FBOs, the State and Politics in Tanzania

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Introduction

Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) are one of the central actors within the community of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the developing countries, especially in Africa. To a large extent, they have been busy with development agenda for much longer than most of the other CSOs in that they either came with the Evangelization of African societies in the 19th Century or the Islamization of the East Coast of the continent even much earlier. As defined by Linz and Stepan (1996) civil society is that area of a polity where self-organizing and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to create associations and solidarities, and to advance interests and occupies the space between an individual and the government. In this wide context, there are, among others, voluntary groups that can be very well organized as well as not-so-well organized, and which assist members to interact in a manner that is beneficial to each – politically, socially, economically, and so on. CSOs in general, can be distinguished between formal and informal, which correspond to the first characteristics on these organizations – being well organized or not that much organized. The former would include such organizations as labour unions, which adhere to codified rules and need governmental sanctions to operate, among other conditions. Informal organizations consist of groups of individuals, who cooperate in different ways for the benefit of their own communities, for collective action, financing, and the provision of services, e.g. neighbourhood vigilante groups, user groups, and informal support groups such as burial solidarity groups. This distinction can correspond to the levels of activity and one organization can be related to. Most of the FBOs in Tanzania belong to the organized category.

One big section of the CSOs are the so called Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), whereby these can be defined as those civil society organizations that are officially established, staffed by paid workers, and quite well resourced. These are the civil society organizations that in many instances act as a go-between when it comes to the interaction between the state and the society. Within this group of NGOs, we again find that they vary widely when it comes to their mandate, size and resources. Many FBOs are part of the NGO community. Then we have the Community-Based Organizations which operate at a lower level and at a smaller scale compared to NGOs, and they differ also in the amount of resources that they operate with including human, financial and material resources.

In this paper we are going to discuss the synergy that has been created between FBOs and governments or their agents given the fact that most FBOs in Africa have a development agenda similar to that of the state. The state and the FBOs often times find that they have the same person as their target. We will argue that while the state sets the rules (including those banning CSOs from engaging in politics) it sometimes does not have the resources to sustain its legitimacy, mainly by its failure to provide the critical social services. FBOs filling the gaps rescue such states and in a way legitimize the stay in power of incumbents by doing what the state should have been doing. In Tanzania, we note that FBOs have

tended to move centre stage and gained even more power after political and economic reforms, as traditional CSOs like cooperatives and trade unions lost power and influence in the privatized economic domain. This raises a dilemma for the FBOs as they help out states most of which are authoritarian and corrupt. Civil society members and activists may not sanction close relationship between their organizations (including Faith-Based Organizations) and the state on that ground. Being too close to the government has led to some being put off-course, muzzled, losing community trust and even banned. However, in trying to influence governmental action and policy CSOs, including FBOs, have had to engage the state in different ways including entering into formal partnerships with governments to develop policy jointly as well as implementing such policies, while others have remained outside and chose to act in a more traditional manner of influencing policy through advocacy strategies. We are addressing such questions as how close should CSOs/FBOs be to the state that does not adhere to "good governance", for example? Can CSOs/FBOs disengage from politics? Are FBOs and other NGOs usurping the power of the people by engaging the state on their behalf? Where are the "political" organs that should speak for the people?

Background to 'Religious' Tanzania

In Tanzania there are three main religious followings: Islam, Christianity and the indigenous religions. The break down by numbers is hard to tell because since the 1967 census the religion item has never appeared on the census form. However, reliably calculated estimates in percentage are that Christians and Moslems share two-thirds of the population. It is also estimated that there are slightly more Moslems than there are Christians. The remaining one-third is shared by the remaining religions. There are also many atheists. But, when talking about religions in Tanzania, people refer mostly to Islam and Christianity. Islam is said to have come to the East African coast at around 700 AD when Arab traders arrived with trading as their main aim. Since the Arabs came as merchants, the spread of Islam went hand in hand with trading, and, where they reached for trading Islam was also preached. It has to be noted that in East Africa Islam was not spread via *Jihad* (holy war) as in some other parts of the world. Since the Arabs' contact was initially with the coastal areas, the same areas have become the stronghold for the religion, followed by those inland trade-route areas which interacted with the Arab traders. Compared to the form of education that Arabs merchants found in the areas they ventured into, Islamic education was much more formal in that it was taught in specific venues, there were formally appointed teachers, and a standard duration.

Christianity, on the other hand, came with European missionaries. The first to arrive were of the Holy Ghost denomination who arrived in Zanzibar in 1863, and moved to the mainland in 1868 settling at Bagamoyo. By the time Germany annexed Tanganyika, there were already five missionary groups operating there. With the multiplication of these religious groups, some missionaries moved to other parts of the country such as Kilimanjaro. The European missionaries respected local languages and in most cases they imparted education (both religious and secular) in those languages. Local communities were often suspicious of the missionaries but with the onset of colonial rule (and with the penetration of cash economy posing new pressures and opportunities), parents willingly

sent their children to mission schools. By the time the First World War broke out the mission schools had enrolled more pupils than those in schools run by the colonial administration. The difference in the content of what was taught by the two religions was to have some impact in the future of Tanganyika. Moslems were taught religious matters and the Arab language with minimal secular education whereas Christians combined both religious and secular education. Mission schools were exclusively for those who converted to Christianity.

In the history of Europe, it has been shown that religion and state were for a long time closely related. In some states this relationship is still very vibrant; in some, those who hold religious authority have the political authority as well (Moyo: 1982:67). During this era, religion was used to, among other things, to legitimize state authority (Smith, 1971: 2). In Africa today there are two main state-religion relationship categories - the confessional states and the secular states (Moyo, op. cit.: 63). The former category includes those countries that have declared that religion has a lot of input into the political processes, for example, Sudan and Libya. The latter category includes those states which claim to be secular i.e. those which allow religious freedom to their citizens but would attempt not to mix religion with politics. Tanzania is constitutionally such a state. As such the constitution gives this freedom and one should not be segregated because of his/her religious beliefs when it comes to state related matters like politics.

While the constitution stipulates that the state is secular, the situation on the ground paints a different picture. And, even when one traces secularism in development theory the same would appear to be the case – that Tanzania would hardly make it to the list of secular states (see for example modernization theorists like Levy, 1966 and Black, 1966). Secularism holds that everything is worldly and things like religion, scientifically unfounded beliefs, superstition etc. should be put aside if man is to act freely. But to be secular, it would seem that the other characteristics of a modern society ought to be there. This is much so when one considers the indispensable scientific approach to matters. Science liberates individuals from superstitious beliefs that one would find they keep haunting individuals in underdeveloped societies.

When one compares the reality of Tanzania as far as the other characteristics are concerned, doubts immediately enter the scene. The population is, by and large, of a collectivist character than individualist. Indeed, the policies that were followed until not so long ago encouraged the population to have that character. Traditionalism, which is still dominant in the rural areas, encourages collectivism rather than the individualist pursuit of advancement. The application of scientific knowledge and technology is at a very low level. The rural population which comprises more than 70 per cent of Tanzanians use archaic tools in their production activities. Tanzania is just starting the process of institutionalizing the brand of democracy that would allow for a representative government of the kind implied in the modernization theory – the liberal democracy. The multiparty system introduced in 1992 is still very shaky, with most of the parties finding it difficult to contest elections – of all the activities political parties should make sure they undertake. As for income, Tanzanians are known to have one of the lowest per capita incomes in the world. And for most of the 1980s it was falling rather than growing, only to start picking again in the mid-1990s. When one looks at rationality which implies standardization,

consistency and order each and everyone ought to abide by, it is all too clear that rules and regulations are not followed in the government bureaucracy, nor are they followed in many other sectors and places. The rampant corruption in public service is indicative of this. Lastly, urbanization in Tanzania is also at a very low level in that only about 25 per cent of the population is urban-based compared to the developed world, where it is as high as 73 per cent on average. It is therefore, questionable whether the state in a country like Tanzania, can truly be secular as one would want to make believe. The separation of religion and state especially the church and the state has been doubted by many in Tanzania itself especially from the Muslim side (see for example, Jumbe, 1994).

When it comes to service delivery, the state in Tanzania does not hide its need for assistance from religious organizations in development issues, as statements by various political leaders have indicated. Indeed other indicators of this religiousness of the state would include:

- the national anthem (with the title *God Bless Africa*) in which God is asked to do nearly everything including the consolidation of freedom and unity;
- every National Day religious leaders are invited to participate in celebrations and are asked to pray for the nation;
- the national (state) radio would open its broadcasts with prayers from the two major religions – Christianity and Islam;
- when natural disasters strike, politicians would open advise the people to seek refuge in prayers rather than science and technology.

Moreover, with the low level of development, religious organizations are still called upon by the government to help in the development process. They have focused their efforts in education, health, utilities and other social services, areas to which the government direct a lot of its resources.

CSOs, Governance and the African Scene

It is well documented that CSOs in Africa existed well before the coming of the colonialists. As for religious organizations in Tanzania it has been noted that Arabs came well before Christian missionaries and they spread Islam along the coast and a few inland regional spots like Tabora and Kigoma. Christian missionaries came later. This happened in more or less the same time as the coming of colonialists (Welch Jr., 2003). He talks of the founding of Human Rights NGOs as early as 1839 to fight slavery on the continent. Civil society organizations in Tanzania date back to before the coming of colonialists (Chazan, et. al., 1988: 73). As such one can say that they precede the modern state we know of today. The coming of the colonial powers and the institution of the state structures we know of today marked a new arrangement as far as the civil organizations were concerned. The type of rule that existed in most of the pre-colonial societies had different rules and relationships with the civil society organizations compared to those which obtained after the institution of the colonial state, which came up with structures – political, economic and even social – which "interfered" with the way life in general was conducted. Then came the self-help CSOs which catered for the economic and social adjustments that were needed by members who were variously affected by, among others, urbanization, monetized economy

as well as labour migration. These later ones were to be the microcosms of 'professional' and trade associations that were to be formed at a later stage, mostly in urban settings as well as in plantations. Some of these associations came to take on the political agenda leading to some turning into nationalist movements.

Given the cooperation that existed between the colonialists and the missionaries, and their relationship when it came to delivery of social services, one can conclude that a close relationship between these organizations and the state would be necessary. As noted earlier, the target of the two was in most cases the same – the people. And, normally CSOs are organized to cater for common needs, interests, values or traditions. The ensuing energy from their cooperation can be channelled to a variety of activities. It is noted that strong and active civil society is the foundation on which rest the four pillars of governance: transparency, accountability, participation and the rule of law (ADB, 2000: 555). This view is supported by Mwaikusa (1996: 79) who is emphasizing that in order to control the government, there is need to have other than the state organs to do that – the CSOs. And it has also been noted that in most state-civil society confrontations, the root cause happens to be the feeling that stakeholders are alienated from the decision making process – processes which make key decisions that affect the livelihood of the people. But also conflicts arise when one religion feels that it is being sidelined in decision making especially with regard to resource allocation (Tambila, 2006: 57). Further, the developments in both the economic and political spheres in the last two decades of the 20th century created even more need for civil society organizations as demand for their presence increased. FBOs have tended to be more confident when demanding such 'favours' from the state because leaders would be part of one or another religion.

There was an increased FBO activity in Tanzania in the years when there was serious economic decline (Wagao, 1993). This increase can be linked to some facts. First, it is to do with the reduced state capacity due to lack of resources. When the state failed to deliver, people tried to cooperate in order to make life possible under the circumstances and religion and ethnicity happened to be the variables used for organization. Second, there was more activism given the developments in the area of civic and political rights as demanded on other parts of the globe. Third, the process of liberalization opened the floodgates for CSOs to form. For the African continent, the degeneration of the state institutions due to bad economic performance from the mid-1970s through to the 1990s, led to the erosion of states' capacity to deliver its classical outputs of social services, infrastructure conducive for socio-economic development, law and order and so on. In some countries the situation was so bad that the citizens saw no reason to interact with the state. They rather avoided it as it became irrelevant as has been discussed by some authors like Hyden (1981) and his theory of the 'Uncaptured Peasantry'. This is to say Tanzania was no exception and this phenomenon of reduced state capacity accounted for much of the resurgence of civil society organizations from mid-1980s onwards. Statistics show that before 1990 there were very few NGOs and only FBOs were allowed to operate 'freely' in the controlled single-party political atmosphere; for some reason the political leaders tended to believe that these were not a threat to their power.

As for the developments in the demand for political and civic rights, this was spearheaded by activists mainly targeting changes in the political system – specifically the re-

introduction of multi-party politics. The shift from single to multiparty politics in Tanzania was part of the wider global picture – that of reforms towards more democratic systems in formerly dictatorial states. In a way it was inevitable. But as it came, it also came with other developments in that many political and semi-political CSOs were formed prior and after the reintroduction of multiparty politics. Many were human rights groups as well as those which demanded for more space in the political arena, which also demanded for the rewriting of the Tanzanian constitution.

For the third factor – that of liberalization – has to do with the weakening of the formerly state controlled, monopolistic NGOs especially cooperatives and trade unions which were then 'liberalized' allowing for the formation of independent more fragmented cooperatives and trade unions in practically all areas. These institutions were not as independent organizations as they should have been, but they were, nevertheless, pro-members in those difficult circumstances, and, there was some coherence as well as state support from time to time, which made them look solid and united. Liberalization weakened them in various ways – and by this process FBOs became more powerful and moved centre stage when it came to courting state resources. Firstly, there was the new freedom which led to some members of existing apex organizations to withdraw and create other umbrella organizations or decide to go solo. As one could expect, apex organizations in the single party states of Africa were impositions, and members were coerced to be part of that organization. For the state and private investors this was a welcome move because the state would not want strong unions as they may scare investors, and investors would want to operate in an atmosphere of least unionized workforce. Secondly, the loss of membership led to less financial capacity as contributions dwindled. Being weaker financially led to reduced union activities including less mobilization in favour of members. Thirdly, even those which left the apex organization had problems with regard to finances and conducive atmosphere to conduct their affairs. Fourthly, the privatization of many of the parastatals led to changed labour relations and regulations some of which banned union activities at the work place. It also led to less financial contributions through retrenchment of members due to reforms in the public and parastatal sectors. Fifthly, the private crop buyers undercut cooperatives by offering better prices initially and once the cooperatives were out of business, they lowered the prices to levels below what was offered by the cooperatives then. These effects of liberalization on these two important organizations led to the creation of some more space for smaller, sometimes more informal civil society organizations that work at the grassroots levels, which is significant because it is at the locality where civil society is most readily mobilized around local issues.

State-CSOs Relations in Tanzania: a Delicate Coexistence

When African countries started gaining their political Independence, the state was seen and used as the main development agency. This was partly because dominant theories of the time – especially those from the Eastern Bloc – advocated the centrality of the state in the development process. Moreover, during the struggles for Independence the nationalist leaders promised a range of economic and social changes which, given the circumstances, only through the agency of the state such promises could be met. In most countries, there

were no indigenous entrepreneurs with enough capital to take on the challenges that came with Independence. The state, therefore, for a considerable period of time, became an engine for development and the provider of goods and services. In this framework of provision in the newly independent states, political leaders became patrons, creating networks of patron-client, characteristic of African politics and which, to a large extent, have led to the characterization of the African state as "patrimonial" (Sandbrook, 1993).

To realize the centrality of the state in the development process, policy making in the immediate post-Independence Tanzania was gradually designed to take the top-down approach. Few people (those who made the Central Committee – CC – of the only party) were the policy makers. Deliberate efforts were made by the ruling elite to alienate citizens from the policy process by concentrating policymaking power into fewer and fewer people. This is attested by the ruling elite's move to shift policy-making power from the parliament to the party's National Executive Committee (NEC), where the CC became the ultimate policy maker. Citizens' alienation from the policy process took place on two fronts. Firstly, independent civil society organizations were not allowed and secondly, public-policy making bodies were subordinated to the party organs. Consequently, citizens lacked autonomous avenues for participation in the policy process. The adoption of the single party constitution in 1965, and making the party the supreme organ of the state, elevated party organs to the national policy making level. The Cabinet, which should have been at the center of the policy-making model as per the inherited Westminster model, was deprived of its power over policy making, and was replaced in this by the CC of the party. The parliament became a committee of the party. In fact, it was subordinated to the party's NEC. What needs to be noted here is that these structural changes placed policy-making power in party organs, thereby giving the party chairman who was also the president enormous powers (Mushi, 1981). The consolidation and institutionalization of the state and party supremacy was carried under the banner of 'nation-building', thereby justifying the exclusion of citizens and their civil organizations from policy making, as well as forcing them to be affiliates of the party.

However, when it comes to FBOs, the story was different. The state knew how very well much it depended on religious organizations when it came to social services, and therefore, these were left alone from 1961 up to 1967 when the Arusha Declaration nationalizations were implemented. As noted earlier, schools and hospitals owned by religious organizations were nationalized for one reason or another, but the main one being the facilitation so that they can be accessed by all. Even then, FBOs tended to have some freedom of their own vis-à-vis 'secular' NGOs. The Catholic Church, for example, was powerful to an extent that its advice would always be heeded by the government (Sivalon, 1992). FBOs went on to build new social service facilities in the aftermath of the nationalizations – and the government would not nationalize these because they were built with concrete agreement with the government that they would remain property of the religions under which the FBOs operated. When the economy started to perform poorly from the mid 1970s to mid 1980s, the nationalized facilities were in bad shape. The government negotiated its way out with the International Financial Institutions like the World Bank ad the IMF out of which a deal was truck which among other things, the government had to withdraw from some service provision or reform their provision drastically. This led to some of the nationalized assets to be returned to their previous

owners. It is for this reason that the percentage of social services delivered to the communities by FBOs remained high despite the nationalizations.

The state in Tanzania has had different relationships with non-governmental agencies including NGOs and other CSOs depending on the perceived benefits and threats to itself. Traditionally, and as some CSOs (and more so NGOs) see themselves even now there should not be too close a relationship between themselves and the state if they are to perform a good job. As Jjuuko (1996: 194) observes, some independent NGOs regard themselves as diametrically opposed to the state or at least as sometimes being incompatible – a stance we believe should not always be the case. However, some see civil society and NGOs as having no other way but to engage the state if they are to attain their goals of influencing policy and governmental action (Kirsten, 2004: 16). He notes that in so doing NGOs can enter into formal partnerships with governments to develop policy jointly or can act as consultants to governments.

There are three general state-CSO scenarios of state-CSO relationships (Kiondo: 2001). The first one is a situation where the state sees the CSOs as being its partner in development and other state activities, and therefore, CSOs are seen as being supportive of the state. In most cases, these activities are the ones related to social welfare and advocacy. In Tanzania, there are many CSOs that fall in this category, and to our knowledge all FBOs fall under this category. The second scenario is where the state feels that its interests are threatened by the activities of the CSOs. These activities would include situations where the CSOs were providing a political platform – whether real or imagined – for political opponents to those in power. Unfortunately, in Tanzania and elsewhere in Africa, most of the CSOs and FBOs that deal with human rights and gender sensitization happen to be seen from that angle by the state. This has been explained by the fact that while the state is supposed to be the guardian of human rights, it has, in most of the times, been the biggest violator of these rights. Given the low level of literacy and civic competence among Tanzanians, for example, these organizations have been making their members and other beneficiaries aware of their rights and urge them to demand these rights from state organs; and this is seen, in most cases, as confrontation.

The third scenario is the one in which the state feels that national security is at risk due to the activities of some CSOs. In most cases, this would happen when it comes to the sources and levels of funding. When funding is from outside the country, and the involved amount are, from the standpoint of the state, too large, then questions start to be raised. Monitoring of the activities become closer and generally the CSO in question would face hurdles here and there whenever they came into contact with the state. Again, the most likely candidates in this basket are the quasi-political NGOs. FBOs in Tanzania have also been outspoken when it comes to issues of human rights, resource distribution and so on. Generally they are advocating for good governance. Furthermore, the activities in which they are involved in – education and health, for example, need large amounts of funds most of which has been coming from outside the country. The advantage the FBOs have is that they also mobilize local resources and given that the contributions are linked to 'faith' they (FBOs) happen to be successful; the government would find it not as easy to monitor FBO funds as would be for a conventional NGO. The interaction between CSOs and the state in this scenario includes also the recent shift on the part of donors and aid agencies to want to

use CSOs as channels of development aid as well as including them as part of the policy process (Tripp, 2000; Mercer, 2003).

While we can have these three categories of the state-CSO relation, they are not always clear-cut. There are instances where the issue of the day would determine the reaction of the state. For instance, when Tanzania Media Women Association (TAMWA) campaigned for children and women rights, the state was supportive because that was in line with its own policy. TAMWA has, for example, worked very cordially with the Ministry of Community Development, Gender and Children when it comes to implementing its mission, which is "to use the media to sensitize society on gender issues and advocate and lobby for policy and legal changes which favour the promotion of the rights of women and children".

However, there are also instances where the same CSO can be close associates of the state and at another point it becomes an adversary of some sort, and therefore, unwanted. In Tanzania a case in point are the cooperatives. These institutions which started during the colonial era and they were protecting peasant farmers from middlemen and other crop purchasers, in the main. After independence, the government tried to support cooperatives – especially through Unions which unified peasant cooperative societies – but it ended up interfering too much in their affairs. In the end they were for some reason seen as a threat by the state and in 1975 they were abolished. In the place of the Unions, the government introduced pan-territorial parastatals which were called crop authorities. These, for a number of reasons, failed dismally (see, for example Ellis, 1988; Lofchie, 1989, and Ponte 2002). The government then decided to reintroduce cooperatives in 1982 as a way of increasing production, but also as a way of controlling the peasants especially when it came to taxation. And, contrary to cooperative principles – such as economic viability – the government established cooperative societies in all villages in the country in the pretext of helping peasant production! So between 1982 and the oncoming of private crop buyers, the government held them (coops) dearly for the 'good job' they were doing for it. Generally, the cooperatives were used as vehicles for government agricultural policy, as well as a means to have the peasant production under effective taxation.

In including this section, we would want to state that CSO-state relationship needs to be looked at from the point of view of the one seeking that relationship and, whether the other party is ready to participate in that relationship. In some cases, there can be mutual benefit. In other cases one party may be reaping benefits that are greater than the other. It is also important to look at the nature of the state. As we have noted, the possible continuum that NGOs can manoeuvre in their relationship with the state can run from a lifeline, through a symbiotic rapport, to a possible death. If the regime in place is dictatorial, undemocratic and a violator of human rights, a close cooperation could well be "a kiss of death" to the NGO in question. The state will find ways to either emasculate it by donating "gifts" which will muzzle the NGO, or will just legislate the NGO out of business. If the regime is rather democratic, observes rule of law and needs the cooperation of civil society organizations for the implementation of some beneficial programmes to the community, then this relationship can be a source of life for the NGO. There can be a series of other relationship patterns that would, in one way or another, be of mutual benefit.

FBOs and Service Delivery in Tanzania

Despite the cautious note about the state-CSOs and the issue of politics, these organizations have such a big potential to perform tasks that would help the government to perform or be seen to perform its duties better. This is more so when we consider that the mushrooming of CSOs in the aftermath of the economic crises of the 1970s, 1980s and the reforms of the 1990s was due to the virtual breakdown of the social services networks created by the nationalist governments after Independence, and supported by the older CSOs, specifically FBOs. CSOs can help government deliver services more efficiently and effectively through the identification of target groups, facilitating their access to the services on offer, and even coordinating the delivery of services from various sources. FBOs have been there before even the governments they are supporting now were in place. They have experience, networks and personnel to make things happen. In developing countries like Tanzania where infrastructure is poor, FBOs – which happen to have members everywhere – have been used as the most reliable and effective vehicles for service delivery where governments failed. FBOs in particular are known to have reached people where governments have failed to reach, especially where roads, telephones and the like are acutely inadequate; or where the government would not want to go because of some political reasons. And, most importantly, FBOs as all other CSOs have the potential to provide checks and balances on abuse of power at different levels of the 'implementation structure'.

In Tanzania, the Faith-Based Organizations in particular, have played a big role in health and education since the pre-Independence era. They are now very active in these service sectors as well. Lange et al (2000) for example, note that in 1986, the state called on churches and other NGOs to play a greater role in the provision of health and education services. He notes, for example that, in the education sector, NGOs were running 61 per cent of secondary schools, 87 per cent of nursery schools and 43 per cent of hospitals in nine districts in Tanzania in 1993. Similar percentages would be true to many more districts. Today it is the schools owned by the religious organizations that perform best in examination. It has now become common to hear that the best ten or so schools are seminaries and schools run by FBOs. This has an implication even for the future in that these graduands will make the pool from which future leaders will be drawn from as they are likely to excel to the top level. This is no small contribution to a country like Tanzania. When it comes to University education, four of the twelve universities in Tanzania are owned by religious organizations. These organizations have other tertiary institutions as well like teacher's colleges and similar education facilities.

In the health sector FBOs have had a big role in Tanzania as Table 1 below shows.

Table 8.1: HEALTH FACILITIES IN TANZANIA BY OWNERSHIP

Facility	Agency				
	Govt.	**Parastatal**	**Religious**	**Private**	**Others**
Consultancy/Specialized Hospitals	4	2	2	0	-
Regional Hospitals	17	0	0	0	-
District Hospitals	55	0	13	0	-
Other Hospitals	2	6	56	20	2
Health Centres	409	6	48	16	-
Dispensaries	2450	202	612	663	28
Specialized Clinics	75	0	4	22	-
Nursing Homes	0	0	0	6	-
Private Laboratories	18	3	9	184	-
Private X-Ray Units	5	3	2	16	1

Source: ***Ministry of Health Statistic*** (Website: www.moh.go.tz Last updated 2007 December 6)

Statistically, FBOs own 25 per cent of referral hospitals; 37 per cent of District level hospitals, which are two critical levels in the health system given that people would tend to go to these hospitals because of more or less guaranteed availability of drugs and other supplies as compared to the many dispensaries and health centres which the government struggles to reliably provide the necessary supplies. And, the dispensaries belonging to FBOs tend to have reliable supply of medicines compared to those of the government also (Munishi, 2004). It is also important to note that the "private" category came up well after 1990 when there was same relaxation of rules as medical staff working in government facilities were not allowed to operate private health facilities. This means the "Religious" category had a very big contribution prior to that policy change and many of these facilities have been there from before Independence. A clear example is the conversion of some religious organizations' hospitals into Designated District Hospitals – in the Table above there are 13 of them meaning that these are the Districts in which the government has not "reached" even today in the 21st Century! The government gives such hospitals subsidies and in some cases it pays the salaries of some specialists and other senior medical staff transferred to these facilities. And, while the private operators would want to have their facilities in urban areas where they can make profits much faster, most of those of the FBOs would be located in the most difficult areas of the country.

Having said that, we need to remind ourselves that the provision of services in support of the government notwithstanding, at some point the FBOs have had difficult times with the state also. During the socialist era in Tanzania, and more specifically during the nationalization exercise after the promulgation of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which sent Tanzania into a socialist experimentation, many religious organizations "lost" their

properties to the state. These included schools, hospitals, and even land. Given the difficulties that the government has been facing in running these facilities as was the case with other facilities, when liberalization of the economy came, many of these properties were returned to their original owners. Some church schools turned government schools could not be returned given the composition of the student community (as for example a then Christians only school now with a religiously mixed student community) and the investment the government had put into these facilities since their nationalization.

Another example of FBOs and other CSOs that have been cooperating with the state would include the many advocacy groups and which are in the good books of the government. Examples would be those dealing with the HIV/AIDS campaigns in communities. These are doing a good job, which the government cannot do alone given the resources needed and the scope of the exercise countrywide. There are others in areas of environmental protection, civic education and good governance, to mention only some areas. In this case of cooperation one can say that the relationship has been that of "lifeline" to some CSOs as the government facilitated the availability of funds, as well as "symbiotic" relationship in that the state has had its functions performed by these supposedly non-state actors.

The Dilemma for FBOs

There are issues of accountability when FBOs engage in service provision – whether funded by donors or by the state. In the case of health in Tanzania, for example, the government has been asked by the FBOs to pay salaries for some staff in the Designated District Hospitals. This aspect has two sides to it. First, would the FBOs and their staff still be accountable to their members/owners? Will they still be pursuing their original goals? In health the original goal could be very different from what they are doing now – as would be the case of designated hospitals. How much will they be able to do in order to balance the forces – the need to perform the core activities for which they were formed, and the need to have the state on their side in order to draw resources, among others? Second, there is the government's accountability to the electorate and the donor as far as the use of resources is concerned. FBOs are not traditionally vehicles for the delivery of services paid for by taxpayers that need to be accounted for in parliament or lender/donor funds that need to be repaid. When something goes wrong there can be problems for the government in accounting for its decisions, although substantial arm-twisting might have come from the donors that these actors be part of policy implementation.

Where FBOs and other CSOs have been co-opted into service provision there can be other repercussions also. As noted earlier, by helping the state to deliver services, whether the services have some donor funding as a way to avoid corrupt and undemocratic governments, or an FBO doing what it believes it should do as a faith based organization, the state may end up being the net gainer, depending on its history of course. While the donors may feel that they are rebuking corrupt, undemocratic and inefficient regimes by channelling aid money through CBOs, this could be a way to cleanse the state in the eyes of the electorate. As Whitefield (2003: 383) remarks, "The powerful influence of donor agencies on local organizations, combined with the application of civil society as idea to achieve their objectives of economic and political liberalization, may work towards stabilizing the existing social and political order". Depending on the timing of the activities,

which happen when there are harsh conditions, the performance of the FBOs and other CSOs may raise expectation and confidence in the regime thereby leading to the regime staying in power longer than it could have been, were the current arrangements not in place. The state can even use the opportunity to channel resources to its friends and foes alike, a thing that could have been impossible were the state to be the direct provider of the services. In short, CBO/FBO activities of that nature are there to strengthen the state.

With the democratization process taking place in many countries in Africa, the churches and mosques have been urging and sometimes outspokenly asked the government to do this and that. In Tanzania the churches and mosques have a lot of influence over the government given the facilities they have in service of the people. While the other types of CSOs would not so openly discuss or engage in politics, these FBOs have had the courage of doing that. In 1995 religious organizations encouraged their followers to participate in the political processes going on in the country including elections. When these first multiparty elections were due, religious organizations organized seminars and printed some materials to help their followers to understand the politics of the day. These include the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania (ELCT), Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC) Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT), The Moslem Council (BAKWATA) and so on. The CCT's "*The CCT Position on Prevailing Situation in the Country*" published in 1995 clearly states in the introduction that it aimed at "educating our Tanzanian Society on political and socio-economic issues prevailing in the society today". It also stated that it aimed at expressing the obligation of its member churches in dealing and getting concerned with such issues. In the document, several political issues are discussed including the relationship between the churches and the state; the church as an advocate of political justice and democracy; political and economic democracy as related to the provision of social services; and the constitution of Tanzania and the need to convene a constitutional conference.

Conclusion

It has always been a dilemma for non governmental organizations including FBOs when it comes to deciding how close to the government they should be. This is more so when it comes to activist CSOs, as they have more than often been reluctant to carry out their activities with government funding, or to act as agents of ministries, departments and agencies of government, or even to accept grants to meet staff and overhead costs. The obvious reason for this is that they see such involvement as compromising their ability to exert pressure on the government from the outside and perform their legitimate role on behalf of civil society. These concerns are legitimate. However, CSOs should not automatically assume that the state and its apparatuses are a threat to them and their independence in particular. Given that the citizens' interests are paramount, any coalitions, partnerships or cooperation that will see to it that this is attained should be taken seriously. But when any engagements are struck then the limits must be well negotiated in order to balance between the goals of the CSO and the possible repercussions that may come out of that relationship as far as the interests of the members or intended beneficiaries are concerned. Here we are talking of the CSO not losing its identity, not displacing or replacing its goal(s). Important also is the need for CSOs to make sure that they come clean when it comes to accountability and transparency.

One other thing needs mention. CSOs are reminded that they should not take over the role of representing the people in policy making, more so in Tanzania where many of those that can engage in policy dialogue are elite NGOs as clearly noted by Mercer (2003: 749) and scathingly attacked by Shivji (2003: 2 – 3) when he remarks that NGOs have come to "lose their sight" about what they should be, what they should be doing and what they should not be doing. He terms all this "participation by substitution" implying that NGOs are alienating core stakeholders in the policy process contrary to what they think – that they are helping the "people" participate in the policy process. Contrary to Shivji's thesis, FBOs seem to qualify somewhat as representatives of the people in that they are not selective – as what gets people under their umbrella is faith and not variables that create elites and non-elites.

In this era of public sector reforms where the private sector has been identified as the government partner number one, and having a variety of cooperation arrangements in place, the private sector has come to see the CSOs as a threat to them. Both have come to realize that sometimes they are vying for the same resources. The CSOs, and especially FBOs, however, have an advantage over the private sector most of the times in that they do not work for profit even when their efficiency levels are the same. It has almost always been that FBOs will deliver better, if only they operate on a level playing field. The challenge is, therefore, for the government to see how the two partners in development can be harmonized for the betterment of the lives of the citizens.

For Tanzania it is for the government to look for ways to allow a CSO remain a CSO while reaping the potential of these organizations, and CSOs (in their different forms, sizes and activities) need to keep the distance that they need not to lose their identity. One way of making things better for CSOs is for them to campaign for better rules of the game as far as they concerned. It remains a fact though, as Henderson (1997: 356) notes that the unfortunate irony is that NGOs must come to terms with existing host governmental authorities often by acceding to repressive policies …". For the Tanzanian FBOs though, they remain powerful when it comes to many issues due to the centrality of their activities for the government of the day and this is likely to be the case for the foreseeable future.

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