Reflection on Electoral Democracy and Peaceful Transfer of Power: The Tanzanian Experience

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Abstract

This paper revisits the Africa's electoral democracy trajectories with the focus on Tanzanian experience of electoral democracy and political transitions. It analyses the conduct of electoral democracy and peaceful transfer of power in Tanzania and gauges whether such experiences may be emulated by other countries particularly those facing crises of political transition in Africa. To do so, the paper adopts documentary review method supplemented by hermeneutic techniques as the most feasible and effective methodology best suited for studying a phenomenon using secondary sources. From this analysis, it is evident, then, although the balance sheet on Tanzania's experience with democratisation over the last two decades or so shows progressive trends; major power transition remains within the confinements of the ruling party, but Tanzanian experience, still, provides some important lessons for other countries can emulate. Notwithstanding such positive trends, the paper recommends for urgent legal and institutional reforms on the mandate and independence electoral management institution and continuous periodic updating of voters for feasible and the regular processes for individuals opportunity to join with their fellows in replacing, or reinstating the government of their country by means of the ballot-box and without to violence.

Keyword: Electoral democracy; election financing; leadership; media; peaceful transfer of power; Tanzania.

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the Africa's and particularly Tanzanian democratisation experience. The major focus is electoral democracy in Africa by depicting Tanzanian experiences. It discusses this mindful of all the possible elections shortfalls (Cheeseman, 2015; Makulilo, 2012; Makulilo and Henry, 2017) since democracy remains one of the indispensable means for an "inclusive sphere where balancing of power, ordering of interests and popular participation become a way of life" (Tarimo, 2013: 151). The aim is to gauge the prospects of Tanzanian electoral democracy covering almost twenty five years of multiparty elections and attest whether this experience can be emulated by other countries, bearing in mind the material conditions in each country. Central to this discussion is that, although the balance sheet on Tanzania's experience with democratisation over the last two decades

shows progressive as well as regressive trends, and that there has not been any political transition involving changes of a ruling party; in terms of democracy as the freedom of the individuals, and the regular opportunity for them to join with their fellows in replacing, or reinstating the government of their country by means of the ballot-box and without recourse to assassination; it deserves a credit and can provide key lessons to other African countries faced with the challenges of electoral democracy.

Democracy is usually associated with the principle of majority decisions within a system of free opposition. Arguably, it guarantees political stability because when the majority of the voters no longer accept the government in office, they can choose the opposition (Butenschon, 1985). While scholars such as Cheeseman (2015); Shivji (2009) and Tarimo & Manwelo (2007) favour of democracy; dissenting voices against democracy have always been there from ancient times such those in Plato's *Republic* (Book V & VI) in which autocracy he favoured over democracy. As such, "Churchill's famous characterization of democracy as 'the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time' is a neat way of balancing a supportive and a more critical view of democratic government" (Schmidt, 2002: 157). In that respect, if one is to go by this characterisation, then, democracy is a form of organising statecraft that is to be the last option after all other forms have been utilized and proved dysfunctional. However, the reality is different. In modern statecraft, democracy is still "preferred as a political system that can overcome political disorder and irresponsible leadership" (Tarimo & Manwelo, 2007:115). But for it to function well, it needs a society that have assimilated and accepted democratic principles, as the only ideal principles to guide the behaviour of those entrusted with responsibilities of representing others and in organizing the state. To use Linz (1990: 158) words, democracy ought to be the "only game in town". In this way, it could facilitate in determining who comes to exercise power and who leaves after the end of office and how to exercise such responsibilities and it has to transcend political affiliations and be an integral part of people's lives.

Like in many other developing countries, democratisation and the need for stability are among the many dilemmas facing most of African countries today. In most of these countries, the people "are overwhelmingly convinced

that, the root cause of their dilemma is the absence quality governance and leaders accountability. Therefore, Africans expect democracy to replace guns, with butter; poverty with plenty and want to life of hope and dignity" (Ambrose, 1995: xvi). As such, that is why there was greater enthusiasm over the waves of democratisation processes, especially 'the third wave' of the late 1980s and early 1990s (Huntington, 1991), which opened-up for electoral democracies in the form of increased options for exercising "universal-suffrage" (Lijphart, 2005), in order to create peaceful means for the transfer of power and for enhancing political stability (Kersting & Cronqvist, 2005).

These transitions and particularly this third wave of democratisation that gained its momentum following end of the Cold War; however, have not led to anticipated democracy (Levitsky & Way, 2010; 2002). In terms of freedoms and liberties this wave also often referred to as the *second liberation* (Cheeseman, 2015; Osaghae, 2005; Tarimo, 2013). It still leaves a lot to be desired by most Africans. For Murunga (2009: 5), it has meant the "installation of 'democratic dictators' who manipulate elections and retain power after going through multiparty elections that are certified free and fair by the ever-mobile election observers." Thus, as Poku (2012) observed, "democracy in present Africa is in a deplorable shape ... with one step forward two steps backwards journey... [and] for the most part, democracy and socio-economic progress has been all talk and no action." As a result, the growing of literature over democratisation process in Africa is largely dominated by skeptics, generally labelled '*Afro-Pessimists*' (Lofchie & Mukandala, 1998; Mueller, 2018; Rieff, 1998) who despite of their divergent theoretical perspectives, they share the conviction that, lack of basic ingredients of democracy are the basis for poor performance of the democratisation processes in Africa. In attesting this predicament, Lofchie and Mukandala (1998: 2), for example, delineate central key issues in explaining the disappointing results of the democratisation decades, as follows:

> […] lack of critically important socio-economic requisites, low level of education and literacy, lack of sizeable and stable middle class, lack of the viable private sector, weak sense of nationhood, low level of leadership commitment to democratic process and a seemingly all-

> pervasive tendency towards ethnicity as a basis of political identification.

Furthermore, other scholars have moved even further and diminished the African democratisation processes (Ambrose, 1995; Levitsky & Way, 2010; 2002; Makulilo & Henry, 2017; Pallotti, 2017). Ambrose (1995: xviii), for example, has equated the African democratization process to "an exercise evidenced in no more than voting while largely ignoring the real issues facing most of Africans." While others have described the process as a transition towards hybrid democracy what Levitsky and Way (2002) have named as "the rise of competitive authoritarianism". As opposed to democratic governments such as Norway , Iceland, Sweden, Mauritius, Cap Verde, and Botswana (for comprehensive list see The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2018), in competitive authoritarianism, "incumbent abuse of the state violates at least one of three defining attributes of democracy: free elections, broad protection of civil liberties, and a reasonably level playing field" (Levitsky & Way, 2000:7). Thus,

> … whether one speaks about the feasibility of liberal democracy in Africa or the emancipatory content of the multiparty politics for a wider citizenry, it is still possible to illustrate that, over the years when liberal democracy was lauded as the only form of human government possible or when multiparty politics was hailed as the way out of state authoritarianism, *states continued to bulldoze people through the ballot-box dictators and under-delivering multiparty governments* (Murunga, 2009: 3 emphasis added).

In that respect, "the multiparty democracy, which was expected to transform political power only led to destructive competition for leadership, lack of guarantee of participation of the masses in the political process, [and] failure to promote a democratic culture" (Ndeda, 2013: 164). Notwithstanding such manifestations of democracy in Africa, the goals are not to dispute goodness of democratic values, but to argue for the need to debag the *one-size-fits-all* notion of liberal democracy in favour of more contextual based democracy and democratisation processes.

Democracy and democratisation processes ought to be mindful of deeply divided nature of most of African societies. The phrase deeply divided society is used in the sense Lustick (1979) used it. For him, a society is considered as a "deeply divided if its ascriptive [identities acquired at birth such as race and ethnicity] ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time and a wide variety of issues"(Lustick, 1979: 325). As such, considering democracy and opportunities it provides to such societies, it is evident that, "democracy is indispensable in organising complex societies because the art of governing divided societies [such of those of African countries] demand that we take into account principles for pluralism, inclusion, and consensus" (Tarimo, 2013: 150). However, as Ambrose (1995: xii) puts it, "while Africa does need democracy; liberal democracy is not the best option for Africa. Africa should be allowed to decide on a democracy that suits African reality." In the similar vein, Ake (1991) has pointed out the debate of incompatibility of liberal democratic project in Africa, while on his part, Shivji (1994) reminded that, liberal democratic project in Africa cannot be sustained without the vision of social emancipation guided by a grand social theory.

With that note, the rest of the paper is structured as follows: the second part is on the method for the study. The third part presents a brief theoretical and conceptual overview, while the fourth part provides a synoptic examination of the state democratisation consolidation in Africa. The fifth part makes the central part of the paper and examines the electoral dynamics, and democratisation processes in Tanzania while the sixth concludes the paper and draws some few possible lessons.

2. Approaching the Case

In studying the Africa's and particularly Tanzania's quarter a century experience of electoral democracy, the paper has relied on secondary sources. To benefit from these sources, the study adopted and employed documentary analysis/review as the most feasible and main method to deal with the documents. But as a method, documentary review is understood differently among scholars. For example, Bailey (1994) underscored it as the analysis of documents that contain information about the phenomenon

under the study. But, for Payne and Payne (2004), they described it as the techniques used to categorise, investigate, interpret, and identify the limitations of physical sources, most commonly written documents whether in the private or public domain. However, according to Desai and Potter, (2006) for the document qualify this role, the researcher need to find out, how does the document answer both the how, why, and when questions, that is how did it come into being, why was it produced and when was it prepared or written. This was the focus for selecting and analysing document that have been used to produce these results.

Documentary review was supplemented by hermeneutics techniques to facilitate deep and critical understanding of the documents under consideration (secondary data) within their broader historical context (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). With regard to hermeneutics techniques, the study drew insights from Hans-Georg Gadamer, major work *Truth and Method,* which encourages finding the broader horizons of a text, broader context, and calls for paying careful attention to the historically situated narratives that helped produce it (Gadamer, 2013: 406). In this regard, Africa's and Tanzania's democratisation processes and particularly multiparty electoral democracy were studied in a broader historical context by trying as much as possible to comply with Jameson's (1981: 9) advice, "always historicise" as a way of putting this discussion in a continuum of strategic arch of the various manifestations of the various elections in African and Tanzania. This is so because, to "historicise means finding the correct interpretive key to understanding contemporary historical situated-ness, and then theorising this period in a broader, trans-historical context" (Mahoney, 2013: 381). In this, way the understanding of Africa and particularly Tanzanian multiparty democracy and the practice of electoral democracy that spans over twenty five years presented in this paper was possible.

3. A Brief Theoretical and Conceptual Overview

3. 1 Conceptualising Democracy

Democracy is one of the contested concepts in the political and related social sciences. Pundits of democracy and democratisation generally tend to choose, implicitly or explicitly, among four main types of definitions: constitutional, substantive, procedural, and process-oriented (Tilly, 2007: 7). Elaborating these further, Tilly (2007: 7-9) urges, since the definitions of the concept democracy, range from these four parameters there has been no single universally agreed definition of the term. Those in favour of constitutional conceptualisation of democracy tend to concentrates on laws a regime enacts concerning political activity; those of substantive orientation focus on material conditions of life and politics a given regime promotes; the procedural working hard to single out a narrow range of governmental practices to determine whether a regime qualifies as democratic; while those who are process oriented tend to identify some minimum set of processes that must be continuously in motion for a situation to qualify as democratic. The latter differ significantly from the former and work towards what Dahl (1998) categorised as criteria for democracy namely: participation, voting equality, enlightened understanding, control of the agenda and inclusion of adults (Tilly, 2007: 9).

Other scholars have tended to find a more convincing and simple definition. For example, Beetham (1993: 55) defines democracy as "a mode of decision-making about collectively binding rules and policies over which the people exercise control, and the most democratic arrangement to be that where all members of the collectivity enjoy effective equal rights to take part in such decision-making directly." To the other end, Mazrui (2002) conceptualised democracy by distinguishing between ultimate goals and necessary instruments of achieving them. But in this discussion and for the purpose of this article, democracy definition by Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1988: xvi) is used. According to these scholars, democracy, or what Robert Dahl term '*polyarchy*', is a system of government that meets three essential conditions. First, meaningful, and extensive competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all elective positions of government's power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force.

Second, highly inclusive levels of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major social group is excluded. And third, it is characterised by a level of civil and political liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organisations sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation.

3. 2. Forms of Democracy

There is nothing intrinsically wrong with different governance structures in different regions of the world (Magesa, 2013: 137). In that respect, some have been in favour of reckoning the indigenous systems to be the source of statecraft. This entails then, that, there are varieties and different ways of organizing the polity. Under the democratic organisation of the polity as well, there are several forms in which democratic organisation can be undertaken. The most common forms of democracy are the direct democracy and indirect or representative democracy. The former is old as civilization and it is often acclaimed to have been better practiced during the times of Ancient Greece government in Athens. Also, it as well flourishes in a more homogeneous community and societies with thin population that allows all adult members of the community to directly participate in the state affairs. In present days, this form of democracy can as well be practiced at a village or hamlet level or when a referendum is called for a major decision such as the legitimating a constitution draft. The latter is more recent and the mostly widely practiced form of democracy in our world today. It is said to be better suited in facing and addressing the dynamics of complex and larger communities where holding direct or popular democracy is not possible. It constitutes various ways in which it is practiced. It may be practiced under both the parliamentary and presidential systems of government. It can as well be categorized under the electoral democracy, dominant-party system, parliamentary such a Westminster democracy, council democracy, consensus democracy and consociational democracy to mention but only a few.

In recent days, the characterisation of democracy has tended to categorise democracies into three models: liberal democratic model; social democratic model and new democracy, each of which is defined by the

discourses/debates in favour of either model. Though the paper is not intending to discuss the forms of democracy; suffices to say some few words on each the three models listed above. First, liberal democratic model is mostly characterised by multiparty elections, accountability, transparency, good governance, and promotion of human rights. The second is social democratic model. This is the form of democracy that is deep rooted in Scandinavian democracies. It advocates for welfare states and works towards addressing issues of equity and needs. The third is a new democracy which is constructed on three fundamental elements: popular livelihoods, popular participation, and popular power (Shivji, 2013: 8-12; 2009).

That said, it is worth-noting that, in spite of either form or model, for democracy and elections to yield intended polity organization outcomes, they all need to be people centred to cultivate a kind of culture. Political culture is among the most prominent democratic principles since democracy and culture cannot be disentangled. They depend and reinforce one another. Since culture influences social-historical aspects, it essentially affects all aspects of social life of particular community. If this argument is true, then, the process of democratisation cannot be realised outside cultural dynamics (Tarimo & Manwelo, 2007: 125) because by definition, democracy can neither be imposed from outside; nor can it be given by outsiders, however good their intentions may be. As Nyerere (1997: 10) bluntly argued "Pre-packaged, Coca-Cola democracy cannot help Africa!" This was a sincere observation made by Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere while addressing the Edinburgh university community. It was and is critical and of greater challenge to Africans as we journey down the road to democratic consolidation since it is shaped by culture and context of life (Tarimo & Manwelo, 2007: 126). And as such, "each society must decide on the type of democracy that suits its culture and history" (Osabu-Kle, 2000, as quoted by Muiu, 2013: 340). And since democracy as a value is 'good-in-itself' and, like any other people, African people deserve to have it, but the question of democracy cannot avoid the social and historical character of democracy (Thandika, 1989 in Shivji, 1993:168).

3. 3. Elections

In respect to Diamond, *et al*. (1989: xvi), elections form an important ingredient of democracy, and act as one of the feasible ways of selecting those to exercise power. Elections constitute not only voting processes and results declaration but also subsequent interpretations of the outcomes (Killian, 2006). It is a system encompassing procedures, laws, rules, and regulations for the electorate to exercise their democratic right to choose their leaders and translate those ballots into actual representations (EISA, 2005: 3). In Africa, these processes, however, are always contentious owing to the fact that, most of elections have been associated with rigging, serious irregularity, and omissions in favour particular category of candidates hence reducing the electorates' trust in the processes (Shayo, 2017). Some of these irregularities have featured in the breach of some electoral regulations, manipulation by state armies and the police, media and threats to some opposition candidates to mention but only a few (Makulilo & Henry, 2017; Paget, 2017; Pallotti, 2017).

As the results, elections have run short of proving to be the most trusted means to selecting leaders into power. Although they are the most convenient means of offering orderly political succession of office bearers; they have to a large extent failed to guarantee proper functioning of democracies. For Makulilo and Henry (2017: 103), elections have been "safety valve to legitimise authoritarian regimes [or] for regulating societal discontent and confining the opposition." Thus, for elections to become credible instruments to political succession; adherence to the rules of the game as well as procedures that has been agreed among players is imperative (Ahmed, 2005). Because of this, the constitutional and legal framework governing the electoral processes have always been central and among fundamental issues during elections.

4. Africa's Democratisation Processes: A Synoptic Account

Explaining the success and failure of democracy in Africa requires us to think about what facilitates political liberalisation (Cheeseman, 2015: 5), which elections are among things that facilitate this process. Thus, the degree of freedom and fairness of elections are some of the explanatory factors of this process. In discussing African's to electoral democracy experience and

political transfer or peaceful transfer of power, it should be established from the onset that "political institutions can hardly play a neutral role in the organisation of interests, ideas, and identities. Some activities will be 'mobilised in' and others will be 'mobilized out'" (Gerring & Thacker, 2008: 27). As the result the electoral process has commonly been dubbed to be partisan hence questioning the very outcome (the leadership) of the process.

From the late 1980s onward, the African political landscape was transformed from one-party state (characterised by personal dictatorships and military rule) to multiparty politics (Cheeseman, 2015). As a political process, democratisation is multifaceted, contested, and differently defined process. It encompasses the construction of participatory and competitive political institutions. Normally it begins with political challenges to authoritarian regimes, advances through the political struggles over liberalisation, and requires the installation of a freely elected government. It concludes only when democratic rules become firmly institutionalised as well as valued by political actors at large (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 194). This process "involves three distinct but overlapping processes: the transition to multiparty, the reconstitution of a new political order, and the later process of consolidating democratic gains" (Cheeseman, 2015: 94).

This seems to elaborate on how Huntington (1991) explained this democratisation process in series of three waves intercepted two reverses. He delineated that the 1980s/1990s democratisation processes to constituted the third wave of democratisation in history of the modern world. Earlier waves were two, the first and second and the year 1820s and 1962s being the periods marking the first and second waves respectively (Huntington, 1991: 12). However, what we have to be aware of, is that, this process is not universal and uniform, but rather, depends on a number of factors, such as the geography, economics, class and ethnic group dynamics, social capital, political culture geopolitical factors, by political leadership, and by diverse historical legacies (Gerring & Thacker, 2008). But, "while almost all African countries embarked on the first phase of this journey, many stalled in the second stage and few became liberal democracies" (Cheeseman, 2015: 94).

The early assessments of the transitions were hopeful as they witnessed the peaceful electoral displacement of authoritarian regimes in countries like Benin and Zambia as harbingers of 'political renewal' and 'second liberation'. However, a critical backlash soon followed in the wake of a series of disputed elections in places like Angola and Kenya (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). This was an affirmation that, "the extent of democratisation in a given country was thus shaped by both international pressure and the domestic context which all depend on the presence of a strong domestic pro-reform constituency, and vice versa" (Cheeseman, 2015: 86). Other scholars such as Ake (1993) links the African democratisation processes with the disappointment of independence. He contends that, the foundation upon which Africa's democracy movement is based is the bitter disappointment of independence and post-independence plans, the development project being a prime example. Poor leadership and structural constraints turned the high expectations of the independence movement into painful disappointment, forcing many African leaders to rely more on coercion which has deepened their alienation. As such, it is disappointing to hear that the hopes of the second independence have also collapsed as Tarimo (2013: 153) puts it:

> […] the process of democratisation has so far created limited impact because personalities that we have in leadership are the same tyrants we had five decades ago. As the results, in some countries the processes have led to the tendency of using identity politics to promote ethnic interests.

Apparently, the process of democratisation has been hijacked by urban based leaders who have no sympathy for the people they rule (Ihonvbere, 1996, as quoted in Tarimo 2013: 154). At large the processes have both ups and down stories. For example, in their interesting assessment of 20 years of democratisation in Africa 1990-2010 for example, Lynch and Crawford (2011:276) highlight seven areas of progress and setbacks. Issues highlighted are as follows:

> […] increasingly illegitimate, but ongoing military intervention; regular elections and occasional transfers of power, but realities of democratic rollback and hybrid regimes; democratic

> institutionalization, but ongoing presidentialism and endemic corruption; the institutionalization of political parties, but widespread ethnic voting and the rise of an exclusionary (and often violent) politics of belonging; increasingly dense civil societies, but local realities of incivility, violence and insecurity; new political freedoms and economic growth, but extensive political controls and uneven development; and the donor community's mixed commitment to, and at times perverse impact on, democracy promotion.

Also, they make far reaching conclusion in which they neither lament the demise-of nor celebrate the triumph of democracy. While they are not making any judgments, issues identified suggest that there is no such uniformity in presenting democratisation experience in Africa.

Lynch and Crawford (2011) position concurs with Grugel (2002) who is of the view that, despite the range of global pressures for democratisation, the consolidation of democratisation is nationally determined. Where democratisation is successful, it is due to two factors, namely the emergence of strong, dense, and vibrant civil societies that work consistently to democratise politics and to hold the state accountable, and the existence of a capable and flexible state. And that there is a range of issues in understanding the phenomenon but central to it is that is a process, a gradual process since is essentially linked to cultural traditions and value system. Democratisation is not an event, but a process by which people organise themselves in search of development from perspective of their culture (Tarimo, 2013: 156-159). As such, it should always known that, "democratisation has been conceptualised as a discourse, a demand, a set of institutional changes, a form of elite domination, a political system dependent on popular control, an exercise in power politics and a demand for global solidarity–and this is by no means an exhaustive list" (Grugel, 2002: 4). Thus, Lynch and Crawford's (2011) analysis of seven issues on progress and setbacks whose critical assessment reveals Africa to have progressed, but not on the desired end; deserves some credit.

Other scholars too have been critical on the Africa's democratisation processes. For instance, Tarimo and Manwelo (2007: 117) have contended that, "the movement of democratising the continent of Africa which began in 1990s, has not created any significant impact in the process of political transformation." They then further attest that, "for unknown reasons, democratisation has come to be equated with multiparty politics, regular parliamentarian elections, and competition for positions. These practices on their own cannot guarantee full participation of the masses in political process". This is evidenced by various studies on African democratisation process (Ewald, 2013; Paget, 2017; Rakner *et al*. 2007). As such, a review on the theoretical literature on democratisation offers a wide array of competing explanations about regime change and analysts have long been fascinated about whether, how, and why democracies are installed and consolidated. The debates generated by these inquiries raise paradigmatic issues that lie at the heart of social and political theory (Bratton & de Walle, 1998). That is, "the dynamics of democratisation reveal a subtle interplay between the inclusion and exclusion processes" (Mmuya, 2011: 9). But, whether we conceive of democratisation as functional for global capitalism, or as an imposition of global capitalist institutions, the introduction of formal structures of accountability or as social struggles to invest citizenship with meaningful democratisation, has become a key tool for the analysis of the contemporary world (Grugel, 2002: 2-3).

5. Electoral Democracy and Political Transitions in Tanzanian, 1965-2015

The United Republic of Tanzania (URT) was born as a result of a union between two sovereign states namely Tanganyika and Zanzibar on April 26, 1964. Prior to the union, Tanganyika was a United Nation British Mandate while Zanzibar was British Protectorate. They won their independence in 1961 and 1963 respectively under the Westminster constitution which allowed the existence of plural politics as well as private candidates. Due to the prevailing social-political material conditions, Zanzibar was forced to undergo bloody revolution on January 12, 1964 to oust the minority government under Sultan Jamshid bin Abdullah. From 1965, Tanzania became a *de jure* one party state, though in practice, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP) continued to exist

along side by side, TANU in mainland Tanzania mainland and ASP in Tanzania Zanzibar respectively. The actual state of one party state was only realised as from 5 February 1977 when the two parties merged to form the '*Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM)' — The Party of Revolution (EISA, 2006).

5.1 Institutionalisation of One Party Democracy in Tanzania, 1965-1985

The organisation of the state craft under the rubrics of democratic principles in Africa and Tanzania in particular, is often treated like an inherited heritage. Nyerere (1961; 1963; 1965) challenged this view by advancing a theory of democracy that manifested its indigenous nature which can as well be articulated to inform the modern state craft. It is a theory that marries practices from both the African past such as free and open discussion and Western practices such as organising public affairs under party system. In this way, he articulates the centrality of democracy in organising public affairs without disputing its Africa origin and by also acknowledging the influence of other cultures in the modern organisation of the polity which often is advanced and adjusted to meet contemporary social realities. As Kweka (1995: 61) succinctly puts it: "the development of democracy in Tanzania has been influenced by ideas and practices of democracy from West, and the East, as well as African past."

The foundation to Nyerere's theory of democracy that was advanced into his seminal essay, '*Democracy and the Party System*' and other subsequent writings is the synthesis of African and external origin of the democracy. Some of its manifestations were evident in the 1950s, prior to his conceptualisation. For example, in favour of locally specific solution, in 1953 two colonial scholars, Hans Cory and Donald Malcolm contested the colonial common democratic trend of 'one size fits all' model of democratic development, but with different footing. Cory was of the view that "the way of living of one race cannot be definitely designed by another especially under present circumstances where the element of freedom is the decisive factor" (Hunter, 2015: 79), while for Malcolm "democracy has many forms, thus, representative government as practiced in Great Britain is one; and it may not be audacious to suggest that Sukumaland has another" (Malcolm, 1953: 106). In that regard, Nyerere conceptualisation of democracy in Tanzania seems to support this view, but expanding it beyond the confines

of ethnic group. It anchors Held's distinctions between "direct or participatory democracy; liberal or representative democracy; and finally socialist or one party democracy" (as quoted by Hunter, 2015: 66). With this, one should not be surprised to hear that, Nyerere once remarked "in spite of our having one party, we were very democratic" (Nyerere, 1968: 4).

Across Africa, the early 1960s saw late colonial experiments with multipartyism rapidly abandoned and the single-party state become the norm (Hunter, 2015). It evolved as an antidote to the democratic system inherited from the colonial history. Like in most African countries, by 1965, Tanzania had "had followed many of its neighbours in Africa and the wider postcolonial world towards a single party system" (Hunter, 2015: 187), in spite of its postcolonial vibrant multiparty democracy. In defence of one party democracy various reasons were often suggested. Three claims, however are the stronger, namely:

> […] (1) the unity of the historical experience of African peoples; (2) the foreignness of two-party or multiparty models of governance in the context of African tradition; and (3) the danger that the delicate fabric of the recently cobbled together and fragile African nations might be rent by the embrace of two-party or multiparty rule (Táíwó, 2004: 253).

These, varied from country to country and from one political leader to another. Thus, unlike most of his contemporaries such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Sekou Toure of Guinea, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; on top of the above claims, Nyerere found evidences for one party democracy institution in the nature of parties that spearheaded independence struggles in Tanganyika. This concurs with what Kweka (1995: 66-71) underscored that the evolution of one party democracy in Tanzania (Tanganyika) must be understood by considering important historical landmarks that characterised politics between the 1950s to mid-1960. The most remarkable one were marked by passing of the bill in July 1965 which made Tanzania a *de jure* one party democracy but de *facto two* party democracies with one each on the either side of the union.

In spite of one party democracy institution; a form of democracy mostly advocated by Nyerere the first president of Tanzania, regular elections after

every five years continued. And as opposed to most of his critics, Nyerere saw an obvious reconciliation between democratic practices and one party state. To him the "two essentials for 'representative' democracy were the freedom of the individuals, and the regular opportunity for them to join with their fellows in replacing, or reinstating, the government of their country by means of the ballot-box and without recourse to assassination" (Bjerk, 2015: 52). And as for Cheeseman (2015) this was so because in his eyes multiparty politics was not just politically dangerous; it was unnecessary, and 'un-African'. This view, have not ceased to picture Nyerere's position on one party democracy. One of the recent accounts is as observed in the Economist (March 17, 2018). It portrayed him as follows: "like many other leaders of the time, Nyerere was an autocrat, instituting one-party rule on the ground that democracy was 'an over-sophisticated pastime which we in Africa cannot afford'."

Though, there were regular and periodic elections, this practice had some limitations. For the presidential position, for example, as from 1965 to 1985, the candidate had no competition as he was the solo presidential candidate. Once a presidential candidate was nominated by the party National Executive Committee, voters were only required to cast 'Yes' or 'No' vote (Shivji, 1994; Shayo, 2017). Slight competition was for the positions of Members of Parliament (MPs) where two members were nominated within the party to contest. These were assigned to *hoe* or *hummer* symbol identities that defined their positions although going by the same manifesto. In this way it can be argued that, for 20 years there was no political transition and no presidential competition but with slight internal competition for the Members of Parliament. But for Lofchie (2014: 3), "it would be a mistake to dismiss its early elections as simply a democratic subterfuge. Tanzania held six single-party elections between 1965 and 1990, and the debates between CCM candidates were heavily attended and widely discussed."

On top of that, this electoral democracy had many other positive things. One of the important ingredient that is often ignored is that "for the candidate to win had to score 50 percent of total votes casted, otherwise the party would immediately recommend for another candidate" (Shayo, 2017: 43). This provision was of great importance especially for parliamentarian elections

as opposed to the current practice of the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral systems. Also, although single party elections were exclusionary and did not change the regime in power, but to some extent they were competitive (Hermet, 1978; Shayo, 2017). This is so because there was a choice between two candidates, who had almost equal playing field, as opposed to the current practice where some parties and their candidates enjoy more privileges than others especially from less affluent and influential parties (Makulilo, 2012). As such in terms of equal treatment of candidates and probably party internal democracy, there were some aspects of vibrant electoral democracy.

5.2 Dynamics of Transfer of Power in Tanzania, 1985-1995

Nyerere's hegemony of *de-facto* one party state was short lived. After merging TANU and ASP to form CCM in 1977, and the subsequent party supremacy in Tanzania; in 1985 Nyerere stepped down of presidency and only remained a chairperson of the CCM party till 1990. It is here and his decision to willingly relinquish from contesting for presidency reminds us, that:-

> [His]...decision to rule through a one-party state was not simply motivated by self-preservation; but rather Nyerere also believed that a single-party system was the best way to rapidly develop his country, which had entered independence with little infrastructure and a low skills base (Cheeseman, 2015: 41).

And when his conviction on the politics he believed in were proved dysfunction; Nyerere became one of the first African president to voluntarily step down from power in 1985, in large part because he came to realise that his faith in African socialism had led to economic collapse and felt that fresh leadership was required to open up of the economy to greater competition (Cheeseman, 2015). It will always be remembered that, he was a man of his own nature whose level of humility in acknowledging the failure of some of his political theories and his willingness to confess and distance himself from many of one party democracy architectures ought to be praised. One of the examples was Nyerere's influential speech of February 1990, during his visit to Leipzig to terminate the relations between Tanzania's Revolutionary Party (CCM) and the East German Communist Party — in which he pronounced

that the African one-party state, of which he had been a major architect, was no longer Sacrosanct (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). Later, Nyerere himself continued to play a leading role in this process, arguing that Tanzania could not afford to ignore the significance of events taking place in Eastern Europe and that it was only by moving towards liberal multiparty democracy which could enable the country to attract the international funds, loans, and investments that it needed to kick-start economic growth (Cheeseman, 2015; Lofchie, 2014).

Nyerere's exit from the top political position was marked by ascendency of Alhaj Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the second president of the United Republic of Tanzania in October 1985. Mwinyi's term of office will always be remembered as it was during his tenure that many radical changes were pursued including the liberalisation and embracing of the market economy. Owing to the debt crisis and the need to access aid, political liberalisation became one of the, among the main conditions of the donors.

Unlike many African countries that experienced protest as a push for political reforms, in Tanzania and other four countries (Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, and São Tomé), reforms were achieved without protests (Bratton and van de Walle, 1992). They were championed by the ruling parties and incumbents, what Cheeseman (2015: 97) calls, "transition from above." Instead of waiting to be dragged kicking and screaming into a new multiparty era, the incumbents and their parties in these countries led the process of 'top-down democratisation'. Although "a number of analysts have attributed Tanzania's move to multiparty democracy to external pressures; it is extremely difficult to neatly disentangle the external and internal forces producing the transition" (Aminzade, 2013: 249). Notwithstanding such difficulties that may be experienced, still silencing from local or domestic dynamics and critical roles played by some peoples such as Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, the Father of the nation in championing for political transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s would render such analysis incomplete. His role was critical in persuading for change. He was instrumental to both the general public and his fellow CCM elites for the steps that were taken to initiate and effect the change for transition to

multiparty democracy in Tanzania (see Ahluwalia & Zegeye, 2001; van Cranenburgh, 1996; Nyirabu, 2002).

The ground breaking Nyerere's contribution to multiparty democracy debates in Tanzania, what Nyirabu (2002: 102) has painted as "an acrobatic U-turn and proclaimed that it was no longer treasonable to discuss the introduction of multi-party politics", was made in February 1990 while addressing the press. During this speech he challenged the ruling party legitimacy's arguing that "CCM had become complacent due to the lack of competition" (Cranenburgh, 1996: 537), and that "it has lost touch with people" (Ahluwalia & Zegeye, 2001: 39). Based on such observation, he then advised that, "When you see your neighbour being shaved, wet your head to avoid a dry shave. The one party is not Tanzania's ideology and having one party is not God's will. One-party has its own limitations."(Nyirabu, 2001: 102). Three months later, he made another significant contribution. During his May 1990 address to CCM Youth Meeting in Mwanza he urged them to move with time initiated an open debate on multiparty system to the astonishment of fellow CCM leaders (Kapinga, 2008; Tambila, 1995). The third major contribution was made two years later. Talking to Daily News in February 1992, Mwalimu remarked that, "CCM can and should welcome the opportunity to give a lead in yet another major peaceful political transition in our country. We have an opportunity to ensure that this change happens democratically under rules to provide for genuine democracy. This is a moment when Tanzania under CCM can choose to change and oversee that change, rather than be made to change (Daily News, 29 February 1992, as cited by Nyirabu, 2002: 102). These three observations by Nyerere were critical not only to his fellow CCM elites but also to the one party system he natured and groomed. His vey stature and position on the need for transformation were very important and opened way for further discussion that were later codified and pursued under a more formalized platform for political change.

That said, however, and as it has been hinted, the leading force to transition multipartism in Tanzania was largely the recommendations of 1991 presidential Commission on single party versus multiparty famously known as Nyalali Commission together with internal political agitations for change

by lawyers, journalists, students, professors, former politicians, and leaders of the ruling party. But, these alone could not have compelled the ruling party and government to initiate the process. Immediate forces behind the scene were the agitations at work. For Aminzade (2013: 249) the discontent generated by structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed by international financial institutions (IFIs) and foreign donors had a significant pressure for the changes that were made in the political landscape.

The bases and dynamics for Tanzanian political landscape transformation were largely set and defined by the Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System in Tanzania that was instituted in March 1991 and led by Justice Francis L. Nyalali hence the famous name Nyalali Commission. The commission travelled all over the country and managed to collect opinion on the form of political system best for Tanzania from a total of 36,299 people. Based on their finding a total of 79% of the total people (36,299) interviewed favoured the continuation of the one party political system but with some changes to enhance democratic practices and behaviour while the remaining 21% called for and preferred the change of the political system from one party to multiparty system (Nyirabu, 2002; Othman, 2006). However, "although the majority of Tanzanians wanted the one-party system to continue, they proposed very many modifications, some of which, in the Commission's view, could only be effectively introduced under a multi-party political system"(Ngasongwa, 1992: 114; also see Nyirabu, 2002: 103; Othman, 2006: 46). As such, to accommodate such changes needed, the Commission recommended for transformation of the political system as the most feasible way to accommodate what all groups articulated. And for the case of Zanzibar, it was much more revealing because 43% of the people interviewed wanted a multiparty system. In other words, there emerged a situation where almost 50% of the people of Zanzibar wanted multiparty system (Othman, 2006: 46).

These variations of interest's percentage wanting multipartyism have been always a remarkable difference between the organisation of politics in Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar. Since it was only 20% in mainland Tanzania and 43 in Tanzania Zanzibar who were in favour with multiparty state, if Tanzania was to go by the verdict of majoritarian choice

as a principle of exercising democracy, Tanzania would not have opted for multiparty democracy. That is to say, the justification to multiparty politics was not *de-facto* situation or wish of majority but other factors (Bomani, 2006: 55), one being the pressure from the donors.

The 1992 switch to multipartyism was not preceded by or predicated on the verdict of people or even voters despite the commonly referred to limitation of twenty seven years of one party democracy. Following the Nyalali Commission's recommendations; the Political Parties Act No. 5 of 1992 was enacted and subsequently assented and became operational in the same year. This Act which applies to both Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar repealed the ban on political parties and instituted the establishment of the office of the Registrar of Political Parties, which is responsible for regulating and governing the operations of political parties [as well as] for the registration of political parties by the Registrar's Office (EISA, 2006: 14). As the results, there were a number of amendments of other laws that could contradict with this act as well and it has since then, been amended from time to time the last amendment being that of July 2015.

Having laid the legal and regulatory foundation for multiparty politics, Tanzania held its first multiparty elections in 1995 with Benjamin William Mkapa of CCM and Augustino Lyatonga Mrema of NCCR Mageuzi by then, as the top most competing candidates for presidential position. This was another test to Tanzania in terms of peaceful transfer of power in which CCM emerged as the winning party and became the ruling party and hence the country managed to pass the test of time.

5.3 Democracy in Tanzania, 1995-2015: Democracy Consolidation or Attrition?

A balance sheet on Tanzania's experience with democratisation over the last two decades shows progressive as well as regressive trends (Mmuya, 2011). Between 1995 and 2015 five multiparty general elections have been conducted in which three government transfers have occurred. The first two spanned a period of two decades and represent progress and reverse in democratic consolidation. Of the five elections 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015, none went without contestations. Of all, three most contested ones are

those of 2000, 2010, and 2015 which the government have been accused of vote rigging, excessive use of coercive powers and intimidation, corruption and suppression of the progress made towards democratic consolidation in favour of the ruling party (Babeiya, 2011; LHRC, 2016; Makulilo 2012; TEMCO, 2001; Roop and Wenghost, 2016).

As we might all know, debates about democratic consolidation in low-income countries are often discourses about the meaning of consolidation itself (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997). But as for Cheeseman (2015: 29-30):

> […] to become consolidated democracies, these states must go through two separate but related processes. First, deepening the quality of democracy requires the evolution of institutions that are not controlled by the executive, enabling opposition parties to compete on a level playing field. [And] Second, securing democratic gains requires the strengthening of democratic norms, practices, and procedures within political institutions, political parties, and society at-large. [In that regard] it is worth separating out these two dimensions of democratic consolidation because, following the reintroduction of multiparty politics, African countries occupied a variety of positions on both scales.

This is closer to the understanding of democracy consolidation by Huntington (1991). To him a regime can be a consolidated regime after two electoral turnovers — that is,

> [when] ... the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of the transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election (as quoted by Bratton & van de Walle, 1997: 234).

Considering what Bratton and van de Walle, (1997) and Cheeseman (2015) have underscored in relation to democratic consolidation; Tanzania seems not qualifying to be a consolidated democracy. The outcomes of 2000, 2010 and 2015 general elections pose a stumbling block to this process. For example, it could be hard for analysts to consider Tanzania to have

consolidated her democracy since the second multiparty election of 2000 general elections led to violence that consumed a number of lives (FIDH and LHRC, 2001; Poncian, 2015).

Further to that are the 2015 elections. These have also distorted Tanzania's image internationally in terms of respecting electoral laws and regulations (Brewin, 2016; Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015a). For example, one of the contested areas resulting from the 2015 general elections that deserve a separate examination, but worth of mentioning here is the Zanzibar 2015 General Elections. The concern is the unilateral annulment of Zanzibar elections by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission (ZEC) Chairperson (Brewin, 2016; CSIS, 2016; EU-EOM, 2016; Makulilo & Henry, 2017; NEC, 2016: 97; Pallotti, 2017; Roop & Weghorst, 2016; TEMCO, 2016: 176; US Embassy, 2015). The annulment demanded an election run-off that has marked the official end of opposition in the Zanzibar Representative Council that have been enjoying a slightly balanced membership from the two major parties of CCM and Civic United Front (CUF) in the Isles since the reintroduction of plural politics in 1992. These issues deserve a slight extensive discussion of election stakeholders and their views of the state of democracy in Tanzania which is not given due analysis due to limitation of space and scope and focus of this paper. Other pending issues have continued to feature elections in Tanzania and seem to have illustrated the state of democracy attrition in include; partiality of electoral institutions elections funding and financing; the role of the media in elections and the union question.

5.3.1 Partiality of Electoral Institutions

Partiality of electoral institutions has been evident. Although the survey of Tanzanian Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) reports of 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 elections have revealed that, the National Electoral Commission (NEC) and the (ZEC) have performed well, it is still accused of being weak, inefficient, and biased towards CCM (babeiya, 2011; Makulilo, 2012; Paget, 2017; TEMCO, 2001). As such, establishing a credible and de-politicised electoral management body (institution) is critical for election integrity (EISA, 2005). Most of the weaknesses observed in these elections were largely caused by the partiality of electoral institutions such as the NEC and the ZEC. Also, the media both the state and private owned, international

observers; Non-Government Organisations (NGOs); Faith Based Organisations (FBOs); Civil Society Organisations (CSOs); and the academia are all to blame (Makulilo, 2011; 2012, Masabo, 2011; EISA 2005; TEMCO, 2001).

Other institutional partiality aspects are the trends toward ethno-religious politics during 2010 and 2015 elections. This have brought to the fore what "until recently, the political science community was cautious about the possibility of peaceful and successful democratic transitions, let alone democratic consolidation in Africa"(Elischer, 2013: 2) and Tanzania in particular. For example, the quest of candidates' religious affiliation and relationship to the top most party officials have featured in both the nomination processes and campaigns (REDET & LHRC, 2016). Furthermore, other issues that have come to characterise our democratic transfer have been the issue of state forces interference (Paget, 2017; Makulilo, 2012). Here the Tanzanian general elections need to be understood in its historical context. What happened is unbecoming, irregularities surrounding election processes such as invading and confiscating some parties' property in the pretext of enforcing the law and nullifying election results amid elections, ought to be looked at with a critical eye (Paget, 2017; EU-EOM, 2016; Brewin, 2016; CSIS, 2016).

5.3.2 Elections Funding and Financing.

Election funding, and its consequences on the kind of leadership is another critical point of concern when it comes to peaceful transfer of power in any country. In Tanzania the Constitution, Political Act of 1992 and the Election Expenses Act, of 2010 provide for the procedures in funding and financing elections. For instance, although the Election Expenses Act sets the "maximum limit allowable to be spent by political parties and candidates in campaigns, anecdotal and circumstantial evidence show that in many circumstances the law was flouted and the enforcement mechanisms did not work properly" (TEMCO, 2016: 110). To avoid this, there is a need for adherence to such regulations and parties' continuous respect to accountability of money gained from various sources for their credibility and the credibility of the leadership they produce through election. But the

overall performance of political parties when it comes to funding accountability and transparency leaves a lot to be desired.

5.3.3 The Media (state/public and private owned)

The media as a source of information and as a tool of campaigns and civic education can do harm if not well regulated. Constantly various reports have revealed the continued media partiality in Tanzanian elections. The TEMCO Reports for 2010 and 2015 General Elections (TEMCO, 2011; 2016), for example, have documented that although the media is an important source of elections information, campaigns and analysis of the policy proposal by candidates, Tanzanian media have revealed some weakness in fulfilling these roles. Some of these weaknesses are: being urban centred, partisan especially public owned media have frequently been misused by the incumbent candidates and lack of editorial independence etc.

5.3.4 The Union Question

The Union question is always at the centre stage of the elections in Tanzania and continues to be one of the contentious issues in election. During 2015 election the need to resolve the union question featured more prominently. For example, the annulment of the Zanzibar elections by ZEC Chairperson did not affect the votes for union presidential candidate and members of the union parliament from Zanzibar. This decision was paradoxical and left many with their arms akimbo asking how one of the same elections can be invalid but another valid. Such manipulations are not healthy for peaceful transfer of power and have revealed how partisan NEC and ZEC are when it comes to endorsing who is to be whom. These are some of major questions which need an immediate response. However, given the controversy of the matter, they can only be addressed within constitutional making a need that calls for revamping the constitutional debates that were silenced in 2015.

5.4 Tanzania 2015 General Elections: A Critical Analysis

The 2015 general elections, was the fifth multiparty general election in the United Republic of Tanzania following the reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. The 2015 general elections were unique in many ways, especially when compared with the 2010 election. Firstly, it witnessed thrust of political enthusiasm and competition due to a number of reasons including political maturity of some of the opposition parties; merging of

opposition parties under their grand coalition of Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), CUF, National Convention for Reconstruction and Reform (NCCR Mageuzi) and National League for Democracy (NLD) commonly known as '*Umoja wa Katiba ya Wananchi*' (UKAWA) and defection of the former Prime Minister and prominent politician, Mr. Edward Lowassa to CHADEMA. Secondly, unlike the 2010 elections, none of the presidential contestants was an incumbent president, a situation which increased fever of knowing what the fifth governance phase would do for Tanzania.

The institutional and legal framework was the same. The NEC for Mainland Tanzania, and the ZEC for Tanzania Zanzibar had the same operational structures such as lack of the branch offices and own officers at regional, district and other grassroots levels. Therefore, they continued depending on the government employees. The puzzle on the independence of these bodies remained to be unresolved, whereby the senior NEC and ZEC were still presidential appointees. In Tanzanian context, especially basing on the ruling parties experience, the president of Tanzania is also a national chairperson of ruling party CCM. Some of the returning officers were also presidential appointees without any vetting process. Private candidacy was not allowed despite the 2013 ruling by the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR), which directed the government of Tanzania to allow private candidacy before the 2015 election. Also, the cybercrime law was added in list of criminal law books. It aimed at controlling, inter-alia, social media. The law was hurriedly passed and endorsed for implementation during the 2015 elections campaigns period making some individuals and organisations the first causalities of this draconian law.

The organisation of the 2015 election seemed to have been done well (EU-EOM, 2016; Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015b; NEC, 2016; TEMCO, 2016). Except for only few polling stations, the rest (more than 90 percent) of the stations had all polling officers and elections materials on time (EU-EOM, 2016) and about 76.6 as per TEMCO (2016) assessment. All polling stations monitored, opened on time, and that, voting exercise was peacefully (EU-EOM, 2016; NEC, 2016; TEMCO, 2016). However, due to financial constraints, only CCM and CHADEMA were able to put their agents in the polling stations for 80 percent (EU-EOM, 2016). Some challenges adversely

affected most of the parties and candidates during the elections campaigns. Due to financial constraints, they could not cover the whole country. Only ACT-Wazalendo, CCM, and CHADEMA, CUF, NCCR and NLD coalition-UKAWA were able to organise country-wide campaigns (EU-EOM, 2016).

Heated elections campaigns were mainly between ACT-Wazalendo, CCM and political parties forming UKAWA. These were as well the parties that received wide coverage in the media given their ability to pay for airtime in the main media. Other parties such as Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) managed to campaign for less than five regions. The dilemma of monitoring and control of election expenses remain intact. The actual amount of money and other resources used during the 2015 election was not immediately established: however, looking at vehicles, helicopters, posters, banners, billboards, hiring of entertainment groups, media coverage, live television shows it is obvious that spending by some of the candidates and political parties was above the required ceiling under the 2010 Election Expenses law. This also created unfair playing ground between political parties, posing a vital doubt of political democratisation in Tanzania under the pretext of multipartism.

The state media, particularly Tanzania Broadcasting Corporation (TBC), and newspapers (Habari Leo, Daily and Sunday News) allied with the CCM candidate. Likewise, the Star-TV which is owned by the CCM cadre supported CCM. The coverage of opposition parties in these media outlets including the CCM owned media outlets, Uhuru Radio and Uhuru Newspaper were mainly on negative incidents. Moreover, the use of public resources in favour of the ruling party was vivid in some of the polling districts. The opposite was expressed in Tanzania Daima, a newspaper owned by CHADEMA cadre.

Nevertheless, the opposition parties especially UKAWA team were supported by another former Prime Minister, Fredrick Sumaye who had crossed from CCM to UKAWA and the resignation of Ambassador Juma Mwapachu from CCM shortly before the elections. This made the election tense more that the country is used to.

The counting, tallying and declaration of the results were relatively fine with fewer incidences of commotions compared with previous years. NEC was able to release all the results on time required by law, in this case within 72 hours from the day of Election on 25th October, 2015 as planned (NEC, 2016). Few places which have their results delayed for a day or so had justifiable reasons, some being geographical location between the polling and tallying stations at ward and district stations levels. The tallying of presidential elections for both Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar left much to be desired. UKAWA objected on the ground that the process of tallying presidential results, which were mailed to NEC's National Tallying Centre in Dar es Salaam were 'schemed' before reaching the national centre and UKAWA efforts to stop NEC from continuing announcing the results were trumped-underfoot. Judge Damian Lubuva, the NEC Chairman went ahead probably given to the comments by the international observers who assessed the mainland elections as free and fair (EU-EOM, 2016; Commonwealth Observer Group, 2015b). Ultimately, the winner was declared to be Doctor John Pombe Joseph Magufuli from CCM.

On other hand, the ZEC Chairperson, Jecha S. Jecha, took unprecedented decision to nullify the whole elections despite the fact that at least 31 of the 54 electoral constituency results for the presidential elections in Zanzibar, all from Unguja which make-up about 60.37% of the tallied results were already announced by ZEC (EU-EOM, 2016; Roop & Weghorst, 2016). This unpopular decision left the country in a critical dilemma to date.

In justification of the annulment, Jecha S. Jecha, the ZEC Chairperson, cited "partisan election commissioners, ballot stuffing in Pemba, ballot boxes counted away from polling stations, observers being barred from entering polling stations, and CUF's premature declaration of victory" (Roop & Weghorst, 2016:193). In spite of these reasons and as ome analysts have commented, his decision,

> … was contrary to the election law which only mandates the commission to announce the results. Article 51 (2) of the Zanzibar Electoral Act 1984 as amended, ZEC has the authority to postpone an election if there are impediments to holding such an election.

> Once the elections are held, the jurisdiction to determine and duly declare the elections as null and void rests with the High Court in line with Articles 117 and 118 of the Electoral Act (Makulilo & Henry, 2017: 111).

There rose a constitutional and legal question on whether ZEC Chairperson has legal force to undertake such unilateral decisions. What complicates the issue, however, are two things. First, by the time of the elections nullification announcement, Unguja constituencies (31 of Zanzibar's 54 constituencies) had been announced officially and winners had been given their wining certificates by the ZEC officers (Pallotti, 2017). And second is that, the votes for union members of parliament and the president were not nullified. Although each had its own personnels; during the 2015 "general election in Zanzibar, ZEC and NEC shared polling stations" (TEMCO, 2016: 59). As such, one wonders how NEC officers escaped such irregularities that the ZEC chief cited, to make the votes for union valid and thus making it possible for NEC to complete the tallying and declaration of the union presidential results. Subsequently on January 22, 2016 a fresh date for people to go for polls was scheduled to be March 20th, 2016 but campaigns were not to be held. CUF the main opposition party in Zanzibar which has all along put a stiff challenge to CCM in Tanzania Zanzibar politics along with its UKAWA allies boycotted the re-run elections. This has left the country in uncalled for political limbo.

6. Conclusion and Possible Lessons

Throughout this examination, it is evident that, while there have been several political transitions in Tanzania; largely they have been within the confines of the ruling party CCM. This have a number of implications although only two are highlighted here. First elections are seen as simply the endorsement of the ruling party and second as actual political transition in terms of the change of personality. In this regard, if the interparty transfer is not considered as actual political transfer, there will be more problems. One of the problems would be that of equating democracy consolidation and political transfer to the change of the ruling party. This would discredit the whole essence of multiparty democracy by equating it to change of political party. Second, if democracy entails freedom of the citizens to install or remove a leader from the political position through the ballot box, then, what

has been happening in Tanzania deserve a credit. Above all, we have witnessed that, although all the political transfer has been within one party; in terms of policy emphasis, there have been significant differences in the policies pursued by one government from the other.

As such, in spite of the shortfalls in electoral democracies, Tanzania, like many other African countries, is undergoing a period of increased quest for democracy. Although many analysts agree that democracy has grown with multiplication of parties, it is difficult at times to notice its operations even in its basic forms (REDET, 2011). However, looking at what is happening around in Africa and elsewhere in the world, some lessons can be drawn from Tanzania.

- Although the need for multiparty politics was not majority driven, Tanzania made bold decision to act in favour of the minority who wanted the changes. This is a manifestation of the unique experience that marked Tanzanian transition to multiparty democracy. In that regard, though the principle of majority rule seems to have been thwarted and giving credence to minority rights, it is an important lesson for creating accommodating systems.

- Tanzania has enjoyed peaceful political transitions despite of the turbulences on the way beginning with Nyerere's voluntary relinquishing from power and subsequent relative peaceful elections. This has been the results of the foundation laid for the nation by founding fathers and that elections should not be tools of tearing countries but rather means of uniting people.

- Since the introduction of presidential term limit each president: Alhaj Ally Hassan Mwinyi, Benjamin William Mkapa and Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete has stood the temptation of clinging to presidency. Each did call for election and respected the 10 years maximum time for presidency without any force or changing constitution. This is hardly available in some of Africa countries. Presidents elsewhere have manipulated constitutions and uplifted their term limits and at times banned them to be allowed to stay in power. This, we think is one of

the greatest lessons that other countries ought to learn from Tanzania which can, not only help to reduce conflicts but also a manifestation of rule of law.

- Peaceful resolution of the post-elections disagreements and conflicts. Both the 1995, 2000, 2010 and 2015 elections were contested by various section of the society. However, people have always resorted to peaceful resolutions of such conflicts. A case in point is the 2010 agreement '*Mwafaka*' between CUF and CCM top leadership which brought in Zanzibar the Government of National Unity (GNU). Had it not been the leadership maturity demonstrated by leaders of CCM and CUF parties, and citizens themselves no one could hope to continue seeing Zanzibar in such harmony, although relative one. But we have to give caution for those concerns not to take them for granted but rather encourage those concerned to resume negotiations for peaceful resolution of what happened in 2015. Another thing to note is that, although they did not resolve the actual electoral problems, how leaders and other people addressed electoral complains of 2010 and 2015 general elections in mainland Tanzania deserves a credit and recognition. Despite some obvious intimidation, injustices and elections faults, leaders and their people have put the country and national interest above those of individuals and parties.

Always we ought to turn our differences into opportunities and rip the best of it for the progress of our countries. A new "potentially liberating political dispensation in Africa must move away from the dominant paradigm of democracy articulated and practiced in Western liberal political systems into or towards indigenous modes of social organization" (Magesa, 2013: 137). However, before we can make such radical U-turn we need to find a transition formula by which Africans can come to themselves. This formula should strive to make sure that each segment of the society is taken into consideration. The promises of electoral democracy as a transition toward more Africa modern political organisation are enormous. Those in power should look at the ways to benefit from its social mechanisms for the betterment of our communities and Africa at large.

In view of the above analysis, and given the unequal playground, one may be tempted to conclude that the 2015 elections were free but not fair. This may call for a number of recommendations which may include: - an urgent need to initiate or continue with legal and institutional reforms on the mandate and independence of NEC and ZEC; the voters register should be updated systematically and periodically. NEC should establish or constitute itself well by acquiring its own offices in Zanzibar and upcountry in Tanzania mainland. The registrar of political parties should intensify the enforcement the elections expenses law by adopting proactive measures including deployment of investigators throughout the country at least during election period. Law enforcers should be reminded of the electoral laws, while political parties should reminded to abide with electoral laws and regulations in order to avoid unnecessary conflicts with law enforcers. Lastly the government must re-initiate the new constitution making process while civil society organisations ought to merge effort with NEC and ZEC on the strategic provision of voters' education.

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