Wildlife Management in Tanzania:
Recentralization, Rent Seeking, and Resistance

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Abstract

Wildlife management in Tanzania is currently undergoing a process of recentralization. While the Wildlife Policy of 1998 opened up for community participation and local benefits, the Wildlife Policy of 2007 and the Wildlife Conservation Act of 2009 re-focus on central government control of income from both sport hunting and safari tourism. The wildlife sector in Tanzania is marked by little transparency and accountability and with considerable rent-seeking behavior. In fact, the hunting business is generally considered one of the most corrupt sectors in a country with increasing public attention on corruption. Recentralization and rent-seeking are not, however, occurring without resistance from communities. Some villages have resisted being part of 'Wildlife Management Areas', which are promoted jointly by the State and international conservation groups as being 'community-based'. Central to this opposition is the recentralization of revenues from safari tourism that previously came directly to villages. In discussing these issues, we draw on careful readings of new legislation as well as in depth studies of wildlife management practices at three locations in northern Tanzania.

Introduction

The last decade has seen a steady chipping away at the promise of community-based conservation espoused in the 1990s across Africa. Many of the advances made in legal reforms for the decentralization of natural resource management have either not been enforced, or have being actively reversed (Nelson 2010). The gap between the discourse of decentralization and democratization of natural resource management and the practice of continued (or even tightened) state control over resources, was already noted at the height of the decentralization craze (Benjaminsen 1997, Ribot 2003, Goldman 2003). This literature pointed out that while there was a growing tendency among international governmental and non-governmental organizations to promote increased community participation as part of a 'win-win' scenario for both conservation and development, there was at the same time resistance from some of the same actors as well as state governments, to carry this policy through in practice. The decentralization of natural resources demands solid policies, functioning laws, accountable governments, and an engaged and informed citizenry. It also requires some degree of actual power transfer from the central government to local communities. Such transfer is particularly difficult and unlikely when the resource at stake is of high investment value (Agrawal and Ribot 1999) as is the case with wildlife in Tanzania (Garland 2006; Nelson, Nshala, and Rogers 2007).

The financial value of wildlife tourism for the Tanzanian economy, was clearly spelled out by the first Tanzanian President, Julius Nyerere:

> 'I personally am not very interested in animals. I do not want to spend my holidays watching crocodiles. Nevertheless, I am entirely in favor of their survival. I believe that after diamonds and sisal, wild animals will provide Tanganyika with its greatest source of income. Thousands of Americans and Europeans have the strange urge to see these animals' (quoted in Neumann 1998: 144, citing Nash 1982: 342).

As Garland (2006) and others have shown, the very value placed on wildlife from colonialism to the present, has had deep and broad implications for the ways in which wildlife are managed in the country. Tanzania has been particularly resistant to decentralizing power over, and financial rewards from, wildlife to its citizens. Nonetheless, as community based conservation initiatives began to spread around the world as both a necessary approach to include local people in conservation and as a win-win solution for conservation-development problems, Tanzania seemed to (in theory) sign on to the process. There has of course been a great deal of critique of this process: both the limited way in which Tanzanian policies aimed at decentralization have actually played out in practice, and the problems embedded within the policies to begin with. In this paper, we suggest that a new analysis and form of critique is needed. We suggest that not only were decentralization policies in Tanzania flawed in both discourse and practice, but that they are now being actively undermined and in some cases reversed. Recent policies and new laws reverse old decentralization policies, the decentralization reforms are being implemented through coercion, and local resistance to the process is being fought with a heavy hand by the state.

Wildlife Management in Tanzania

Wildlife management has historically been a centralized state affair in Tanzania. All wildlife in the country officially belong to the Director of the Wildlife Division, in the Ministry of Tourism and Natural Resources; except for animals residing inside national parks, which come under the jurisdiction of the Tanzanian National Parks Authority (TANAPA). The Director of Wildlife controls sport hunting, which provides a large portion of foreign income to the Tanzanian state. Wildlife also contributes to the national economy through wildlife viewing tourism, which is mostly concentrated inside national parks, but increasingly also taking place on village land.

In the 1990s, Tanzania's tourism industry grew by over 10 per cent per year (World Bank/MIGA 2002). Most of this occurred inside national parks. Yet, as national parks in Tanzania are not fenced, wildlife migrate beyond park boundaries to utilize resources in village lands. In these lands, hunting is permitted in registered hunting blocks

administered by the Wildlife Division. While, a specific portion of profits received is meant to be distributed to district level administration, for allocation to local populations, in practice this is rarely followed. Nor are villages consulted regarding the allocation of hunting blocks even when such blocks overlap directly with village land. Additionally, historically, there were no official mechanisms for villages to benefit from wildlife.

In the 1990s, as tourism continued to rise inside national parks, safari companies started to develop individual agreements with villages that had abundant wildlife on their land to establish village-based wildlife viewing safaris. This essentially provided a new marketing angle for tour companies, but it was also a way for villages to benefit from wildlife directly through joint-venture contracts. Some of these villages earned up to USD 30-40,000 per year in direct revenue from safari tourism (Honey 2008, Trench *et al.* 2009).[1] In this way, many villages had found ways to benefit from wildlife on their own. As such, when the government introduced their own version of village-based wildlife management, 'Wildlife Management Areas' (WMAs) around 2003, many villages were skeptical and not particularly interested in taking part.

In the 1990s, in response to pressure from international donors, Tanzania began to outline plans for the decentralization of wildlife to local communities, particularly through the creation of WMAs. However, today, there remains little if any trace of the initial promise of decentralization and community control of wildlife. In fact, as we show in this paper, there has rather been a steady recentralization of the wildlife sector in Tanzania, coupled with a growing resistance by communities of the government's 'community-based approach' to wildlife conservation. We show that despite the dominating win-win discourse of decentralization and participation, wildlife conservation in the country continues to be dictated and controlled by central and regional government, often to the detriment of local communities. This recentralization is also associated with increased elite capture and rent seeking possibilities for the powerful actors that control wildlife management in the country. Recentralization is occurring through new legislation,

[1] These very villages today are key cites of resistance against the recentralization of wildlife as discussed below.

through continued promotion of hunting at the expense of safari viewing in village lands, and paradoxically, through application-by-coercion of the 'community-based' approach to wildlife management, WMAs. Local actors see this alleged 'community-based approach' as a threat to their livelihoods, leading to some resistance against introducing this approach on their land.

The paper is divided into three substantive sections. We begin by discussing in some detail the ways in which the wildlife sector in Tanzania is being recentralized, followed by a section outlining specific rent-seeking behavior occurring as a part of this recentralization. These processes are not, however, occurring without resistance from communities and the final section provides examples of the different forms in which resistance is taking shape.

In discussing these issues, we draw on careful readings of new legislation as well as in depth studies at three locations: Longido District, Simanjiro District, and Loliondo Division in Ngorongoro District. In Longido, we look specifically at the Enduimet Wildlife Management Area, which consists of nine villages and is centrally located between Amboseli National Park in Kenya and various conservation areas in Tanzania. Here, a number of species such as elephants, zebras, wildebeest, and different antelopes migrate through the WMA land. Sinya is the key village in Enduimet, containing the majority of wildlife in the area. Yet, Sinya only joined the WMA in late 2009 after several years of resistance. The case of Sinya is used to illustrate recentralization, rent-seeking and resistance. Simanjiro District is located on the eastern boundary of Tarangire National Park and the Simanjiro Plains provide an important wet season dispersal area for migratory wildlife from the park (wildebeest, zebra, gazelles, and elephant). The plains happen to reside inside village lands (Emboreet, Sukuro, Loborsoit, Terrat), all which have resisted establishing a WMA and have experienced conflict with the hunting industry. Simanjiro is used as an example of resistance. Loliondo Division lies east of Serengeti National Park, north of Ngorongoro Conservation Area, and south of the Kenya Border. Loliondo is home to numerous resident wildlife as well as part of a key dispersal area for migrating wildlife from Serengeti National Park. For this reason, Loliondo has

long played a central role in both conservation discussions and the growing village-based tourism industry (Nelson et al. 2009). We draw on recent highly politicized events in Loliondo to discuss both recentralization and resistance.

The discussion of Enduimet is based on 93 household interviews from four of the nine villages in addition to key-informant interviews with village leaders, district leaders, game scouts, NGO representatives, safari companies, and officials of the Wildlife Division during 2008-2010. To illustrate that the Enduimet story is not a rare and isolated occurrence, but rather reflects common trends seen elsewhere, we present similar stories from Simanjiro and Loliondo, despite not having as solid data from these two locations. Data on Simanjiro comes from one of the authors working on and off in the area since 2006 on wildlife conservation politics. Information was obtained through informal conversations and open-ended interviews as well as observations and participations in village level meetings. The discussion of events in Loliondo draws primarily from secondary sources, but also from discussions by one of the authors with NGO activists working in the area.

All three of these areas are located in the Northern Tanzania Safari route and are predominately Maasai in residence make-up. Maasai are pastoralists/agro-pastoralists who have a history of tolerating wildlife on their land, due primarily to a predominately pastoralist livelihood. Today, livelihood diversification in Maasai areas has lead to increased agricultural cultivation, and out-migration for work in cities and the mining area of Merrerani (Homewood, Kristjanson, and Trench 2009; McCabe 2003). Yet, wildlife conservation fills another important niche of livelihood diversification, were incomes and village level profit can be made. Therefore, we argue that our findings are particularly troubling in showing how such profit possibility is being undermined by a recentralization of control of the wildlife sector. Findings are also useful for other areas (Maasai and non-Maasai), where wildlife exist.

From Decentralization to Recentralization

The Tanzanian government launched a new Wildlife Policy in 1998, which included a focus on the rights of local people to benefit from wildlife conservation, and the role that wildlife management could play for rural development. The policy stressed how important it is that people in rural areas receive a fair share of the large revenues from safari tourism and sport hunting (URT 1998). Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) were the main tool proposed to implement this new 'community-friendly approach.' WMAs were proposed as community-run conservation areas, where several villages come together[2] and give up land for wildlife conservation. In return, the villages receive a certain proportion of the tourism revenues from these areas. There were many initial critiques of WMAs, mainly pointing at the heavy bureaucratic demands, continued state and regional government control over revenue collection, and the strong role played by outside conservation organizations. In many ways villages were only being delegated certain privileges, but not authority over wildlife, and WMAs were being proposed as a way to strengthen the national park system and assure the protection of important wildlife corridors and dispersal areas (Goldman 2003).

Even with these problems, the new wildlife policy as a whole promised a shift in the wildlife sector in Tanzania towards engagement with local communities. The development of the policy seems, however, to have largely been a donor-driven process and the distribution of profits in wildlife management that the policy introduced 'threatened the powers of the Wildlife Division … and most particularly the revenue it regularly receives from hunting fees' (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002:92).

Many donors had been involved in the Tanzanian wildlife sector during the 1990s (e.g. GTZ, NORAD, USAID, DANIDA), and the new policy was to a large extent a consequence of influence from these donors who subscribed to a win-win discourse of

[2] There are currently 21 WMAs in Tanzania in various stages towards formal establishment. The number of villages in each WMA varies from 2 to 30.

conservation and community development (Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010). Donors were pushing the rhetoric of participation, and the Tanzanian government was also observing what other African countries were doing as part of the general trend in wildlife decentralization. However, it is doubtful whether there was any serious intent to follow through on a decentralization agenda. Many years passed before legislation was presented, and the process was far from transparent.[3]

In 2007 the policy was revised and its tone changed (URT 2007). The focus was now on state management of wildlife, and little was mentioned about participation, development and benefits for local communities. There was also explicit mention of the need to protect wildlife corridors, even if in village lands. In the period between the publications of these two policy documents, discoveries of extensive corruption in the wildlife sector (Nshala 1999, Sachedina 2008, Nelson 2009a and 2010) and the failure of the government to implement the 1998 policy led most donors to withdraw from directly supporting the sector. USAID is the main donor currently remaining. It funnels its support mainly through World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) to implement the establishment of WMAs on village land.

In 2009, a new Wildlife Act was passed in the National Assembly. This law strengthens central control of wildlife and gives the Wildlife Division more opportunity to intervene in the management of village land. According to the new Act, pastoralists need written permission in order to graze livestock in Game Controlled Areas (GCA) even where these areas overlap with village lands. Yet, most Maasai village land overlaps considerably if not entirely with GGA areas, which also act as prime areas for sport hunting. The Wildlife Division has always controlled wildlife on these lands (through hunting concessions), now they are expanding their reach to control the land itself. This means that under the new law pastoralists risk having to seek permission from the Director of the Wildlife Division to have livestock graze in their own village lands, if this

[3] While local community based organizations and national NGOS played a role in commenting on and critiquing the initial policy, few if any of their recommendations were accommodated in the revised policy, and civil society organizations were excluded entirely from participating in the transformation of the policy into a bill.

land overlaps with a Game Controlled Area. This current process of recentralization in wildlife management is also playing out in contests over control of the two main income-generating activities in the sector; photo safaris and sport hunting.

Hunting has always been under the complete control of the central state, managed through the Director of Wildlife. Hunting blocks are allocated to individual companies on village land, but villages play no role in the process, have little say in the way the company functions in their land, and obtain few if any benefits from the arrangement. As mentioned above, photo safaris companies, on the other hand, began in the 1990s to engage local communities directly through joint venture contracts were lease and bed-night fees were paid directly to village governments in exchange for use rights for tourism wildlife viewing. Village governments control the process and the funds they receive.[4] The Wildlife Division has, however, recently taken control over this source of income as well.

In 2008, the state introduced a new set of Non-Consumptive Utilization of Wildlife Regulations to standardize fees along the same lines as hunting revenues. These Regulations declare all non-consumptive tourism operations in village lands — including game-drive, photography and walking safaris — illegal without the permission of the Director of Wildlife (URT 2008). The Regulations were met with questions and resistance from local communities and tour operators alike. Villagers legally have the right to go into contract with an individual or company. Photo safaris include such contracts and do not involve hunting, recognized as the purview of the Director of Wildlife. Some suggest that the regulations were proposed partly because of growing conflict between hunting concessions and photo safari operations in village land. Another likely reason is related to the high levels of revenue being generated by photo safaris, money the state did not have access to, when it occurred in village lands.

[4] We do not mean to suggest here that there are not issues involved with this process, nor to say that all the money always reaches villagers. There are many issues of money being captured by village government leaders, as well as cases with tour companies dictating the use of certain kinds of funds.

Revenue sharing of wildlife utilization remains, however, unclear. Safari operators have interpreted the new regulations as implying higher fees that must all go to the central government. In areas that are registered as a WMA, the Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) responsible for managing WMAs shall now receive 65 per cent of the tourist revenues from non-consumptive use (photo safaris). For the villages that previously had individual deals with safari companies, this obviously means a considerable decline in income; also because they have to share this income with several other villages. In addition, since there is no open, accessible information about the total revenue received, it is difficult to verify whether the correct amounts are actually transferred to the CBOs in practice. The CBO office receiving the checks have no way of knowing what the total revenue from tourism is in the area they are supposed to manage. This is because as a WMA, the money goes from the Wildlife Division via the District office to the CBO. With village contracts directly with tour companies, the checks go directly to village bank accounts.

In addition to control over hunting profits, managing hunting (through the quoata system) has also been recentralized. When WMAs were initially introduced, villagers were promised that state-controlled sport hunting would be phased out at the advantage of local control of hunting within the WMA, with villages receiving hunting quotas. But devolving control over hunting to the local level is no longer on the national agenda. The hunting industry simply seems too lucrative for decentralization. Of the hunting fees collected by the Wildlife Division, 25 % is supposed to go back to the local level. This includes the districts as well as the CBOs. Yet it is not clear how much should go to the WMA CBOs, and, again, there is lack of transparency, with remaining uncertainty regarding how much money is actually being distributed to the districts (Nelson et al. 2007, Leader-Williams et al. 2009).

We suggest that all these processes reflect different attempts at recentralizing the wildlife sector: regulating non-consumptive tourism on village lands; regulating the use of village lands that fall within GCAs, and continuing to manage hunting and the profit associated

with it, even within WMAs. We now turn to specific examples to illustrate how recentralization is playing out on the ground.

Enduimet WMA

When Enduimet WMA received user rights status in August 2007, the *Arusha Times* heralded the event on its front page saying, 'Villages granted total authority over wildlife: Investors uneasy about business prospect' (Nkwame 2007). The article went on to explain how, with their newfound authority, Enduimet WMA residents can enter into any contract with foreign investors and local firms, while having the power 'to terminate game hunting and tourism business operations currently being undertaken' (Nkwame 2007). Despite this sanguine prediction, the article failed to realize that all business ventures are still subject to the approval of the Director of Wildlife.

In the Enduimet WMA, after the Non-Consumptive Utilization of Wildlife legislation was passed, all tour operators stopped paying fees to the villages from 1 July 2008. Payment of all fees must now go through the Wildlife Division in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Some tour operators feel that the new fees are too costly for them to continue operating in local villages[5]. Additionally, the new fee structure has caused confusion amongst the villages, as many are not clear as to why they have stopped receiving money even though safari companies continue to operate tourism activities on their land. It has strained relationships between community members and safari operators. In the village of Sinya, the new regulations were seen as another attempt by the government to increase control over wildlife investments and weaken village authority over benefit allocation. It confirmed villagers original suspicions about joining the WMA in the first place—that being in a WMA would only force the village to share wildlife revenue with another eight villages.

Prior to the establishment of the WMA, Sinya had a contract with Tanganyika Wilderness Camp (TWC), for photo safaris. When Sinya initially refused to join the WMA, the Tanzanian government forced the tour operator to move their camp to the neighbouring

[5] Interview, owner of Tanzania Travel Co., Ltd. (TTC), Arusha, 27 November 2008.

village of Elerai, which greatly strained relations between the village and TWC. The new Regulations for non-consumptive tourism further complicated the situation. After 1 July 2008, Sinya stopped receiving any sort of revenue from TWC, even though the company continues to use Sinya's land for game-drives. As far as the TWC's Administrative Officer was concerned, the company should not be paying both villages and the central government, especially when given that the new fees were higher than what they used to pay to Elerai and Sinya villages independently[6]. The villagers in Sinya were unclear about the new regulations and felt that both the government and TWC were not giving the village what was due to them. According to the Village Executive Officer (VEO)[7] of Sinya:

'they (TWC) are still coming (i.e. bringing tourists to their land) and for us, we don't know who is benefiting from that money. Because when they come, they are paying money and maybe the government is taking that money, but for us we are no longer benefiting'[8].

The reason given by officials in the Wildlife Division for taking over the collection of revenues from safari operators is that there is not enough capacity or knowledge of financial management in the CBOs that are in charge of running the WMAs.

Loliondo

WMAs were pushed in Loliondo between 1999 and 2003 by the central government and the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS), but were successfully resisted by a coalition of villages (Ngoitiko et al. 2010)..

Yet, government pressure has persisted throughout Loliondo Division, through attempts to control both wildlife revenues and the land on which hunting occurs. Several village governments in the area have independent contracts with non-consumptive tourism

[6] Interview, TWC Administrative Officer, Arusha, 24 November 2008.
[7] This is a state appointed and paid position. The VEO is in charge of maintaining village records and budgets.
[8] Recorded interview, VEO, Sinya 14 November 2008.

companies. Hunting also occurs in hunting blocks that are controlled through the central government. In Loliondo Division, as is the case in much of Maasai occupied lands, nearly the entire area is located inside a hunting block. This includes the land of six villages, inside the Loliondo Game Controlled Area (Nelson et al. 2009). This entire hunting block is under the control of Ortello Business Corporation, a company owned by the royal family of the United Arab Emirates (Feminist Activist Coalition (FEMACT) 2009).

OBC came to Loliondo in 1992. There was a national scandal that ensued when the government decided to allocate the entire Loliondo GCA to one company, despite it not being up for lease yet. Conflict ensued between the company and local communities for years, as OBC put up permanent structures on village land without consulting village governments (Nelson and Ole Makko 2005). The company continued to work in the area but without the support of villages and with direct connections to, and support from the central government. Five years after the initial contract was signed between OBC and the Tanzanian Government, villages were informed that the contract had been renewed, despite promises that they were to be involved in discussions regarding the renewal process (Ngoitiko 2008). Villagers were not interested in having the contract renewed, as they had a series of complaints about how the company was operating (Gardner 2007), many of them conservation related. For instance, residents were concerned with what they saw as indiscriminate capture and killing of animals (the company was allowed to capture and transport live animals back to UAE).

Local Maasai leaders had crafted strong relationships between their villages and private tour operators so that Maasai themselves could control and benefit from wildlife conservation in their lands (Gardner 2007).[9] The actions of OBC were seen as threatening the joint ventures through over-hunting, but also through direct threats and intimidation of tour companies. While OBC had legal rights to all wildlife in the area (as granted by

[9] See Gardner for an interesting discussion of the ways in which neoliberal reforms where worked in this particular area to empower villagers vis-à-vis the state, through business partnerships for conservation. This is quite a different analysis than that provided by Igoe (2007) and Igoe and Croucher (2007) regarding community brokered joint-ventures.

the Director of Wildlife), the village government did have legal rights to enter into contracts with private operators on their land.[10] Maasai complained that OBC harassed non-consumptive tour operators working in the area and interfered with Maasai grazing rights in village land. More serious complaints about OBC included: intimidation and threats, harassment and detention, and even torture by the OBC security forces (Ngoitiko 2008). The words of one woman resident in the area, quoted in Ngotiko 2008: 4), express the Loliondo Maasai position, 'the government and, indeed, justice are not on our side. We have been forced to accept things as they are because we have no power.'

In 2008 there were attempts by OBC to reconcile conflict with villagers. They tried to convince village governments to sign a contract that would designate grazing times and locations so as to avoid conflict with hunting activities. A CBO in the area worked hard to get proper Maasai representation in the process, which did not happen before several village governments signed the agreement any way. Then in July 2009 in the middle of a prolonged drought, villagers were told they needed to remove their cattle from areas utilized by OBC for hunting. They had no place else to go and the land used by OBC had grass when few other places did. Residents complained of drought and hunger, and brought in traditional leaders to support their case to the district council. Herders refused to leave the area—those in villages that signed the contract and those in ones that did not.

Then on July 4, government forces started to burn bomas in 7 villages that were located inside a hunting block to remove residences that were said to be in areas designated for the hunting company. In addressing the ensuing conflict, the government proposed to designate much of this area as a wildlife corridor and a GCA to buffer Serengeti National Park, both prohibiting human habitation. This, despite official village land use maps existing for the villages in question, where different areas have already been legally zoned for housing, grazing and wildlife viewing. Maasai in Loliondo are now recalculating their options, refusing the GCA and corridor and proposing instead a WMA,

[10] See Gardner (2007) for a more detailed discussion of this tension and the complexities involved between rights over land and rights over wildlife in the same area. See also Sachedina (2008) for a discussion of similar conflicts in Simanjiro District.

but along revised lines, which take into special consideration the importance of pastoralist land use in the area.

Rent seeking[11]

As wildlife control is recentralized, wildlife revenues continued to be captured by local, regional, and state elites. In this section we discuss two types of rent seeking that are highlighted in debates about wildlife management in Tanzania: corruption related to the hunting sector and misuse of money from safari ventures..

Sport hunting

Evidence suggests that sport hunting is controlled by a network of central bureaucrats and politicians, as well as Tanzanian and foreign business people (Nshala 1999, Nelson 2009a). Presidential licenses are 'regularly issued to friends of the Minister or Director, or to former holders of these posts (and) (m)any concessions (are) allegedly leased to smaller national companies silently owned by senior public officials with political links in Ministry or Wildlife Department' (Leader-Williams et al. 2009: 304).

We have ourselves tried to acquire turnover figures from hunting companies as well as from the Wildlife Protection Fund of the Wildlife Division, without much success[12]. This fund collects and manages hunting fees and is responsible for their redistribution to the local level. Key actors have also resisted efforts to introduce more transparent and thereby more democratic processes around the allocation and monitoring of hunting blocks. These blocks are hired out to hunting companies for a period of three years.

[11] The term 'rent seeking' is often associated with the issues of corruption and bribery. It implies extracting value from activities without making any contribution to productivity, and it is usually linked to the misuse of governmental authority (Source: The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics vol 4, Macmillian, London, 1998.)

[12] Of the two hunting companies contacted, one willingly shared information, while the other resisted and the Wildlife Protection Fund did not wish to disclose any figures on income and disbursements.

Among observers of the wildlife sector in Tanzania, there is general agreement that the hunting business is marked by extensive corruption (Nshala 1999, Sachedina 2008, Jansen, 2009, Nelson 2009a and 2010, Leader-Williams et al. 2009). Tanzania is the only country in eastern and southern Africa that does not have bidding rounds for hunting block allocation. The process lacks openness and the prices are estimated to be well below the market level (World Bank 2007, Nelson 2009a). This under-pricing creates opportunities for personal rent seeking for key officials who control the allocation of hunting blocks and the collection of hunting fees. The Wildlife Division is currently unable to account for hunting fees worth millions of dollars every year (Leader-Williams et al. 2009). In recent years, there seems to have been a consolidation of central actors' control of the hunting industry in Tanzania. This has happened despite the increased focus on corruption in the natural resources sector in Tanzania following for instance the disclosure of corruption in the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (Jansen 2009).

'The Commission Report on the State of Corruption in the Country (United Republic of Tanzania (URT), 1996) noted that corruption had grown since the 1970s through a combination of circumstances, including the poor economy, low salaries, lack of essential commodities, and restrictions on public servants earning extra income. When the economy was liberalised during the 1990s, the Commission noted the emergence of endemic and systematic corruption through a combination of factors, including businessmen developing close ties with leaders, erosion of integrity among leaders, and lack of transparency in the economy' (Leader-Williams et al. 2009).This institutionalized corruption in the hunting sector also has its negative consequences for wildlife populations and biodiversity, because there is widespread overshooting of allocated hunting quotas (Leader-Williams et al. 2009).

Safari tourism

Where villages have individual deals with safari operators, state officials accuse village leaders of capturing most of the benefits for themselves. This is often used as an argument for more state control of such arrangements.

For instance, a representative from the Wildlife Division in Arusha maintained that the Non-consumptive Regulations were set up to assure funds would not be misappropriated or embezzled by village leaders and safari operators who, he contends, have not been transparent regarding revenue collection and expenditure[13]. The District Game Officer of Longido also cited similar arguments when he urged the Enduimet community to join the WMA. In an interview, he explained that community-based wildlife management through a WMA is a better option for the community because it assured more transparency. He said that now, village leaders would have to have a clear plan of development projects and document their expenditure and progress before they can receive money from wildlife related benefits. In the case of Sinya village, the District Game Officer contended that only certain people in the leadership have benefited from all the profit the village obtained from non-consumptive tourism. Similar situations occur in other villages, with accusations made as well in Emboreet village in Simanjiro District of the ways in which money intended for village use has been appropriated by village government leaders (Sachedina 2008).

With the recentralization in the control over revenues from safari tourism taking place in village lands, there are, however, increased opportunities for rent-seeking among state officials who manage these revenues. Hence, the recentralization process may be seen as a means to shift rent-seeking opportunities from the village level to the central state.

Resistance (and Coercion)

The centralization and recentralization of power by the Tanzanian state over wildlife in village lands, has not gone without resistance by villagers. Resistance comes in many

[13] Interview, Acting Assistant Director of Wildlife Division, Arusha, 27 November 2008.

forms. The very establishment of contracts with tour companies by villages resists the state enforced monopoly on wildlife. State attempts to recapture this money has also lead to resistance, as have the new centralized attempts to pressure villages to establish WMAs.

Central management authorities have been putting pressure on villages to establish WMAs. This is particularly true for villages located in or around wildlife migration routes, areas deemed especially relevant for conservation interventions. Yet, there has always been some resistance against the establishment of WMAs, by local villages, particularly in Maasai areas. This is because, as noted above, many Maasai villages have been in direct partnership with private tour companies and did not see the benefit of joining a WMA. Partnerships with tour companies were under their direct control. WMAs, while promoted as community-based, still mandated centralized authority, and often demanded the splitting of profits across multiple villages. In fact, many Maasai activists and local leaders (customary and village elected leaders) participated in early debates over the wildlife policy and contributed to demands made to parliament regarding the new wildlife law. Maasai have long seen their land alienated for conservation purposes. Past conservation efforts in the Serengeti, Ngorongoro Conservation Area (NCA) and Mkomazi Game Reserve, to name a few, have meant forceful evictions or severe restrictions of daily activities (Shivji and Kapinga 1998, Neumann 2000, Brockington 2002). For many Maasai, WMAs represent the latest threat of land loss, and therefore result in immediate fear and resistance.

Organized resistance to WMAs and wildlife corridor protection occurred in Loliondo, Longido, and Simanjiro districts. Loliondo is, however, the only place, which managed to totally reject a *formal* government proposal to establish a WMA on village land (Ngoitiko et al 2010).

In Loliondo, 'community members and local NGOs believed that a WMA might simply be an expedient way to place large areas of community land under central protection for wildlife, and that any tourism investments therein would primarily benefit external parties

(Nelson and Ole Makko 2005). Ultimately, the WMA proposal was rejected following a long series of debates and meetings, including extensive pressure from outside for the communities to formally agree to WMA formation'. (Ngoitiko et al. 2010: 275) However, as described above, resistance to a WMA in Loliondo in the end was futile, as the central government has made it clear that, one way or another, they will control wildlife conservation efforts (and profits) in this area. This does not, however, diminish the role that resistance has played in Loliondo. Residents' resistance to the WMA and to state actions in the area received national and international attention (Pampazuka news 2009, Renton 2009), demanding some degree of negotiation with the government. If a WMA is the final compromise, it is likely to be a WMA designed along lines that enable greater local decision-making and pastoral land use.

In the Enduimet WMA, Sinya village resisted for several years to be included in the WMA, but after long-standing pressure from the government and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), the village elected a new leadership in late 2009, which then agreed to participate in the WMA. Sinya earlier refused to be part of the WMA, because the villagers did not understand why they should share the tourism revenue with eight other villages since Sinya is clearly the village with the most wildlife within the area. In addition, the people of Sinya were afraid of losing control over their own natural resources, especially their own grazing land, if they joined Enduimet WMA. It is common in WMAs to have zones within which there are restrictions on grazing.

When Sinya refused to enter the WMA, Tanganyika Wilderness Camp was pressured by the government to move its camp from Sinya to the neighbouring village of Elerai. The new camp was named Kambi ya Tembo ('Elephant Camp'). Sinya's resistance to the WMA continued, however, in the form of disturbing tourist activities. There were complaints, for instance, from Kambi ya Tembo's manager to Sinya's leadership that young boys from the village were grazing livestock too close to the campsite and that the jingling of cattle bells disturbed guests at night. More serious accusations were made of

village members blocking a TWC vehicle that was full of tourists from conducting their game-drive session in Sinya's land [14].

Clouds of distrust and resentment toward Enduimet WMA have also brought about fears of land alienation in other villages. Although expulsion, prohibition of grazing, or collection of firewood in Enduimet WMA have not been documented, anxiety about it is still present. In the villages of Tinga Tinga, Ol Molog, Kitendeni and Elerai, household respondents alluded to or directly expressed their worries about land alienation, particularly when community members see beacons being placed on their land. They see the beacons as a sure sign that the land set aside for the WMA will one day be taken away from them. A female respondent conveyed her feelings about the beacons:

> *I was aware that beacons were placed in our land. It is meant for us to recognize where the boundary for wildlife is. We hate it; we are no longer getting enough area to graze our cattle. We are allowed to go there now, but I'm afraid that one day we can be told not to go there.* [15]

Fear of land alienation and a lack of understanding about the beacons have lead to destruction of WMA beacons in Enduimet (Sachedina 2008; Nelson 2007). As discussed above, the new Wildlife Act introduces new land use restrictions in land categorized as a Game Controlled Area (GCA). Longido GCA overlaps with village land and with the Enduimet WMA. At this time, it is not yet clear how the new act will affect the Resource Zone Management Plan of the WMA or the livelihoods of the people living in Enduimet, yet it is likely that if grazing restrictions are enforced, village resistance to the WMA will increase.

In Simanjiro district, villages have also fought the creation of a WMA, which was being promoted by AWF. The Simanjiro plains provides valuable wet season grazing and calving grounds for wildebeest and zebra, as well as a valuable seasonal pasture for

[14] Interview, Longido District Officer, Sinya, 14 November 2008.
[15] Respondent 51, female, Kitendeni.

Maasai cattle. Some have argued that the very survival of wildebeest and zebra in Tarangire National Park depends on their ability to access the high-quality pastures of the Simanjiro plains (TCP 1998; Voeten and Prins 1999) and this has driven a series of conservation interventions in the area, much which have been met with resistance from villagers. Resistance to conservation efforts in Simanjiro villages was based in a history of land loss to conservation. Herders lost access to important dry season grazing areas, drought reserves and water sources when they were evicted from Tarangire National Park in 1970 (Igoe 2004, Cooke 2007). Fears of park expansion continued into the 1990s (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002), with the creation of a new game reserve on the southern boundary of the park. A proposal for the creation of a conservation area in the Simanjiro plains was put forth by Frankfurt Zoological Society in the early 1980s ((Borner 1982), fueling increased fears of land grabs by Maasai communities (Goldman 2009).

Yet, wildlife continue to migrate beyond the boundaries of the national park into village lands in Simanjiro, and some villages have found ways to profit from this, through the creation of joint-venture contracts with tour companies. Lolkisale, Loborsoit, and Emboreet villages have all participated in such endeavors. In Terrat Village, an innovative conservation easement was started by a consortium of tour operators, community organizations and researchers with great success (Nelson 2009b). Yet, resistance to WMAs and centralized state control over wildlife has remained strong in many Simanjiro Villages. AWF worked for years to convince Loborsoit village to accept a WMA, with little success. The campaign began to divide the village along political lines, creating increased tensions and conflict. At one point a group of women stood in the main road into the village, physically blocking an AWF vehicle from entering the village. The WMA continues to be pushed by AWF, though there is little sign that the villagers will agree. On the contrary, several villages (Sukuro, Emboreet) have requested to become part of the conservation easement currently working in Terrat. This is because with this easement, all of the money goes directly to the villagers who have complete decision-making power over how it is used and the easement does not forbid grazing of livestock.

In addition to resisting a WMA, village leadership in several villages in Simanjiro have directly challenged the hunting company working in their district. As with many other Maasai areas, much of the village land in Simanjiro overlaps with GCA Land. This means that hunting blocks are allocated by the central government for use in many of the same areas where wildlife viewing tourism concessions work. When a hunting company began threatening tour operators, village government leaders took the issue directly to the Director of Wildlife. They complained about the behavior and actions of the hunting company, which did not respect the villages as legitimate owners of the land on which they hunted. The complaint was taken seriously with the Director of Wildlife visiting Simanjiro to hold village meetings and a dialogue started with the hunting company.

Maasai on the other side of Tarangire National Park have also fought a WMA, but with much less success (Igoe and Croucher 2007). Here certain (Non-Maasai) communities were convinced that a WMA was their best option, many did not realize until much too late that it was not something they wanted (Davis, 2010), and other villages split over the decision. In a neighboring village to the area where the Burunge WMA was created, Maasai are feeling the effects of loosing access to an important grazing area that is now inside the WMA. When one man from this village was asked what he thought about WMAs, he said:

> ' It is bad. Really bad. First, the villagers don't see any benefit at all from it and as if that wasn't enough, pastoralists lost a huge area of grazing land. The village government brought it in by force but the villagers of Minjingu [the neighboring Maasai village] didn't want it. Maramboi is a place that has been used by pastoralists since long ago. It is a huge area that was lost. People say that WMA is a small organization inside AWF. They say that it is a small inroad for AWF to get pastureland.'

It should be clear from this quote that there still remains a great deal of confusion over exactly what a WMA is, but that despite this confusion, pastoralists see it as an intrusion, and as a loss of valuable grazing land and remain actively resistant to it.

Conclusions

Wildlife management in Tanzania has, during the last few years, been undergoing a process of recentralization that seems mainly to be driven by a rapidly growing tourism industry that again is raising the rent that wildlife provide. There is a long history in Tanzania of this rent being captured at the level of the central state – a tendency which is currently being reinforced.

During the 1990s, international influence from the win-win discourse on environmental conservation led Tanzania to develop a 'community-friendly' Wildlife Policy (1998). Following up on this policy, the state proposed the establishment of Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs) on village land where villagers would receive most of the benefits from wildlife management. Since the WMAs were proposed, they have, however, gradually been captured as tools for the agendas of central state officials (rent-seeking) and international conservation NGOs (wildlife conservation). Hence, the element of rural development that played a key discursive role in this initiative in the early days has waned over time.

The recentralization currently taking place in Tanzania is, however, no exception. In southern and eastern Africa, there is currently an emerging trend of recentralizing control over natural resources and thereby cancelling previous attempts at supporting rural livelihoods through devolution of rights to resources (Nelson 2010). In addition, preparations for the implementation of REDD+ seem to have a recentralizing effect on conservation practices (Phelps et al. 2010, Sandbrook et al. 2010).

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