratic role of elections among the voters contributed towards low voter turnout in the 2010 general elections.

The other important explanation that rose from the data that was generated was the degree of competition in the elections. Learning from the three multiparty elections that preceded the 2010 general elections, some respondents argued that the electoral competition was low to the extent that in most cases victory thresholds could be predicted by voters. Except for some few constituencies like the Ubungo and Karatu parliamentary elections, the candidates, party leaders, supporters, and voters in general could predict performance of political parties even before elections. In Karatu for instance the executive leaders of CHADEMA who were interviewed said that they just voted to rescue the parliamentary elections, but they clearly knew that with exception of Karatu, CHADEMA was not strong enough to compete with CCM for the presidential position.

Likewise, low competition affected participation of both the voters who were supporting both the strongest party and those who supported weak parties. In Igalula for instance, while the followers of CCM said that they did not see the importance of voting since they

were sure that their party was going to win, the followers of opposition parties like CUF and CHADEMA (which were weak in Igalula) said that they did not vote since they knew that their parties were going to loose elections. Related to the influence of the low competition during the elections, an unofficial translation from Kiswahili shows the comment of one respondent who said;

> *We all knew from the earliest time that the fight was not between equal bulls. It was just like a fight between a bull and a calf. All of us had known even before the elections that CCM was going to win. Myself I did not see the reason to why I should climb the mountain looking for the coming river while I clearly knew that it must come down to the valley…There was no need of wasting time by staying at the polling station while I knew that even if a half of this street does not vote CCM was going to win.*

The expression on the extent of competition as quoted above may be expanded to the national level. Stiff electoral competition during the 2010 general elections appeared in very few constituencies such as Karatu, Bukoba Urban, Kasulu Urban, Manyovu, and Moshi Urban. Arguably, the level of electoral competitiveness affected voter turnout in one way or another. The justification of such an argument is that; the voters who were supporting strong political parties were able to learn that the candidates they were supporting would win even without their votes. On the other hand, voters who were supporting weak political parties and their candidates were not encouraged to vote because they thought that voting would not make their choice candidates win elections.

Data gathered through interviews and documentary reviews revealed other causes of low voter turnout. These included the following. First, CCM had introduced a new nomination model which operated like full-fledged elections. In some cases like Igalula, some voters believed that the CCM nominees had already won seats that they were being nominated to

compete for. Second, associated with nomination disagreement, the lost candidates within CCM divided the voters and started to campaign for non-voting among the voters. Probably, this is one of the reasons that make Igalula the lowest turnout constituency in the 2010 general elections. The same case of divisions within political parties was reported in Karatu where some CHADEMA supporters were convincing voters not to vote or to vote for CCM since the nominee for MP position was not their choice. Third, in areas of Ubungo, one respondent said that voters had fear that violence would happen on the day of elections was created by some political parties, which were in stiff competition. Fourth, the effects of First Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system that usually placed smaller parties at a position where they lack representatives in the parliament. Related to this, some of the voters who did not vote said that they have been voting since the advent of multiparty elections, but they never get represented. Thus, they did not see the essence of voting.

Fifth, there were claims of mismanagement of the PNVR where some potential voters who possessed NEC voter registration cards, were not allowed to vote since they did not appear in the updated PNVR list. The cases of missing names of voters were commonly reported in the three cases. Sixth, there were unfriendly electoral legislations and decisions, which discouraged some potential voters from voting. These included the requirement that voters should vote on polling stations where they had been registered, voters whose registration cards got lost within a month or two months before elections had no chance to update their registration. Seventh, after long vacations in September 2010, higher learning institutions were to remain closed until the polls were over. Eighth, some respondents almost in all

cases said that disillusionment of the voters regarding poor performance of the government, government institutions, and elected leaders between 2005 and 2010 was a cause of low voter turnout.

4.2.5. Variation in Voter Turnout

Having analyzed the causes of low voter turnout, the study sought to identify the reason that may explain why there was a great difference between the highest voter turnout in Karatu constituency (64.4 percent) and the lowest voter turnout in Igalula constituency (22.2 percent). Based on the data that was gathered through interviews, the central factor that could explain the variation in voter turnout was the difference in civic culture orientations of voters in the three constituencies. Unlike Baregu (2001) who explained the civic culture of Tanzanians as homogenous, the study identified that the voters of Karatu are eager to participate in politics, they are critical to political leaders; they discuss politics and are free and confident to question on the ways they are governed. This is also expressed in terms of their interest in participating in studies related to political issues. As one respondents explained, during meetings for instance, the majority of the people attend and they are very keen to question their leaders and know what is going on. The civic culture orientation in Karatu highly encouraged participating in political processes including elections. Probably, this is why voter turnout in Karatu was higher than Ubungo and Igalula constituencies.

In Ubungo, one respondent told the researcher that the majority of the people have confidence and interest in politics, but they mostly talk politics rather than doing politics. Thus, despite of being rich in information and easy access to voter and civic education, people do not participate in meetings which seek solutions to problems that collectively affect them. This nature of civic culture may have a bearing influence on scoring voter turnout as low as 30.5 percent despite sufficient information and relatively proper logistical arrangements during the 2010 general elections.

Experiences from Igalula show that low participation was not only in case of participating in the 2010 general elections polls. One respondent, who was also a government official said that the people of Igalula are not politically competent enough to question their leaders and would rather reject attending village development planning meetings or refuse contributing for service rather than holding accountable irresponsible village leaders. In Igalula, politics are treated inseparable from day-to-day affairs and the level of political tolerance is very low. Generally, these civic culture orientations are associated with low participation behavior. Thus, the major difference in voter turnout was mainly influenced by civic culture orientations.

4.3. Voter Education for the 2010 General Elections

The main aim of providing Voter Education is to create an informed electorate, which is capable to participate in the electoral process including casting their votes on the Election Day. The second objective of this study was to examine the influence of Voter Education on voter turnout. In this regard, the study analyzed the organization of Voter Education,

facilitators who delivered Voter Education, the strategies used to provide Voter Education, and the messages conveyed by Voter Education. This section deals with the organization and provision of Voter Education and what the key stakeholders consider to be the influence of voter and civic education on voter turnout in the 2010 general elections.

4.3.1. Voter Education Organization and Financing Arrangements

4.3.1. 1. Voter Education Organization

Voter education for Tanzania 2010 general elections involved both NEC and Development Partners. The NEC is a statutory organ that is responsible for providing voter education, coordinating, and supervising all persons and organizations involved in the provision of voter education. The provision of Voter Education for the Tanzanian 2010 general elections was guided by NEC as stipulated by the electoral legislation. The interview with one of the NEC officials revealed that NEC had strengthened the voter education and information department, which had 11 officials specifically prepared to handle matters related to voter education in the 2010 general elections. The National Electoral Commission formulated a national voter strategic plan 2008-2010 in 2007. The strategy defined both the objective of voter education during the 2010 general elections and the main target groups.

The major thrust of voter education for the 2010 general elections was “to influence the public to effectively participate in the electoral process” (NEC Voter Education Strategic Plan 2008-2010, p. 24). In this regard, voter education initiatives focused on providing

information related to the voters regarding the electoral process ranging from registration to casting ballot on the Election Day. More specific attention was devoted on emancipating the women, youth, persons living in rural and rural areas with limited access to information, persons with disabilities, non-literate, as well as people who live in remote areas.

Data from reports and documents revealed that the Development Partners in collaboration with NEC also played a critical role in facilitating voter education. Ten Development Partners set the basket fund for financing different electoral activities including voter education. The donors under the auspices of UNDP established the Election Support Project (ESP), which was tasked to manage all the election activities which Development Partners had agreed to support. A Voter Education Reference Groups (VERG) was established to play consultative role during implementation of voter education. Regarding voter education, ESP had to ensure that the funds contributed by Development Partners are and effectively so as to achieve democratic participation of the voters in the electoral processes.

The voter education interventions which were carried out with the support of ESP were assistance of NEC regarding voter education contents and design; voter registration learning package; production of voter education material; several voter education information dissemination via radio and TV spots; and special activities targeting the youth, women, and people with disabilities. Moreover, ESP made available the Voter

Education Grant Facility (VEGF) to 43 CSOs, which were competitively selected to provide voter education in the country. Specific physical follow-ups and 'spot' supervision of the delivery of voter education outreach activities by CSOs was contracted to a consultancy firm, Delliotte.

Generally, the voter education planning and organization function was relatively improved during the 2010 general elections compared with the previous elections. There were clear division of functions between the NEC, Development Partners, and the CSOs. Despite the improvement, the study identified some weaknesses regarding the organization of voter education. The terminal report of the ESP revealed that there were weaknesses in the process of ensuring that CSOs outreach activities are conducted as planned. The mechanisms for quality assurance were inadequate. Both NEC and Delliotte were supposed to monitor the outreach activities through 'spot' supervision, but the ESP report show that the two institutions relied on written reports while the CSOs did not reach some of the areas where they were supposed to carry out outreach activities. The number of CSOs which were financed to deliver voter education was low compared to the size of the country and the number of voters. The targeted groups for voter education are found in villages and streets of all the 232 constituencies, which could not be reached by 43 CSOs in about 90 days as it was required under the VEGF.

4.3.1.2. Voter Education Financing

Voter education for the 2010 general elections was financed by both the Development Partners and government of the United Republic of Tanzania. Documented sources of data showed that the Development Partners or donors were the main source of resources for voter education. NEC report on the 2010 Tanzania general elections shows that the cost for the Tanzania 2010 general elections was Tshs 154,560, 531,132/=. Out of this amount of money, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania contributed Tshs 135,635,803,145 (87.76 percent). The development partners through ESP contributed Tshs 18,924,447,987 (12.24 percent). It should be noted however that this was the amount of money that ESP disbursed directly to NEC to meet the cost of election activities. The total donors' contribution for the 2010 general elections was USD 25,644,518 (Tshs 37,056,328,510) as by March 2012 (ESP Report, 2012). As such the total cost for the 2010 general elections by March 2012 was Tshs 179,288,233,260 (ESP, 2012), NEC, 2011: 16). As table 4.6 shows most election activities were directly funded by ESP.

Table 4.6: Funds Allocated by ESP for Election Activities (including voter education)

ELECTION FINANCING COMPONENT	CUMULATIVE EXPENDITURE (USD)	AMOUNTS IN TSHS * (JUNE 2009-MARCH 2012	PERCENT (ACTUAL)
1. Assistance to NEC	8,531,728	12,328,346,382	33.27%
2. Voter Education	5,131,926	7,415,633,070	20.01%
3. Support to Media	1,252,556	1,809,942,712	4.88%
4. Support to political Parties	2,226,053	3,216,646,585	8.68%
5. Election Observers	2,015,377	2,912,219,765	7.86%
6. Peaceful Environment during Election	2,747,313	3,969,867,285	10.71%
7. Operations, Monitoring and Evaluation	2,240,727	3,237,850,515	8.74%
8. UNDP General Management Support	1,525,290	2,708,089,000	6.54%
9. Contingency	0	0	0%
10. Exchange rate Loss /Gain	(26,451)	(38,221,695)	(0.10%)
Total	**25,644,518**	**37,056,328,510**	**100.00%**

**(The conversion from USD to Tshs was based on 1,445 Tshs/1USD).*

Source: Compiled from ESP Report of the 2012, NEC Report on the 2010 General Elections, p. 15-16

As shown in table 4.6, voter education component was received the biggest share of the funds (i.e. 20.01 percent). Consequently, in terms of fund allocation for 2010 Tanzania general elections, of all election activities, voter education was the first priority.

The study revealed that NEC report on Tanzania 2010 general elections is silent on the exact amount of money that was spent on voter education. Whereas ESP report reveals the money that was spent on voter education, NEC report does not. This leaves a lot to desire taking into account the importance of voter education in emancipating voters to turnout and cast ballot on the Election Day. Apart from lack of sufficient attention of government in financing voter education, there were other pitfalls related to organization and financing, which hampered effectiveness of voter education. The interviews with respondents from CSOs which were engaged in voter education activities showed that funds for outreach activities were not released in time. The interviews also revealed that some of the CSOs failed to submit satisfactory narrative activity and financial reports to qualify for the second installments of VEGF funds and thus had to use their own funds and wait for reimbursement. Some of the CSOs which had no own sources of funds had to postpone the scheduled voter education activities. From this point of view, the organization and financing of voter education for the 2010 general elections was not much effective in terms of ensuring that voter education activities achieve the best of their desired objective.

As pointed out earlier, the study findings reveal that generally the voter education activity was not starved in terms of financial resources compared to previous elections. The silence of the government regarding the money that NEC specifically spent on voter education generates more heat than light in terms of the importance that voter education holds as a distinctive component of the electoral process. Whereas the donors through the ESP allocated the largest share of the election funds the for voter education, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania did not. In the light of study findings, it seems plausible to argue that the provision of voter education for the 2010 general elections was largely and generally left to external financing.

4.3.2. Voter Education Providers

Voter Education providers who participated in direct provision of civic and Voter Education at constituency level differed from one constituency to another. In all cases, there were educational information, which aimed at making voters to understand the electoral process in general, their rights to vote, and the importance of elections. There were different Voter Education providers in different constituencies. However, activities and representatives of some providers of Voter Education were reported to have demonstrated their efforts in some areas compared to others.

NEC provided Voter Education materials in all the wards and villages in the three constituencies covered in the study. In Ubungo, NEC printed voter education postures and billboards, which were placed on public buildings including the offices of Ward Executive

Officers (WEOs) and offices of Street Executive Officers (SEOs) as well as Private business areas such as shops and Travel Booking Offices at the main Bus Terminal. In Karatu, there were different posters which were placed on doors of most of the public offices such as the District Council Offices, political party offices, hotels, bars, and even private business premises. In Igalula, NEC Voter Education materials were only found in specific areas which had public building like the police station at Kigwa 'B', the VEO office at Kigwa, and the farmers store at Kigwa 'B' market.

Apart from the NEC, CSOs played role in emancipating different groups of voters to participate in elections. The Tanzania Youth Vision Association (TYVA) for instance was reported to have provided Voter Education targeting the young voters in both Ubungo and Karatu constituencies. There were CSOs, which were engaged directly in provision of Civic and Voter Education like TYVA and Agenda Participation (AP) in Ubungo while other CSOs provided youth Voter Education indirectly through different programs and Trainings. Such CSOs included the Tanzania Youth Coalition (TYC) in Ubungo, Open Mind Tanzania (OMT) in coalition with Full Love Tanzania (FULOTA), which made several meetings with groups in areas of Msewe, Kibo, and Kimara Baruti. Moreover, voter Education was indirectly provided by Faith Based Organizations (FBOs). Such FBOs were the Catholic Women Association (WAWATA), Tanzania Assemblies of God (TAG), which linked congregations with voter education as well as the Young Islamic Activists, who conducted open evening public talks at Ubungo Abiani, Traffic Lights, and Min-Buses' Terminal. The Young Islamic Activists focused on issues related to how Muslims

should participate in elections. Different actors who participated in Voter Education provision in the studied constituencies are listed in table 4.7 below.

Table 4.7: Actors who provided Voter Education

	Constituency		
VE Provider	**Ubungo**	**Karatu**	**Igalula**
NEC	NEC –Brochures -Postures -Billboards	NEC –Brochures -Postures -Billboards	NEC –Brochures -Postures -Billboards
Civil Society Organizations	Tanzania Youth Vision Association (TYVA), Concern for Development Initiatives in Africa (ForDIA), lawyers' Environmental Action Team (LEAT), Tanzania Gender Network Program (TGNP), Agenda Participation, Baraka Youth Network, Open Mind Tanzania, FemAct	TYVA, Pastoralists Indigenous Non-Governmental Organization (PINGOS)	-None
Faith Based Organizations	Tanzania Assemblies of God, Kibangu Healing Ministry, WAWATA Msewe (catholic), Young Islamic Activists	Evangelist Lutheran Church of Tanzania, Roman Catholic, Muslims	Islamic Mosque Elders
Artist and Artist Groups	Different Bongo Flavor artists, comedians, live bands, gymnast, traditional dancers	Music May Day	Twilumba Dancing Group

Source: Field Data, 2011

Data in Table 4.7 reveal that there were different providers of Voter Education. However, Ubungo constituency which was in an urban area had many providers of Voter Education including NEC, CSOs which were obligatory Voter Education providers such as TYVA, BAKWATA, LEAT, and ForDIA as well as CSOs and FBOs, which were not funded but provided Voter Education as part of their action plans. CSOs in the last category include Baraka Youth Network, Agenda Participation, and Open Mind Tanzania. Incase of Igalula, which is purely a rural constituency, the data reveal that there was little outreach of Voter Education providers (especially in villages like Kigwa and Mbuyuni. The same, in Karatu constituency, villages like Kilimatembo and Rhothia are located close to the town, but were

not reached by TYVA and its volunteers. Instead, they ended up reaching streets which are found in the middle of the Town such as National Milling Corporation (NMC), Sokoni, Majengo, and Kati. In this regard, the study revealed that the voter education providers were not able to reach all the areas with potential voters. Most of their activities were geographically overlapping while other areas (especially rural areas) were left without voter education.

4.3.3. Voter Education Provision Methods and Techniques

Different actors used different methods and strategies to reach and educate the voters so that they can become motivated to participate in different stages of elections. The commonly known method which was used to provide Voter Education for the 2010 general elections was distribution of printed materials into different strategic places so that they can be read by the target voters. NEC, which had printed a variety of Voter Education materials including banners, booklets, and brochures, used the government officials who posted these materials in different public places including hospitals, health centers, dispensaries, schools, bus stops and bus terminals. The Voter Educational materials were mainly available in government offices, offices of political parties, while in Ubungo could also be found on walls of private buildings like shops and bars.

The other method which was used by NEC was sponsoring TV and Radio spots aimed at providing specific messages to the potential voters. The spots sponsored by NEC conveyed election related information including the date on which polling would take place, rights of women and disabled as well as voting qualifications. To capture the attention of the

audience, the adverts were casted during popular local TV programs like the “Original Comedy”, “FATAKI”, and “Wa-Hapahapa” shows, which are broadcasted by different TVs and Radio stations. TV spots which included prominent artists like Mrisho Mpoto, Dickson Makwaiya (Bambo) and Abdala Mkimbira (Mhogo Mchungu), and Rajab Mwhishee (Kingwendu) were designed and aired frequently on different TV stations. The spots were mostly displayed on TV stations which were thought to be watched by the majority of the targeted groups. For example, the famously known youth Voter Education spot on TV used a football team in which a youngman show great interest in football compared to voting. The other youth educates him that as the coach has a responsibility to select a strong team; the youth are responsible to vote for a strong team in political leadership that can score a goal in bringing development of all the youth.

The other method which was used to provide Voter Education information was organized debate sessions in which different groups participated. This method was common in Ubungo where TV stations such as Clauds TV in collaboration with YUNA organized youth debates on topics, which aimed at creating awareness related several electoral issues. According to one respondent in Ubungo (who was the first time voter), the debate helped him to understand issues such as voting qualifications, qualifications to vie for different positions, alternative ways of holding elected leaders accountable, and the importance of voting for the youth.

The other popularly used method during Voter Education provision was the use of open gatherings which were usually accompanied by artistic shows by different groups and

individual artists. This method was used by TYVA in Ubungo and Karatu while it was not used at all in Igalula. The TYVA volunteers and local music artists such as Ali Kiba, Husein Machozi, and Barnaba targeted clouded places like Kwa Jacky, National Milling, and NBC ground in Karatu and conducted live concerts at which voter education messages were conveyed by TYVA facilitators. In Ubungo, the method was widely used compared to both Karatu and Igalula. Despite the fact that these events were attended by many people, their effectiveness remained questionable since some respondents thought that attendees were mostly coming to see artists rather than getting electoral information. In this sense, the use of artistic shows as a strategy for attracting and gaining the attention of voters remains questionable.

4.3.4. Common Messages

Having Voter Education is a positive strategy for creating an informed electorate, but the creation of an informed electorate requires that the messages conveyed by Voter Education providers must be able to achieve specific and useful objective. The common objective that Voter Education intends to achieve is creation of awareness among the voters on elections and related questions such as why should they participate and how they should participate. However, this is not enough if voter education does not make all the potential voters determined and confident to participate in the elections. The Voter Education providers were guided by the NEC through the Voter Education Strategic Plan of 2008 and other elections legislations to design the messages that reflect the National Voter Education strategy. Despite the fact that all Voter Education providers were guided by a single strategic plan, the messages they conveyed differed from one provider to another.

The NEC materials contained different messages for different categories of voters depending on what they were emphasized to do. There were messages which were directed to all people, and actually urged them to exercise their voting rights by virtue of being citizens. Some messages warned the voters not to be engaged in corruption. Some messages insisted the qualities of good leaders while some expressed the cost of avoiding participating in elections. There were also messages that emphasized the quality of an individuals' vote towards changing the political and economic status of the specific group or all the citizens.

Apart from the general messages, some CSOs and CBOs had messages which aimed at building solidarity among the specific groups of members so that they can vote with a certain concern or show up (or refrain from voting) due to a very specific reason that each actor had given. Examples of Voter Education providers who were said to convey messages building solidarity for members to take a specific action were BAKWATA, TAMWA, TAWLA, PINGOS, Anglican Church, FemAct, and Tanzania Gender Network Program. Table 4.8 bellow summarizes the messages which were commonly conveyed by Voter Education providers during the 2010 general elections.

Table 4.8: Common Voter Education Messages

	Message Extract (as written, or quoted)	Emphasis Point						Often Appeared/ Mostly Used By
		The Value of voting	Insist to vote (E-day)	Vote Knowledgeably	Right &Responsibility	Solidarity building	Other Information	
1	Choose leaders who care for us, not for their own welfare			√				FemAct /TYVA,NEC
2	Your vote matters for the change you aspire	√						TYVA/NEC
3	Women are capable, give them the chance to prove					√		TGNP/TAMWA
4	Your vote is your right, make sure you exercise it				√			NEC, TYVA, etc
5	They should assure us that they do it, otherwise no vote						√	BAKWATA/ELCT
6	Women have rights to vote and be voted for in elections				√			NEC/TAWLA
7	Only one vote makes you loose your choice candidate	√						NEC/TYVA, etc
8	The elections shall be held on October 30 2010						√	NEC/TYVA/TGN
9	You will not be allowed to vote if you lose voter ID						√	NEC/TYVA
10	Get at the polling station early on the polling day						√	NEC/TYVA
11	Verify registration status on polling station before E-day						√	NEC/TYVA
12	It is time for women to demonstrate that they can lead					√		NEC/FemAct/TG
13	It is a criminal offense to sell/destroy your voter ID						√	NEC
14	Participating in elections is complete only when you vote		√					TYVA
15	Your vote has a power of change, use it confidently			√				NEC
16	The future of Tanzania is in your Hand Go and Vote		√					NEC
17	You can only vote if you are registered						√	NEC
18	Any citizen above 18 years can vote				√			NEC/TYVA, etc
19	Vote in person or select a person you know well to help						√	NEC

20	Writing any word on the ballot paper makes it spoilt						√	NEC/TYV
21	Elections is a proper chance to hold leaders accountable	√						TYVA/AGP/OMT
22	Through elections you exercise your democratic right	√						TYVA/NEC,etc
23	Voting is also a responsibility, comes from God				√			TEC
24	Pray for peace during elections, It is our responsibility				√			TEC

Source: Field Data, 2011

Table 4.8 shows that most of the Voter Education messages were about educating voters on a variety of issues related to elections and their democratic rights. The NEC, the Election Management Body had mandate of providing Voter Education for all voting groups. NEC directly conveyed messages that carried information needed by voters to participate confidently in elections. Apart from information that enhanced awareness of specific voter groups, NEC conveyed messages which provided information on the general election conduct as well as the 'dos' and 'don'ts' in the elections.

On the side of CSOs, TYVA concentrated on the youth group as TGNP, TAWLA, FemAct, and TAMWA were doing for women voters. However, unlike TAMWA, TYVA, and TAWLA's central messages, TVYA concentrated on supplying elections information, encouraging the youth to vote, and also building confidence among the youth to participate with determination and become aware of the value of their votes. Generally, all the Voter Education providers had designed messages which sought to influence some changes regarding how the voters define themselves as decision makers, the process of voting and its importance, and ensuring that voters have awareness before participating in elections. The main weakness in the messages was on their point of emphasis. Most of the above

messages were about increasing voters' awareness of their rights and duties in the electoral process. Very few of the messages required voters directly and specifically to show up and vote on the Election Day.

4.3.5. Strength and Weakness in Voter Education Provision

4.3.5.1. Strength in the Voter Education Provision

The most critical strength in voter education during the 2010 general elections appeared at planning level. The provision of Voter Education during the 2010 general elections was a planned process. It was indeed a rational response to the need to orient the Tanzanian citizenry to the desired consolidation of democracy. In the voter education strategic plan, the NEC identified that there was a need to reduce dependence on donors in the process of financing voter education and related activities. The strategic plan laid down clear target groups that are to be focused so as to increase voter turnout. It is arguably true that the 2010 voter education placed the issue of increasing voter turnout at agenda as the central concern of civic and voter education than it had been for any of the previous elections' preparations. Improvements were also made in terms of having in place the specific officials to manage activities related to voter education within NEC where the Voter Education and Public Information Division worked close with the ESP during the 2010 elections compared to previous elections.

ESP and the NEC started as early as January 2010 to plan for voter education. NEC set up a Voter Education Reference group to play a consultative role in planning and implementing voter education. The group conducted continuous quality control in

designing of voter education material before they were approved by NEC. Moreover, the participants in delivering voter education for the 2010 general elections increased to include CSOs and FBOs, which participated in the program. 43 CSOs were directly sponsored from the Voter Education Grant Facility support basket fund to provide Voter Education in specified target areas. There were also voluntary CSOs, which acquired funds from their own private sources and participated in voter education provision. All these points show that the efforts put in the voter education programs were somehow sufficient compared to previous elections. However, at the stage of implementation, the Voter Education project had several weaknesses as presented below.

4.3.5.2. Weakness in Voter Education Provision

First, the implementation of Voter Education activities started too late that there could be little distinction between Voter Education and campaigns processes. While the planning process started in January 2010, formal implementation on ground started around August 2010 (two months before elections). According to the CSO leader who was interviewed during the study, the implementation started late since the funds for running programs were released too late. In Dar es Salaam for instance, one of the voter education providers argued that his CSOs would have been more successful if it had started its programs before the launch of election campaigns by political parties. Also, related to the timeframe for implementation, the program was taken as temporary in the sense that it was not aligned with long term civic education initiatives. For CSOs which were which were expected to

conduct countrywide provision of voter education, the program was supposed to start at least in June or earlier.

Second, Voter Education project was organized and implemented under an insufficient funding. Although it cannot be denied to say that the government contributed money for voter education, it is hard to be assured that it contributed since there were no evidences showing that the government contributed any specific amount for voter education. Even the NEC report was silent on the contribution of the government specifically on voter education. Instead, the NEC report reported the amounts allocated by Development Partners through the ESP and DDTP to voter education specific expenses

Third, interviews with voter respondents and voter education facilitators show that voter education was overloaded in terms of its scope. It included three different programs which are related but they could hardly be compatibly provided by the same actors, at the same time, and within a short time. These are civic education, Voter Education, and voter information. Data which was collected through interviews with voter education facilitators revealed that Voter Education programs included a very broad range of issues including the rights and responsibilities of a voter (as well as a citizen), functions of a government, electoral legislations, activities in the electoral process, information directing voters on dates of important events, importance of voting, what criteria they should use to choose a leader, avoiding corruption, voting qualifications, qualifications for being voted for, and the functions of elected political leaders such as MPs and president. In actual fact, it was

difficult to cover all those aspects within two months which were busy with other electoral activities including campaign rallies. Effective Voter Education is the one that seeks to achieve participation by all potential voters in the voting process, and prepare the potential voter to cast the vote with confidence. Therefore, Voter Education messages did not specifically seek to make all voters cast their votes on the Election Day.

Fourth, the findings from interviews showed that were some limitations concerning the outreach and coverage of Voter Education providers over the population that was potentially targeted. Most of the Voter Education providers concentrated their efforts in towns and cities. Even in smaller urban centers like Karatu, educational materials by NEC reached the same population reached by the CSOs and FBOs including those which worked as voluntary providers of voter education. In addition, voters in remote areas who had no access to TVs and Radios such as Mbuyuni village in Igalula (which was indeed a typical remote area) did not have access to Voter Education materials, which were supplied by NEC.

Fifth, the study revealed that in some contexts Voter Education programs became a means for addressing issues that prompted differences including religious differences in the electoral process. In Karatu there were allegations that some leaders of ELCT were convincing followers not to vote since the CHADEMA contestant who was formerly a pastor entered politics without consulting them. At the same time, there were related allegations that some of the pastors used Voter Education as an opportunity to campaign for the CHADEMA candidate. Incase of Ubungo, the Islamic Council of Tanzania

(BAKWATA) leaders and activists were alleged of preaching their followers in open forums to use the elections to influence the incumbent presidential candidate to give them the right to have the Islamic court. One respondent, while she was clarifying the topic she had heard while she attended the BAKWATA Voter Education forum she said;

> *They were not actually educating the people about the elections, they were just campaigning that they (Muslims) should have a single voice that they would not support Mr. Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete (who is their fellow Muslim in this sense) if he does not allow them to have the Kadhi Court as he had promised them in 2005(*own translation from Kiswahili language*).*

It is obvious true that if voter education was well monitored, it would rarely deflect to such irrelevant issues. Moreover, little was done to spot-check and control so that independent providers of Voter Education comply with the national Voter Education Strategic Plan and other electoral laws. The study revealed that both NEC and UNDP focused on the quality of plans and reports, which were submitted by voter education providers rather than what they were delivering on the field.

Generally, the point of ineffectiveness within the 2010 voter education provision was due to lack of closer coordination and monitoring to make Voter Education program implementation abide by the planned objectives, legal requirement, and standards. The aim to reach all the target groups was right, but at the time of designing and disseminating messages; the groups like those who could not read and the disabled in remote areas were rarely taken care of. The needs assessment so as to align voter education with political and economic context under which the 2010 general elections were held was not much taken

into account (if it was conducted) at the point of designing messages and strategies. However, there is no any evidence showing that in the whole process of planning voter education there was needs assessment related to which kind of voter and civic education would be relevant. This would in turn help voter education designers to come up with simple methods which focus primarily on getting out the voters to vote on Election Day.

4.4. Role Played by Political Parties in Voter Mobilization

Political parties are regarded by many political scientists as the instruments of democracy. In connection with democratic elections, Johnston (2005) identifies the role of political parties as including mobilization and organization of the social forces that energize democracy. Political parties in elections are guarantors of candidates' commitment to the voters. He argues that political parties promote citizen participation, and at the top of all they mobilize support of the voters —not in the name of civic virtue, but in the name of winning elections. Owing to the last role, "mobilization of voters so as to win elections", voter participation and voter turnout in a multiparty competitive election depend on the extent to which political parties are able to mobilize voters to support them in elections. The most important occasion for voter mobilization by political parties is during elections so that they can turn out to cast votes. To examine the role that the political parties played in mobilizing voters in the 2010 general elections, this study focused on voter emancipation strategies and messages conveyed to emancipate voters.

4.4.1. Voter Mobilization Methods and Strategies

Political parties started the mobilization process by designing mobilization methods, techniques, and strategies. The strategies at constituency levels for most of the political parties were developed by the executive leaders of political parties, candidates, and members of campaign teams. The major method used was speaking on open public campaign rallies. Different political parties used different speakers who used different techniques to effectively win support of the potential voters. In most cases, the rallies were opened by artistic performances like comedy, new generation music, and traditional dances, which were common for CCM and CUF presidential candidates. The performances were used to gather the people, while some had direct mobilization messages. Among these, the most remembered artistic messages include '*Tumewachoka Mafisadi*" (meaning we are tired with squanderers), a song by an artist who was used by CUF mobilizers and "*Chagua CCM*" (choose CCM) of Diamond Platnamz, a famous Bongo flavor performer.

Mostly known speakers during mobilizations were campaign managers and retired politicians who were well respected for example the former president of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mr. Benjamin William Mkapa and the former CCM general Secretary, Mr. Philip Mangula for CCM. The other prominent speakers were Mr. Philemon Ndesamburo, Professor Mwesiga Baregu, and Freeman Mbowe (for CHADEMA), and Julius Mtatiro and Mr. Juma Haji Duni (for CUF). After the prominent figures had spoken to clean the scene, candidates plus their wives (who mostly used to kneel down so as to achieve sympathy of women voters) spoken and mobilized the voters

to vote for them. However, open campaign rallies were rarely used by small parties like SAU, UDP, Jahazi Asilia, and Demokrasia Makini, which were also mobilizing voters in Ubungo constituency.

The second popularly used method was house –to- house canvassing which was used mainly by CCM and CHADEMA. Political parties had groups of well sensitized mobilizers whose role was to move from one house to another meeting household members and convincing them (sometimes through misinformation) to support and vote for their party. This method had taken a unique label in the constituencies for example, in Karatu was referred to as BMW campaign, standing for *Baba, Mama, na Watoto* (father, mother, and Children), where the mobilizers who visited households must also include an old man, aged woman, and young man and woman so as to hold the whole household at attention of listening them. In Ubungo it had different names including, "*nyumba kwa nyumba*" (house-to-house), "*mtu kwa mtu*" (meaning person-to-person), "*kitanda kwa kitanda*" (bed-to-bed), and "*shuka kwa shuka*", (bedsheet-to-bedsheet) as well as "*kanisa kwa kanisa, msikiti kwa msikiti*" (church-to-church, mosque-to-mosque). This method was not used in Igalula. This mobilization method demonstrated to be effective in areas like Karatu where people knew each other and had shared interests, but it was found to be very challenging in Ubungo where the mobilizing teams found themselves puzzled on whom to target while people were busy with their own lives and very few bothered to listen them.

The other strategy which was used to mobilize voters was airtime on TV shows and Radio broadcast where the political parties and candidates were given the chance to speak out

their policies to the voters. This method was mostly used by CCM, CHADEMA, and CUF presidential candidates as well as the Ubungo CHADEMA parliamentary candidate. Related to that, there were debates aired on TV stations where different candidates were given chance to defend their party policies and their own promises. Through the later, candidates were directly questioned by voters and had to respond on spot (but CCM candidates did not appear).

Also, political parties utilized the ICT technologies where CCM and CHADEMA candidates used website and blogs where they recorded campaign events' videos and uploaded them to make them accessible by different groups of voters, especially the youth. Through different social media networks such as Face book, Twitter, Jamii Forum, Global Publishers, Wanazuoni, Viadeo, and You Tube, candidates and party supporters were able to share electoral information with potential voters. For instance, the Ubungo CHADEMA parliamentary candidate used his Face book page to get more than 500,000 people who said that they supported him. He also designed a link that directed the readers to all CHADEMA events' blog and the main party website, which updated the voters with popularity which CHADEMA was winning during campaign rallies. The candidate disseminated information which revealed his personal and party policies to voters through his email subscribers. Probably, this method contributed much to the support he received during elections. The use of internet ICT technologies was a new, creative and probably effective voter mobilization method during the 2010 general elections.

The other methods which were used included the use of phone text messages, which were mobilizing voters to take part in voting while some comprised hateful contents against opponents. Though it was not a legally recognized mobilization method, text messages senders displayed the names of political parties such as CHADEMA and CCM (meaning that they were recognized by phone services provider networks). Text messages were sent to all network users even without their own consent. In turn, the voters themselves could share them through forwarding. Giving examples of some of the messages which the respondents had come across, it was noted that there were text messages with contents which could be unofficially translated from Kiswahili below;

Text Message Extract 1: [*assumed to be circulated by CCM supporters*]
"Leaders of CUF are murderers, they are threatening the voters. If they win the elections they will turn a country into a bloodshed ground"

Text Message Extract 2: [*assumed to be circulated by CCM supporters*]
"CHADEMA leaders have proved that they are murderers since they killed the CCM youth commander".

Text Message Extract 3: [*assumed to be circulated by CHADEMA supporters*]
"CCM leaders are big squanders and they do not have any good intention for the Tanzanians".

Despite the messages did not appeal the voters to support the sender, it was assumed that through hating the parties and candidates that the messages were attacking, the voters would divert their support to the sending party (including voting for it during polling day). Apart from these techniques, political parties such as CCM included supply of free clothing materials such as caps, T-shirts, khanga, and handkerchiefs to voters so that they can show

their opponents that they are well supported and thus would win election. A summary of the methods and the parties, which often used them, is presented in table 4.9 below.

Table 4.9: Strategies used by Political Parties to Mobilize Voters

Mobilization Technique	**Political Parties**		
	CCM	**CHADEMA**	**CUF**
House to house canvassing	√	√	
Open campaign rallies	√	√	√
Phone text messages (SMS)	√	√	
Internet messages, websites, blogs, social networks	√	√	
The use of newspapers	√	√	
Television airtime	√	√	√
Radio airtime	√	√	√
Supply of free clothing materials (khanga, caps, T-shirts, handkerchiefs)	√	√	
Supply of printed materials like flags, placards, postures, brochures, etc	√	√	

Source: Field Data, 2011

Table 4.8 shows that CCM and CHADEMA used almost all the possible methods to mobilize voters to support the party and its candidates in the 2010 general elections. However, the extent to which the methods were able to influence voter participation in voting differed from one constituency to another and still their rationality could be questioned by stakeholders. One of the respondents proved to the researcher that not all those who received clothes had voting qualifications (including registration), while the other respondent argued that the majority of those who received clothes were low income groups like bar maidens, the "*mateja*"(drag users), and the "*wapiga debe*" (vagabonds who illegally promote bus routes at bus terminals). In this view, such mobilization seems to have little practical connection with increase in voter turnout.

4.4.2. Messages Conveyed by Political Parties

The effectiveness of voter mobilization process does not depend merely on the presence or absence of mobilization teams and strategies they use. In light of the account made by Broder (1971) and Pomper (1972), the capacity of political parties to bring out the voters on the Election Day also depends much on the message that the political parties and candidates convey to potential voters and their impact on those potential voters. The stakeholders during interviews identified many messages which conveyed by political parties, party leaders who accompanied candidates, party mobilizers' networks, as well as party candidates at different positions when they were mobilizing voters.

The messages differed from one party to another and one mobilizer to another. However, the messages can be broadly classified into those messages which urged the voters not to choose corrupt leaders, those which urged voters not to listen the opponent parties, those which asked voters to vote for the parties' candidates in all decisions, those which urged the voters not to miss the polls, as well as messages, those which highlighted the quality of candidate and party policies, which urged the voters not to listen the opponent parties when they come into the constituency. Table 4.10 summarizes some of the messages which were mentioned by the respondents. The messages were categorized in relation to what is being emphasized in the message.

Table 4.10: Messages Conveyed by Political Parties

		Point of Emphasis							
	The Message s Provided by political parties, their leaders, and key voter mobilizing teams .	**Don't Vote for Corrupts**	**Do not Listen other parties**	**Vote for us in all positions**	**Emphasis to go for Polls**	**Quality candidate/party policies**	**Others**	**Political Parties which in most cases used that message**
1	Vote for our party in all the positions, a complete team			√				CCM,CHADEMA
2	Vote for 'xx' (candidate)-Vote for 'yy' (political party)			√				
3	Your support to us is only when you show up to vote				√			CHADEMA/CCM
4	Remind you neighbor on the polling day and place				√			CHADEMA/CCM
5	Elect our candidates, are the ones who can make peace					√		CCM
6	Elect our candidates, are the ones who are educated					√		CHADEMA/CUF
7	Our party, the only that can fight 'Ufisadi' (squandering)					√		CHADEMA/CUF
8	When they come, do not listen them (or chase them)		√					CCM
9	Just listen them, but on the voting day do your due						√	CUF
10	Do not sell your vote, keep your voter ID card safely	√						CHADEMA
11	Our party is the one that listens the voters/all the citizens						√	CCM/CUF
12	The only party that can serve Tanzanians out of poverty					√		CUF
13	Take their money, but thank them by not voting them						√	CUF/CHADEMA
14	Look at what we have done, we are going to do more					√		CCM
15	Give us the chance to construct roads, water supply etc.					√		CCM
16	We must stay at polling stations to vote and guide votes				√			CUF/CHADEMA
17	We trust him, we need him (the candidate)				√			CHADEMA
18	Look at poor social services, it is due to xx(party)				√			CHADEMA/CUF
19	The electoral rules do not allow xx (prohibited practices)						√	CCM
20	Trust our party, it is the only that has clean candidates					√		CHADEMA
21	Candidate "xx" is corrupt, I have evidences "yy"						√	CHADEMA/CUF
22	Political party "xx" has no resource, how can it serve you						√	CCM
23	We have all the resources to provide services to you						√	CCM

Source: Field Data, 2011

The data in table 4.10 shows that most of the messages conveyed by the political parties were expressing to the voters issues related to the status of political parties and their candidates in terms of their capabilities, education, competencies and policies. The messages also emphasized other qualifications of candidates including political experience and political exposure. CCM candidates and mobilization teams used to tell the voters how their government has been able to maintain peace and build infrastructure since independence to the present. They also emphasized that CCM is the only party that should form a government that listens to the people. Moreover, the dominant content within CCM mobilization messages included the claim that the voters should vote for CCM since CCM had resources including the offices, the money, and even the schools and hospitals.

Each political party emphasized the cost that the voters would incur if they do not elect its candidates into the government. CCM claimed that the voters would experience wars and loose the growing access to services including health, education, transport, and water. CHADEMA and CUF emphasized that if the voters would not vote their candidates to office they should not expect to see improvement in living standard, corruption would continue growing, and poverty would become endless. However, the specific message emphasized by each party would remain uniform of change to suit the needs of voters in a specific constituency. For instance, the respondents in Karatu told the researcher that CCM leaders and candidates were telling the voters that if they wanted more schools, offices, buildings, and hospitals they should vote for CCM; if they do not, CCM has a plan of taking all its offices including the offices of the District Commissioner (DC) and District Council and leave CHADEMA to build their own buildings. The same, CHADEMA and

CUF in areas like Karatu and Ubungo concentrated on telling the voters that they should vote for their candidates since they are the only political parties which are determined to fight grand corruption and have well educated candidates.

In Ubungo, respondents reported that CHADEMA candidates and leaders specifically told the potential voters that their party was committed to groom up ethical leaders, create ethical government, create employment for the youth, and finally services free of charge. Specifically related to mobilizing the voters to turn out and vote, CHADEMA candidates in Karatu had specific messages that told potential voters that doing away with CCM rule was possible only if they show up to vote on the Election Day. The one popular message which was used by CHADEMA mobilization team in Karatu as it was unofficially translated from Kiswahili was *'Tanzania without Kikwete/CCM-was possible" how to make it possible?-by showing up and voting for CHADEMA"*. Probably, this message had some elements which specifically informed the voters that their support to political parties and their candidates cannot be realistic if they do not turn out (showing up) to vote on the Election Day.

It is clear that all the parties used messages that aimed at gaining support of voters (even of they could not be realistic). However, the weakest point in this kind of mobilization was that, the message contents focused primarily on getting the voters to believe that they must vote for CCM rather than convincing the voters to turn out and vote on the Election Day. It is from this point learnt that instead of assuming that getting the voters out to vote was a the primary concern of mobilization and conveying messages which called voters to show

up for polls, political parties simply assumed that deciding to vote on the election day was not a problem. The big worry and concern of political parties was that, voters would turn out, but they would not vote for their opponents.

The general observation that can be drawn on the messages used is that, the messages were more effective in terms of informing the voters on the performance of the government, candidate qualifications, and policy directions of different political parties. The messages could also inform voters that they have responsibility of making changes through supporting candidates and political parties, which can best serve their interest. On the other hand, the messages were less effective in terms of convincing potential voters to turn out and vote on the Election Day. This gap in mobilization messages arises out of the fact that the main concern of political parties was largely to convince voters so that they could support them and not their opponents. Arguably, mobilization of voters would probably be effective if the political parties were emphasizing that effective support would be realized if all the eligible voters turned out to vote and every voter takes his/her vote seriously as crucial for making change in government and policies.

4.4.3. Assessment of Voter Mobilization by Political Parties

Effective voter mobilization by political parties does not just mean having voters who only understand the qualifications of candidates and political parties. The major aim of effective voter mobilization is getting the best percent of the voting population consciously involved in the election process (especially voting). Mobilization for supporting specific political parties and candidates (whom voters think have policies that can solve their social,

economic, and political problems) important, but it is a more of a strategy to win that may function even where there is low voter turnout. In this sense, the effectiveness of mobilization depends on several factors. These include coverage of the potential voting population, mobilization methods and strategies, and messages conveyed by political parties, of which all were supposed to be realized in terms of increasing voter turnout. The above qualities in their totality constitute what ought to be considered as an effective mobilization, which was indeed more evident in areas with high competition between political parties.

Generally, findings show that in areas where mobilization was done effectively and seriously, used creative, innovative, and inclusive, messages and techniques like Karatu, voters turned out to support the highly competing political parties. It should be noted that the higher turnout for Karatu may closely be linked with existence of a well mobilized population of different groups of voters (including the youth, women, the employed, and the farmers). This level of voter turnout could not be realized in areas like Ubungo where there were mobilization efforts, but the environments did not allow the mobilizing teams of political parties to target voter groups and directly tell them that in order to make their perfect support to parties and candidates they prefer they should turn out to vote on the Election Day.

The general assessment of mobilization strategies by political parties show that mobilization was not effective enough since it did not manage to influence voters to

participate in elections. The weaknesses that affected the effectiveness of voter mobilization strategies root from different processes in planning and implementation of mobilization strategies and messages. Few of these can be clarified in the forthcoming paragraphs.

First, political parties did not target all the groups of potential voters. Each political party tried to side with a limited number of targeted potential groups while some had intentionally decided to neglect some of the potential voter groups in society. For example, much of the support to CCM was from women; CCM did little to mobilize support of the youth. At the same time, CHADEMA, which had invested much of its efforts in mobilizing support of the youth, did not take sufficient steps in mobilizing women voters as well as voters from rural agrarian societies. In this case, the turnout among voter groups became higher for one group in one constituency while low in the other constituency. For example, many of the voters who participated in elections were youth in Karatu, but for Igalula constituency were women. Thus, such coverage pattern discouraged turnout for the youth in Igalula and the women in Karatu.

Second, the methods used by different political parties to mobilize voters were somehow peculiar and some were not able to show feedback before the Election Day. For example, the mobilization teams of CCM in Karatu used to visit one house after another, talking to voters in person, distribution of free T-shirts and Khanga, and candidates visiting churches and mosques; all these ensured that political parties and candidates get closer to the voters,

but they could hardly evaluate their impact on voters. In addition to that, the CHADEMA and CUF strategies of gaining voters empathy through exposing the negative side of the opponent was somehow inefficacious since some of the voters instead of taking steps by going to vote for them, they would rather decide to stay at home on the polling day rather than voting for the 'corrupt politicians' (whom in this sense could include all the politicians including those of CHADEMA and CUF).

Third, the majority of the messages conveyed by political parties were not rationally focused at influencing the voters to show up and vote on the Election Day. The majority of the messages show that each of the political parties was seeking legitimacy and clearness in front of the voters compared to its opponents. Therefore, mobilization activities by political parties could help the voters in understanding political parties and their candidates in terms of their policies, strengths, weaknesses and exploring maladministration within those political parties rather than influencing the potential voters to turn out and vote on the Election Day.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1. Introduction

This chapter summarizes the research design and the main findings of the study on the causes of low voter turnout in the 2010 Tanzania general elections. The summary highlights the major findings regarding the research objectives and related tasks. From the findings, the chapter makes conclusions after which on the basis of three cases draws recommendations related to management of elections in Tanzania.

5.2. Summary

This study aimed at examining the root causes of low voter turnout in the 2010 Tanzania general elections. The specific attention was paid to two major factors that correlate positively with the rate of voter turnout in elections. These were Voter Education and the strategies employed by political parties to mobilize voters. To fulfill the objective of the study, the study adopted the case study strategy, which permitted the researcher to get in-depth information regarding the unprecedented low voter turnout phenomenon that characterized the Tanzania 2010 general elections. Three constituencies, which were purposely selected to generate data, were Igalula, which had the lowest voter turnout, Karatu, which had the highest voter turnout and has been the best experience of oppositional politics since reintroduction of multiparty politics in 1992; and Ubungo, an urban constituency, which arguably had rigorous practice of Voter Education and mobilization.

Data was generated through administering structured questionnaire with 150 voter respondents including 50 from each constituency. The study also involved conducting thirty two in-depth interviews with sampled key election stakeholders including candidates, political party leaders, CSOs leaders who participated in voter education provision, and the election administrators under the Election Management Body (EMB), which included the Returning Officers (ROs) and Elections Officers. In addition to questionnaire and interviews, the study relied on use of official documents which produced secondary data. The data were subjected to content analysis to locate converging and diverging views, which were used to evidence the study findings.

The study findings showed that low voter turnout was a result of a combination of factors. There was no single standalone reason that could entirely explain the low voter turnout phenomenon. Relying on the responses of different respondents, the main twelve reasons which were associated with low voter turnout in order of importance were: First, the dominant belief among voters that their individual votes cannot make change (low political efficacy). Second, following economic hardship, people have lost interest in political processes compared to income earning activities. Third, people do not know the importance of voting (related to voter and civic education). Fourth, the voters believe that elections do not create any significant change in political system. Fifth, voters refrained from voting as a way of penalizing the elected leaders and the institutions created through elections for their poor performance. Sixth, multiparty elections have not been able to influence

significant changes in policies since 1990s. Seventh, the voters see voting as a useless cost in terms of time and resources, which they have to avoid. Eighth, people did not go to vote since they wanted to punish the government for inadequate performance. Ninth, lack of significant competition within the elections made voters foresee what would be the result of polls even before voting. Tenth, the new CCM intra party nomination model divided voters in some constituencies while in the other constituencies made some voters believe that elections were over. Eleventh, the long term effect of the *First-Past-the-Post*/the winner takes all electoral system, which encourages wastage of votes and voter's preference. Twelfth, there were cases of mismanagement of Permanent National Voter Register (PNVR), which led to some eligible voters not to appear in the voter lists at polling stations. The findings revealed that the variation in voter turnout across constituencies was basically due to growing differences in civic culture orientations and civic competency across the country.

In terms of Voter Education, the findings revealed that Voter Education during the 2010 general elections was emphasized and given the deserving attention. The NEC and Development Partners (DPs) capitalized the importance of involving a wide range of actors from the civil society realm. The strategic plan for voter education provision was designed two years before the elections. The priority areas and target groups including the women, youth, disabled voters, first time voters, and voters from remote areas were clearly spelt out in the voter education strategic plan. However, Voter Education was neither adequately

funded nor effectively coordinated. The design of both the contents and strategies did not consider the wider economic, political, and social contexts in which elections were held.

Voter Education programs started too late, almost close to the elections. It was hard to separate Voter Education from campaign rallies. The provision of Voter Education was not sufficiently funded by the government. While development partners allocated specific amounts to finance voter education, the government did not give the voter education component a deserving attention in terms of financing. Quality assurance on spot was not well planned; the NEC and UNDP relied on reports submitted by the Voter Education providers. The number of CSOs that were engaged in Voter Education provision was too small to reach the vast population of potential voters all over the country. In addition, the content of Voter Education was designed as a means for creating awareness of the voters on their civic rights and responsibilities in relation to elections and democracy as well as provision of information on the basic conducts of elections instead of emancipating voters to vote on the Election Day.

Regarding voter mobilization by political parties, the study revealed that the political parties made efforts to mobilize voters to support them to win elections. However, only three political parties, CCM, CHADEMA, and CUF had effective voter mobilization strategies. The common used mobilization strategy was the use of open rallies on which prominent political figures were used to sensitize the voters to support the parties and their candidates. The other common strategies, were the house-to-house canvassing that created

direct contacts between mobilization teams and voters, and the use of the internet technology to share elections information, and promote candidates and party policies. Sometimes, political parties such as CCM and CHADEMA tended to distort information through the use of Short Messages Services (SMS) that attacked opponents on their negative conducts including corruption. To a great extent, mobilization was somehow effective in terms of getting voters out to attend campaigns and question candidates on the performance of their parties. However, there were some weaknesses in the parties' voter mobilization processes. Political parties did not target all the potential voters. Each party invested a lot of efforts in a specific voter group (such as women, youth, rural communities, employed people, as well as higher education students).

Political parties spent much of their time promoting candidates and attacking their opponents rather than preparing all the potential voters to participate in voting as a way of supporting them. On the other hand, political parties such as CUF aimed at building solidarity and instigating the voters to stand against authorities which would side with the NEC and CCM in rigging elections (such as police) created environment of fear that the election day would be associated with violence on polling stations. Generally, the political parties' mobilization efforts were not specifically focused towards emancipating the voters to cast their votes on the Elections Day, they were rather suitable for attracting sympathy and support from voters as well as creating environments for decreasing support of the voters towards opponent political parties.

5.3. Conclusions

The decline in voter turnout during the 2010 general elections was an unforeseen and unprecedented event in the history of general elections in Tanzania. From the study findings, it is demonstrated that the decline in voter turnout during the 2010 general elections was influenced by a combination of different factors. Learning from the voter turnout during the by-elections, which were held between 2007 and 2010, it could be concluded that there was a great need to have strong strategies for increasing voter turnout during the 2010 general elections. The 2010 general elections were held under environments which would not encourage higher voter turnout. First, there were changes in the economy where the cost of living was growing tremendously and it was becoming hard to people to afford basic needs due to the rising prices of basic needs including food.

Second, the 2010 general elections came after three multiparty general elections of which the results had not shown significant positive policy changes as it was expected by the majority of the voters. Third, closer to the 2010 general elections were a number of reported cases of corruption, irresponsibility, and misuse of public offices by elected officials. It is from these three major factors that the majority of the ten top reasons provided as causes of low voter turnout were mostly connected with the loss of confidence in elections, government performance, and the belief among voters that voting would not bring about change. Therefore, voter turnout depends much on the way the voters define the government, elections and political institutions. In other words, when voters have negative attitude towards the government and its institutions, voter turnout may be low.

Efforts to increase voter turnout including Voter Education and voter mobilization by political parties were important for increase in voter turnout. However, the implementation of Voter Education programs could not be successful since it was not sustainable. The preparations for Voter Education strategies and programs started as early as 2007, but the implementation was delayed until less than three months before the Election Day. The implementation of Voter Education programs was delayed due to the fact that the budget for implementing Voter Education program depended much on development partners. While the CSOs were ready to start providing Voter Education, the release of funds by the development partners (including UNDP) was not done in time. Therefore, the study concludes that under funded voter education may not sufficiently increase voter turnout during elections.

Voter mobilization by political parties as an important aspect in the electoral process requires that there should be an adequate degree of political tolerance. During the 2010 general elections, voter mobilization was used as a means of manifesting party policies and attacking the opponent parties. The Election Management Body (EMB), especially the NEC, which was the main coordinator of the electoral process identified political parties as important stakeholders in providing Voter Education, but did not create environment for developing a shared understanding among political parties that the central goal of Voter Education and mobilization was to achieve higher voter turnout during the Election Day. Political parties which are vital actors in mobilizing voters are not well empowered to reach

all groups of potential voters in rural and remote areas. Due to inadequate access to resources, smaller political parties such as JAHAZI, MAKINI, PPT Maendeleo and SAU were only able to reach and mobilize voters in urban areas such as Dar es Salaam while big political parties such as CCM could mobilize voters even in rural areas.

From the findings, it is worth to learn that both Voter Education and voter mobilization can be effective and successful if they are well supported and implemented as part of a comprehensive, strategic, and long term voter and civic education program. Also, Voter Education and mobilization can be effective if it is designed in the way that the contents and messages are aligned with the existing, economic, and political context. Voter Education and voter mobilization will successfully become a means for increasing voter turnout if it is directed towards informing the voters that it is very important for them (individually-each and every voter) to make a decision to support or oppose to changes in economic, political, and social policies.

In conclusion, voter education may not lead into increased voter turnout if it is not implemented sustainably. Voter education may positively affect voter turnout if its strategies and contents are specifically shaped so as to influence the voters to turn out and vote on the Election Day. Political parties may become important vehicles of increasing voter turnout if they are sufficiently empowered to mobilize voters in rural and urban areas. While there are few political parties that dominate voter mobilization process, some of the voters who do not support those political parties are likely to decide to abstain from voting.

5.4. Recommendations

In the light of the study findings and conclusions, it seems plausible to make the following recommendations.

First, there is a need for undertaking serious interventions so as to ensure that the low voter turnout that was experienced in the 2010 general elections does not pave the way into apathy which is dangerous to the growth and consolidation of democracy in Tanzania. The most important way is that, the government should set aside a permanent fund for voter education.

Second, there is a need to review the legislations that seem to undermine voter turnout during the elections. The study recommends that the law that requires the voters to vote in their original registration stations should be reviewed or repealed. Moreover, as a country with many small and weak parties such as Tanzania should adopt an electoral system that attempt to accommodate the voters' choices and preferences such as the Proportional Representation (PR), Alternative Voting, or the Two Round System to control the effect of the dominant party system on voter turnout. Generally, the First-Past-the Post system should be abandoned.

Third, the NEC which is the main Election Management Body should improve the planning and implementation of the electoral process. This should include conducting the need

assessment before preparing Voter Education strategic plan, early preparation of the Voter Education strategic plan, informing the voters on updating the PNVR and setting enough time for updating the PNVR. Furthermore, the PNVR should be displayed early before the final update so as to allow all the potential voters to verify their registration status. In addition, the NEC needs to design an electronic system that can allow voters who are not in their original polling stations to vote online.

Fourth, the implementation of voter and civic education programs by CSOs needs to be monitored so as to achieve cost effectiveness. Government institutions should be empowered to complement the efforts of CSOs and FBOs in the process of providing Voter Education. There is a need for having mechanisms for spot checking the CSOs during Voter Education provision so as to make sure that they have reached the potential target groups. Moreover, local government authorities and CSOs should work in partnership so as to make sure that Voter Education sessions are attended by a sufficient number of potential voters.

Fifth, donors and Development Partners should be encouraged to provide their financial support in time. The government of the United Republic of Tanzania should start elections preparations as early as possible so that the donors and development partners can get enough time to fulfill their pledged assistance. Starting the preparations timely and putting open the budget needed for elections may provide the chance for more donors and development partners to support the elections.

Sixth, the government of the United Republic of Tanzania should set a side a separate fund for financing voter and civic education. The fund for supporting voter and civic education should be sustainable, it should be allocated finance annually, and the funds allocated to it should be made open. This will in turn encourage donors to support the voter and civic education initiatives on continuous basis.

Seventh, since this study focused on examining two causes of low voter turnout (out of several factors, which were identified), it was impossible to cover other issues that appeared to be of interest in generating sufficient psephological knowledge. It is recommended that a study be conducted the influence of civic and political culture dynamics on participation in political processes including elections. Last, the study recommends that a study should be conducted on how the behavior of political institutions including political parties hinder or facilitate participation of the citizenry in governance elections.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Interview Guide Questionnaire for Voter Respondents

A. SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION

1. Street/village_____Ward_____Constituency_____
2. Sex: Male [ ] Female [ ]
3. Age: 18-25[ ] 26-33[ ] 33-40[ ] 41-47[ ] 48-55[ ] Above 56[ ]

B. VOTER'S VIEWS ON CAUSES OF VOTER TURNOUT

1. Did you vote in the 2010 general elections?
    a. Yes
    b. No
    c. I don't remember
2. If you voted, what TWO major factors made you decide to vote?

    1. To make the candidate I liked win
    2. To make the candidate I disliked loose
    3. It is just my civic right/duty
    4. To influence change in policies/development
    5. Since other people around me voted
    6. I do not know why I vote
    7. other (specify)_____

3. If you did not vote, why didn't you vote [encircle any THREE reasons)?
    1. I had traveled/transferred
    2. I did not register for voting
    3. My voter registration card was lost/ destroyed
    4. My name did not appear in the voter register
    5. I did not like the candidate (s) for some positions
    6. The polling station was far away from my home
    7. I don't find confidence in voting process (results)
    8. I was afraid of violence at the polling station
    9. I knew that my choice candidate would loose
    10. My vote could not save/make loss of anything
    11. I knew who was going to win (no need vote)
    12. Other (specify)_____

4. For the other voters who did not vote in this area, what are likely to be the SINGLE major reason that made voters not to vote in your area?
        1. The polling stations were far from their homes
        2. Many names did not appear in the voter register
        3. Voters had known who is going to win (their vote could not help)
        4. Lack of sufficient Voter Education among voters
        5. Loss of trust in elections and resulting institutions
        6. Fear of violence at polling stations
        7. Buying of voter registration cards
        8. Wanted to punish government and its leaders for poor performance
        9. They did not like the candidates who were vying for elections

10. Other (specify)_____

5. During the 2010 general elections, out of every 100 registered voters, only 42 voted. This is far low compared to all the previous elections in history. In your opinion, what can be the major THREE reasons that may have made people refrain from voting starting with the most important reason?
   i. _____
   _____
   ii. _____
   _____
   iii. _____
   _____

6. Which of the factors were mostly associated with decline of voter turnout during the 2010 general elections?

What major Factors can you consider to have influenced the decline of voter turnout in the 2010 general elections?	*Tick*
People do not have confidence in elections as a democratic process. Elections do not deliver the expected results for the voters [Lost Value/Role of Elections]	
Lack of competition among parties, voters loose hope that their individual votes cannot make change either for strong parties or weak parties [Ill Competition]	
People think the government, elected officials and institutions do not listen and cater for their interests. The people do not feel that they can influence government process and political decisions [Political Efficacy]	
People are not aware of the benefit and importance of participating in voting, they also think that if they do not vote they will be punishing the candidates they hate [Lack of Voter Education]	
The elections cost my time, I have so many other things to do that make income, the government does not empower the poor, poverty, lacking access to services, classes [Deteriorating Economy*]*	
The polling stations were few, far away, the voters could not find their names in the voter registrar, the queue were too long for the voters to wait and vote, elections were held on a day that is not appropriate, etc [Logistical Reasons]	
voters were terrified, voters were prevented from casting polls, bribery, buying voter registration cards [Other]	

Thank You for Your Valued Contribution

Appendix 2: Interview Guide for other Stakeholders' In-depth Interviews

SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION

1. Stakeholder Category [Not the code number in your Notebook]

1. Party Leader
2. Candidate
3. Elections Administrators/NEC Officer
4. Voter Education Providers

2. Constituency _____Ward_____-Village/Street_____

GUIDE QUESTIONS

1. Today Tanzania has 18 registered political parties. It is claimed that the activities of political parties have expanded very much both in rural and urban areas. To what extent were different political parties, which exist in this constituency able to reach most of the areas and mobilize people to participate in the 2010 general elections?
2. Political parties are very important means for mobilizing voters to participate in elections. How would you comment on strategies and initiatives used by different political parties to mobilize voters to support them and participate in the 2010 general elections?
3. I heard that there were so many providers of voter and civic education including CSOs, FBOs and other actors in different areas (including rural areas) in Tanzania. Who were the Voter Education providers who were providing Voter Education in this constituency and to what extent do you consider them to have been successful?
4. During the 2010 general elections, many people who had registered to vote did not vote on the polling day. Can we discuss the reasons that you think contributed to such very low voter turnout?