# The Relationship Between Community-Based Organisations and the Effective Management of Coastal and Marine Resources in the WIO Region

Rosemarie Mwaipopo, Eleanor Fisher, Innocent Wanyonyi, Patrick Kimani, Joseph Tunje, Flower Msuya, Vivian Bashemerewa



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# Acronyms and abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ASFADA | Arabuko Sokoke Forest Adjacent Dwellers Association |
| BIRO | Bilisa Integrated Relief Organization |
| BMU(s) | Beach Management Unit(s) |
| CBNRM | Community-Based Natural Resource Management |
| CBO(s) | Community-Based Organization(s) |
| CCM | Chama Cha Mapinduzi |
| CFA(s) | Community Forest Association(s) |
| COMRED | Coastal and Marine Resources Development |
| CORDIO.EA | Coastal Oceans Research and Development in the Indian Ocean- East Africa |
| CSO | Civil Society Organisation |
| CUF | Civic United Front |
| DSDO | District Social Development Officer |
| EAWLS | East African Wildlife Services |
| EC | European Commission |
| EEZ | Exclusive Economic Zone |
| FAN | Forest Action Network |
| FGD(s) | Focus Group Discussion(s) |
| GECOFO | Garsen Environmental Conservation Forum |
| HASHI | Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga |
| ICIPE | International Centre for Insect Physiology and Ecology |
| KCMC | Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union |
| KEFRI | Kenya Forest Research Institute |
| KFS | Kenya Forest Services |
| KICAMP | Kunduchi Integrated Coastal Area Management Plan |
| KMFRI | Kenya Marine Fisheries Institute |
| KNCU | Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union |
| KWS | Kenya Wildlife Services |
| MACEMP | Marine and Coastal Environment Management Programme |
| MBWG | Mangrove Boardwalk Women Group |
| MCCC | Mida Creek Conservation Community |
| MCCG | Mida Creek Conservation Group |
| MCG | Mkangagani Conservation Group |
| MCS | Monitoring, Control, Surveillance |
| MFG | Mida Fishermen Group |
| MIMP | Mafia Island Marine Park |
| MMCG | Mphengele Muungano Conservation Group |
| MNRT | Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism |
| MoGSSD | Ministry of Gender, Sports and Social Development |

| | |
|---|---|
| MPA | Marine Protected Area |
| MTMCG | Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group |
| MWG | Muungano Women Group |
| NEMA | National Environment Management Authority |
| NGO(s) | Non-Governmental Organization(s) |
| NIMCS | National Integrated Coastal Management Strategy |
| NMK | National Museums of Kenya |
| NRM | Natural Resource Management |
| OCAT | Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool |
| PDGSSD | Provincial Director of Gender, Sports and Social Development |
| PFM | Participatory Forest Management |
| REMP | Rufiji Environmental Management Plan |
| ROSCA | Rotating Savings and Credit Association |
| RUMAKI | Rufiji Mafia Kilwa Seascape Programme |
| SEEGAD | Smallholder Economic Growth through Agribusiness and Association |
| SHG(s) | Self Help Group(s) |
| TAFMEN | Tana Friends of Marine Environment |
| TAFMEN | Tana Friends of Marine Environment |
| TASAF | Tanzania Social Action Fund |
| TCZCDP | Tanga Coastal Zone Conservation and Development Programme |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| VFDCC | Village Forest Development and Conservation Committee |
| VICOBA | Village Community Bank(s) |
| VLC | Village Liaison Committee |
| WIO | Western Indian Ocean |

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# Executive Summary

This study examines the relationship between Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and marine and coastal resource management in the Western Indian Ocean Region. It explores what roles CBOs play in relation to natural resource utilisation and whether they have an ability to act effectively as community managers of these resources. The research focuses on CBOs in the coastal zone of Kenya and Tanzania.

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- document the types of CBOs existing in coastal areas of Kenya and Tanzania and how they have developed;
- capture the internal dynamics and capacity of different CBOs;
- consider the connections between CBO activities and natural resources in coastal and marine areas;
- examine whether CBOs can mediate community diversity and dynamics to act as a force for integration around coastal resource management;
- highlight the relationships between different CBOs and external institutional structures and governance processes; and,
- identify whether CBOs engage in activities that constitute 'natural resource management' and to consider whether these activities are 'effective'.

## METHODOLOGY

The study covered 6 study sites, 3 in Kenya and 3 in Tanzania, each selected on the basis of representation and comparison. Criteria used for site selection were: (i) geographical coverage; (ii) management interventions and status such as protected/non-protected area; (iii) community dependency on marine and coastal resources; and (iv) experience in community-based engagement in NRM; and, (v) resource use conflict. In order to select a total of 24 CBOs for in-depth study, brief information was collected on the range of CBOs present in the study areas. Methods employed for data collection included: focus group discussions, institutional analysis, interviews, observations, and consultations with key informants. Feedback and validation meetings were also held with representatives of all participating CBOs and relevant officials in June-July 2009.

## BACKGROUND

To guide the analysis the study examines the idea of 'effectiveness' by placing emphasis on trajectories of CBO development and consequences for natural resource management outcomes. This is in preference to driving data collection and analysis on the basis of an ideal-type model of organisational effectiveness to which CBOs should conform.

To elaborate on these factors, the effectiveness of CBOs in natural resource management is viewed in terms of interplay of different elements. For ease of analysis, a rough division is made between 'internal' and 'external' factors, each situated within the wider social, political, economic, and ecological context that shapes a CBOs capacity to act and sustain this capacity over time. Developing from this interplay of factors, our assessment of the effectiveness of CBOs in management is ultimately located in terms of the impact CBOs have had upon management processes and their ability to sustain these processes over time.

'Internal' factors focus on how CBOs are organised, as represented by both formal statements and individual members' perspectives. 'External' factors focus on relationships between the CBO and external actors in order to capture the dynamics of power and authority over natural resource management at the local level and how this authority is concentrated in ways that enable or constrain CBO effectiveness.

When considering the internal organisation of the CBO, care has been taken not to over-emphasize structural factors (i.e. constitution, rules and regulations, membership numbers, etc.) over processes (including its internal systems and the way the CBO and its members relate to each other and the outside world) to avoid viewing CBOs as 'closed boxes' in which situation-specific dimensions of CBO action and effectiveness would be missed. It is however recognised that structural factors within the external environment, such as a legal mandate and recognition in policy, can have a profound effect in terms of shaping constraints and opportunities for CBO management actions.

## RESEARCH FINDINGS

CBOs in coastal and marine resource management have for many years been part of the agenda for coastal and marine resource management in the WIO region, albeit in a range of capacities. Several achievements can be claimed in terms of putting in place grassroots or community structures to affect natural resource management processes, and to strengthen responsibility towards resource management. However, persistent capacity constraints and challenges raise substantial questions over the degree of effectiveness of these CBOs, especially with regard to coastal and marine resource management ideals. These processes feed into shifting allegiances of CBO commitments toward management.

Although management strategies differ according to country, project and place, understanding CBO effectiveness in relation to natural resource management includes a need to gauge their ability to recognise and act upon a management issue. Once an issue requiring action is recognised, the capacity to act effectively is underpinned by a CBOs ability to access and effectively utilise appropriate resources (material and non-material), and by its legitimacy as a valid and mandated component of wider management structures and processes coming from government and its relations to NGOs, donors, and in some cases the private sector.

An important influence on these processes is the extent to which community members themselves give value to natural resource management, and recognise CBOs as a means to enhance livelihoods in different ways, through for example establishing mechanisms for local action on poverty issues and for recognised access to resources, but also as a way to realise collective aspirations for local control over natural resources. Simultaneously, the limited legal mandate many CBOs have for making decisions and carrying out actions with regard to coastal and marine resource management can severely constrain their influence, for this reason understanding the way a CBO has been established and by whom (community, government, donors, NGOs) is essential.

Owing to these complexities, key findings include the following:

- A diverse range of CBOs and community-based structures operate in the management of the coastal and marine resource environment in the study sites, with their diversity largely determined by mode of establishment, type of membership, and collective goals.
- A legal mandate is critical for legitimacy and a CBOs capacity to pursue NRM objectives.
- Even with a legal mandate, the ability of government designed structures (BMUs; CFAs, KyM) to address issues that involve multiple stakeholders, and stakeholders who command high political favour is minimal.
- The mode of establishment of a CBO influences the nature of relationships between members, group cohesion, the values regarding NR management that a CBO upholds, and CBO sustainability over time. It also creates processes of inclusion and exclusion with respect to whether and how the CBO can act as a voice for the local community. This in turn is shaped by wider social divisions and power relations, which may be reinforced through the way government operates at the local level.
- Leadership ability is important, and shapes the capacity of a CBO to illustrate successful resource management practices to the community.
- Many CBO members possess good knowledge and experience in relation to ecological processes, and can apply this experience to affect certain management strategies, but most lack the necessary practical skills to make this experience realisable in terms of sustained and positive impact on NRM. Also the sophistication and scale of ecological dynamics and the complexity of multi-stakeholder interests diminish the ability of CBOs to handle many management demands.
- CBO capacity to mediate resource use conflict at local level is shaped by community ownership and legitimacy, leadership dispositions, legal mandates, relations to government institutions, relations between community members, and also the character and history of interactions over time. There are positive examples of resource conflict mediation but also examples of intractable local level conflict that a CBO is unable to influence and indeed may contribute to.

- There are limitations in translating management incentives into practical usable terms, such as incorporating indigenous knowledge into management; or relating certain scientific messages with their primary concerns of livelihoods. All too often outside agencies create generic information on environmental issues and management actions that individuals can relate to in abstract but which do not connect to people's resource use activities in specific local contexts.
- Several CBOs have been able to demonstrate activities with positive resource management objectives, however much of it is short-lived and relates to the presence of external funding or of government interest in a particular issue at a specific time.
- Support and capacity building sustained over time is important to enhance organisational capacity within CBOs. This includes information, sources of information, and mode of information delivery that CBO members can access, and use for effecting changes in the environment. Capacity building is also important to sustain these achievements.

## CONCLUSIONS

CBO effectiveness needs to be situated within a historical trajectory of capacity development and learning over time, whether leading to sustainable or unsustainable organisational dynamics and coastal and marine resource management outcomes. In short, we consider that a 'snap-shot' perspective on effectiveness may rarely be helpful.

CBOs working in the coastal and marine environment of the WIO region operate in a context where community relations are shaped by profound differences in power and economic influence, the politics of processes of resource use access and change, and by social divisions reinforced through the movement of individuals and groups of people around livelihood demands. Ownership of and control over resources can have a profound impact on natural resources and their management by CBOs as different powers become exposed, which impinge on local communities but which at best may not be connected together, and at worst are contradictory. At its basic sense, the different tiers of local government are meant to facilitate a democratic process, but this needs indeed to be streamlined to benefit rather than hinder the management actions of local CBOs.

Also important is the need to reconcile the lack of clarity by many CBOs about their roles and lack of appropriate collaborative management planning by government to consider how issues that arise could best be tackled by a CBO. Ambiguities in responsibilities carry very basic problems for people or CBOs trying to protect their own environments. In this respect, a CBO's capacity to act is often constrained by the political context in which government decision making and action is capable of eroding rather than building local capacities, in effect compromising the ultimate impact in terms of management effectiveness. Linked to this is the way that political pluralism carries with it positive and negative features for CBOs, sometimes giving people a powerful voice to express resource related grievances; but also with the potential to create exclusion.

At a general level, CBOs in Kenya and Tanzania are operating amidst a dynamic environment, in which shifting social, economic and political contexts impact on their activities. Different needs and demands for livelihood sustenance have complicated the capacity of existing systems of power to make people conform to sustainable resource use practices. At the same time, ecological dynamics challenge their ability to handle many management needs within their localities. To some degree the decentralisation and devolution of powers to local level in both Tanzania and Kenya has enhanced the capacity of local organizations in terms of decision-making and having an influence over NRM, but this capacity is limited. Overriding and overlapping mandates with respect to sectorally-based NRM decision-making and lack of devolved control in practice can deny CBOs the ultimate powers to act upon the management decisions that they regard as detrimental to resource conservation or their livelihoods.

The study identified how the lack of legal mandate conferred on CBOs (except Beach Management Units, Community Forestry Associations and Kamati ya Mazingira) can severely constrain their capacity to act and authority in relation to NRM. Indeed, even with such legal mandate, the ability of government designed structures (BMUs, CFAs, KyM) to address issues that involve multiple stakeholders, and stakeholders who command higher political favour was very minimal, if at all. This is particularly the case where external agents carry national legitimacy and connections to power-holders above community-level, for example, investors in tourism businesses, marine products harvesting and processing companies, or oil and gas exploration and production companies, as was witnessed in the two countries. This experience, as

was witnessed to be the case confronting several other groups along the coast illustrate that the activities of a CBOs are quite unlikely to be successful, however meaningful, for lack of being even locally legitimized. This questions the assumption that local leadership may be the best place to support effective management within its localities.

Manipulation and corruption can also cause CBO leadership to betray communities when it comes to making decisions about resource use. This is especially when a powerful user comes in (e.g. private investors). Where village leadership forms alliances with private companies, the respective community groups have protected neither the members nor the community from exclusion of their rights to resources, or from environmental abuse.

In short, this study finds that there are examples of excellent practice and leadership by CBOs in relation to NRM. However, internal CBO capacity is very limited and the external political economy imposes severe constraints on CBOs ability to act as effective natural resource managers.

# Section One

## 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This study examines the relationship between Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and the effective management of coastal and marine resources. The discussion centres on the idea of 'effectiveness' and how it can be understood in the context of coastal and marine resources. In order to do so, the study explores the roles CBOs play in relation to natural resource utilisation and whether they have an ability to act effectively as community-based managers of these resources. The study focuses on CBOs in Tanzanian and Kenyan coastal areas of the Western Indian Ocean Region.

In the last three decades there has been a shift from centralized state controlled management systems to more participatory and inclusive processes that consider resource users' ability to contribute to management processes through a range of arrangements (forms of 'co-management'), developed in the wider context of devolution and decentralisation. CBOs have been heralded as important grassroots organisations that can contribute to co-management in the WIO Region, however, relatively little has been documented about whether CBOs have the capacity for effective natural resource management.

Evaluating the effectiveness of local institutions and practices and the extent to which they have been able to manage resources is difficult.[1] The notion of effectiveness has its roots in theory developed for organisations (private, non-profit) in industrialised countries.[2] This raises substantial questions about how one applies ideas of effectiveness to CBOs in the WIO Region, and considers their role in coastal and marine resource management given that many of them are relatively new, quite small, and unlikely to have formalised organisational management practices. Indeed, two central questions the Research Team started with were whether and how it is possible to understand and evaluate effectiveness in a manner that is appropriate to small community groups in the WIO Region. Difficulties over applying notions of effectiveness to the groups in question are also reinforced by the constraints on members' ability to systematically analyse their own effectiveness due to lack of skills, training and exposure.[3] This is in addition to the contested nature of the devolution of management functions in relation to coastal and marine resource management in which, although collaborative management has been significantly advanced, yet many powers are retained within conventional resource management authorities and/or there are tensions within and between these authorities and other actors in the coastal zone. Also significant is a wider context of social economic dynamism in coastal areas, which can mean that CBOs need to grapple with changing conditions over relatively short periods of time. Each of these factors can undermine CBOs capacity to develop and function sustainably. Against this background, what is evident, however, is that the nature of community-based structures working for resource management has evolved with time, contributing to peoples' learning. This has introduced new versions of responsibility and participation as the state and people learn both from a range of different actors and from their own involvement in community initiatives in both Kenya and Tanzania.

The relatively recent emergence of CBOs in Kenya and Tanzania, and their increasing recognition as forms of grassroots organisation of relevance to coastal and marine resource management suggests that it is imperative to take a view of effectiveness that places emphasis on process as well as outcomes rather than utilising forms of typological classifications rooted in thinking on organisational management relevant to industrial countries.

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[1] Arnesen, 1997
[2] Price, 1968
[3] Sorgenfrie & Wrigley, 2005

Applying such classifications could carry the danger of 'straight-jacketing' community groups into a model that doesn't take into account their embryonic and informal nature, their diversity and changing character, and the dynamic context (ecological, social, political, economic) in which they are situated.[4] In addition to formal recommendations, our conclusion reflects on these issues in the light of our research findings.

## 1.1 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The importance of community participation in natural resource management and the need of return benefits to local people affected by coastal and marine resource management has been acknowledged as an important component of management activities in the WIO region as demonstrated by an increasing number of community-based management or co-management initiatives.

The aim of this study examined the relationship between Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and the effective management of coastal and marine resources management. In order to do so, it explored the roles CBOs play in relation to coastal and marine resource utilisation and whether they have an ability to act effectively as community-based managers of these resources. The specific objectives were as follows:

- To establish the types of CBOs that exist in the coastal areas of Kenya and Tanzania and consider how they have developed.
- To capture the internal dynamics and capacity of different CBOs.
- To identify the connections between CBO activities and natural resources present in Coastal and Marine areas (paying attention to issues of scale as relevant to coastal resource governance).
- To examine whether CBOs can mediate community diversity and dynamics to act as a force for integration around coastal resource management.
- To highlight the relationship between different CBOs and external institutional structures and governance processes.
- To examine the knowledge held and practices undertaken by members of a CBO (individually or collectively) that can be understood to constitute 'natural resource management.

## 1.2 THE COASTAL ENVIRONMENT AND PEOPLE IN EAST AFRICA

The coastal environment is of primary ecological and socio-economic importance, supporting diverse natural systems and a rich coastal culture. The coastline included in this study, from the northernmost point of Kenya to the southernmost point of Tanzania, is 1440 km in length.[5] It is considered a national asset in both countries; but one that is under increasing pressure, showing signs of destruction due to both anthropogenic and natural causes, including intense over-exploitation of fisheries, mangrove and terrestrial forests, and the loss of coastal and marine habitats. This section briefly describes the coastal and marine resources in the study area and people's linkages to and use of them as a context for local-based management processes.

### 1.2.1 The Coastal Zone and its Natural Resources

### i) Kenya

The Kenya's coastal zone is characterized by a coastline dotted with sandy and rocky beaches and an inshore fringing coral reef that runs parallel to the coastline. In most areas, immediately after the reefs, sea grass beds dominate the sandy substrates. The continental shelf is relatively narrow, ranging from 5- to10-km wide and dropping to below 200 m just 4 km away from the shoreline, slightly past the continental shelf, the seabed slopes achieve depths of above 4,000 m.[6] At the mouths of rivers, breaks in the coral cover occur where there is heavy sedimentation.

Near-shore habitats are important in the distribution of fisheries and invertebrates. Kenya's near-shore waters harbour extensive sea grass beds with at least 12 species recorded. They are important foraging grounds for endangered species such as dugongs and marine turtles, as well as important locations for fish species like rabbitfish, surgeonfish and parrotfish. Various species of shellfish and sea cucumbers are also found in seagrass beds.

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[4] Fabricius *et al*, 2004
[5] Information in this section is based on FAO (2007) and TCMP (1999, 2001)
[6] Obura et.al, (2000a)

On the deeper edges of the near-shore lagoon towards the continental shelf is an extensive belt of fringing coral reef decreasing in extent, size and diversity northwards into Somalia, resulting from the cooler Somali current upwelling system. Kenya's coast records 220 species of *scleractinian* coral species. Growth of coral reefs in Kenya is best supported at depths from sea surface to about 20–25 m deep, where water clarity begins to deteriorate at between 15–25 m and hence abundance similarly declines from 15m. The Kenyan coral reefs are dominated by the massive reef-building coral of several species.

Depression of the growth of coral reefs between Malindi and Lamu occurs due to inflows from Kenya's two largest rivers, the Athi/Galana/Sabaki and Tana Rivers, resulting from their high sediment loads. There is also broken growth of coral reefs at creeks and river mouths, where out-flowing fresh water suppresses reef growth. Coral reefs support a wide variety of reef dependent fish, which include important demersal finfishes such as snappers, rock cods, emperors and surgeon, amongst others. Other important species include crustaceans and invertebrates such as prawns, lobsters, crabs, shells, sea-cucumbers and molluscs that include squids and octopus. Deeper waters support the pelagic species such as king fish, tuna, eelfish, barracuda and mullets. Some significant threats to coral reefs include coral bleaching resulting from a rise in the sea surface temperatures with the most profound effects being in the 1998 El-nino event.[7] Heavy sedimentation, especially from the River Sabaki, has caused significant mortalities in the Malindi reefs, within the Malindi National Park and Reserve. Other threats to coral reefs have occurred due to local activities such as boat moorings and the use of beach seine nets which are widespread along the coast.

The coral reef, sea grass and pelagic systems contribute significantly to fisheries production and coastal livelihoods in Kenya. Most fishing is undertaken on the reef inshore grounds, by artisanal fishers, using simple fishing vessels and gears such as gillnets, shark nets, hook and line, beach seines, spear gun and basket and fence traps.[8] Artisanal fishing in inshore waters is labour-intensive and is estimated to employ over 10,000 fishers directly and indirectly providing a livelihood to another 60,000.[9] Kenya's artisanal landings are estimated to be at least 95% of the marine catch and another 5% caught by the commercial trawlers mainly prawns caught in the shallow waters of Ungwana Bay.[10] The overall annual catch landings from the marine sector have fluctuated over the years but remain within the range of 7,000 tonnes per year representing a paltry national percentage of 3.2% in 2002 and 5.3% in 2003, while the rest was from freshwater sources.[11] Against an increasing human population and dwindling fish stocks, there has been a rise in the number of artisanal fishermen over the years. One result also has been the increased use of destructive and unsustainable gear, which poses a substantial threat to fisheries resources.

Major rivers that enter the Indian Ocean include the Tana and Sabaki in Kenya, and the Pangani, Rufiji and Ruvuma in Tanzania. These rivers are loaded with sediments whose movements shape dynamic ecosystems around the delta areas. Together with smaller rivers feeding into the Indian Ocean, they form extensive wetland and riverine habitats supporting a wide variety of fauna and flora, including many rare species. The River Tana is the longest river in Kenya at 850km long and originates from the Kenyan highlands, entering the Indian Ocean (Ungwana Bay) at Kipini and encompassing a catchment area of 127,000 km$^2$. It has an annual discharge of an average of 4,000 million cubic metres of freshwater and 6.8 million tonnes of sediment during peak flows that correspond to the long rainy seasons of April and June and November to December.[12] The river forms an extensive delta estuary that is a safe ground for Northern Kenya and the larger Tana River region herdsmen who retreat to the delta for foraging of their cattle during drought seasons where it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of cattle arrive for grazing.

Mangrove forests are found in intertidal areas between the land and sea and line sections of the coastal zone in East Africa. The mangroves cover about 54,000 ha, mainly occurring along creeks and bays in which sediment has collected. The highest mangrove forest concentration is found in Lamu Archipelago, forming 67% of total mangrove cover in Kenya. Kilifi and Kwale districts each has 10% of total mangrove forests in Kenya; other significant through proportionately smaller mangrove areas include Mombasa and Malindi Districts at Tudor Creek and Mida Creek respectively. Kenya has eight out of nine mangrove species found in East Africa and the forests in which they are located are of great significance to coastal people.[13] For millennia, the communities have used the mangroves as a source of wood fuel, building material, fish & crabs, and medicine. More than 10000ha of mangrove forests are lost in a year due to both

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7 Wilkinson, http://www.oceandocs.org/bitstream/1834/545/1/BleachWilkin1998.pdf - accessed on 23rd July 2010.
8 McClanahan & Mangi, 2004; Ochiewo, 2004; McClanahan *et al*., 2005b
9 Ochiewo, 2004; UNEP, 2006
10 UNEP, 2006
11 Republic of Kenya, 2005
12 Kitheka *et al*., 2003a-c; 2005
13 Taylor *et al*., 2003

anthropogenic and natural causes. Mangrove forest decimation in Kenya is mainly due to extraction for wood, salt mining and industrial pollution. Dredging has also contributed to loss of mangrove specifically in Lamu where a channel was created to ease navigation.

The coastal strip is characterized by coral ragged soils that support coastal lowland grasslands, scrubland and intermittent coastal forests. The coastal forests are semi-evergreen, found in low ridges of between 100-300m above sea level, and cover a land surface of 13900 ha. The two major coastal forests are Sokoke Arabuko (41000ha) in the north and Shimba Hills (19260ha) in the south, while in between there are several small 'kaya' forests ranging in size from 10-2000 ha.[14] The Mijikenda tribe of the Kenyan coast consider these forests sacred. The government recently gazetted them, so they are now protected under the National Museums of Kenya (NMK). The Kenyan forests have important ecological and socioeconomic importance: home to endemic plant and animal species, source of energy to both rural and urban communities, provide cheap building material, source of income etc. Today large areas that formerly were under forest cover along the Kenyan coast, and in particular Diani, have been lost due to development of the tourism industry, residential development and agricultural activities.[15] In the far north of Kenya some expansive sections of woodland remain, as do areas of scrubland with thorny bushes.

The Kenya coast is also home to various minerals, including salt, coral rocks, titanium, limestone and tanzanite, iron ore and gypsum. These minerals are important, as they provide sources of income to local communities, thereby improving their living standards. They have also aided in industrialisation of the nearby urban centres. For example, limestone and iron ore excavated in parts of Kilifi district are used in the manufacture of cement in Mombasa.

**ii) Tanzania**

The Tanzanian coastal area is endowed with abundant and unique resources: like any other coast, there are multiplicities of human activities that rely on resources that are bound in estuaries, mangrove forests, beaches, coral reefs and seagrass beds. The coast is fed by sediments from large rivers such as Rufiji and Ruvuma in the south, and rivers of intermediate size such as Ruvu, Wami and Pangani in central and northern Tanzania. The coast is therefore potentially rich in offshore aggregate resources. Recent estimates indicate that the population of the coastal regions now numbers approximately 25 percent of the country's population, with a growth rate ranging between two and six percent (see 1.3.3 below).[16] The economy of the coastal communities depends mainly on social and economic activities such as crop farming, subsistence forestry, artisanal fishing, lime and salt production, aquaculture, mangrove harvesting, livestock husbandry, tourism, and small-scale trade handicrafts all of which depend on the coastal resources. Also the region has rapidly expanding cities, which require a redistribution of resources as the demand for agricultural land, building materials such as mangrove poles and coral for lime increases. There is growing concern that this resource base is already degraded and increasing pressures from a growing population and emerging economic developments will cause further damage. All these issues threaten the livelihood base of coastal people and ultimately their sustainability. Thus, addressing the issues associated with sustainable use of coastal resources is critical.

Nine species of mangrove trees form the forests that cover an estimated 133,480 hectares. The forests are found along many parts of the coastline from Tanga to Mtwara, occurring on gently sloping shores, and around river estuaries, creeks and bays. The Rufiji delta supports the largest single mangrove forest in eastern Africa, covering 53,000 hectares and providing nursery grounds for 80 percent of Tanzania's shrimps.[17] Mangrove forests along the shoreline also provide important protection against wave and current forces and therefore coastal erosion. Other major mangrove stands occur at the estuaries of the Pangani, Wami, Ruvu, Matandu, Mbwemkuru and Ruvuma rivers. The islands of Mafia, Unguja and Pemba also support well-developed mangrove forests. Mangrove ecosystems have for many years played an important role in the social and economic development of coastal communities. Today, mangrove ecosystem is still the main provider of firewood, charcoal, poles, tannin and traditional medicines. Overall, it is estimated that over 150,000 of Tanzanians make their living directly from mangrove resources. Management efforts, awareness and management of Tanzania mangrove ecosystems have improved significantly. However, the human pressures on mangrove forests require continued attention. Major pressures include demand for timber, fuelwood, production of charcoal, building poles, conversion of forest areas for urban development, salt production, and other land uses.

[14] GoK, 2008
[15] Pers. Communication with residents, Diani, Kenya, September 2008
[16] NICEMS, 2003
[17] TCMP, 2001

Seagrass communities in Tanzania's coastal waters are represented by 12 species. These seagrasses form dense beds that cover large areas of sandy or muddy coastal bottom, from the mid tide mark to a depth of 20 m or more. Their importance results from their ecological interactions with other ecosystems in the marine environment, especially mangroves and coral reefs, and in their wide range of physical functions. Their most notable role is to provide breeding, nursery and feeding grounds for many invertebrates and fish species. Seagrass beds also support complex food webs both through dead and living biomass. The fish and shrimp communities associated with seagrass beds are important to both the artisanal and industrial fishery. The main physical function of seagrasses is derived from the ability of the roots to bind sediments, thereby reducing re-suspension and lateral movement of sand and mud along the shores. In this way, seagrass beds reduce coastal erosion.

Coral reefs are found on about one third of the coastline of Tanzania. Most of these are comprised of fringing and patch reefs, restricted to a narrow strip (usually 1 to 3 km wide) along the coast. Coral reefs have a number of ecological and economic values: the most obvious ones are associated with extractive activities such as fishing, shell collection, invertebrate collection and tourism. These natural resources provide coastal people with both a source of income and a source of protein. The provision of a barrier against wave action and the potential as a source of medical compounds to fight diseases are important, but more difficult to quantify. Another use of corals, which brings serious negative impacts on the reefs, is the mining of live corals to produce lime for building. Coral reefs serve as breeding, nursery and feeding grounds for many marine animals, including over 500 species of commercially important fish. Other animals that are dependent on coral reefs include lobsters, octopuses, bivalves, gastropods, and sea cucumbers, all of which are important in artisanal fisheries, with some contributing to the export earnings of the country. Coral reefs support 70% of artisanal fish production in Tanzania.[18]

In addition to mangroves, coral reefs and fisheries, there are several other important marine resources in Tanzania coastal waters. These include plankton, seaweeds, marine turtles, marine mammals and coastal birds. These living resources play a major role in the health and functioning of coastal and marine ecosystems, artisanal fisheries, and the economies of coastal people. The most frequent cause of pressure on other marine resources that are currently exploited—such as shells, sea cucumbers, marine turtles, and dugongs, is over-harvesting. The nesting populations of turtles have been declining rapidly due to incidental fish catch, hunting, and loss of nesting beaches.

### 1.2.2 The Coastal Economy and Livelihoods

The coastal zone is home to people who have long generational ties to the area and to recent migrants attracted by economic opportunities.[19] For traditional dwellers, the use of marine and coastal resources is deeply embedded within their livelihoods and cultural identity. For recent migrants, these resources offer new livelihood opportunities. Products with good market values are also highly attractive to local and foreign-owned businesses.

Economic activities along the coastal zone of Kenya and Tanzania are heavily dependent on natural resources. They include agriculture, maritime trade and transport, tourism and tourism-related businesses, fisheries, mining, and exploitation of major and minor forest products. Although dependence on natural resources is common to both Kenya and Tanzania, there are differences between the two countries, particularly with regard to coastal tourism. Tourism is a primary source of foreign earnings for Kenya, and past estimates suggest coastal tourism accounts for 60-70% of this sector (1996).[20] Tanzanian tourism is less as developed as it is in Kenya. However, since 1999, the Tanzanian tourism sector has received a stronger push, contributing approximately 13% of GDP.[21]

Although tourism brings some positive economic benefits to people along the coast and in the two countries as a whole, it also contributes to excess demand for resources such as water, pressure on land, decline in reef fisheries, degraded marine habitats, loss of biodiversity, and coastal erosion. At the same time, tourism, while creating economic opportunities for local groups, it can also create profound conflict through competing demands for particular areas and resources, due to the dynamics of power and influence that can act against local control over resources and their management. This is particularly the

[18] Ngoile and Horrill, 1993
[19] UNEP, 1998
[20] Hale *et al*., 2000: 75
[21] GoT, 2001

case in Kenya, where tourism is a long-established industry that shapes social activities and patterns of development, but it is also a growing issue in parts of Tanzania, particularly on coastal islands such as Mafia. For example, in the Kenyan study areas of Malindi-Watamu there has been an influx of foreign residents and tourists, with large swathes of prime land becoming dedicated to tourism and resource use conflicts. The situation is similar in Msambweni where tourism is being revived after near collapse in 1997 after the Likoni clashes.[22]

On a smaller scale, similar processes can be seen in parts of Tanzania. A major consequence is that land has become expensive and out of reach for ordinary indigenous residents: in Kenya available land is sold to the highest bidder in the tourism sector, while in Tanzania processes of 'land grabbing', involving underhand tactics for land acquisition, can leave poorer local residents at a disadvantage and contribute to significant micro-level conflict. Tourism also affects socio-cultural diversity within the coastal zone, particularly in Kenya due to the large influx of people from interior villages attracted by economic opportunities.

Many economic activities on the coast encompass significant differences in the scale and type of exploitation, ranging from industrial to artisanal forms of technology and labour organisation. This is marked in the fisheries sector, for example, where coastal and marine areas are exploited both by local fishers (artisanal and small-scale), and industrial fishing operations, such as shrimp trawlers.There is also farming of marine species and industrial processing of products. Associated with these forms of production are networks of private traders and companies for marine products, with significant international finance in the sector.

Fishing activities by artisanal fishers take place along reefs using simple fishing vessels and gears. The numbers of people involved in coastal fisheries are notoriously difficult to gauge; however, in Kenya it is estimated that about 10,000 fishermen are directly involved in fishing[23] with another 60,000 coastal people depending on these fisheries.[24] In Tanzania, 40,000 artisanal fishers are estimated to operate in the coastal and marine environment.[25] Along the coast, destructive resource use practices associated with artisanal fishing have contributed to the pressure on fisheries.

In many coastal areas, agricultural and forest-based activities are also important. Rain fed agriculture is a significant basis for subsistence and commerce along the coastal zone, notably, in mainland areas due to lack of land availability and poor soil quality on islands such as Zanzibar, Mafia, and Pemba in Tanzania. About 90% of the population in Malindi and Kilifi districts and 60% of that of Lamu in Kenya, heavily depends on agriculture.[26] The main food crops grown include maize and cassava while mangoes, cashew nuts, pineapples, bixa and coconut palm comprise cash crops grown in the region. Demand for farm land and high population growth have driven farmers to encroach upon marginal lands.

Mangroves provide products such as firewood, poles, tannin, and charcoal for not only the coastal communities but also for outside individuals and companies. Overexploitation is, however, threatening many of the remaining mangrove forests along the coast of Tanzania[27] and Kenya, particularly near urban areas due to clearing for urban building projects.

Coastal mining activities encompass limestone deposits, fossil coral blocks and sand used for building and construction works. Others are salt production found in areas north of Malindi in Kenya, and in areas such as Rufiji in Tanzania. Oil and gas deposits are being explored in Kenya, while gas is being exploited off Songosongo Island in southern Tanzania.

Rapid population growth combined with economic development places significant pressure on the coastal environment and its resources. This has led to degradation of resources as indicated by impacts such as over exploitation of near-shore fisheries, forests, and degradation of mangrove areas. Steady growth and diversification in aquaculture/mariculture activities are being experienced by coastal communities.[28] Non-traditional activities such as fish farming, prawn/shrimp farming and seaweed production are currently being promoted as means of poverty alleviation. Small-scale crab farming and pearl-oyster cultures have also been introduced.

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22 The Likoni clashes took place in 1997 in a previously stable part of Mombasa's south coast, when violence erupted at the time of the general election, underpinned by ethnic conflict, land and employment issues: these and similar riots were to have a devastating consequence for tourism.

23 Ochiewo, 2004

24 UNEP, 2006

25 World Bank, 2005

26 GoK, 2008

27 TCMP, 2001

28 TCMP/MWG, 1999

Demand for a livelihood and food security can also place significant challenges on local groups trying to introduce resource management changes because members themselves need to make a living and are participating in processes that over time undermine sustainable resource utilisation. For example, for communities along the Rufiji Delta in Tanzania, food security is primarily dependent on rice cultivation along river banks, near wetlands and increasingly along the lowland mangrove area. Shifting cultivation through clearing land together with local practice in upland cultivation have generated the understanding that after every 4 years virgin land needs to be secured to maintain production levels. The same practice was applied in the mangrove area until the intervention of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT) through the Rufiji Environment Management Project (REMP) and Mangrove Management Projects.[29] Migrants also take up the practice when they settle in the Delta villages. The inability of management efforts to curb the practice has been coupled with an unwilling village leadership because as members of these communities, they are also privy to the activity, while for others, rice production in the '*kapani*' area is their best option for household food security. Rice production has not only been destructive because of clearing mangrove areas but also from the use of pesticides, as explained by a female farmer at Mtunda A Village in Rufiji District (see Box 1).

These livelihood demands take place within an economic context in which market liberalisation and processes of embracing private sector operators, has substantially expanded the market for marine products through the 1990s and into the 2000s; thus the rate of extraction for products such as lobster, octopus and squid for international markets has proliferated, typically with a negative impact on conservation and management efforts. Being within the same populace where marine resource extraction is increasing, many community structures have failed to be the repositories of local management.

Further pressure on coastal resources comes from industrial fishing operations and shrimp trawlers. This has been particularly marked in Tanzania since liberalisation of the economy in the 1980s and 1990s, when there was an influx of private traders and companies in the marine products industry including export, industrial processing and farming of marine species. This has created new challenges to coastal and marine resource management, not only by introducing new and more powerful players in natural resource extraction, but also through creating incentives, albeit in a negative way, for intensive exploitation by both local people and industrial producers.

Ultimately, unequal power relations confronting community groups are apparent in the way operators (with government backing) such as investors in tourism, in marine product processing and similar economic activities such as urban development, become part of the management agenda that communities have to face up with.

### 1.2.3 Population, Well-Being and Poverty

The coastal zone of Tanzania is estimated to be home to approximately 25% of the country's human population.[31] According to the 2002 Population and Housing Census, districts making up the coastal zone on mainland Tanzania were recorded as having a total human population of 4,555,193 (including Mafia Island). Intercensal regional growth rates between 1988 and 2002 were highest for Dar es Salaam (DSM)

[29] Ngaga *et al*, 2009
[30] Interview with farmers at Mtunda B village, Rufiji District (August 2008)
[31] URT, 2002

#### Box 1: Rice cultivation and pesticide use in the Rufiji Delta, Tanzania

Rice cultivation in the Delta along the tributaries of the Rufiji river, as they flow into the Indian ocean has been common for more than 10 years. This cultivation in the area that is locally known as the "*kapani* area" takes a period of 6 months from planting to harvesting. Initially, the mangrove trees were cleared to allow unfettered production, but after the Government came in, people now plant rice in between mangrove shootings. Two weeks after the seedlings have started to grow; "*we buy a pesticide from local dealers and mix it with rice or maize husks and then spread it among the upcoming rice seedlings to control a type of crab, kowe, that eats the seedlings*". The pesticide is normally applied 2 or 3 times in the field depending on the degree of crab infestation, and is spread during low tide so that it washes away the dead crabs when the water floods. Rice cultivation in these areas is quite productive; hence, farmers invest on its production. A female farmer said, "*it is only the crabs that nibble on these husks that die; prawns and fish do not get affected*". About 4 litres of this pesticide (diluted) is applied in an area of 1.5 acres. According to local farmers, village leaders and Agriculture Extension officers are aware of the use of this pesticide, as it is sold openly in the villages. One farmer mentioned that it was called Fenitrothion, or *sapa*. But apart from faint awareness on the environmental destruction or health problems that may be caused by the use of this pesticide, its use has continued unabated.[30]

at 4.3%, followed by Pwani (the region surrounding DSM and including Mafia) at 2.4%, Pemba at 2.2%, Tanga at 1.8%, Mtwara at 1.7% and Lindi at 1.4 percent. These regional figures do, however, disguise higher growth rates for a coastal town such as Tanga. For the Zanzibar archipeligo, the total population was 984,625 with highest intercensal population growth being in the Urban West area of Unguja at 4.5% while growth in the North Region of Unguja was 2.5% and the South Region it was 2.1%. Intercensal growth on Pemba was 2.3% for the South and 2.2% for the North. Regions showing high rates of growth are dominated by large urban areas (Dar es Salaam and Urban West), while overall growth rates are low for Tanga, Mtwara and Lindi when compared to other regions in Tanzania.[32]

Comparable figures between 1988 and 2002 do not exist for Kenya, data being available for the Population Census of 1999 and on increase in population numbers from 1989.[33] For the Coast Province as a whole, the 1999 population was 2, 487,264 increasing by 35.98% from 1989. For Coastal districts, population increases were: Kwale 29.52%, Lamu 28.01%, Mombasa 44.02% Taita Taveta 19.01% and Tana River 40.86%. Kilifi District was divided between the 1979 and 1989 census, so comparable figures are not available for Kilifi or the new district of Malindi. Due to differences of time-scale, these figures are not a good basis for comparison with Tanzania but the census does tell us that population increases are highest along the urbanised central belt of coastal Kenya, in and around the coastal towns of Mombasa, Malindi, Kilifi, and also on Lamu.

Turning to socio-economic data on these coastal populations, first with respect to Tanzania, it was estimated in the 2005 Poverty and Human Development Report that households below the poverty line are 26% in Tanga, 38% in Pwani, 19% in Dar es Salaam, 39% in Lindi, 38% in Mtwara. In Kenya as a whole, poverty incidence in the Coast Province of Kenya is 57.6%, contributing almost 10% to total national poverty.[34] Poverty levels are known to be highly spatially heterogeneous with marked variation at constituency level; poverty incidence ranges between 30% in Bura to 84% in Ganze Constitutency.[35] In this regard, 60% of an estimated 1.363 million poor people in Coast Province are concentrated in a third of the 21 Constituencies. This heterogeneity is also apparent in differences between rural and urban areas: with urban poverty incidence varying widely among constituencies, at 34% in Mvita Constituency compared to a high 66% in Garsen Constituency.

While poverty may remain relatively determined in coastal areas, its severity is compounded by issues of assets entitlement and access to resources, which affect the capability to engage in sustainable resource extraction that would result in livelihood benefits for the people.[36] Linkages between poverty and resource degradation are complex but poverty and the related need for a livelihood can lead people to undermine conservation initiatives,[37] just as economic development can also drive unsustainable marine and coastal resource use.

## 1.3 METHODOLOGY

This study was based on a social methodology which combined qualitative social and participatory techniques.The rationale for taking this approach was twofold: firstly, many of the existing studies on CBOs in Kenya and Tanzania have tended to be quantitative in nature, enumerating the number and range of CBOs.[38] Secondly, a qualitative approach is appropriate for an in-depth understanding of the character and effectiveness of CBOs within the context of marine and coastal resource management and of wider development within East Africa, including their social and political environment and their impacts on society in terms of their chosen mandates.[39] In addition, owing to the reality of diversity in terms of social, economic and ecological contexts, the study also adopted a case by case examination, reconciling with the contention that this diversity also influences people's understandings, capacities and ultimate evaluation of resource management strategies in the context within which they live.[40] Also the participatory aspect, conducting the research in liaison with resource managers, community development officers and CBOs provided a feedback mechanism and form of engagement.

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[32] For comparison, growth rates in other regions (1988 – 2002) were: Kigoma 4.8% (high due to refugee influx), Arusha 4.0%, Manyara 3.8%, Tabora 3.6%, Rukwa 3.6%, Shinyanga 3.3%, Mwanza 3.2%, Kagera 3.1%, Morogoro 2.6%, Mara 2.5%, Ruvuma 2.5%, Dodoma 2.3%, Singida 2.3%, Kilimanjaro 1.6% and Iringa 1.5% (URT, 2002).

[33] GoK, 1999; Authors' estimates of population increase based on figures in 1999 census.

[34] GoK, 2005a

[35] Ibid

[36] See for example Sesabo & Tol, 2005

[37] Tobey & Torrell, 2006

[38] E.g. Ndumbaro & Yahya-Othman, 2007

[39] ForDIA, 2011, CSI Tanzania Country Report, forthcoming

[40] Fabricius *et al*, 2004

### 1.3.1 Site Selection

In total the research covered 6 study sites, a number considered appropriate to provide a representation of CBOs, which was viable according to available research resources. Consideration was also given to issues of comparability between the Kenyan and Tanzanian sites. Hence the primary study units were selected from 3 administrative entities (districts) in both Tanzania and Kenya, each with diverse biophysical, socioeconomic and resource governance issues that have an implication on the capacity of CBOs as effective managers of the environmental resources. All districts also have significant interventions for community-based activities in coastal and marine resource management. A number of criteria were used for site selection:

- **Geographical coverage:** Sites were selected to ensure geographical coverage within the coastal zone of each country: In Kenya, three districts of the Coastal province were selected, namely Tana Delta in the north, Msambweni in the south, and Malindi which was midway between the two. In Tanzania, the sites were in the districts of Rufiji in central Tanzania, Kilwa in the south-eastern coast and Mafia an Island off the southern coast, each with considerable variation from the other.
- **Management interventions and status such as protected/non-protected area:** The presence of management interventions such as the proximity of a site to a marine protected area (MPA) was assumed to have likely effects on a community's perceptions and behaviour as regards coastal resource management. In Kenya, the site in Malindi is within Watamu MPA, while Tana Delta and Msambweni sites are non-protected areas. In the case of Tanzania, Chole and Jibondo villages are within the Mafia Island Marine Park. This gave a good basis for comparison between CBOs that have been influenced by relative proximity to conservation initiatives.
- **Dependency of community on marine and coastal resources:** all selected study sites were endowed with rich biodiversity, which forms the mainstay of community livelihoods; hence the main interest was on the resources. The focus on such resources perceived to be socially and economically important to the community that is taking into account community interest. CBOs have tried to intervene in resource management in these areas. Among these resources were: marine resources which includes among others, marine fisheries, mangroves forests, beaches etc; and terrestrial resources such as, mainland forests, wildlife, fresh water fisheries , crop lands, rangelands etc.
- **Community-based engagement in NRM:** another factor for site selection was the history of community-based processes, including how the CBO was initiated and its activities. The CBOs studied engaged in different activities; some had activities that were focused on management of marine-based resources while others had activities that were terrestrial-based. This gave a broad understanding of the operations by different CBOs.
- **Resource use conflicts:** the existence of resource use conflict, between communities and other stakeholders such as external trade, inter-ethnic differences, and multiple user issues also formed basis for selection of study sites. The communities in the study sites have varying degrees of resource-based conflicts, both marine and terrestrial. This criterion enabled the study to assess the capacity and effectiveness of the CBOs in preventing and mediating resource use conflicts at the community level. This factor was notable in all sites.

### 1.3.2 CBO Selection

The approach to CBO selection within the study sites was rooted in the participatory methodology used for the study. As part of this methodology it was essential that the research teams liaised with state officials at different administrative levels and with representatives of NRM projects as well as local people in order to produce outputs of relevance to NR management. Thus once sites had been selected, the district administrative unit was the starting point for research, with meetings held with officials to gain an overview of key issues and to identify villages according to the criteria listed above. Details were provided of known CBOs situated in the relevant areas and this information was triangulated with additional knowledge from secondary sources and key informant interviews in order to overcome the danger of biases towards certain villages or CBOs being introduced by district-level officials.

Once villages had been selected, meetings were held with the village leadership to identify all CBOs in the village, as well as other grassroots groups and committees with connections to the environment and livelihood activities. This list was used to identify a representative sample of CBOs/grassroots groups for in-depth study according to the following criteria: (i) CBO characteristics (nature of CBO - external or locally driven, membership size, type/nature of organization, registration, objectives for establishment, roles and responsibilities, etc.); (ii) Social composition of CBO and local population (taking into account divisions of

ethnicity, migration, socio-economic issues related to marginalization, and social identity issues such as gender, age and power relations). The names of specific CBOs to be studied during the research were given by the local village administration, that is, village heads during the participatory village profile exercise.

In Kenya, the study involved a total of 15 CBOs or community-based structures engaged in activities relevant to natural resource management, as shown in Table 1.

*Table 1: CBOs selected for study in Kenya*


| Msambweni District | Malindi District | Tana Delta District |
|---|---|---|
| **Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group (MTMCG)** | Mida Creek Conservation Community (MCCC) | Tana Friends of the Marine Environment (TAFMEN) |
| **Gazi BMU** | Mida Creek Conservation and Awareness Group (MCCAG) | Muungano Women Group (MWG) |
| **Mkunguni BMU** | Mkangagani Conservation Group (MCG) | Mphengele Muungano Conservation Group (MMCG) |
| | Gede Community Forest Association (GECOFA) | Garsen Environmental Conservation Forum (GECOFO) |
| | Mida Fishermen Group (MFG) | Kipini BMU |

Apart from the CBOs mentioned above for which in-depth studies were done, the study also investigated other community grassroots initiatives in coastal and marine resource management for comparative purposes. Such initiatives included Bilisa Integrated Relief Organisation (BIRO) in Tana Delta District, Simakeni Environmental Group (SEG) and Makuti Women Group (MWG) in Msambeni District where representative members were interviewed.

In Tanzania a total of 16 groups were consulted for in-depth examination as shown in Table 2.

*Table 2: CBOs selected for study in Tanzania*

| Rufiji District | Kilwa District | Mafia District |
|---|---|---|
| RUFIDELTA, Muhoro village | SOZOCO-MAE, Somanga Ndumbo Branch | BMU, Kilindoni village |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Ruma Village | SOFIDE Fishers Group, Somanga Ndumbo village | Mikingamo fishers NGO, Bweni village |
| Jitegemee Salt group, Ndundutawa village | Upendo Women's Group, Kilwa Masoko | Kamati ya Mazingira, Jimbo village |
| Bee keeping groups (2)m Kikale village | Mgongeni, Kamati ya Mazingira, Kilwa Kivinje | Kitunda Familia Group, Ndagoni village) |
| | Nia Njema, VICOBA | Chole Society for Women's Development (CSWD) |
| | Songambele, VICOBA | BMU, Dongo village |




*Map 1 - Study Sites in Kenya and Tanzania*

In addition to these community-based structures, experiences on community-based coastal and marine resource management were also sought from Jibondo village government representatives (within the Mafia Island Marine Park, Mafia district) and Songosongo island village government (adjacent to the Songosongo Gas Production Site, Kilwa district). These two communities are located within some of Tanzania's highly sensitive areas with regard to community-state relationships over the rights of access over resources, and hence have had a range of experiences regarding community capacities to be effective in NRM.


### 1.3.3 Research Methods and Techniques

The research combined the following methods:

- **A selective review of literature and documentary analysis:** A review of existing information and documentary analysis was done: this combined published outputs with reports from previous studies, government publications, and NRM project documents; where available, records of organizations have also been used for clarification purposes. Other sources included websites and other relevant reports and maps.
- **Focus group discussions (FGD):** Focus group discussions were conducted for CBO history, internal characteristics and external dynamics and for an understanding of the community and natural resource management issues. This included institutional analysis in which participatory mapping of relationships and institutional arrangements related to coastal and marine resource management in the study area were examined. With the aid of participatory visualization techniques, the community members drew resource maps of the area showing the types and location of natural resources available, and the CBOs or other management structures responsible. Through this exercise the question of who manages what resource and the community's role in natural resource management were examined. Group discussions also enabled a village profile for each research site to be undertaken to understand 'the community' and resource management issues in the locality. Purposive sampling technique was used to include representative members of a particular CBO. Five to ten people, and where appropriate male and female of mixed ages, were selected and interviewed on issues that focused on activities of the CBO, including their mandate and link to natural resource management. Through this method it was possible to explore the perceptions, experiences and understandings of CBO members with regard to coastal and marine resource management.

Key informant/semi structured interviews: were conducted with government officials at different levels, with representatives of institutions linked to community groups or NRM initiatives, community members, and academic experts. Stakeholders were identified purposively in relation to their connections with CBOs and coastal and marine resource management. Where appropriate, narratives were used to collect information on community experiences and how they have been affected by various natural resources management policies. A list of interviews is provided in Appendix iii. These interviews clarified understanding about community-based processes, provided data and documented accounts of CBO activity in coastal and marine resource management. A field guide was designed by the research team to aid collection of data using this technique. Government agents were purposively selected and interviewed, as they were assumed to be custodians of specific information of interest to the study.

- Field observations: Throughout the data collection phases and visits to the villages, community institutions and projects, the team made observations and records, including photographs to show the spread of natural resources and related activities in the area.



**Picture 1: Participatory Institutional Analysis** (diagram drawn by turtle conservation focus group discussion participants from Kenya)**.** Source: © Kimani (2008)



Focus Group Discussion, Tana Delta, Kenya. Source: © Wanyonyi, Kimani & Tunje (2008)



Field visit with Mangrove tree planting group, Rufiji, Tanzania. Source: © Mwaipopo, Bashemererwa, Msuya (2007)

**Picture 2: Participatory information collection techniques.**

# Section Two

## 2.1 KEY CONCEPTS

This section outlines our conceptualisation of key notions used within this study, namely: natural resource management (NRM), effectiveness; community-based organisations (CBOs) and the notion of community. Appendix ii provides a literature review for the project, which incorporates a brief conceptual framing of ideas about notions of community, institutions and institutional capacities and (CBNRM). These definitions stem from the content of the discussion informing our understanding of CBOs and effectiveness.

### 2.1.1 Understanding 'Effectiveness'

The notion of effectiveness has its roots in management theory developed for organisations (private, non-profit) in industrialised countries.[41] There is little work that systematically considers questions of CBO effectiveness for NRM or wider development issues in developing countries, including coastal and marine resource management. This is not surprising, as there is a dearth of comparisons on the performance of civil society organisations worldwide. Although a large number of studies exist, they tend to be organisationally specific and relate to project evaluation.[42] This raises questions concerning how one applies ideas of effectiveness to CBOs in Kenya and Tanzania, particularly given the way they have changed over time, that most are unlikely to have formalised organisational management practices, and that they are situated in contexts where members' ability to systematically analyse their own effectiveness may be constrained by lack of exposure or lack of skills training.[43] In addition to the primarily structural aspects, a similarly valid aspect relates to the objectives that a CBO sets for itself, within the context of NRM. Often, the desire is to meet livelihood demands, coupled with the need to make decisions on the use of resources, whose nature changes over time, influenced by the dynamic social, economic, political and ecological changes. This suggests the importance of avoiding ideal-typical classifications of effectiveness that have been developed for organisational management in industrial countries. Constraints on CBO development and their changing character, also raises questions over whether, even when adapted, ideal types are appropriate to CBOs in the coastal zone of East Africa.

How then should the question of the relationship between CBOs and NRM effectiveness be addressed? A dictionary definition of the word effective is "producing a desired or intended result".[44] But how do we understand what a desired result is and how can it be evaluated with respect to both NRM management as defined by a range of different stakeholders and to the mandate that CBOs establish for themselves? Since the 1960s there has been extensive debate over the meaning of effectiveness and methods of its evaluation. Early work was based on a goal approach, with effectiveness being assessed in terms of the extent of goal achievement.[45] However, this approach has been roundly criticised because it is inadequate for understanding how organisations work in practice and it "assumes…that abstract goals can be converted into specific, objective measures; and that data relevant to those measures can be collected, processed, and applied in a timely and appropriate manner".[46]

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41 Price, 1968
42 Fowler, 1997
43 Sorgenfrie & Wrigley, 2005
44 http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/effective?view=uk Date accessed: 11th May 2009. Effectiveness meaning the quality of being effective.
45 Price, 1968
46 Herman & Renz, 1999: 108

More recent approaches for understanding effectiveness have developed in response to critiques of the goal approach. They place emphasis, for example, on system resources, contingency to situational variables, multiple constituencies, value conflicts, and legitimacy.[47] We do not elaborate on these issues but it is sufficient to note that there is substantial debate over what effectiveness means, both broadly and with respect to application to NRM, what criteria should be used to analyse effectiveness, and what standards these criteria are being judged against. There is also a debate on who assesses effectiveness: should it reflect the perspectives and goals of the CBO and its members, or should it reflect wider NRM planning goals? The former can be insular and self-serving; the latter may ignore members' achievements or be inappropriate.

It follows from our view of the dynamic nature of institutional processes and environmental change at the local level, that effective action is itself dynamic with opportunities and constraints for action presenting themselves and changing over time. This suggests that effective action within a CBO is built upon the relationships and practices of its members, which necessarily take place within a specific context and their engagement with others external to the CBO. Again, how do we take into account the different perspectives of stakeholders concerning what (effective) management is and how effective and lasting a given CBO's actions are likely to be? How do we consider the contested nature of people's claims to natural resources and existing power relations which mean that some actors' claims are likely to prevail over others at the local level?[48]

To facilitate analysis we divide an understanding of CBO capacity for effectiveness in terms of internal and external factors, although we recognize that in practice, they are inter-dependent. By implication, it is necessary to situate the internal workings of a CBO within a wider context, be it institutional, political, economic, social or ecological, in order to capture the extent of people's capacity to act, as well as underlying dynamics of change that impinge on this capacity. This dual view is important because: "A consistent vision, mission, identity and social role are preconditions for effective actions; however, they only reside in people's minds, hearts and on paper. Linking these aspirations and intentions to the right activities means understanding what is going on in the outside world and then 'fitting' the organisation's work into the environment."[49]

To summarise, in order to consider the extent to which CBOs are able to achieve effective management (processes and outcomes) in coastal and marine resource management, we need to take into account those aspects of coastal and marine resource management CBOs have to be effective at, considering their mandate and what they do.[50] This means teasing out how effective a CBO is at the tasks it sets itself and also considering how these tasks relate to wider management systems. It is also necessary to capture tasks which relate to NRM, as opposed, for example, to purely income generating activities. Examples could be, the ability to influence resource management policy and practice at the local level, or holding stakeholders accountable and responsible to sustainable use of resources. However, as it will be illustrated, this is not always straightforward, particularly where CBOs promote livelihood activities that have NRM dimensions.

### 2.1.2 Understanding 'Natural Resource Management'

The management of natural resources falls within the larger realm of management where efforts, skills and resources are targeted at achieving desired outcomes. Desired outcomes from management efforts of natural resources revolve around ensuring sustainability of the resource for future unlimited use. Natural resources themselves are either renewable or non-renewable meaning possibilities of regeneration and non-regeneration respectively. Natural resource management generally involves consciously making decisions about natural resources and advancing their sustainability given that some are renewable and are ever in danger of depletion. The scope of management includes but not limited to aspects of; prohibition of pollution and destructive extractive methods, monitoring and enforcement of controls, public education and outreach, protection of critical habitats, ensuring ecological integrity, ensuring of resource regeneration, setting of extractive limits, stakeholder involvement in decision-making, environmental and development planning. Ensuring that all these ideal conditions are met is daunting and undoubtedly makes management of natural resources complex and hard to achieve against competing interests.

Natural resource management also falls in between the exploitation of resources and total protection against resource harvesting. The more agreeable level of resource extraction that allows both exploitation and protection constitutes the science of conservation that is widely applied as a management tool. The

[47] Ibid; Cameron, 1986
[48] c.f. Leach *et al*, 1999: 233
[49] Fowler, 1997: 47
[50] Fowler, 1997

emphasis on conservation has led to creation of protected areas that constitute no-take zones and limited use zones. Coastal and marine natural resource management is most challenging due to the complexity of the coastal zone and the very nature of marine resources taken to be, often common property resources.

Perhaps the biggest challenges in natural resource management is the ability to influence and sustain behavioural changes towards sustainable uses of resources and strategies to ensure a collaborative linkage between the institutions responsible for managing resources to handle issues of social and ecological scale. It is this context that CBOs have become such a key component of natural resource management where resource managers are increasingly involving communities and their groupings in resource management.

### 2.1.3 Understanding 'Community'

In order to understand where CBOs are situated and who they relate to within a locality reflection on the notion of community is important because it is often a misunderstood term and having a good understanding about what constitutes a community is an important basis for effective CBNRM.

A very common critique of the concept of community in community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is that it is perceived to be homogenous, made up of similar people with common interests and based within a single locality. This emphasis can lead to a disregard of conflict divergent interests, inequality, power relations, heterogeneity, dynamism, and non-spatial forms of association. In short, the use of notions of community within approaches to conservation can be ahistorical and ill-informed about social processes. Such flawed thinking can mean that practical initiatives are undermined because they haven't taken into account the likely consequences of these social processes in terms of shaping conservation and development outcomes.[51] There is also a strong criticism of an assumption of a past or present harmony between people and their environment that would imbue communities with the capacity for resource management, particularly when these people are viewed as 'traditional' or 'indigenous'.[52]

These features are critical when considering who a CBO represents in the context of the dynamic nature of people's social organisation around coastal resource use in the Western India Ocean (WIO) Region. For example, fisher folk and traders can be highly mobile, migrating into and across coastal areas. This can be due to long established forms of resource use such as exchange, canoe building, or to new forms of exploitation, such as the expansion of prawn fishing in the 1990s in Tanzania. By implication, some groups of people are marginal to spatially-situated 'communities'; although they may be part of a community of people that extend over the East African coast (e.g. the *Wakojani*), defined by common interest, ethnicity, etc. It also means complex power relations operate at the local level in terms of how different groups of people access natural resources and the decision-making power they have over these resources. Linked to these power relations are other divisions shaping patterns of resource use associated with gear, gender, age and ethnicity.[53] In particular, the sexual division of labour, and its connections to property and resource ownership patterns means there is seemingly persistent inequality in decision making power over household and community processes between men and women.[54]

We should not assume, however, that divergent views of community and idealisation of the concept are not necessarily negative. As Li (1999) argues, different (idealised) notions of community can be drawn on as leverage in processes of negotiation over development resources.[55] She warns, however, that idealised notions of community can do damage when translated into specific policy recommendations unless initiatives are cognisant of impacts upon poor people's everyday struggles over resources. Similarly, Brosius *et al* (1998) identify a problem of 'generalisation' whereby concepts such as community become integrated into resource management regimes but in the process become generic, and dissociated from local political contests;[56] this points to an issue of importance to the present study, namely the need to ground notions of community within particular historical, social, economic and political contexts.[57] As Mosse (2007) argues, there is typically lack of contextual analysis in literature on collective action and institutional formation.[58]

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[51] Guijt & Shah, 1998
[52] Sillitoe, 1998
[53] TCMP, 2003
[54] Mwaipopo & Ngazy, 2003
[55] Li, 1996
[56] Brosius *et al*, 1998: 159
[57] c.f. Peters, 1996
[58] Mosse, 2007see also Steins, 1999

Linked to criticism about ideas of community, has been critiques about the extent of community capacity to encompass ecological heterogeneity, and lack of cognisance of dynamic environmental change. This draws on changing ecological and biological thinking, which questions views of ecological systems as stable, balanced and progressive in a linear evolutionary fashion. Leach *et al* (1999) provide an overview of these arguments and identify three themes within the (contested) scientific literature: firstly, an understanding of ecological variability in space and time; secondly, non-equilibrium perspectives leading to the need to explore the implications of scaling up dynamic processes; and, thirdly, recognition of the importance of history on current dynamics which has led to work on environmental change at a variety of time scales.[59]

These critiques of community and ecological change have been well rehearsed over the last decade.[60] For the purposes of this study critical issues concern what is meant by the 'community' that a CBO represents. Who is included and who is excluded and the nature of their use of marine and coastal resources that give reference to community.

### 2.1.4 Understanding 'CBOs'

Included in Appendix ii is a history of the development of civil society organisations in Kenya and Tanzania. A central point emerging is that forms of community based grassroots organisation are not new, having been present since colonial times, although the terminology 'CBO' is recent; also striking are differences between CBO development between Kenya and Tanzania, relating to wider trajectories of change between civil society and the state in each country. With reference to coastal and marine NRM, a range of different types of CBO are present; these have been initiated under different influences between autonomous groups within communities, the state, the market, and a wider civil society. This study deliberately incorporates examples of CBOs with different developmental trajectories.

The term 'CBO' itself is fairly recent; having emerged under the influence of international development discourses in the 1990s; nevertheless it has since gained widespread use in the region. Yet, like the concept of community (see Appendix II), an understanding of what constitutes a community-based organisation CBO is not straightforward. Internationally, literature on CBOs is fragmented across specialist areas (health, arts, conservation, etc.) and there are considerable differences about what constitutes a CBO, their history and organisation, in different parts of the world and even between Kenya and Tanzania.

Very broadly, CBOs are understood to be 'grassroots organisations' although definite characteristics are unclear. One distinction commonly made is between NGOs and CBOs: NGOs are understood to be intermediary organisations that are formed to serve others, whereas CBOs are membership organisations made up of groups of individuals who are collaborating for a common interest.[61] By this definition a CBO could include women's groups, credit circles, youth clubs and co-operatives. However, as Manji and Naidoo (2005) argue, should we consider membership organisations such as trade unions and chambers of commerce as CBOs?[62] They also suggest that an "attempt to define CBOs using either function or the degree of formality in their constitution provides no satisfactory method for defining such entities".[63]

If one bears in mind the discussion about difficulties emerging from the term 'community' (2.1.3 above), a further problem relates to what constitutes 'the community' a CBO represents: who is included and who is excluded? For instance, a women's group may include women with common interests who come from a particular neighbourhood, or are of a particular age range, or social standing; but it is highly likely that other women are excluded from such a group. By implication only certain members of a particular community are represented within the CBO. This is an important issue when the CBO is seen to have a mandate to speak for 'the community' (or in this instance 'women'). When this mandate is reinforced through local government or connections to NRM Institutions, inevitably some people become excluded from such representation and exclusion may be based on processes of power at the local level. This presents particular concerns when exclusion is systematic and groups of people are marginalised from a particular community. There are many further issues that can be raised in a discussion about CBOs, but it is helpful to situate such issues in the Kenyan and Tanzanian context.

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[59] Leach *et al*, 1999: 231
[60] For example: Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Leach *et al*., 1999; Cleaver, 2004
[61] Malena, 1995 cited in Manji and Naidoo, 2004
[62] Manji & Naidoo, 2005: 1
[63] Ibid: 1

## i) CBOs in Kenya

There are different definitions for CBOs in Kenya, depending on the perspectives of different stakeholders. CBOs fall under the Ministry of Gender and Social Service Development (MoGSSD). In the past (post 1964), as the Ministry of Social Services and Cooperatives, its main responsibility was to organize state functions at district/ province levels. It would register small groups, including dance troupes, which were then nurtured, helping them graduate into the cooperative societies that were instrumental in economic growth after independence. These registered community groups were symbols of a flourishing civil society in the 1960s and 1970s.

At present, the mandate of CBOs is limited because they are not recognized nor defined under the Companies Act (1979), pertaining to societies, associations, NGOs, and companies, in which a legal mandate is conferred by the Registrar of Societies in the Attorney General's office who can issue a legal 'Certificate of Registration'. In contrast, the MoGSSD is charged with responsibility for issuing certificates for groups which it defines under categories of 'self-help groups', 'youth groups', 'women's groups', environmental groups and more recently, 'CBOs'. This certificate is issued at the district level and is a 'Certificate of Recognition' under the provisions of the Cooperatives Act of 1964; however, it is not considered to be 'registration' in the legal terms of the Companies Act Cap 486 of 1979 (revised in 2009).

To add a further complication, whereas registration of CBOs is decentralized to the district level under the Cooperatives Act of 1964, NGOs are established under an Act of Parliament of 1991, and they are not under the MoGSSD as is the case of CBOs. NGOs work at a wider scale (i.e. are represented nationally and/or internationally) compared to CBOs, which are localised; most NGOs also have a board of trustees and often have several and diverse projects, unlike CBOs. In contrast, the MoGSSD defines self-help groups as small groups registered with the Ministry of Gender and Social Services having a minimum of 10 individuals with an odd number to facilitate voting. These are often 'village organisations' and 'community organisations' and have memberships of less than 30 people drawn from the community, and carrying out activities for members and community development benefits. Environmental law also does not define CBOs but acknowledges the importance of the civil society in environmental issues.[64]

The fact that there is no standardised definition of a CBO in Kenya, and despite an understanding of what a CBO is, considerable variation in what constitutes a CBO in different sectors and parts of the country, is significant, particularly for any attempt to generalise about CBO effectiveness. Despite no official government or legal registration of a 'CBO' in Kenya, since they are issued certificates, there is recognition of their existence. Interviews for this project suggest a perception within the MoGSDD and the Ministry of Fisheries that 'CBOs are a creation of NGOs and development projects' and used as structures to facilitate project implementation. CBOs are perceived to have been created by external development agencies rather than being a product of genuine community development.

Despite differences, a CBO is widely understood to be a locally organized group that is registered by the District Office, MoGSDD. It is a community group composed of stakeholders in a village or locality who have come together with a common goal, usually for their own benefit and that of their community. Besides the size of the organization, the MoGSSD staff did not provide much distinction between a village/ community organization and a CBO. A village organisation is smaller than a CBO such that several village/ community organisations can form one CBO. This is important because it is a critical difference with the notion of CBO that is used in Tanzania, and indeed internationally.

The role of policy and other government-lead agencies shapes the role, mandate and extent of jurisdiction of CBOs. While the MoGSSD conducts registration of CBOs, it is other government-lead agencies that work with the CBOs in the management of coastal and marine resources. The Kenyan Wildlife Services (KWS), the Kenyan Forests Services (KFS) and the Ministry of Fisheries Development (MoFD) have close interaction with CBOs. KFS and MoFD have formulated policies that have led to the formation of new types of CBOs: Beach Management Units and Community Forestry Associations.

Kenya's environmental law[65] outlines participation and jurisdiction of CBOs. In its provisions for participation of other stakeholders in environmental management affairs at the provincial and district levels through the Provincial Environment Committee (PEC) and District Environment Committee (DEC), it provides for participation of two NGOs at both the provincial and district levels whereas, it only provides for participation of two representatives of CBOs at the district level. Non-inclusion of

[64] Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA, 1999). E.g. the EMCA provides for public involvement in the Environmental Impact Assessment process, environmental advocacy, etc.

[65] EMCA, 1999

CBOs at the Provincial level could perhaps mean that CBOs are only expected to work at local levels. By implication, environmental management legislation imposes a jurisdiction of how far CBOs can go in relation to CBNRM. However, no criteria of CBOs to be involved in the District Environment Committees are stipulated in the Act.

## ii) CBOs in Tanzania

In contrast to the size and 'umbrella' nature of CBOs in Kenya, CBOs in Tanzania are held to be small-scale organizations that are interest-based, community entities expressing civil society, motivated by local social, political and economic processes usually within a certain geographical entity. Most of them have an informal character and may remain invisible to people outside the group except when they are required to register. A common feature is their grassroots characteristic, although their activities may range from the 'rotating saving clubs (commonly known as *upatu* or *mchezo*) of women, or *beni*, the female dance groups of coastal women to quite prominent sports associations and other self-help organizations.

CBOs in Tanzania have enjoyed a stronger membership base than many NGOs because they are based on local patterns of organization or cooperation. Recently, though, government and donor interest in CBOs as stepping stones for grassroots development has generated a plethora of varied structures-cum-CBOs many of which have simply been formed in-order to get financial assistance.

CBOs are recognized by the state as valid organizations at community-level, but do not have any legally defined identity. Tanzania does not have a written legal or policy document guiding the formation of CBOs, but establishment and operations of CBOs are recognised at the local authority level – at the District Office, whose mandate includes recording their presence.

Before independence in 1961, CBOs could be registered under the Societies Ordinance (1956), the Trustees Ordinance (1957), and the Companies Ordinance (1956). Later, the Cooperative Act (1976) and the Sports Council Act (1976) came into effect.[66] More recently the NGO Act of 2002 simply mentions the existence of CBOs but states that they are not registered under the Act, but at the Local Administration level. Today CBOs are considered to be associations of people, where they have organized to address needs – self-help, education, recreation etc. "*kikundi cha watu katika ngazi ya mtaa wanaoungana kwa ajili ya kutatua tatizo linalojitokeza katika jamii*" (lit: a group of people at street [neighbourhood] level who join together in order to address a problem that is facing the community).[67] Some CBOs have also been instrumental in advocacy or as watchdogs for community interests.

Given their lesser recognized status in terms of policy, the objective of government is to sensitize CBOs to register formally as NGOs and have wider coverage and recognition. However, this implies that members need to follow outlined NGO procedure for registration, which involves conducting a formal meeting that sets objectives, selects leadership and design a constitution. The minutes of this meeting are then submitted to NGO office for registration. During the study, many members of self-initiated CBOs attested to an understanding that to get government or any form of support is difficult because most of them do not have any legal entitlement, or rather, a formal registration and therefore recognition before the law.

It is virtually impossible to make a comprehensive assessment of the nature, size and scope of informal groupings at grassroots level except to assert their vivid presence and contribution to local level sustenance. These include groups organized for income-generation. Others have been initiated by government or donor processes, and a significant number by faith-based organizations. The Tanzania National Water Policy (2002), for example, requires users to mobilize and organize themselves into associations, especially Water User Associations, to apply for water rights and to pay for application and user fees. Membership is usually determined by an objective and is therefore not necessarily determined by members but may include externally influenced ideas to serve purposes whose benefits may not necessarily accrue directly to the members.[68] More common examples include occupation-based associations, community-development associations, traditional groups (e.g. local militia, *Sungusungu*), women's informal savings and credit schemes, hobby-cum-self help groups, faith-based groups (often organized around neighbourhoods). Some of the groups are loosely bound, organizing only on the occasion to implement an activity, but other groups command more formality, have constitution and are organized according to clear principles and operational planning.

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[66] ForDIA, 2002

[67] Consultation with Director for NGOs, Tanzania (2/10/2007)

[68] Mushi, 2001

Recently, the activities of NGO networks that support civil society activities at grassroots and the establishment of the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) provide some impetus on local support systems to grassroots.[69] The FCS, for example, provides material support to 'registered' organizations, while networks coordinate resource provision and information to partner organizations. However, being urban-based, most of these Civil Society apexes are constrained in sufficiently reaching out to community-based structures in rural Tanzania in an attempt to build their capacities.

## 2.2 CBOS WITHIN THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NRM

This section outlines the structures of institutional responsibility for NRM in Kenya and Tanzania. It is significant in order to situate CBOs in relation to levels of decision-making over NRM and sets the scene for looking at effectiveness, in particular, for considerations of what power and authority CBOs, local communities and village governments have over coastal and marine resource management, and the extent of their role in decision-making processes.

It is indeed necessary to begin this examination by contextualizing the increasing importance of CBOs in coastal and marine resource management within the wider processes of community participation that have been informing NRM processes in the region for the past 2-3 decades. The idea of community participating in NRM had been enshrined in the 1980s in Africa when a shift in the development process towards, 'people centred' development, public involvement, cooperative management, power sharing, decentralisation and devolution, and empowerment[70] were adopted to rectify the top down, centralised approaches that were proven to be unrealistic to both development and a larger part of the population. Both of these concepts were based on a moral principle, apparently recognizing that it is both appropriate and humane for those who directly depend on resources, to have a part in making decisions for its use. These arrangements were also underpinned by the acknowledgement that altering the unsustainable resource use patterns that damage the marine and coastal environment cannot be done without the support of local people and communities.

Approaches to community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) widely influential in East Africa, came to be a solution, to the extent that political emphasis on good governance, democracy and people's participation in development has made non-representative conservation projects increasingly unattractive to governments and non-governmental organisations. This development of CBNRM can be located under greater pressure for 'decentralisation by devolution', popularly known as the D-by-D approach, which involves transferring decision-making to the lowest appropriate management level.[71]

Decentralisation denotes the transfer of power, authority or responsibility for decision-making, planning, management or resource allocation from the central government to other administrative units, such as District and Village Governments.[72] Devolution, on the other hand, assumes bestowing to other decisions makers, the capacity to act, i.e. conferring formal powers to make decisions to local units.

Decentralization by devolution in NRM at the community level has taken place through two major processes, namely co-management arrangements and the establishment of community-based management initiatives. In the case of marine and coastal area management in East Africa, forms of co-management include the mainstreaming of stakeholder participation in Marine Park or Coastal Area management, and Community Forest management practices. Most of the efforts have concentrated on capacity building of communities to engage and make decisions for management of resources. In both Kenya and Tanzania several forms of co-management have been initiated between civil society (villages, NGOs, CBOs and similar grassroots groups) and the state, or between central and local state institutions. This co-management is held to be a way to introduce more 'flexible' and 'collaborative' forms of NRM.[73] Community-based management puts in place grassroots institutions for management, such as the Beach Management Units in the fisheries in the region.

Developing initiatives and thinking on marine and coastal resource management have drawn on wider trends in NRM. There are important differences, however, shaped by the character of the resource base, the co-existence of different types of management systems, and the complex mosaic of institutions that govern how people access and use marine and coastal resources. In this respect, coastal environments present particular challenges for decentralization and community-level initiatives.

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[69] ForDIA, 2011, CSI Tanzania Country Report, forthcoming
[70] Junge, 2002: 6
[71] Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999: 4
[72] Junge, 2002; Kalonga *et al*, 2003
[73] They include vertical subsidiarity, transferring authority to lower levels of government, or horizontal subsidiarity, transferring authority to civil society groups or the private sector (Döring, 1997).

In all of these processes unresolved issues have often been tenure and ownership, benefit sharing and livelihoods. Tenure is the critical institutional element governing natural resource use. Consequently, reforming tenure to increase the degree of local authority and responsibility is a central component of these environmental policy reforms.[74] Benefit-sharing assumes that material incentives are the panacea for community participation and behavioural change, but as our findings will illustrate, sometimes management processes do not take into account how communities place themselves in relation to the resources, rendering material outcomes as simply being more superficial than the real value of their lives.

Despite significant achievements in the process of decentralisation of resource governance in the two countries, these unresolved issues keep coming up in the actual practice of management itself. Included in these challenges is the way that decentralisation and devolution of powers remains a principle dissociated from the political will to devolve powers in practice. At the same time devolution may also be limited in the context of a rapidly changing social, economic, political and ecological context, rendering grassroots institutions limited in capacities to take action. However, a brief examination of the institutional layout for NRM is necessary. When we examine the institutional arrangements for NRM, both countries follow a hierarchical organisation of formal institutional structures for NR governance, divided in sectoral terms. Within this hierarchical institutional structure, processes of decentralisation have had important implications for coastal and marine resource management. What is evident in both countries are the linkages between 4 levels of actors: the Central Government, the District Authorities, Local communities and intermediaries (herewith described to include International and local NGOs, the private Sector). Their relationships have been evolving, in many ways, responding to the changing contexts that demand new and more socially acceptable interventions for natural resource governance. Within these processes, there is an increasing space and responsibilities shouldered on local communities, although the scale of their effective decision-making power is limited.

### 2.2.1 Levels of Decision-Making for NRM in Tanzania

The multi-layered institutional framework for NRM in Tanzania reflects back to efforts to institute democratic governance down to the grassroots, together with the influence of successive economic and political reforms through a series of periods that have redefined the practice of sustainable resource management. In many respects, the systematic consolidation of power by the government, albeit within several attempts to recognize local authorities,[75] was softened by the 1990s Local Government Reform Process that firmly instituted functional capacities at local level. CBOs emerge from the community level as both recipients and actors of NRM policies.

Currently, management of the coastal and marine environment within the whole Tanzanian NRM structure is the domain of a number of Sectoral Ministries which interact through a complex set of linkages. The overriding but interrelated function over the environment is vested in the Office of the Vice President, which executes its roles through the Division of the Environment which oversees the planning and coordination of environment management activities undertaken by government sections and non-governmental organizations (URT, 1997). The National Environment Management Council (NEMC) provides technical support to these processes.[76] Other NRM functions are coordinated through a hierarchy of decision making processes that run from central district, and village government level structures (see Diagram 1). This framework, guided by the National Environmental Policy (1997) and the successive Tanzanian Natural Resource Management Policies (most being recently reviewed) illustrate strong support for devolution of powers for management and the streamlining of community-based management at grassroots.

#### *i) Central Government – Line ministries*

Sectoral jurisdiction over coastal and marine resource management at central government level is shared between several Ministries. Key among these is the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG); the Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock Development (MFsL); the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT), and the Ministry of Lands and Urban development (MLUD).

Their major responsibilities are development of NRM policies, approval and regulation of local government's (district level) administrative functions (MRALG) and approval of village by-laws for NRM (MRALG). Enshrined in the recent reforms in NRM Policies and Acts, for example, the National Forest

[74] Kalonga *et al*, 2003
[75] Mniwasa & Shauri, 2001
[76] ICAM, 2003





*Figure 1: Coastal and Marine resource governance and decision-making linkages in Tanzania*

Policy (1998) , the National Forest Act (2002); the Wildlife Act (2002), the National Fisheries Policy (1997), the Fisheries Regulations (2002), Fisheries Act (2003) and the Land Act (1999), is the commitment to community participation and involvement as actors and primary beneficiaries.[77] In addition, to make sure that local government authorities and the structures of local management are consulted and kept informed of the management of fisheries, the Fisheries Department has been promoting the formation of groups for a long time. A group in Bweni village (Mafia) was formed in 1975 under this support.

The complexity within the coastal and marine environment dictates that these institutions have to interact in their functions. But this has led to a multiple actor situation with overlapping mandates and nature of decision making powers. Often, different styles of interventions, sometimes out of greed and pure corruption, have led, for certain institutions, to override others and to sanction for unsustainable uses of the coastal and marine environment. Often the victims have been the local communities. Such weaknesses due to over-lapping mandates are the case even at District level; indeed, attempts to create 'collaborative-stakeholder platforms' are often mentioned but questionable in practice.

[77] Mniwasa & Shauri, 2001

### *ii) Local Government Authorities - District Council Level*

The Local Government structure from District level to the grassroots is the primary governance system putting in practice Tanzania's ideals of decentralisation by devolution. The Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP,) adopted by the Government in the 1990s aimed at improving the delivery of services to communities, on the principles of good governance, financial accountability and community participation by strengthening the capacities of administrative institutions at this level.[78] Institutions within the Local Government Authorities' level include: village councils, district councils, township and municipal authorities. These have direct responsibilities in environmental and NRM management. According to the Local Government Authorities Act, No. 7 of 1982, these institutions are obliged to "provide for the protection and proper utilization of the environment for sustainable development" (URT, 1982). At the District level, the District Management Team that incorporates all District government functional officers (Planning, Fisheries, Natural Resources/Tourism, Cooperative Development Department, Community Development and Lands) designs District Development Plans, which are ultimately approved by the District Council. At this level, Ward Councillors participate with respect to tabling local communities' needs and plans in development (URT, 1982).

From the interviews with District functionaries, the functions of District Councils and how they are coordinated in practice include the following: Dissemination of state laws and regulations for management. Sometimes the DC may translate some regulations to fit a particular local context. However, provisions that are made at district level are not above state laws. Examples given during the field work included decisions over land use and issues identified as national investment (e.g. establishment of facilities for processing & export marketing of marine products (Mafia) and infrastructure for Tourism facilities – such as hotels and diving centres – Mafia, Kilwa); Review and forwarding of village by-laws to the MRALG; Coordination and incorporation into District Planning of national programmes such as TASAF, MACEMP and RUMAKI and to provide logistical support to grassroots groups (finance, technology, capacity building).

The Department of Lands, Natural Resources and Environment is one of the eight departments at District level, which serves as the overall coordinator and manager of natural resources at district level. The sections under this Department, Lands; Natural Resources (fisheries, forestry, wildlife and beekeeping); and, Environment provide professional and advisory duties to Communities. All CBOs, except for the BMUs and *Kamati za Mazingira* are registered (or recorded) by the Department of Community Development (CDD). The Community Development Department is also responsible for coordinating activities for capacity building (needs identification, ironing out objectives, project planning, seeking external assistance – funding or skills training) in collaboration with other functional officers. Most donor interventions and NGOs channel their activities through the CDD as a local development requirement but also because the CDD provides the formal link between external agents and the people.

In this set-up, district functional officers (Fisheries, Forestry, Beekeeping, and Co-operative Development) are each facilitated by projects and other external sources work with the CD Department to facilitate the establishment and functioning of CBOs. TASAF, that stands for the Tanzania Social Action Fund was established by the Tanzanian government as 'a multi-sectoral programme that provides direct financing for small-scale public investments targeted at meeting the needs of the poor and contributing to social capital and development at the local level' (TASAF, 2008). At District level TASAF is coordinated by either the Planning Division or the Community Development Department, the latter whose expertise includes mobilization and capacity-building or empowering of communities to participate and spearhead their own development. Through TASAF funding, communities have engaged in improving their livelihoods and facilitating their access to basic services of their choice such as health care, water or education facilities. TASAF funding also supports small-scale community projects. is coordinated by either the Planning Division or the Community Development Department, the latter whose expertise includes mobilization and capacity-building or empowering of communities to participate and spearhead their own development.

Devolution has given local institutions or grassroots units of government the mandate to make autonomous and independent decisions that are separate from the central government. The Tanzania National Forest Policy (DATE) , for example, states that Village forest reserves will be managed by the village governments or other entities designated by village governments for this purpose, such as NGOs, user groups, associations, religious institutions, etc. The reserves will be demarcated on the ground, management objectives defined, and multi-purpose forest management plans prepared covering all different uses of forests.[79]

[78] URT, 1998
[79] URT, 1998

### *iii) Community structures: Village Government and Village Council*

In the mid 1970s, the Village Administration was established as a local, grassroots-based administrative and political institution to promote rural development and democracy. Village Assemblies (*Baraza la Kijiji*) in which every adult of 17 years and above can participate and vote are the primary forums for decision making,[80] while Village Councils, widely referred to as Village Governments (*Serikali ya Kijiji*) are functional entities comprised of 3 Committees responsible for Economy and Planning; Social Development (that includes, Health, Environment and Education), and Security.

The Village Council (made of members of the Village Assembly) serves as the grassroots ultimate decision maker and through it the Village Government (VG) is its implementing structure. The VG receives, coordinates, mobilizes, and facilitates resource management activities structures including *Kamati ya Mazingira* and the Beach Management Units (BMUs).

According to the Local Government Act No 7 of 1982, Clause 120, No. 163, Village Governments have the mandate to develop by-laws for the governance of certain aspects within the Village's jurisdiction. Village by-laws are then submitted to District Councils for further submission to the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG). By-laws are approved by the Village Council, and therefore in principle have at least the consent of the village community (URT, 1982). [But] in practice, and particularly on coastal and marine environment, these by-laws are often overridden. This has been the case where the Central or District Government for example, allows for the development of beach hotels, or other facilities within village jurisdiction, pressurizing for local consent for such developments in the guise of national development priorities. This has led to a series of conflicts.

In reality therefore, while community-based structures can be efficient for facilitating the mobilisation and participation in village affairs, the effectiveness of CBOs can also be undermined by corruption and embezzlement of funds by village leaders; by the inability of such systems to integrate local or traditional systems of authority; and by the lack of resources and skills, which have often led to village institutions being undermined by members, where alternative forums for decision making have developed. Section 3 will highlight how the relationship of CBOs to the village administration is an important factor in facilitating or constraining CBO effectiveness, particularly where it involves categories of people who may not themselves (or family members) be represented within village government (e.g. women's groups in some villages). These features of the village administration then become significant.

### *iv) Intermediaries*

A number of intermediaries operate across all the above mentioned governance levels in coastal and marine resource management, the most significant being Donor-funded programmes and also traditional systems of management, which may not be legally mandated but have considerable influence on the way people use resources at local level. In the study sites visited during this process, programmes offering support to community groups in the coastal area included TASAF, MACEMP and RUMAKI, each with its own objectives and mandates, despite their common agenda concentrating on the coastal and marine environment. TASAF has been instrumental in the organizational level of CBOs in the coastal area of Tanzania. Likewise, the operations of MACEMP, the Marine and Coastal Environment Management Programme are channelled through the District Councils and are co-ordinated by the District Officers (Focal Person). These two programmes are therefore integrated into District Development Planning, and executed directly by them. The District appoints a TASAF coordinator and a MACEMP coordinator from within its functionaries. The RUMAKI Seascape programme on the other hand, is a WWF intervention, which directly administers a Government-supported Japanese Social Development Fund (JSDF) for the Community-based Coastal Resources Management and Sustainable Livelihoods Projects, which was launched in March 2006.[81] In addition, RUMAKI has supported the establishment and training of BMUs in Mafia and Rufiji districts visited by the study.

To enhance communities in resource management, MACEMP supports demand-driven projects by groups through a Coastal Village Fund (CVF), and also builds the capacities of District Functional Officers through training and the provision of material support (WB/GEF, 2005).[82]

NGOs managed by individuals also support community groups, usually for income-generating activities by providing credit or direct support for community development projects. Each such institution may however demand a special way of using resources depending on its agenda.

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[80] URT, 1982

[81] RUMAKI Annual report (2009)

[82] The CVF is a MACEMP Facility that is channeled through the TASAF II for implementation of micro community projects (WB/GEF, 2005).

### 2.2.2 Levels of Decision-Making for NRM in Kenya

Natural resources management in Kenya has historically been the domain of government-led agencies, which ensure resources are properly managed. However, with a new thinking on resource management through participatory co-management schemes, community groups are now increasingly being involved in management. Significant in the context for this change have been processes of decentralisation whereby in the 1990s the Kenyan government, similar to many other African governments, initiated a series of radical market-orientated reforms, followed by a comprehensive programme of reforms in the public sector and local government.

Nevertheless, despite community-level initiatives, the Government of Kenya continues to rely on sectoral policies across different ministries, which unfortunately tend to overlap or duplicate responsibilities. The Environmental Management and Coordination Act (2000) was established with the aim of coordinating all the 77th statutes in different ministerial acts touching on legal issues pertaining to the environment; it would be fair to say, however, that in practice communities continue to experience the consequences of responsibility duplication and the shifting of responsibilities between sectors, creating the danger that takes the lead in practice on a particular issue.

#### *i) Central Government*

Sectoral jurisdiction of coastal and marine resources is divided between five main government agencies (see Figure 2)

- Department of Fisheries (DoF) charged with the mandate of managing all fisheries resources in a sustainable way to maximise production.
- Kenya Forestry Service (KFS) with responsibility over forestry;
- Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) with responsibility over wildlife and protected areas, including marine parks;
- Tourism Department with responsibility over all tourism-related licences.
- The National Museum of Kenya (NMK) is also viewed as an important stakeholder in the management of forest resources.

Because of division of responsibility over NRM between different Ministries, the enforcement of regulations and responsibility for management can be challenging. This is reinforced by overlapping mandates, and lack of systematic communication or liaison between government departments. These overlaps are apparent in Marine Protected Areas, where there is lack of harmonisation between KWS and the DoF with respect to fisheries and marine protection, and between KWS and KFS with respect to mangrove forests, and between the Department of Tourism and KWS, KFS, and the Fisheries Department with respect to tourism activities. However, through the promulgation of National resource management policies, several attempts to decentralise responsibilities to communities have been undertaken. For example, the Kenya Forests Policy (2007)[83] and The Kenya Forests Act (2005)[84] all provide for community-based arrangements, decentralization of responsibilities and devolution of powers to local actors. Yet, several challenges emerge around resource use conflicts at the grassroots level, as shall be demonstrated in our research findings.

#### *ii) District, Local Authority and Constituency Planning and Development*

Development in Kenya, including NRM functions, has been decentralized from the national to district level. District planning is, however, carried out within policy frameworks established at the national level through National Development Plans. These policies are desegregated both sectorally and geographically. In the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD) strategy, planning, identification, implementation and monitoring have been the responsibility of the District Development Committee (DDC). The aim of the DFRD strategy was to involve the people in identifying and prioritizing projects to be undertaken in their areas. This was aimed at making planning participatory, responsive to the local needs as well as ensuring that resources and the development process are controlled by the people. The DDC was to receive prioritized project proposals from the communities through the location and divisional development committees. This planning machinery is also dominated by sectoral planning which affects spatial planning in terms of resource allocation.

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[83] GoK, 2005[b]
[84] GoK, 2008[b]





*Figure 2: Division of Government Responsibilities over NRM in Kenya*

### *iii) Institutional Co-management Arrangements with Local Communities*

Institutional co-management arrangements with local communities follow from divisions in jurisdiction over resources at central government level, with numerous initiatives to form co-management arrangements between government and local communities. Currently, Beach Management Units and Community Forestry Associations are being promoted by government through resource management initiatives in coastal areas.

Substantial engagement with communities has been channelled through Beach Management Units (BMUs), for which there is a pilot programme at 8 landing sites. The Fisheries Department has also made a deliberate effort to incorporate local communities in fisheries management, including eliciting community views within policy making processes such as the formulation of the Fisheries Policy.[85] The BMU programme includes involving communities in training BMUs, in plans to give loans to CBOs through BMUs, and the donation of a boat engine to each of the pilot BMUs in Kenya. For the BMUs to be effective in their new roles in coastal and marine resource management, the community still requires the provision

[85] GoK, 2008[b]

of patrol boats, good infrastructure at the fish landing sites installed with freezers, accorded more enforcement powers such as prosecutorial ability for offenders and creation of a regional structure where fishermen in the coast will be able to elect one chairman for all fishermen in coastal region to coordinate activities of BMUs.

Community Forestry Associations (CFA) in Kenya is enshrined in law through the Forests Act (2005), which permits a member of a forest community and others resident in the same area to register a CFA under the Societies Act (45(1).[86] CFAs can be found across forested regions of Kenya, having been promoted by the government as a method of sustainably managing forestry resources.

Other government initiatives are at a wider scale but still complement the current efforts of the Fisheries and Forestry Departments to benefit CBOs; these include a newly established fund for groups, the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which is managed at constituency level through constituency committees headed by the Member of Parliament. CDF initiative has encouraged community members to join or form groups in order to access and benefit from the government's CDF funds.

### *iv) Intermediaries*

An extensive number of NGOs play a role in funding and supporting NRM management activities in the coastal zone. There is a wide recognition that NGOs have a significant role to play in assisting the rural poor in breaking out of their condition of poverty. A major source of strength of the NGOs comes from their insistence on the empowerment of the poor as the key to the transformation of their livelihoods. This includes the need for mobilization of local communities and representatives of civil society in all matters of participatory planning and implementation of sustainable socio-economic programmes at grassroots level.

The 1983-1993 National Development Plan recognized the efforts of NGOs in development activities and therefore strengthened their efforts through the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD),[87] noting that NGOs, in collaboration with the District Development Committee (DDC) groups and local authorities, could enhance the process of local participation in the development projects. However, in principle the 1997-2001 Development Plan relegates the role of NGOs to arid and semi-arid areas, development of fishing, infrastructure, development of technology and culture only, setting aside an earlier prominence given to NGOs in the context of DFRD.

[86] URL http://www.reconcile-ea.org/wkelc/Forest_Act.pdf Date accessed: 19 June 2009.

[87] Kameri-Mbote, 2000

# Section Three

## 3.0 THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CBOs IN COASTAL AND MARINE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

CBOs in coastal and marine resource management have for many years been part of the agenda for coastal and marine resource management in the WIO Region, albeit in a range of capacities. Several achievements can be claimed in terms of putting in place grassroots or community structures to affect natural resource management processes, and to strengthen responsibility towards resource management. However, persistent capacity constraints and challenges raise substantial questions over the degree of effectiveness of these CBOs, especially with regard to coastal and marine resource management ideals. These processes feed into shifting allegiances of CBO commitments toward management.

Although management strategies differ according to country, project and place, understanding CBO effectiveness in relation to natural resource management includes a need to gauge their ability to recognise and act upon a management issue. Once an issue requiring action is recognised, the capacity to act effectively is underpinned by a CBOs ability to access and effectively utilise appropriate resources (material and non-material), and by its legitimacy as a valid and mandated component of wider management structures and processes coming from government and its relations to NGOs, donors, and in some cases the private sector. An important influence on these processes is the extent to which community members themselves give value to natural resource management, and recognise CBOs as a means to enhance livelihoods in different ways, such as poverty alleviation, identity and recognised access to resources, but also as a way to realise collective aspirations for local control over natural resources. Simultaneously, the limited legal mandate many CBOs have for making decisions and carrying out actions with regard to coastal and marine resource management can severely constrain their influence, for this reason understanding the way a CBO has been established and by whom (community, government, donors) is important. A CBOs' capacity to act may also be restrained by the political context in which government decision making and action is capable of eroding rather than building local capacities, in effect compromising the ultimate impact in terms of management effectiveness.

To elaborate on these factors, the effectiveness of CBOs in natural resource management is viewed in terms of interplay of different elements. For ease of analysis, a rough division is made between 'internal' and 'external' factors, each situated within the wider social, political, economic, and ecological context that shapes a CBOs capacity to act and sustain this capacity over time. Developing from this interplay of factors, our assessment of the effectiveness of CBOs in management is ultimately located in terms of the impact CBOs have had upon management processes and their ability to sustain these processes over time.

'Internal' factors focus on how CBOs are organised, as represented by both formal statements and individual members' perspectives, and 'external' factors, focusing on relationships between the CBO and external actors, to capture the dynamics of power and authority over natural resource management at the local level, and how this authority is concentrated in ways that enable or constrain CBO effectiveness. When considering the internal organisation of the CBO, care is taken not to over-emphasize structural factors (its constitution, rules and regulations, membership, etc.) over processes (including its internal systems and the way the CBO and its members relate to each other and the outside world) to avoid viewing CBOs as 'closed boxes' in which situation-specific dimensions of CBO action and effectiveness are missed.

## 3.1 TYPE OF CBOS IN THE STUDY SITES

Several types of CBOs and community-based structures have been operating in the management of the coastal and marine resource environment in the study areas for a long time (see Section 2.1.4 and Background in Appendix ii). Major differences between the types of CBO can be identified according to the way they were established and their objectives and here we divide them into the following groups: (i) community/village-initiated groups, driven by local community concerns; (ii) government initiated groups, designed specifically for natural resource management objectives; (iii) donor/NGO externally-initiated community groups, usually formed with the parallel objectives of livelihood enhancement and environmental protection or management; (iv) umbrella organizations that bring together several community level organisations with a large membership; such organisations are likely to be driven by government and/or external NGOs/donors.

For the reasons following lack of clarity in definition of CBOs, "community structures" that were selected for detailed investigations in this study included those that can be grouped under the categories listed in Table 3. It is important to note that for purposes of comparison and contrast the Study deliberately encompassed the different types of "community structure", both those with a legal mandate ("government-initiated groups") and those without ("community-initiated self-help groups", "donor/NGO-initiated groups" and "umbrella organisations").

Each of these groups has a different disposition in terms of its capacity to act upon NRM processes and impact upon management effectiveness. This is discussed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 below. A brief description of each of these groups is given below. A detailed summary of all CBOs included in the study is provided in Appendix I.

### *(i) Community-initiated groups*

These groups were formed out of self-help initiatives by community members, often bringing together like-minded people who joined to address a common problem, such as, income-generation (Mphengele Muungano); fish marketing challenges (SOFIDE); poverty alleviation (RUFIDELTA); and self-help (Upendo Group). Many of these groups were formed purely out of livelihood enhancement objectives but which had to be linked up to activities geared to maintain sustainable use of resources.

***Table 3: Types of CBOs/community structures included in the Study***

| Type of CBO | Examples studied | Average size of CBO membership |
|---|---|---|
| Community-initiated self-help groups (organically dev) | Mphengele Muungano (Kenya) | 12 (six couples) |
| | RufiDelta (Tz) | 5 |
| | SOFIDE (Tz) | 20-30 |
| | Upendo Group (Tz) | 18 |
| Government- initiated groups | BMU (Kenya & Tz) | 9-15 Committee (members all stakeholders) |
| | CFA/PFA -GOCOFA(Kenya & Tz) Kamati ya Mazingira (Tanzania) | Number not fixed, dependent on village requirements |
| Donor/NGO-initiated groups | Mida Creek Conservation Group (Kenya) | 24 |
| | TAFMEN (Kenya) | 38 members |
| | RUMAKI initiated groups (Tz) | 30 members (6 sub-groups of 5 members each) |
| | MACEMP initiated groups (Tz) | 30 members |
| Umbrella organizations | Mida Creek Conservation Community (Kenya) | 11 groups |
| | SOZOCO-Mae (Tanzania) | Not fixed |

### *(ii) Government-initiated groups*

These groups are recognised in law and given legitimacy by Government. Most prominent examples include the following:

- ***Kamati ya Mazingira* (lit: Environmental Management Committees – Tanzania):** These structures were introduced through a central government directive in the 1980s as sub-committees under village governments, initially driven by international concerns over global deforestation and desertification. The *Kamati* are institutionalised in all villages in Tanzania. Their mandates are usually drawn up on the basis of environmental issues in a specific locality, and may go beyond overseeing the sustainable use of natural resources (e.g. forestry, marine resources) to public sanitation and land conservation issues.
- **Beach Management Units (BMUs – Tanzania and Kenya):** In Tanzania these structures were established by the National Fisheries Act (2003) in all fishing communities and are described as: ''a group of devoted stakeholders in a fishing community whose main function is management conservation and protection of fish in their locality in collaboration with the government".[88] In Kenya, supplementary legislation to the Fisheries Act of 1991 gives BMUs exclusive rights over fisheries resources within a designated area and landing stage; thus only fishers who are members of a BMU have the legal right of access to exploit fisheries resources at gazetted and designated landing sites. By virtue of their government-established mandates, BMUs are currently the most viable structures for coastal and in-shore resource management in terms of legality and formal incorporation within government resource management structures in both Tanzania and Kenya.
- **Community Forestry Associations (CFAs – Kenya):** they are enshrined in law through the Forests Act (2005), which permits a member of a forest community and others resident in the same area to register a CFA under the Societies Act , Cap 108 of 1968 (45(1).[89] CFAs can be found across forested regions of Kenya, including along the coastal zone, having been promoted by the government as a method of sustainably managing forestry resources. Once the CFA has been registered and approved by the Director of Kenya Forest Service, it has the authority to make binding decisions about management at community level.

### *(iii) Externally-initiated Groups (NGOs and donors)*

Many community groups are organised around the related objectives of income-generation and resource management activities, in order to mobilise and give incentives that commit people to coastal and marine resource management. The formation of these groups' centres on the relationship between poverty levels and use of resources, and the challenges this had on sustainable management. From these processes groups such as beekeeping and fish-farming have been formed. Among the most vibrant are community-based credit and savings organizations, e.g. Village Community Banks (VICOBA) whose establishment has been initiated by RUMAKI and MACEMP programmes in Tanzania.

### *(iv) Umbrella organizations*

Most of the Umbrella organizations had been externally initiated or facilitated and are formed as structures that mobilize and coordinate the operations of several smaller CBOs within a particular locality which have stakes over a particular resource base, and therefore have large membership, but can also make a wider community accountable to their operations. They are most common in Kenya, where they are used as a means for NGOs to co-ordinate their support to grassroots groups.

MCCC, for example, is a community-driven initiative formed in 1990 in Dabasso village of Watamu division of Malindi District, Kenya, and works towards fostering of conservation of the Mida Creek mangrove and fisheries resource. It has 11 active registered Self Help Groups (SHGs) and has a limited mandate over the management of resources but enjoys good support from government agencies since it is instrumental in combating illegal activities e.g. collaborating with KWS and KFS in the arrest of illegal mangrove cutters.

Garsen Environmental Conservation Forum (GECOFO) was formed 2006 in Garsen division, Tana Delta District, Kenya, through the assistance of a KWS warden in Garsen and East African Wildlife Society. It is an umbrella body composed of 20 small CBOs. They have broad objectives targeted at poverty reduction through sustainable management and utilization of natural resources, including crocodile, guinea fowl, the mkindu palm (*Phoenix reclinata*) and also the promotion of ecotourism.

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[88] URT, 2003: 7.

[89] URL http://www.reconcile-ea.org/wkelc/Forest_Act.pdf Date accessed: 19 June 2009.

Gede Community Forest Association (GECOFA) was formed in Gede Division of Malindi District, Kenya and draws its mandate from the new Forest Act (2005) and policy (2007). It is bestowed power by the Act to plan an area for conservation and to be in charge of it. It further promotes and seeks assistance for support towards its members for livelihoods activities e.g. beekeeping and ecotourism activities. Its membership is corporate with 27 member CBOs representing about 450 individuals. While most of the umbrella organizations have disintegrated, or are severely weakened and in-active due to lack of funds and internal leadership wrangling, a few like KCWA are still in operation. These umbrella groups are mainly registered as trusts and associations rather than CBOs.

## 3.2 INTERNAL FACTORS INFLUENCING CBO EFFECTIVENESS

Internal factors are those that can be drawn from the CBO's mode of establishment, structure, nature of membership, capacity in terms of exposure, skills and access to information, legitimacy including legal mandates, and leadership.

These factors influence the values upheld by CBO members in relation to commitment and willingness to manage resources and their capacity for sustaining and effecting management activities; they also shape the degree of group cohesion and group sustainability, aspects that have an implication on the degree to which a CBO can work effectively with regard to management objectives. Each factor, however, should not be treated in isolation and they are presented here simply for making logical connections regarding how they together influence a CBO's capacity to act on and ultimately impact on NRM.

### 3.2.1 CBO Formation and Membership

The manner of CBO establishment and type of membership has implications for members' commitment to attain group objectives and sustain a group over time. Section 3.1.1 outlined the common types of CBOs found in Kenya and Tanzania (community-initiated; government-initiated, donor/NGO-initiated, and umbrella organisations).

The manner of establishment of a CBO influences the nature of relationships between members, but also the values regarding management that a CBO wants to maintain. Membership in voluntary structures aiming at resource management is, however, rarer compared to those structures formed in terms of 'membership as a duty' (by government or NGOs/ donors). For those CBOs where membership has been drawn on voluntary basis, be they organically developed or initiated from outside, membership has been influenced by certain parameters including 'know-who' (e.g. in rotating-credit groups) or kin relations (Mikingamo Fishing Group, RUFIDELTA, Rufiji, Tanzania; Bweni, Tanzania and Mphengele group, Dumi, Kenya). For such CBOs their sustainability can be maintained as long as their commitment to the value of management is upheld, although it usually has a direct relationship to their livelihood sustenance. However, as was witnessed, their capacity to act effectively in management was challenged by their mandates.

For CBOs based on 'membership as a duty', membership has largely been pre-determined by the government, as are their rules of operation. Kamati ya Mazingira (Tanzania), BMUs, and CFAs have criteria for their membership predetermined by government, BMU regulations have also been provided by the respective governments that also establish their mandates (see Box 2).

#### Box 2: Membership criteria

Membership of BMUs is based on the general membership criteria outlined in the BMU Regulations (2005) of Fisheries Acts in Kenya (CAP 378 of 1991) and Tanzania National Guidelines for BMUs.[90] In all BMUs studied (i.e. Mkunguni, Gazi, Kipini [Kenya] and Kilindoni, Mafia [Tanzania]) eligibility for membership is broadly stipulated as inclusive of all resource users or stakeholders in a given locale as, for example, the case of Kilindoni BMU where members can range from fishers, fried fish traders, fish mongers, curio sellers, gear repairers and boat makers.

**Membership Criteria for Kilindoni BMU, Mafia, Tanzania (as understood by BMU Committee members):**

- Committee Membership criteria – a stakeholder = fisher, a processor or a user of the fisheries (eg consumers)
- Leadership criteria – a local person, resident of Kilindoni people were encouraged to apply for leadership positions and the Village Goverment scrutinised the names and presented 25 of them. In a village community meeting each of the contestants was given room to campaign.
- Member - Local resident (*mwenyeji*) – defined as a resident, not a temporary fisher, for example, a migrant fisher (*mvuvi wa dago*).

[90] URT, 2005

**Processes of inclusion and exclusion:** one of the outcomes of the nature of establishment and membership with regard to management effectiveness is the inclusiveness or exclusiveness that these processes create. Firstly, most CBOs in the region systematically exclude others from management practices because of the very criteria of membership. This can – ironically – weaken wider community ownership, implying that not all management decisions may be taken up willingly by all community members.

To provide an example, BMUs embrace 'all' stakeholders within a locality except a non-resident member. However, in terms of acting on management, it is the BMU Executive Committee (with 15 members) which in practice can make decisions. Indeed those who become selected onto the Committee and those who come to influence the decision making process, are often only an 'elite' selection of members amongst the Executive Committee, usually influenced by community or village government leadership preferences. Reasons for this include the desire to maintain the power to control resource management or simply for political clout. The outcome is that some community members, often the chronically poor and marginal groups of people, who do not meet the requisite criteria either due to illiteracy, inability to invest earnings, party political leanings, or social identity (e.g. ethnicity, sex, non-resident), may be excluded and is unlikely to be represented in management decisions.

Again, qualifications for membership can provide a challenge (see Box 3). These have been set according to sex, age, occupation, and sometimes even kin-relationships. Yet all of these criteria are directed towards the desire to sustain a common value, which is the basis for group sustainability.

From the membership criteria, therefore CBOs as community groups however well placed to understand what is happening within a community with regard to NR related activities can also be ineffective due to the fact that they are not always inclusive. These processes of exclusion can reflect established power relations within a community, often reinforced by government modes of operating around NRM at the local level. By implication, therefore, most CBOs are unlikely to speak or act on behalf of the wider community due to lack of common legitimacy.

Umbrella CBO organisations are more inclusive since they draw their strength from the broad based involvement of smaller groups in conservation or management activities. For Mida Creek Conservation Community (MCCC), Garsen Environmental Conservation (GECOFA), and Garsen Environmental Conservation Forum (GECOFO) in Kenya, membership is inclusive of all types of occupations; any community group that is registered as a self-help group (SHGs) and demonstrates that it shares the same ideals as the umbrella CBO, can be a member (see Box 4).

Such broad-based organizations draw their strength from inclusiveness, sometimes simply necessary to influence behaviour change regarding NRM, but many of them require significant and continuous capacity building in terms of resources and skills (see Box 5).

Finally, the nature of membership also has an impact on the capacity to act on management initiatives related to NRM because it creates dynamics that depend on a network of relationships and support systems outside the group. These networks may be generated from personal relationships such as kinship or friendship; or they may be based on neighbourhood

**Box 3: Criterion for CBO membership leading to processes of exclusion**

Upendo women's Group in Kilwa, Tanzania claimed that *we do not prefer male members because men are impatient; they want quick results and cannot always be trustworthy*. The *Mpaji ni Mungu* Women's Group in Gazi Village, Kenya, is a women's-only organisation involved in *makuti* (palm-leaves) weaving and distribution. For a new member to join this group she must be a woman from the village who is married. Arbitrarily determined criteria are also used. These include: honesty and commitment to the group constitution, contrary to which one's membership is terminated. Similar conditions are given for membership in the Mangrove Boardwalk Women's Group in Gazi Village, Kenya.

According to the Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group in Kenya, a new member has to write a letter to the group chairman stating his/her reasons for joining the group. The executive members make a decision on the membership, taking note that a person with known poor public relations or with a bad reputation is not allowed to join the group. Once a person is accepted in the group, s/he is given the constitution to read and understand the group's objectives, mission and vision, principles and activities. A member is excluded from the group if she/he fails to attend three consecutive meetings. For other groups the criterion for membership is based on occupation, that sometimes automatically exclude one on the basis of sex, for example, male fishing associations (Mikingamo Fishers Group, Mafia).

association, common resource use interests, or livelihood associations. CBOs whose individual members can draw on 'connections' with government officials have been able to confidently act upon decisions more than other groups which do not share this privilege. This is the same for CBOs that work as umbrella organizations, an experience that Kenya has quite advanced in.

**Group cohesion:** The mode of establishment and nature of membership has a significant influence on group cohesion. This is because aspects such as common identity and trust were seen to be important elements in enabling a group to work towards self-defined goals. From the CBOs included in this study it was observed that trust is assessed – self-evidently - from a subjective view point and is built up and maintained in different ways. Yet group cohesion is necessary in sustaining a management decision by group members.

Where groups have been formed on the basis of philanthropic concerns, and supposedly a common desire to respond to community needs (Upendo group Kilwa Tanzania; RUFIDELTA, Rufiji Tanzania), group cohesion and subscription to management decisions have been maintained as the group members remain committed to the cause. CBOs in this status deserve support and encouragement. For those groups primarily driven by income-generating purposes, as was the case of many hastily formed, donor initiated CBOs in 2006-2007, their cohesion was sustained as long as this primary motive for establishment was achieved. This implies that the latter groups' values were not really squared in

### Box 4: Mida Creek Conservation Community (MCCC), Kenya

MCCC membership is corporate, and the basic criterion is to be involved in conservation business. Their major goal was to bring together all small CBOs within Mida Creek (which is the source of community livelihoods) and work towards conservation of resources (especially mangroves) and proper management of MIDA Creek. Aspects such as sex and age are not important. They currently have 11 CBOs which are obliged to subscribe membership fees, monthly contributions and sustain the objectives of conservation that include beekeeping groups, butterfly farmers, fishers, tree planting groups and livestock keepers. Many of them are also involved in tourism activities. Although MCCC works within an area that has overlapping mandates in terms of management – Kenya Forest Services, Kenya Wildlife Service and Department of Fisheries, it at least has local legitimacy community recognition and acceptance. This means that decisions that are made by MCCC can be applied over a large area. One of their activities is to conduct surveillance, around the creek, an activity that is recognized by other actors.

### Box 5: SOZOCO-MAE, *Shirikisho* - a people's voice?

SOZOCO-MAE, The Southern Zone Confederation for the Conservation of the Marine Environment, popularly known as *Shirikisho* is an NGO, formed in 1994 and registered in 1998. It is organized as a coastal community chapter, having branches in all villages within the coastal districts of Mtwara and Lindi Regions of South-eastern Tanzania. It was formed as a result of dialogue between different groups of villagers, government officers, politicians and development agencies in the period 1993 to 98. This dialogue was mediated and extended to policy makers and the public mainly through means of participatory video. Their main objective was to counter dynamite fishing that was in the 1990s a scourge to fishing and community livelihoods in the south-eastern coast. The process was supported by the Rural Integrated Programme Support (RIPS), funded by Finland. The process began with a historical meeting at Sudi village by fishermen from 12 villages together with four District Fisheries Officers and two consultant facilitators from RIPS, and later by a meeting at Msimbati village in 1996 which declared the forming of the NGO.

Shirikisho, the community initiated organization which seeks to enhance community participation in marine environment protection and sustainable use of marine resources in the south-eastern coast, operates through mutual cooperation and a community participatory approach in all its activities.[91] During its prime time, Shirikisho was able to mobilise many members along this region and successfully acted as a voice against abuse of the marine environment. It enjoyed the recognition and support of district and regional officials. In terms of a community structure Shirikisho was well-grounded as an agent of mobilization. By 2009, lacking material support and innovative ideas, including the establishment of Government initiated community-based structures for resource management such as Beach management Units, Shirikisho feels threatened that its role as an actor in the coast is being made obsolete.

[91] Pwani Yetu, 1999: 8

*Table 4: The Legal Mandate of CBOs*

| Mode of group establishment | Level of legal mandate |
|---|---|
| Community-initiated CBOs [or organically-formed] | These are recognized by government as legitimate groups (despite being a grey area in law), but do not have legal mandate over NRM law. Hence, they are not able to make binding decisions on behalf of or for the community, and usually depend on their ability to persuade people to act. |
| Government initiated groups (CFA, BMU, Kamati ya Mazingira) | Basically, they are extensions of the government at community level, established under the approach of decentralisation and devolution of management powers. Government regulations bestow legality through policy (fisheries, forestry, and environment). They can take people to task because they are part of the structure of Local Government responsible on behalf of the Village Council/community for proposing and upholding By-Laws on resource management developed at village or community level. |
| Donor-initiated organizations | Most of them are established in accordance with government-donor regulations to subscribe to the twin objectives of resource conservation & management and livelihood enhancement. They are given responsibilities to act upon NRM but do not have legal mandates to make decisions on behalf of the community over NRM. |
| Umbrella groups either organically formed or externally initiated | Their legality is established by their wider community acceptance and their ability to commit members (within its jurisdiction) to subscribe to management decisions. They, however, do not have the binding legal mandate over NRM since their decisions can be overridden or have to be made in collaboration with other government structures. |

resource management, but rather using resource management as a means to achieve their ends of income generation, and hence not necessarily aiming at being effective resource managers.

Kinship relations have also been used to maintain group cohesion, especially where mistrust in relation to finances, or commitment towards participating in activities has been experienced. For example, Upendo Women's Group (Kilwa, Tanzania) deliberately excludes kin under the rationale that this could lead to corruption, in the same way that MACEMP laid claims when facilitating the formation of CBOs.

In contrast, membership in GECOFO (Kenya), and Mphengele Muungano Conservation Group requires only married couples, a mechanism that is claimed to reduce mistrust between couples, promote gender equity, enhance commitment and time for group activities, and promote unity and teamwork in the group. For the Muungano Group, duties are distributed according to sex. The men in the group engage in farming activities while women engage in mat weaving. As a group they are all involved in forest conservation activities including the conduct of patrols against illegal logging. They are also involved in planting of the mkindu palm (*Phoenix reclinata*) as a way of conservation to ensure sustainability of their mat weaving activities. The commitment to the objectives of the group is widely supported by the very membership of the group where both couples are involved together and whose activities directly relate to the livelihoods of the families involved.

### 3.2.2 Legal Mandate

Legal mandate refers to a group having the ability to make decisions and act upon those decisions regarding NRM. This includes having the capacity to make others act upon those decisions drawn by the group, albeit involuntarily. A legal mandate is critical both for legitimacy and a CBOs wider capacity to pursue NRM objectives. This is a central difference between the different categories of CBO (community-initiated; government-initiated; donor/NGO-initiated; umbrella groups) because even where a group has recognised responsibility, if it does not have a legal mandate, its capacity to act is constrained. Legal scenarios observed in the study areas are summarised in Table 4. What it illustrates is that a legal mandate is lacking for the majority of CBOs in Kenya and Tanzania and is a major constraint on NR management capacity.

As has been illustrated, the legal mandate of a group to act upon NRM is established by government policy or government regulations and directives. The legality can, however, also be drawn from community-level recognition of activities, as the MCCC enjoys, but unlike the former, it cannot be necessarily binding.

For example, binding mandates for making decisions are enjoyed by BMUs in both Kenya and Tanzania, because they have been formed by a national policy (see Box 6).

The powers to draw and enforce NRM laws applicable at local level are an aspect that enhances the capacities of these structures above the rest at the community level. An example of Kamati ya Mazingira of Ruma Village (Rufiji Tanzania) is provided in Box 7.

However, and as is reconciled below, even with such legal mandate, the ability of government designed structures to address issues that involve multiple stakeholders, and stakeholders who command higher political favour was very minimal, if any at all. This is particularly the case where external agents carry national legitimacy and connections to power-holders above community-level, for example, investors in tourism businesses, marine products harvesting and processing companies, or oil and gas exploration and production companies, as was witnessed in the two countries (see Box 8 for a Tanzanian example).

This experience, as was witnessed to be the case confronting several other groups along the coast illustrate that the activities of a CBOs are quite unlikely to be successful, however meaningful, for lack of being even locally legitimized. This questions the assumption that local leadership may be the best place to support effective management within its localities.

### 3.2.3 Leadership Ability

Leadership ability within CBOs is an aspect that contributes to the capacity of an organization to act on management decisions.

Some CBOs are run in an ad hoc manner, possibly due to hasty formation; others can draw upon leaders who have the legal or government designed mandate to act, however, those credited with being successful by other community members, as well as by outsiders, have committed leaders who are typically strong personalities. This can be an asset to a CBO, with the caveat that one would anticipate

**Box 6: The legal mandate of BMUs in Kenya**

According to the BMU regulations 2005, of the Kenyan Fisheries Act (2005),[92] BMUs are vested with: (i) law enforcement (participate vetting of boats for eventual registration and fisher licensing by the Department of Fisheries, enforce approved laws by Director of Fisheries); (ii) beach Development (fish bandas and sanitation); (iii) collection of fisheries data; (iv) conflict Resolution and welfare matters; (v) handling emergencies.

**Box 7: Mandates of the Kamati ya Mazingira (Environment Committee), Ruma Village, Rufiji[93]**

Kamati ya Mazingira of Ruma village, Rufiji, Tanzania was facilitated to develop By-laws for the protection of natural resources in their area (simultaneously with other neighbouring villages). These By-laws, officially approved in 2003 stipulate activities that are allowed, but with a VG permit within their [coastal/mangrove] forest area, such as collection of fuel-wood, medicine, beekeeping, collection of poles for the construction of houses and fishing vessels. The By-laws also indicate payments to be charged when harvesting for business purposes, and fines or reprimands for contravening the sustainable use of the mangrove forest or destruction owing to livelihood endeavours such as rice cultivation in the mangrove area.

Much support was offered by the REMP project during their 1st phase of operations in Rufiji District. By-laws feature as the grassroots legal mandates in the Tanzanian Local Governance Structure. Local Government Act No. 7 of 1982 (1982), Section 120 (1) No. 163, stipulates that Village Governments have the mandate to develop by-laws for the governance of certain aspects within the Village's jurisdiction. By-laws are initially approved by the Village Council, and therefore given consent by the village community. Village by-laws are then submitted to District Council for further submission to the Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government (MRALG) for final approval and legality.

Using these By-laws, the Kamati can apprehend any person who contravenes proper use of the mangrove area submit cases to higher levels such as to the District Forest Officer if the offence is beyond their capacity to charge minor fees.

[92] GoK, 2005[c]

[93] Halmashauri ya Kijiji cha Ruma, Wilaya ya Rufiji. Sheria ndogondogo za kulinda Msitu wa Mikoko wa Kijiji cha Ruma. Sheria ya Serikali ya Mitaa (Serikali za Vijiji, 1982) No. 7 ya 1982. October, 2003.

from wider learning that if the CBO is successful over time, this element of personality may create challenges when it needs to move on from dependence on a particular individual.

This leadership ability shapes the capacity of the CBO to engage with different stakeholders in resource management activities. In this case, agency and the self-styled initiative to act upon management needs and hence management decisions is important for a CBO being effective. Some of the successful groups attribute their achievements in management-related activities to the personalities of founding members as the case of SOFIDE (Somanga Ndumbo, Rufiji District, Tanzania) in Box 9 illustrates this contention.

Active leadership, both exposed and well-connected also shapes the capacity of a CBO to illustrate successful resource management practices to the community. For example, RUFIDELTA (Muhoro village, Rufiji) in Tanzania found themselves receiving positive recognition from the people when they succeeded in introducing vegetable gardening as an alternative livelihood activity, discouraging them from rampant tree felling for fuel-wood or cultivation, in ways that people could see and benefit materially from the results.

CBO leadership agency and innovativeness also influence their sanctions into NR management processes at community and higher levels. Sometimes gender, political party allegiances or kinship influence one's inclusion, but these are simply arbitrary. What is more effective is when that leadership can influence enhanced capacity to effect management decisions as Box 10 on the ability of the leader of MCCAG illustrates.

Among the best achievements that can be attributed to the group include the ability of the group to conduct an environmental education programme in schools around the Mida creek; to mobilise community members to undertake environmental initiatives, including mangrove restoration, and its recognition by government agencies in-charge of marine resources around the Mida creek.

Yet these are very few qualities the groups can boast of, and indeed these characteristics reflect groups with longevity that have managed to develop over time, improving their objectives in accordance with the demands of the wider environment. Many groups have failed to perform due to poor educational levels, low capacity, weak exposure and poverty that have denied them such focused objectives and therefore meaningful performance.

### Box 8: Songosongo village and the impact of SONGAS – villagers' experiences

Residents of Songosongo island village, lying within the same island where Gas extraction activities are conducted by SONGAS alleged that they are experiencing effects of the gas extraction to the environment and to the people, presumably from the dumping of chemicals in the near waters of the sea and burying/burning of chemicals near their residences. Some of these effects were contended to be skin rashes, the dying of farmed seaweed, fish kills, and death of a cow that drank water from a pool near a site where chemicals were buried. A local informant explained that "Some of the people getting skin rashes formed an environment protection group". Their aim was to try and stop the dumping/burying/burning of chemicals near residences, and also to initiate tree planting along the shoreline. However, the group has not been able to effect any change because they do not get much support from the village government, and the village leaders have not shown interest in what the group is trying to do. The group feels that the village leaders have formed an allegiance with the owners of the gas plant.

### Box 9: SOFIDE's Group Chairperson – The 'Professor'

SOFIDE – Somanga Fishers Development Group was established in (1995) and is led by an individual who is popularly known as 'Professor'. Professor is claimed to have the knack of acting initiatively and seeking information on how and where to appeal on certain issues regarding the marine environment or marketing aspects. SOFIDE was established as a platform to improve fishers' incomes by avoiding middlepersons in marine products marketing. This was in the late 1980s when the market for marine products was expanding and bringing in a lot of players. They were successful in linking up directly to buyers through negotiating as a group and seeking for resources to perform with autonomy. Over time, SOFIDE noted that its activities were increasingly being affected by destructive fishing practices, and through the initiative of 'Professor' he sought the confidence of the Village Executive Officer and Village leadership to act upon the use of destructive practices. Professor resorted to this strategy after realizing that individual group attempts to reprimand those contravening sustainable fishing practices led to abuse and threats to him and his fellow CBO members. Through this strategy SOFIDE links most of its activities to the village leadership and therefore the village government is often used as a platform to explain about resource management to the community. By doing so, SOFIDE has established its own legitimacy by cutting itself above the rest.

Manipulation and corruption have also caused leadership to betray communities when it comes to making decisions about resource use especially when a powerful user comes in (e.g. private investors). Mafia in Tanzania is a case in point where the Chole VG signed a contract for land occupation with the management of the Chole Ruins Hotel, usurping a women's market building that was strategically located for tourists to buy their wares; and this had negative consequences for the women's livelihoods. In such cases where village leadership forms alliances with private companies, the respective community groups have protected neither the members nor the community from exclusion of their rights to resources, or from environmental abuse.

### 3.2.4 NR Management Skills: Information and Knowledge

Management skills as discussed in Section 2 can be generally described to include skills involved in running an organization for the achievement of its objectives. However, NR management skills at CBO level as it was observed were largely enhanced by the ability of members to acquire the required information and knowledge necessary to effectively perform organisational and management objectives.

**Box 10: Mida Creek Conservation and Awareness Group**

The Mida Creek Conservation and Awareness Group (MCCAG) is a living example in Kenya whose success and general impact in the community can be attributed to agency and self-styled leadership. The group was started on a humble beginning in 2005 by a lady who was unemployed despite being a certificate holder in Agricultural extension. Creating employment opportunities for the youth, mangrove forest conservation and general improvement of community livelihood were the core goals of the organization. To achieve these, the group initiated small-scale activities using meagre financial contributions from the first few members that largely dealt with environmental conservation, raising awareness and promoting ecotoursim. A few years later, these activities drew the attention of other interested stakeholders, both national and international. Today, the group undertakes a number of activities that include mangrove afforestation, mangrove boat-rides, fishing and community environmental awareness. The group is also maintaining a restaurant and has constructed a mangrove board walk for its ecotourism activities. Some of its members have undergone training on tour guiding so as to enrich its eco-tourism activities. The MCCAG has also been supported by various agencies to upscale and even start new activities, including ReCoMaP, UNDP-GEF and Nature-Kenya.

In our study, the skills that were assessed in relation to a CBO's management effectiveness include the following: Firstly, project management skills including organizational and financial management; secondly, environmental management skills to address NR management activities. For the latter, we examined the kind and level of knowledge on environmental processes that CBO members possess and how they use it to affect management strategies or activities. We probed into sources of information including skills training that enables CBOs to improve their performance. Thirdly, we examined how with such skills, a CBO is able to make an impact on management.

Our findings suggest that while many CBO members possess good general experience in relation to ecological processes, and can apply this experience to affect certain management strategies. Being community-based, members' knowledge is typically drawn from long-standing experience of and contact with their immediate environment. Most CBOs however lack the necessary practical skills to make this experience realisable in terms of sustainable impact on NRM.

An example of the way in which such experience can be applied to affect certain management strategies with positive but limited scope is the way CBOs can establish rates of resource degradation from both empirical evidence and from its impact on their livelihood sustenance. Such experience or local knowledge has been used to address certain practices of sustainable resource use. SOFIDE Group in Somanga-Ndumbo (Kilwa, Tanzania), for example, tried to enforce the traditional adherence to fishing seasons claiming that such restraint was capable of reducing overfishing and destruction of fish-breeding areas. Very few modern management strategies, apart from paying lip-service to the value of traditional knowledge, incorporate the local knowledge that people have accumulated through their livelihood practices and occupational skills into management interventions. Consequently this discourages community members. Conversely it is also difficult for some CBOs to link generic environmental messages from the outside to local experience and understanding, leading to frustration.

A central challenge is the fact that, given the changing social contexts within which CBOs are operating, it is difficult for management demands to be upheld easily because of the conflicts of interests and social power different resource users possess; CBOs find it profoundly difficult to generate community harmony in such circumstances.

At the same time, the sophistication of ecological dynamics can diminish the ability of CBOs to handle certain management demands. This is because of the lack of necessary skills and awareness to act as required. For example, fish farming along the southern coast of Tanzania has gained considerable popularity among CBOs because of its observed economic benefits and the rate of development of fish ponds is also increasing. According to technical people involved in this development, the initial objective is to convert some of the saltpans into fishponds for those who think that fish farming is more profitable. For those who did not have enough saltpans to convert for fish farming they are allowed to construct fishponds beyond the mangroves i.e. on the leeward side.

**Box 11: Fish farming – Upendo group Kilwa**

Upendo women's group has been managing a huge fish pond in the Jangwani mangrove area within Kilwa Masoko since 2007. They have received seed money and other support from RUMAKI. They raise channos channos, (milkfish or *mwatiko*). They requested a plot from the Kilwa District Natural Resources Office. In this area, the group manages 4 ponds: 2 large-sized ponds are 40x40 metres while 2 others are 20x20 metres.

Fisheries extension from the District Fisheries office and other experts is also provided. While the material benefits to members have been significant, the members' ability to comprehend the ecological aftermath and their ability to mitigate its impacts are minimal. This aspect relates to issues of ecological scale not commensurate with local capacities, and the demand to enhance local skills for appropriate management is wanting.

A recent study[94] conducted in Mtwara established the growing popularity of fish farming, but also viewed the concern of extension officers that villagers are constructing ponds without consultation, demanding specific monitoring for management of both the production process and the area where these ponds are being developed (see Box 11).

Given the growing demand for managing fish ponds, clearing more areas to suffice such development seems inevitable. However, reasons could be that community-groups have not been able to digest the initial information provided by extension officers about management of the areas, or they have purposely objected to experts' advice because there is more money in fish farming than in salt production. This suggests that they are not adequately trained or informed about the best way of handling the competing dynamics of livelihood demands hand in hand with the ability to address the sustenance of the mangroves. Consideration of how the overall management process enables community-groups to organise the evolving livelihood demands within the context of ecological conservation is therefore crucial.

**Information:** In relation to knowledge, sources of information and types of information that CBO members can access are important for effective management. Several types of information are necessary for CBOs to be effective. One type is information geared for advocacy purposes that can equip CBOs to act upon a resource management issue at the right time. This includes having the right information to protest against intended actions leading to the mismanagement of resources. Another one is information that builds awareness and understanding on environmental processes.

In terms of effectiveness, one aspect of the study was to examine the relationship between management skills and behavioural changes regarding use of the environment. Training and capacity building for CBOs have been the preserve of the government, but with significant intervention by international donor programmes. MACEMP and RUMAKI supported training in Tanzania has influenced significant capacity building in management skills, including organizational capacities. Most livelihood-based CBOS, BMUs and *Kamati za Mazingira* for example, attest to the benefits of awareness raising and training facilitated by these two programmes.[95] In our assessment of effectiveness we have linked such training and capacity building in relation to its ability to lead to influencing behavioural changes.

From the study, it was established that the internal organisational capacity within CBOs is generally low, a finding that cuts across the different types of CBOs and research sites in Kenya and Tanzania. In Tanzania interventions by Government and the MACEMP and RUMAKI Projects have significantly improved the capacity of local authorities at district and village levels to support community-based activities in NRM.

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[94] Report of the Mid-term Review for the Community Development and Sustainable Use of Marine Resources in Mnazi Bay-Ruvuma Estuary Marine Park (WWF-CO, Tanzania March-April 2010).

[95] Focus Group Discussion with BMU, Kilindoni; also RUMAKI Programme report (2008-9).

For example, district officers receive continuous capacity building opportunities and the 3 councils have been supported with operational funds and equipment such as computers and vehicles. For MACEMP, in particular, the coordination of activities at district level has allowed a closer connection with community groups at village level. Frequent follow-up visits and community-reporting back mechanisms are also indicative of positive development.

A government intervention for CBOs' capacity building has included formulation of standard group constitutions, financial management and group dynamics. In turn, relevant districts and village government personnel have also benefited through tailor-made skills for CBOs' capacity building.

In Kenya, apart from its main function of registration of community groups, the Ministry of Gender and Social Services (MoGSSD) performs other functions at the district level such as coordination , supervision e.g. during elections and in technical support. It coordinates the groups' activities and also facilitates the transfer of information from the central government to the groups. The District Social Development Officers' (DSDOs) office plays a pivotal role in capacity building and providing assistance to CBOs, upon request by the groups by conducting training on leadership skills such as: - resource mobilisation, conflict resolution amongst CBOs, report writing skills, communication skills and training in financial management skills. Other functions include supervisory roles to ensure that CBOs conduct activities as per their guidelines, checking on the transparency and accountability of e.g. government small grants disbursed by the ministry.

The MoGSSD, NGOs, government agencies and stakeholders provide capacity building to CBOs including training in basic skills leadership, bookkeeping, good leadership skills, management, governance e.g. forest guides, participatory research, training in proposal writing. Others provide coordination support to CBOs thorough conflict resolution, providing letters of introduction for bank accounts and applying for funds. Stakeholders also assist CBOs through awareness creation in environmental management, government policies, existing environmental laws, benefits of local groups (CBOs) from natural resources, sources of funding and fundraising, and encouraging advocacy platform for civil society. They also initiated and supported projects for community benefits from ecotourism, community conservation programmes, income and self-sustaining projects and provision of projects start up materials e.g. tree nurseries, beehives etc. Other forms of technical support included proposal writing; management of CBOs, financial management, provision of resource centres e.g. Arabuko Sokoke, provision of books, video machines and films volunteers.

The impact of capacity building in terms of skills can then be examined in relation to how CBOs have been able to sustain activities that are positive to coastal and marine resources through behavioural changes. A Kikale beekeeping group in Rufiji District started planting mangroves after training and information from the District Natural Resources office. This was after repeated appeals to stop rice cultivation among the mangroves. They explained that their success could be seen after two years when the trees would have grown 2 metres tall, and their ability to mitigate the negative impact they caused on the environment, as illustrated in Box 12.

### Box 12: Sustaining mangrove replanting and impact on local environment –Kikale Village, Rufiji

In Kikale village, Rufiji, villagers formed a community group that was involved in planting mangroves in areas where they used to farm rice. This, according to the group members, is aimed at keeping the environment at a good state with trees and at the same time with the rice crop. By the time the study team visited the area, the mangrove trees were about 2m tall (see fig. (a) below). The aim of the group is to later use the trees sustainably for their day to day needs i.e. cutting trees while planting new ones. Picture 3 illustrates sustainably grown mangrove trees, and picture 4 below illustrates rice planted between mangroves, a common practice in the area.





Pictures 3 & 4
Photos: © Mwaipopo, Bashemererwa & Msuya (2007).



***Picture 5: Fish farming in Msimbati, Mtwara***
Source: © Mwaipopo (2010)

The impact of mangrove planting by community groups enabled them to mitigate the negative impact on the environment. The achievement of this group is however not replicated throughout the area, and rice planting within the mangrove is still a challenge affecting the sustained use of the mangrove forest. Turtle conservation in Msambweni, Kenya is another achievement, as illustrated in Box 13.

### 3.2.5 Translating Management Incentives

The inadequacy of most conservation interventions in terms of devolving management strategies that are commensurate with the required resources and skills has often led to many failures. Often, as was observed for those communities within Marine park Areas, it was difficult for communities to establish the benefits they had initially thought would accrue to them when they consented to MPA management. In one interview with a MIMP official, Mafia, it was explained that conservation activities by MIMP are going at a faster pace than community benefits. The officer used the phrase "*at quick march v/s slow march*". Support to management has been considerable compared to the benefits that people have realised. This is because of the lack of political will to allocate enough funds for community activities, a responsibility of the MIMP Board. Although MIMP conservation strategies include the introduction of environmentally friendly gear since 1995, this component has not adequately covered the demands of Park residents, while Park management has continued receiving facilities and equipment for management. In 1995 the Park started with one patrol boat, and by 2008 it had 4 modern Patrol Boats and 23 Staff, and several vehicles. The Social service incentives that MIMP has instituted such as the Juani Dispensary building, a Secondary education programme for girls, and Credit programmes have not necessarily translated into household income poverty alleviation, because what people have wanted is more fish catches and more income. Hence the original messages within which the Park was being advocated for have not materialized. With low incentives therefore, it has been difficult to establish the sense of ownership among the people even with considerable awareness campaigns. People still feel that the resources are MIMP's and not of the people, and therefore do not give support to the Village Liaison Committees that are supposedly their representation in MIMP management.[96]

What was more common, however, was the tendency of top-down approaches, which often stressed on 'envisaged' benefits from management, but failed to put in place a reliable trickle down mechanism for people to be able to connect the 'idealised' management benefits and its value in terms of people's livelihoods. Both of these scenarios have caused a lack of appreciation to management interventions, and have limited the ability of the people to act confidently with regard to management activities.

[96] Interview with MIMP officials (September 2008).

This is because, for most, if not all CBOs, the value of coastal and marine resource management is primarily gauged by its influence in enhancing or sustaining the livelihoods of the people.

The Salt making in Ndundutawa village had organised itself for income-generating objectives. This group has been introduced to salt panning, in order to reduce the destruction to mangrove trees, but until the time of our study, its organization was not ready. The reality was that traditional salt making in Rufiji District coastal villages has been a lucrative enterprise for a long time, and easily managed by individuals or family units. It is, however, labour intensive, and uses a lot of firewood; but according to the operators, fuel wood can be out-sourced. Hence producers often disassociate themselves from responsibility to the destruction of mangroves. The boiling is conducted individually, and the proceeds too. In those villages where salt is needed in abundance for preserving fish, salt has an easy market. The management aspect here is the reality that sometimes Groups do not make easy connections between livelihood demands and resource management.

### Box 13: The Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group

The Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation group Kenya in the south coast is an example of a community group that sustainably undertakes sea turtle conservation and awareness activities. The group, which was community initiated, is one of the Turtle Conservation Groups (TCGs) along the Kenyan coast whose activities are supported by Kenya Sea Turtle Conservation Committee (KESCOM).

Since its inception in 2004, the group has undertaken activities that aim at conserving turtles and enhancing community livelihood by realizing the tourism potential endowed in the area. Ecotourism activities have been realised after the acquisition of a boat that is also used to take tourists out to the reef for a fee. Its activities include identifying turtle nests and protecting them, collecting solid waste including plastic from the shoreline, and creating community awareness in marine environmental conservation. The group also keeps records of any nests found and turtles rescued, and report any incidences of sea turtle poaching to KESCOM.

The group enjoys good will and recognition from the local community members, government agencies such as KWS and Department of Fisheries, and other NGOs. The efforts of the group in turtle conservation and management are recognised wide and afar. Recently, the group was a recipient of CDTF funding that was used to: i) set up a group office, ii) establish a community resource centre where information on marine environmental conservation and in particular turtle can be accessed through different media, including audiovisual, and ii) acquired a boat to be used for patrol, rescue and ecotourism business. Through an aggressive community awareness programme, the community developed a positive attitude towards turtles and it now supports conservation efforts. The fact that it has links with other leading agencies is also a credit because such agencies can easily support the activities of the group.



***Picture 6: Livelihoods from traditional Salt making along the Rufiji Coast.***
Source: © Mwaipopo, Bashemererwa & Msuya (2007).



***Picture 7: Kikale Beekeeping groups, Rufiji, Tanzania***
Source: © Mwaipopo, Bashemererwa & Msuya (2007).

Sometimes, however, it was observed that management initiatives that are introduced are well-meaning, but their results take time and hence dampen the patience needed for people to appreciate them. The Beekeeping projects at Kikale village are an example:

The beekeeping groups of Kikale village, Rufiji District explained that they had been introduced to beekeeping, an activity that was new to them, because they were informed it was promising in enhancing livelihoods from the sale of honey and bees wax, but was also strategic for preserving trees from rampant cutting. Lacks of skills, lack of information on markets, coupled with impatience, however, were the discouraging factors. Those incentives that have had no immediate impact have also limited their ability for a sustainable impact on community's capacity to manage resources effectively.

The concerted intervention by programmes and projects on awareness raising and mobilization at community level has indeed built up people's responsibility towards management, for example behavioural changes. However, it has been difficult for people to translate the messages into usable information, particularly when it clashes with livelihood endeavours. This can affect people's willingness to change as CBO members and the wider community become enmeshed within the complexities and changes in the local livelihood systems consequent to their participation in accordance with their livelihood needs. Such situations challenge management efforts and the capabilities of local organizations in handling them.

### 3.2.6 CBOs' Ability to Mediate Local Resource Conflicts

Given the pressure on coastal and marine resources in the Western Indian Ocean and the many different interest groups competing for these resources, an important component of CBOs effectiveness lies in their capacity to mediate resource use conflicts at local level. This implies being able to hold stakeholders accountable to management demands. The users (stakeholders) in the coastal and marine environment interact in many ways, but each has different capacities and power to influence management decisions.



***Picture 8: Mangrove use in Gazi, Kenya***
(Source: Wanyonyi, 2008)

Some of the relationships between these multiple users are influenced by leadership dispositions, legal mandates, and relations to government institutions, relations between community members and the character and history of interactions over time.

What is evident is that all of the CBOs involved in the study contend that their ability to resolve resource use conflicts is a key aspect in assessing their own achievements in management activities. This is because competing uses of resources have often negatively impacted on community livelihoods, led to natural resource degradation, generated conflict and sometimes physical confrontations. Additionally they have rendered certain communities incapable of addressing management requirements. Some examples of showing capacity to mediate conflicts are given in Table 5 below.

In most of these experiences, CBOs fail to resolve the resource use conflicts because of several factors, including lack of resources such as patrol boats (BMU, Kilindoni Mafia) or because of manipulation by the government institutions responsible. Most important however, is that most CBOs fail to address resource conflict issues because of the lack of legal mandates to effectively apprehend other resource users as bestowed by NRM policy. Many of the examples given above attest to this challenge.

### Box 14: Kilwa Kivinje against Mtando fishing

For a long time, Kilwa Kivinje villagers were in conflict with the migrant Kojani fishers, an agile but supposedly uncontrollable group of fishers from Pemba. Their conflict was partly because of social relationships, the migrant fishers being accused of seducing the women of Kilwa Kivinje with presents and money. On the other hand, the migrant fishers were known to use the purse seine net (locally known as *mtando*). The *mtando* was known to be destructive to the marine environment because of its dragging style. According to Kivinje residents, much of this was learned through the radio. To add to their pain, Kivinje residents accused the District Fishers for cushioning this conflict because they provided fishing licenses to this group, albeit the knowledge that they used *mtando*. Despite their complaints to the District officials, nothing was done. In 2006 up to 2007, Kilwa Kivinje residents had been protesting physically against the Kojani fishers, until the latter were formally prohibited from fishing in Kilwa waters by the District government.

*Table 5: CBO capacity to tackle resource use conflicts in Kenya and Tanzania*

| CBO or Group | Area in the region | Nature of conflict and organization capacity to handle |
|---|---|---|
| Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group (MTMCG) | Msambweni, Kenya | Conflict with members of the Msambweni community that poach turtles. In cooperation with KWS they have managed to have occasional arrests of turtle poachers which has put them at loggerheads with some of the members of the society.<br><br>Conflict with private beach developers who have constructed buildings up to the 30m high water mark, hence occupying the turtle nesting sites. |
| Mkunguni BMU | Gazi and Msambweni | Gazi community harbouring Wapemba fishers who use destructive fishing gear while Msambweni uses traditional gear (fishing traps), therefore the latter's livelihoods are threatened. But Wapemba fishers are skilled and have strategic alliances with Gazi community. It was also alleged that foreign fishers from Gazi bribe government agents so as to legitimize their destructive practices.<br><br>The chachacha fishing net and the spear gun which are mainly used by the local youths are also perceived to be destructive. |
| BMU Kilindoni | Mafia fisheries | Establishment of prawn hatchery in Kilindoni, south of the landing bay at Kilindoni. Originally, the area was used for drying dagaa by local fishers and traders. |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Jimbo village | Mafia fisheries | Establishment of Prawn farm at Jimbo by TANPESCA, a marine products marketing company |

Sometimes, poverty, livelihood realities and social connections have limited the willingness of CBO members to act accordingly, even on matters within their own locales. This is sometimes because of the reality that "*anaekata mikoko ni mpwa, anaesimamia mazingira ni mjomba*" (lit: the one who cuts mangrove trees is a nephew which, the one who is responsible for the environment is the uncle" (FGD with Kamati ya Mazingira Ruma village, Rufiji, Tanzania).

In other occasions however, where the nature of conflicts involve a different set of players, even where the scale of resource degradation is more localised, CBOs have been able to mitigate them successfully. In these cases, management effectiveness can thus be gauged in terms of their ability to confront different stakeholders and address the rate of resource abuse as Box 14 illustrates.

## 3.3 External Factors Influencing CBO Effectiveness

The external factors that were considered key in examining the effectiveness of CBOs in this study included those structures and processes that permitted or constrained CBO activities. Here we consider: (i) the institutional layout within which decision making structures and processes in CBOs are located; and, (ii) the social and ecological dynamics and changes of which CBOs feel limited to address even within their immediate locales (e.g. shoreline erosion, sedimentation). These together influence the scale within which CBOs are able to operate and impact on NRM.

To a large extent, the wider economic, social and political context as illustrated in Section 1 is critical in framing and transforming the parameters of CBOs capacity to act with regard to coastal and marine resource use and management. The dynamism of this context emerges from many factors: through social change shaped by population growth and dynamics and poverty processes; through livelihood demands, including migration and related resource use movements leading to a multiplication of resource users in coastal environments; and through economic changes driven by neo-liberal transformation and infrastructural development and through drawing new actors who are, more powerful and versed in a reasonable management process at local level. This clearly has implications for CBOs in that by necessity they need to encompass resource management in a rapidly changing context. But as illustrated in the Section on internal capacity above, their ability to act effectively is sometimes compromised by the inadequate support systems and decision making capacities that this whole context magnifies.

Again, local politics have an implication for resource management processes because they influence the space and the capacity of a community or community-based structures to operate effectively in pursuing management goals. In this respect, what was observed was that political pluralism carries with it positive and negative features for CBOs in both countries, although the way it is manifested in each country is very different. Firstly, the political situation seems to also stymie the participation or performance of certain groups because they feel unrepresented and un-recognised. Contentions of discrimination by government of groups which associate themselves with opposition parties were made in all study sites of Tanzania, Rufiji, Mafia and Kilwa to the claim that some community groups cannot win popular support in other activities including NR management. On a more positive front, political pluralism can give people a voice and the courage to express grievances publicly. This aspect has been capitalised by groups and communities in Mafia District, although it has simply enabled them to voice discontent, but not to effect binding decisions over resource use.

In Kenya, the dynamics of political pluralism at the local level are rather different but community structures are to a large extent affected by political influences, some positively when they receive support, but often negatively. A common source of conflict within a CBO is when its leaders participate in local politics while still holding office. As a result any dissenting views led to further conflicts. Furthermore, CBOs have often been exploited for political interests; as a consequence the activities of the CBO are neglected, affected or even derailed. Political interference at times includes the local administrators such as chiefs being so closely involved in community structures activities that they endorse relatives as leaders overlooking members' choices.

### 3.3.1 The Institutional Framework and Power of CBOs

The hierarchical organisation of formal institutional structures for NR governance in both Tanzania and Kenya, partly divided in sectoral areas, outlines the mandates and provides for the decision making capacities of CBOs at community levels, as detailed in Section 2.2. What is evident from the research findings is that although efforts and mechanisms to devolve powers to local levels have contributed to the enhancement of local organizations' capacity in terms of decision-making and having an influence over natural resource management, this capacity is limited in several ways:

Firstly, overriding and overlapping mandates can deny CBOs the ultimate powers to act upon certain management decisions that they regarded as detrimental to resource conservation or their livelihoods. Overriding mandates have created difficulties to CBOs where ministries or departments with jurisdiction over resources have been reluctant to redistribute power and associated responsibilities in practice or to sanction and facilitate policy making, especially in resource control decisions. What irks CBOs is the lack of a democratic process in making decisions about resource use.

Secondly, the lack of legal authority that CBOs have to act in relation to NRM is another issue. As explained above, only BMUs (Kenya and Tanzania), CFAs (Kenya), and Kamati ya Mazingira (Tanzania) are recognised in law and are given legitimacy by government, even where other CBOs have recognised responsibilities.

Thirdly, continuous changes in policy can affect the functions of CBOs already in operation on coastal and marine resources since they tend to bring in competition between community members and tend to diminish the powers to act by certain community groups. The same has been the case between BMUs and Kamati ya Mazingira (Tanzania). Sometimes policy shifts isolate or demarcate resource management mandates into minimally defined user groups, contrary to the broader-based community approaches to resources that involved many people. This causes discouraging responses to resource management. The formation of GECOFA into a CFA in Kenya and that of BMUs in Tanzania, are cases in point. In the case of Mida area in Kenya, the formation of GECOFA usurped the activities and the mandates of Mkangagani

Conservation Group (MSG) originally with about 450 members and Arabuko Sokoke Adjacent Forest Dwellers Association (ASFADA) which were formally established to handle forest conservation activities. This is because the GECOFA was established by government policy and its mandates outlined formally.

On the other hand, CFAs that have clearly binding mandates and were used efficiently can act positively on NRM processes. For example, using the Forest Act (2005) CFAs, among other things, they may do the following: protect, conserve and manage a community forest or part thereof pursuant to an approved management agreement entered into under this Act and the provisions of the management plan for the forest; formulate and implement forest programs consistent with the traditional forest user rights of the community concerned in accordance with sustainable use criteria; assist the Kenyan Forest Service in enforcing the provisions of the Forest Act (2005) and any rules and regulations made pursuant thereto, in particular in relation to illegal harvesting of forest produce; keep the Service informed of any developments, changes and occurrences within the forest which are critical for the conservation of biodiversity; …do any other activity that is necessary for the efficient conservation and management of the forest.[97]

For the case of Tanzania, the establishment of BMUs has generated conflict with Kamati ya Mazingira within whose mandates BMUs have been planted to operate. Issues of conflict include lack of clarity between the mandates of the BMUs versus those of Kamati ya Mazingira over who has the right to oversee the management of resources, for example mangrove forest areas that are within local landing sites. Mangrove forests in many cases were the domain of Kamati ya Mazingira, and even control over the proceeds from its use. The major reason was that BMU regulations and modalities of operation were directly instituted by the Central Government, while the mandates of Kamati ya Mazingira are drawn at Village level.

Successful management interventions were, however, observed in those experiences where government structures made strategic alliances with CBOs or traditional systems of power. In these experiences, some community structures have been able to make a difference with regard to NRM as Box 15 illustrates.

One of the biggest challenges is the lack of effective consultations between stakeholders to facilitate collaborative management. Despite widespread rhetoric concerning co-management and participation, government structures in both Kenya and Tanzania tend to act against community-based NRM through only limited incorporation or indeed exclusion into management processes. There are exceptions, but these tend to arise when there is an extensive input by an external agent such as a conservation organisation. This tendency has discouraged many community groups and structures to develop, to the extent that if democratic governance and consultations are not instituted, any community level structure is doomed to be ineffective, and has sometimes generated intense conflict.

In addition to decisions being conveyed as orders, higher level authorities such as central or district governments in Tanzania may make decisions that override or ignore village governments and local people's intentions for NRM. This arises from insensitive decision making processes with regard to local needs and 'business as usual' within natural resource sectors.

### Box 15: Incorporation of traditional community leadership in NRM at Garsen, Tana Delta District, Kenya

The Provincial Administration at Garsen on the Pokomo side, works with a Council of Elders known as "Gasa". Gasa is a group of elderly men and women carefully selected by the community to make important decisions affecting the community. The Gasa system has been in place for ages among the Pokomo people and is responsible for setting user rules e.g. allowing the use of forest wood only for construction and not for commercial purposes. The Orma people also have an equivalent organ but that is not very active in conservation issues, perhaps due to the nomadic nature of the Orma people. The Pokomo Gasa carries forth guidelines over natural resource use that is still applicable to-date in the Bilisa area and the community adheres to them. Traditionally and still valid, all the resources were charged under Gasa which controls and authorizes people to use the resources and also informs the government agency in charge of the particular resource about its decision. Gasa also prohibited use of destructive fishing gears such as spear guns and encouraged traditional fish traps, and obliged people to adhere to a set of closed fishing seasons as a mechanism to conserve the fisheries. The council has authority to punish any person degrading the resource in order to deter others from doing the same. Through the Gasa, the community feels that it owns the resource, although it is the government that has total control over it by formulating NR policies.

[97] GoK, 2005[b]

It is also the case that local people often do not properly understand government instigated structures and processes, even where these processes have a CBNRM dimension. For example, in Kenya the introduction of the CFA policy was not well articulated to communities during its inception and operational stages by the Kenya Forestry Service. This has had various negative consequences. For example, at Mida Creek in Malindi, Kenya, due to misinformation, certificates of management were issued to non-community members instead of those recommended by community through the Village Forest Development and Conservation Committee (VDFCC) who approves who should form a CFA. The local community argues that the process should have involved a bottom up approach instead of the top down approach taken by KFS.

Lack of adequate consultations with grassroots organizations has led to the failure to outline management responsibilities, sometimes even where such distribution of roles could easily be done. Collaborative planning has therefore been limited and therefore central management issues on the fisheries such as enforcement and resource-use conflicts do not enjoy a joint approach.

This is also an issue confronting BMUs in Tanzania, as revealed during an interview with a principal fisheries officer conversant with Fisheries Management in Mafia.[98] Lack of consultation may be quite deliberate on the part of government authorities. For example, some community members in Mafia claimed that the Fisheries Department or the MIMP management does not want to inform Community groups about enforcement plans or patrol exercises for fear that these structures would leak information to offenders thus making patrol exercises futile, because of the inevitability of the Groups' social connections and reality as members of the village. Many meaningfully established community groups are therefore incompetent as the government prefers to enrol them simply as mechanisms that act as the 'eyes and ears' on the ground to report NR violations.

Lack of collaborative management is also reflected in the way control over resources in a locality is organised. Often, this is typically fragmented between different government agencies, creating confusion and unclear authorities for local groups. For example, in the Mida Creek area of Malindi in Kenya, there is a conflict between government agencies over resource jurisdiction and the Mida Creek Conservation Community (MCCC) and therefore the Mida Creek Conservation Group (MCCG) feels caught in between. This is compounded by the lack of mandate of MCCC over resources: mangroves being regulated by KFS and KWS, while fisheries are regulated by the Ministry of Fisheries and KWS. In practice, there is a very thin line between who is managing what and where their mandate ends. As a consequence, CBOs in the area feel sidelined in the management of resources in favour of the government initiated community initiatives such as the CFAs, whose technical and management capacity and lack of experience they contest with.

Such experience is, however, different when more collaboration between community groups and government structures is experienced as evidenced in Tana Delta District in Box 16.

### 3.3.2 Issues of Scale

Issues of scale express several complications in relation to CBO effectiveness in NRM. In our study we refer to both the temporal and spatial implications resulting from the dynamic and interacting ecological and social processes that are evident in people's lives, and the ways in which they impinge on CBOs capacities to handle management processes.

**Box 16: Collaboration in NRM at local level**

In Kipini of Tana Delta the local provincial administration office (the District Officer) is active in resolving many resource use disputes and supporting group relations and community interactions. The area being remote and cut-off from the rest of the Kenyan urban coast, government becomes an important and respected service provider in such places. KWS, KFS and the Ministry of Fisheries Development are mandated in local resource management. There is close cooperation amongst these government agencies in the area on resource governance, and community-led development and management initiatives are also well visible here. There are at least seven active village organizations and community initiatives that support local development initiatives in Kipini area, including Kipini community power project and Kipini community development project. They are not registered as organizations but are active in their own project oriented initiatives. Tana friends of Marine Environment (TAFMEN), Kipini Beach Management Unit, Tumbuguni and Kavine groups are some of the most active groups in coastal and marine natural resource management activities.

[98] Pers. comm. with Senior Fisheries officer, (14th October 2008).

Firstly, and as explained in the background, the coastal and marine environments are in flux. The users and uses of coastal and marine resources are increasing and changing in nature and magnitude at a fast rate. This has sometimes led to a faster rate of depletion and destruction of the coastal and marine environment, at a pace that local people cannot control.

At the same time, local people's uses and capacities to access coastal and marine resources are either increasing or become hampered by these other parallel processes depending on the opportunities opened up for them. Processes such as fish farming along mangrove areas, for example, are quite innovative but it has been challenging for local communities to realise, and thus handle its implications on the mangrove ecosystem.

On the level of powers and decision making that CBOs have in relation to coastal and marine resource management, it was observed that CBOs can better manage resources that are within their immediate locality, not only because of their proximity and long-term experience with that environment, but also because of their ability to, sometimes, influence behaviour change among fellow stakeholders. Otherwise, even within their immediate environment, many CBOs do not have a voice in an arena with multiple and more powerful actors. This is usually an implication of government, or line ministries which are responsible for making major decisions including the licensing of major operators who intervene in areas under the jurisdiction of community-based systems of authority. In areas where CBOs do have any legal mandate, this is more complicated.

The dynamic context to natural resource use and land utilisation in the coastal zone frames CBOs capacity to act and the parameters of their authority over a diverse array of resource users situated within and beyond local communities. Indeed, these features are not limited to CBOs because they also frame how local government mandates are carried into practice, and the relationship of different local government actors to particular CBOs. The examples above suggest that community relations can be shaped by profound differences in power and economic influence, the politics of processes of resource use access and change, and by social divisions reinforced through the movement of individuals and groups of people around livelihood demands.

The Shrimp ponds in Jimbo, owned by the Alphacrust Company, an affiliate of TANPESCA is an example of how control over the marine environment for marine resource extraction by private companies along the east African Coast, is outside the reach of community groups and can have a profound impact on natural resources and their management. Jimbo villagers are sceptical of the manner in which these ponds where established, while nearby Ndagoni village fishers claimed that their traditional rights of passage to fishing grounds had been interfered by the construction of walls surrounding the ponds. Such situations are often an outcome of how the system of government decision-making over resource-use planning and management is situated, and perceives local community rights. The inequity of these processes and the way they can undermine any authority held by community groups, or indeed village government, is



***Picture 9: Shrimp pond wall in Jimbo, Mafia***
Source: © Mwaipopo (2010)



***Picture 10: Erosion along the banks of the Rufiji river as it enters the Indian Ocean, Ruma, Rufiji Tanzania***
Source: © Mwaipopo, Bashemererwa & Msuya (2007).

further entrenched by processes of land use change in which people can be dispossessed not only from the land but also from access to the sea and related resources as has been the case with government-sanctioned tourist investments along the beaches. The research highlighted repeated examples where this is taking place on a micro-scale, with the resulting conflicts becoming entrenched. The right to legally own and control resources is indeed a major aspect in effective management.

In terms of ecological dynamics and changes, there are many complexities in ecological processes that cannot be handled simply at local level. Sedimentation and shoreline erosion as observed by communities along the Rufiji coast for example is illustrated below.

Much as Ruma community maintained a mangrove tree planting process, with several by-laws enforcing the responsibility to observe mangrove protection, erosion along the banks of the Rufiji was extending too rapidly for their comprehension. One of the residents claimed that there are certain things one can do, and others that one cannot.

# Section Four

## 4.1 CONCLUSIONS

This study was organised around two primary questions: (i) what is the relationship between CBOs and marine and coastal resource management? And, (ii) do CBOs have the ability to act as effective natural resource managers at community-level? To answer these questions we have traced how the development of natural resource management policies and practices has evolved over time and stimulated different community-based initiatives along the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania. This has contributed to a proliferation of community-based groups, with support from external agents including governments, donors (multi-lateral and bilateral), and international NGOs.

Concerted intervention for community-based practices in coastal and marine resource management has allowed for the mushrooming of a range of different types of community groups, with important differences between them. In this respect the lack of a single, commonly accepted definition of what is a CBO can be an advantage. Key among these differences is how CBOs have been formed (instigated by government, NGO/donor initiatives, or by people themselves) and whether the group has an accepted legal mandate to act in relation to NRM, as do *Kamati ya Mazingira*, Beach Management Units (BMUS) and Community Forest Associations (CFAs), but not other CBOs. There are also significant differences in terms of the size of membership; some groups command a larger membership, giving them recognition over a wider space, compared to much smaller self-help groups.

Because of these differences and the importance of comparison and contrast the Research Team took a broad view of which types of "community level structure" should be encompassed in the study. It also deliberately included Kamati ya Mazingira in Tanzania, which are an organ of village government and not autonomous groups, because they have important environmental functions in coastal villages. What was evident was that CBOs have a range of objectives – some of which relate to income-generation, while others relate to explicit NRM criteria (especially BMUs, CFAs, and Kamati ya Mazingira), and yet others have combined the two, linking NRM objectives to livelihood sustainability. What is important, however, is the ability to uphold the collective cause that inspires different CBOs to form and to link their activities to NRM objectives. This is so because even where groups are exclusively defined in terms of income generation objectives, it should not be forgotten that utilisation of the natural resource base is vividly experienced in people's daily lives, because it forms the basis of people's livelihoods.

In terms of effectiveness, CBO members widely claim a capacity to demonstrate successful resource management; for example, the ability to initiate NRM-related interventions, or to convey useful knowledge to the community about NRM, i.e. fellow residents to acknowledge the value of the process in relation to NRM. These roles include acting as pressure groups through advocacy, knowledge dissemination, linking livelihood sustainability to an incentive intended to protect resources, and the ability to negotiate around different positions in relation to NR related conflicts.

In practice , the dynamic character of the external environment (environmental, economic, political, and social) within which groups are operating, issues of scale pertaining to NRM, low human resource capacity, weak integration into government NRM structures, and relations of power and inequality leaving CBOs at a disadvantage are all factors that act against effective CBO action for effective NRM. Standing out from the field research is the low base from which CBOs are emerging: in terms of human resource development, features such as skills training, their internal organisational capacity, and also the levels of infrastructural development that surround the CBO. For this reason CBOs are typically concentrated in urban areas or

accessible villages where information and other support can be readily accessed, and where government, donors and NGOs are active. Challenges that face such community groups are, however, substantial; including lack of training, lack of management skills, and inadequate funds.

Again, the CBOs working in the coastal and marine environment of the WIO region operate in a context where community relations are shaped by profound differences in power and economic influence, the politics of processes of resource use access and change, and social divisions reinforced through the movement of individuals and groups of people around livelihood demands. Ownership of and control over some economic activities such as parts of the tourist industry and company marine resource extraction by private companies, are outside the reach of community groups and yet can have a profound impact on natural resources and their management; factors reinforced by the locale for government decision-making over resource-use planning and management, which may be far removed from local communities and indeed local government and sometimes even district government.

The inequity of these processes and the way they can undermine any authority held by community groups, or indeed village government, is further entrenched by processes of land use change in which people can be dispossessed not only from the land but also from access to the sea and related resources. The research highlighted repeated examples where this is taking place on a micro-scale, with the resulting conflicts becoming entrenched. Concerted intervention by programmes and projects on awareness raising and mobilization at community level has to some extent built up people's responsibility towards management; yet it is difficult for people to translate the messages into usable information, particularly when it clashes with livelihood endeavours or when powerful private operators have the upper-hand, with the backing of government actors. This situation can affect people's willingness to change, as CBO members and the wider community become enmeshed within the complexities and changes in the local livelihood systems since they participate as livelihood seekers in accordance to their needs. Such situations challenge management efforts and the capabilities of local organizations in handling them.

What also emerges from the detail is the way in which the institutions, governance processes, and power structures very often work against CBOs, and rarely act as effective support structures to facilitate community actions, empowerment and voice in relation to natural resource use and management at the local level. This starts with the way in which some groups are simply proxies for government to claim community involvement and local organisation. It is also reflected in the ambiguous way CBOs are treated in law and government policy and practice, including the lack of legal mandate that constrains many CBOs with respect to NRM. For those CBOs and community structures that do have a mandate, other factors are apparent which constrain effective action. These factors include: lack of clarity about their roles; weak knowledge of government policies amongst members, and lack of appropriate management planning by government to consider how issues that arise should best be tackled by a CBO. We have also seen that the role of local government, and in particular, village government, is instrumental in facilitating or constraining CBOs, and very often, this relates to personal relationships and political alliances. In addition, powerful private sector interests, political party allegiances, local power alliances, and corruption can each militate against CBOs playing a role as effective resource managers.

The presence of multiple government and donor/NGO stakeholders and powers at the local level further complicates management efficiency, even for the government bodies mandated by law to oversee NRM processes. This is because different powers become so exposed that they make different decisions about coastal and marine resource management, a situation that impinges on local communities. At its basic sense, the different tiers of local government are meant to facilitate a democratic process but certain laws come down as orders or different laws conflict with one another or create ambiguities in responsibility; this carries very basic problems for people trying to protect their own environments.

Livelihoods and livelihood dynamics generate changing lifestyles, demands and opportunities which affect management controls and the disposition of CBO members. Currently, concerted intervention by projects is having some impact on income poverty, yet as was mentioned by RUMAKI (Kilwa District, Tanzania), it does not guarantee that the poorest are reached; the latter also have an impact on resources. This is in fact an important point in relation to CBOs; it is unlikely that the poorest and most marginalised sections of coastal communities will be included in such groups, either through exclusion due to membership criteria or because the chronically poor simply do not have the capacity for additional group-based activity in addition to basic livelihood needs.

Despite such caveats, the multiple ways in which people form groups or organizations for coastal and marine resource management can also be a vibrant arena because as has been illustrated, organizations evolve and sustain themselves by taking advantage of the different opportunities to get support,

recognition and their own livelihood sustenance. However, lack of coordination of activities at village level has implication for management effectiveness, since organizations end up doing different activities whose primary objective may not be readily commensurate with conservation.

It is often assumed that if people are able to get better technology/income, then they may not be tempted to over-exploit resources, but this is by no means automatic. For example, ability to access more efficient fishing gear leads to more extraction of marine resources. Being integrated into community that is engaged in the uptake of such technology can make it difficult for some CBOs to separate themselves from community actions, as they are part and parcel of the same social milieu where these actions take place. It therefore becomes complicated to ensure that management practices are adhered to.

Lack of management skills is also a major challenge to community structures. Many do not have proper leadership organization, or ability for financial management or even advocacy, hence they lack the ability to manage the businesses they set up. As a result of these weaknesses, many such community structures are often not eligible for direct funding, as donor partners want to deal with properly established structures. For this reason they are required to work under NGOs. Community structures were also prone to internal strife, especially after receiving funds from external donors or NGOs, as families fight over control & resource ownership.

Another associated challenge is the lack of technical skills by CBOs to undertake projects they initiate whether they are income or conservation activities such as forest, fisheries, turtle management, bee keeping, plastic recycling and business management. Further still, many groups lack resource mobilization skills, more especially, they do not have technical skills in proposal writing to enable them access funds. With a combination of these challenges, such groups become ineffective.

The study has identified that group cohesion within a CBO emerges particularly from factors such as kinship, livelihood, and friendship networks, particularly where these networks are able to generate trust between group members. One issue that emerged is that the basis of membership should not be predetermined because it is not the panacea for a group to sustain itself. Here we are thinking particularly of the way some donors seek to ban kinship relations between members of a group, but kin relations may be important in sustaining a CBO, particularly when the organization is formed in relation to a common livelihood activity such as fishing, and where a system of command or hierarchy is required and where knowledge and practices are transmitted through kinship relations.

The base of well-performing CBOs is indeed dependent on a sound and committed membership relationship, but as had been observed in the case studies, their ability to survive and perform is reliant on maintaining wider networks, support and strategic links with people or institutions beyond their immediate membership. For some of the groups studied, a CBOs ability to appeal to well-connected kin was necessary and strategic for its development (e.g. Upendo Women's Group in Kilwa Masoko). It therefore suggests that the 'know-how', and the 'know-who' help determine who can survive the multiple pressures on CBOs.

It was established that to a small extent, that some organizations have been able to achieve their original objectives, thus regarded them as successful. The case study of SOFIDE and SOZOCO-MAE attest to this, as during its prime years, SOZOCOMAE, through the support of RIPS was able to publicly denounce dynamite fishing and to inform the government about it. SOZOCOMAE attributes its success to the government response in forcibly curbing dynamite fishing using the navy in the mid 1980s. Here timing of the formation of the CBOs and its advocacy in an area that at the time was of concern to government was crucial to the CBOs success.

For such successful actions to occur more widely, building knowledge and information dissemination systems for effective resource use practice is essential. Currently this is inadequate because community members can neither translate conservation messages into useable material, nor get information through a consultative process. Finding themselves sidelined, people will resort to what they can do best, which may not be in the best interests of NRM. Projects and government programmes rarely learn about what people know about the environment through local knowledge and practices. Hence information packages used to empower people with information remain generic and inadequate for people who have intimate experience of specific localities and environments. Furthermore, CBOs and community members are exposed to a limited information base. Seldom was it seen that CBOs are empowered to comprehend or at least be adequately informed about understanding their dispositions in a holistic sense. For example, how is land ownership connected to their livelihood sustainability and vulnerability? Only a few, for example, the *Kamati ya Mazingira* of Mgongeni village in Tanzania, claimed that their fight against the use of *mtando* nets by Kojani fishers was because they learned from the media that *mtando* destroyed coral reefs.

Overarching issues emerging from this study include the following: the lack of a mandate, power and authority held by many CBOs with regard to NRM related decision-making is a prime constraint upon effective NRM action. Except for those CBOS that have been established as part of government structures (BMUs, CFAs, *Kamati ya Mazingira*), lack of incorporation into planning, decision making and formal resource management systems act against CBO NRM capacity.

Where government and donor or NGO partners are seeking to encourage CBO engagement in NRM, top-down, hastily formed structures should be discouraged as they hold the danger of being exclusive, concentrating power in the hands of well-connected CBO members, and reinforcing social conflict. In order to properly development capacity at community level participatory and democratic membership processes should be encouraged so that community groups come together with common values subscribing to coastal and marine resource management. This implies promoting bottom-up processes in forming the groups. This could enhance the formation of groups that are community-needs oriented with more focused objectives for resource management.

The internal capacity challenges confronting CBOs are profound, with lack of skills in organisational management, and weak ability to connect generic environmental messages to the contexts in which individuals live and work. If government and related actors desire to incorporate CBOs into NRM, capacity constraints suggest the need for sustained capacity building over time in a fashion that is relevant and appropriate for CBO needs. This includes provision of information in a useable form for CBO members to connect it to their daily experiences; this requires information providers to reflect on the content of provision and to reconsider dissemination pathways. Initiatives that have demonstrable positive impacts on NRM are also important for illustrating how the sustainable management of resources can occur at the local level. Within these processes of capacity development it is imperative that NRM interventions from government, donors and NGOs recognise that improvement in livelihood standards is a primary incentive for community groups to form and to engage in NRM-related activities.

Externally, CBO members can be at severe disadvantage in tackling local conflict around NR use issues. This is underpinned by profound inequalities in power and financial resources that may be bolstered by the way private sector agents enter into local areas to utilise resources with the backing of government. In addition CBOs are often challenged by the scale of NRM issues that they confront, sometimes because of the lack of mandate or resulting from lack of skills, but also because they are confronted by many NRM challenges that are inappropriate for community-level management. Encouraging and facilitating collaboration and networking among community organizations operating in the same area may help them to tackle such issues, although both financial constraints and the way government planning structures operate may limit these forms of collaboration.

Generally, therefore, this study has illustrated that the effectiveness of a CBO in coastal and marine resources management can be summarized as requiring the following attributes:

- legitimacy amongst resource users and local government;
- leadership skills;
- ability to help people connect livelihood security to sustainable resource use;
- capacity to mediate conflicts between resource users;
- power and authority to enforce rules and regulations;
- linkages to coastal resources of a scale appropriate for community-level management;
- Support by state institutions, donors and NGOs, providing a context conducive to effective action;
- Co-ordination between government initiatives, donor projects, and laws with CBNRM components.

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# Appendices

## APPENDIX I – A DESCRIPTION OF CBOS INCLUDED IN THE FIELD RESEARCH

### Summary description of CBOs in Kenya

| Name | Historical background *(Reason/ location-District/ type of organization)* | Membership description *(composition; gender/ age/number/form of membership)* | Mandate *(goal and objectives/legal powers /form of registration)* | Area of specialization *(main activities)* | Management efforts *(issues/ activities/ achievements)* | Management challenges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mida Creek Conservation Community (MCCC). | • MCCC is located in Dabasso village of Watamu division of Malindi district<br>• The umbrella group was formed to foster conservation of Mida Creek mangrove and fisheries resources. | • It is a community-driven initiative formed in 1990 and whose membership is corporate with 11 active registered Self Help Groups (SHGs) | • MCCC is registered as a CBO by MOSSGD but lacks broad legal mandate to manage resources.<br>• However, MCCC enjoys good supportr from government agencies, since it is instrumental in combating illegal activities. | • Active in mangrove reforestation<br>• Also active in patrols for illegal activities | • The group has conducted re-afforestation of destroyed mangrove areas.<br>• It has also collaborated with KWS in the arrest of illegal mangrove cutters<br>• Active in community awareness activities | • It lacks legitimacy over resources, since it is a voluntary organisation where not all CBOs or community members belong.<br>• They lack capacity to manage; both financial and technical. |
| Gede Community Forest Association (GECOFA) | • GECOFA is located in Gede division of Malindi district.<br>• It was formed to foster environmental conservation. | It is a Community Forest Association (CFA) whose membership is corporate with 27 member CBOs it is therefore an umbrella CBO with about 450 individuals. represented | It draws its mandate from the new Forest Act[99] and Forest Policy .<br><br>It is bestowed power by the Act to plan an area for conservation and to be in charge of it. | • Promotion of tree planting, especially farm forestry.<br>• Promotes and seeks assistance for support towards its members for livelihoods .activities e.g. beekeeping | • They have been collaborating with KFS in forest patrols and asssist them withininformation on illegal logging. | • They lack capacity to manage; both financial and technical. |

[99] GoK, 2005[b]

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mida Creek Conservation and awareness Group (MCCAG). | • MCCAG is located in Mida village of Gede division, Malindi district.<br>• It was established in 2004 to foster environmental conservation to raise awareness and to promote ecotourism. | Its formation was assisted by an NGO in the area and has 25 individual members. | MCCAG is registered as a CBO by MOSSGD but lacks a broad legal mandate to manage resources. | • Members actively particiapte in ecotourism activities as a livelihood option.<br>• Also involved in mangrove rehabiliation<br>• Promotes and seeks assistance for support towards its members for livelihoods activities e.g. beekeeping. | • They have been collaborating with KFS in forest patrols and asssist them withinformation on illegal logging.<br>• Active in community awareness activities. | • They lack full control over management e.g. cannot arrest or sanction against offenders<br>• They lack capacity to manage; both financial and technical.<br>• They lack full control over management e.g. cannot arrest or sanction against offenders. |
| Mida Fishermen Group (MFG) However, | • MFG is located in Mida village of Gede division, Malindi district.<br>• It was started by the local fishers from the area in the 1990s as a belief that there was unity and strength in groupings. | • It was formed through a voluntary community driven initiative in 1990 and has a membership of 15 members currently after withdrawal of some initial members. | • The group was formed with objectives: i) to improve livelihood of its members ii) to harness donor funding, and iii) to have one voice in advocacy and fight against illegal gears.<br>• The group is registered by MOSSGD | • The group primarily relies on fishing as a main activity | • The group has focused mainly on advocacy especially against "harassment" of fishers by authorities e.g. KWS for fishing using types of gears | • Lack of transparency and accountability in the operations of the group has led to the withdrawal of some members<br>• The group lacks the mandate and capacity to control destructive practices |
| Mphengele Muungano | • Formed 2008 in Garsen, Dumi village. Community initiated (Organically formed)<br>• registered by MoGSSD. | • 6 married coulples (12 members).<br>• Registration fees and monthly subscription<br>• membership restricted to couples only. | • promote conservation and mangement of *mkindu* palm (*phoenix reclanatta*)used in mat making.<br>• promote livelihoods. | • mat making<br>• bee keeping<br>• tree planting<br>• farming. | • regulated the exploitation of mkindu palm by outsiders<br>• forest patrols and replanting. | • no legal backing for their activities<br>• inability to control oveharvesting of mkindu palm tree by outsiders. |

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| Kipini Beach management Unit (KBMU) | • Initiated by the government through Fisheries Act/Policy. | • open to all gender and age-groups<br>• undertake marine related activities. | • patrol shoreline<br>• provide security<br>• collect fish catch data<br>• help in social events e.g. funerals. | • environmental conservation<br>• each cleaning<br>• community sensitization and awareness creation. | • censure, control and confiscate illegal gear<br>• beach clean-ups<br>• mangrove replanting in collaboration with other partners. | • lack of capacity to control resource users<br>• resource use conflicts with neighbouring BMUs |
| Tana Friends of the Marine Environment (TAFMEN) | • Formed in 2003 in Kipini Village, Tana Delta. Initiated by KESCOM | • 29 composed of farmers, fishers, civil servants, and fortune seekers.<br>• majority are youths. | • conservation of the endangered sea | • beach cleaning<br>• sensitization on resources conservation including sea turtles. | • reporting on resource misuse to KWS and DoF<br>• mangrove replanting<br>• beach patrols. | • conflict with community over use of marine resources-sea turtles and mangroves<br>• lack of powers to arrest. |
| Muungano Women Group | • An umbrella organization, formed in 2003, an initiation of the area DO to resolve a problem.<br>• found in Kipini Village, Tana Delta district. | • Has 62 members drawn from 4 indepenednt women groups<br>• women of all ages, drawn fron the vilage and its environs. | • improve living standards of the members and the community in general,<br>• conservation and management of coastal and marine natural resources. | • operating a posho mill<br>• mangrove restoration and rehabilitation<br>• beach clean up<br>• weaving and marketing of *makuti* products<br>• marketing of sun dried fish<br>• dress making. | • mangrove replanting<br>• beach clean ups. | • members lack committment in carrying out envuirnemntal conservation activities<br>• lack of capacity in financial management. |
| Garsen Environmental Conservation Forum (GECOFO) | • Formed in 2006 initiated by KWS warden.<br>• Umbrella body composed of 20 small CBOs | • 20 small CBOs engaged in various enviornmental conservation activties | Poverty reduction through sustainable management and utilization of natural resources. | • community sensitization natural resource conservation (Nile crocodile, guinea fowl, *phoenix reclinata*) | • facilitate arrest by reporting perpetrators of resource degradation to relevant authority. | • lack legal backing to arrest offenders<br>• inability to regulate sport hunting by foreigners |

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| | • found in Garsen division, Tana delta district. | • pay a membership fee of Sh. 1000 | • agitates for equity in sharing of conservation benefits with the community. | • ecotourism, and HIV/Aids awareness creation, care and support. | | • inability to stop over harvesting of *Mkindu* palm<br>• the deliberate diversion of the course of River Tana. |
| Msambweni Turtle and Marine Conservation Group (MTMCG) | Organically formed 2004, found in Mkunguni village in Msambweni district | • has 15 male and female youths | • conserve sea turtles<br>• enhance community livelihoods by promoting the area as tourist destination<br>• to conduct beach clean ups. | • identify turtle nests and protect them<br>• Cleaning the shoreline<br>• creating awareness in environmental conservation. | • identifying and protecting turtle nests along the beach<br>• beach surveillance<br>• reporting turtle poaching<br>• beach clean ups. | • no arresting powers<br>• lack surveillance tools. |
| Mkunguni Beach Management Unit (BMU) | Formed in 2006, government-initiated through Fisheries Act/Policy, located in Mkunguni village of Msambweni district. | • 66 registered members, both male and female, above 18 yrs.<br>• all are marine resource users<br>• membership fee Ksh. 100. | • conserve the environment<br>• create awareness to the fishers<br>• ensure cleanliness at the landing sites<br>• control illegal fishing and use of poor fishing methods. | • do beach clean ups<br>• collect revenue from fishers per kg fish catch. | • vet gear of new fishers<br>• checkout for illegal fishing gears<br>• facilitate arrest by reporting any misuse or abuse of resources. | • resource use conflcit with neighbouring village<br>• lack of cooperation in upholding decisions made, e.g. some fishers<br>(youth) use illegal gear<br>• no powers to arrest. |
| Gazi Beach Management Unit | Formed in 2006, government initiated through Fisheries Act/ Policy, located in Gazi village in Msambweni district | Over 80 members, both male and female, all with interest in marine resources, from within and without the village. | • carry out environmental conservation activities<br>• carry out beach patrols<br>• control illegal fishing and use of poor fishing methods. | • collect revenue from fishers per kg fish catch<br>• collect fish catch data. | • checkout for illegal fishing gears<br>• facilitate arrest by reporting any misuse or abuse of resource<br>• together with others; undertake mangrove replanting. | • have no arrest powers<br>• allow migrant fishers perceived to use destructive gear fishers in their area<br>• resource use conflcits with their neighbours. |

## Summary description of CBOs in Tanzania

| Name | Historical background *(Reason/location-District/ type of organization)* | Membership description *(composition; gender/ age/number/form of membership)* | Mandate *(goal and objectives/ legal powers /form of registration)* | Area of specialization *(main activities)* | Management efforts *(issues/ activities/ achievements)* | Management challenges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RUFIDELTA – Rufiji Delta Development Group | Organically formed in 1999 Dar by 3 individuals whose place of domicile was Muhoro village. Wanted to address poverty-related issues through improved Agricultural extension in the village. | 23 members, mostly in Muhoro, some in Dar. | -advocacy and community mobilization<br>-depend on convincing power to be able to make a difference<br>-sometimes request VEO to be able to address community. | -agricultural extension | -environmental protection through tree planting<br>-advocacy against shifting cultivation , and therefore forest destruction<br>-demonstration farming (vegetable gardening) | -conflict with Kamati ya Mazingira<br>- resources to implement interventions |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Ruma Village | | | Has a Constitution and By-laws approved by DC. | | -coordinates environmental CBO activities | |
| Jitegemee Salt Group, Ndundutawa village, Rufiji | Initially established by members mobilising independently and later formed in 2006 as a MACEMP group. | 30 members | -community recognition because the process of establishment was through a Village Council meeting. | -Salt making. Trained to produce salt by solar panning to reduce traditional making by boiling<br>-mangrove trees preservation. | -mangrove trees preservation<br>-advocacy. | -little clout to influence behaviour<br>-poverty major hindrance to behaviour change. |
| Beekeeping Group, Ndundutawa | MACEMP formed groups in 2007. | 30 members, 21 male and 9 female. | -community recognition because the process of establishment was through a Village Council meeting. | -Bee-keeping – 20 modern hives (in 2007)<br>-mangrove planting. | -mangrove planting (self initiated). | - comprehending link between beekeeping and mangrove tree protection – too long<br>-behaviour change among community members eg forest fires, tree felling. |

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Mgongeni, Kilwa Kivinje | Established as a VG structure, a requirement for environmental management. | 10-12 male and female members of the Village Government and elected community members. | Formulation of By-laws applicable within village<br>-deals with destructive fishing and mangrove cutting measures<br>-prohibits free range grazing<br>-sanitation. | -environmental protection. | -confronting and taking to court dynamite fishers<br>-stopping *mtando* fishing in their area. | -lack of equipment esp for patrol<br>-community members manipulated by others to abuse marine environment<br>-District Govt not taking action when they address resource grabbing esp land allocation by District officials. |
| Somanga Fishers Development Group- SOFIDE, Somanga-Ndumbo, Kilwa | Organically-formed group, established in 2000 in response to cheating by middlemen in the local marine products trade. | Originally 35 members, now about 25 active. Only male members, some are related by kin. | -non legal<br>-own constitution is private<br>-convincing power to Village leadership. | -fishing<br>-protection of marine environment. | -sustainable fishing<br>-mobilizing VG to pressurize fishing regulations<br>-advocacy. | -lack legal mandate<br>-inadequate collaboration between different institutions and CBOs to protect marine environment. |
| Southern Zone Confederation for the Protection of the Marine Environment - SOZOCO-MAE | Formed 1994-96 facilitated by RIPS. | Wide membership in all villages in the coastal districts of Lindi and Mtwara regions. | -wide community approval<br>-political recognition<br>-currently used to disseminate environmental messages by NGOs (WWF, 2010). | -advocacy, esp against destructive fishing (dynamite fishing)<br>-mobilization of coastal communities<br>-awareness raising. | -advocacy and mobilization against unsustainable fishing – e.g. use of beach seine, michinji and dynamite<br>-tree planting. | -lack of mandate, and acknowledgement, especially with the formation of BMUs which are taking over roles<br>-lack of resources.<br>-lack of legal mandate.<br>-realising, through constant capacity building its role in conservation of the fisheries.<br>-no clear direction. Convinced to form group for IGA |
| Upendo Women's Group, Kilwa<br><br>Nia Njema, Kilwa Masoko | Formed organically in 2004 by female community members in Kilwa Masoko as an UPATU group called Tusaidiane. Supported orphaned and children | 30 members, All women's group.<br><br>5 members – 4 male, 1 female, part of a larger | -community recognition because they can demonstrate activities<br>-recognized by | -fish farming<br>-income generation and participation by women. | -community recognition because the process of establishment was through a Village Council meeting. | |

| | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Songambele, Kilwa Masoko | in poor homes in their neighbourhoods. | VICOBA group. | district leadership as an active women's org. | -VICOBA primarily | -policing the fisheries, mangrove area. | purposes |
| Kamati ya mazingira Jimbo village, Mafia | Established in 2007 through MACEMPmobilization. Encouraged working together in seaweed farming. | 5 members – 4 male, 1 female, part of a larger VICOBA group | -community recognition because the process of establishment was through a Village Council meeting. | -fishing. | -working as a group for income generation | -Government dictating use and management of resources |
| Kitunda Familia, Ndagoni, Mafia | Established in 2006 | | | -VICOBA | -advocacy, education, policing | -lack of mandate to confront powerful users such as Alphacrust Shrimp farming in the area |
| Mikingamo Fishers Group, Bweni village, | Established in 2007 as part of being incorporated within the MPA. One of Jimbo's hamlet, Mlali is within the MIMP | 5-members that are part of a larger 30-member group. | -community recognition because the process of establishment was through a Village Council meeting | Seaweed farming | -Conducting patrols in Mlali reserve by Kamati ya Ulinzi ya Msitu wa Mlali, | -lack of powers to interfere with damage of marine and mangrove environment affecting village to enforce |
| Kilindoni BMU, Mafia | Established in 2006 through MACEMP mobilization. Originally formed as a fishing group | Kin-related male members | -sub-committee of Social welfare Committee of VG | -training by MACEMP | - adherence to sustainable fishing, dropped mtando fishing | -behaviour change - fishers require constant reminder to adhere to sustainable fishing |
| BMU, Dongo village | Formed in 1972 for enhanced incomes through improved fishing. | 25 members, female and male. | -sanctioned by Village Council though community meeting | -trained to develop village By-laws | -advocacy. | -lack legal mandate |
| Chole Society for Women's Develoment CSWD, Mafia Village | Formed in Jan 2008. Claims to have been prompted by local fishers' agitations regarding restrictions on fishing practices. | 15 member Committee and members all villagers who have applied. | -recognized by village community, and VG | -sustainable fishing | -Patrol around fishing areas | -plan to be members of BMU committee to be more effective with regard to NRM |
| | Established in Nov, 2007 and trained by MACEMP. | | -effective largely within group members – can control or influence action of others | -recognized through Village Community meeting | -Cleaning landing sites | -making people use techniques that are destructive in other ways, eg wando – needs trees |
| | Established in 1994 and registered in 2000, so that they would receive assistance from Norway. | Female members only. Began with 70, now has 263 members. | --recognized by village community, and VG, and district officials as a sustainable org. | -sustainable fishing | - | Kuletewa sheria toka juu |
| | | | -effective largely | -transportation business. | Kuhamasisha uvuvi wa kutumia nyenzo nzuri, wando, jarife, mshipi, dema, na nayavu za usiku | -kuambiwa sheria walizounda wao hazitatumika, ingawa wamepewa mafunzo ya kutunga sheria |
| | | | | -awareness raising and enforcement of sustainable use o environmental resources. | | |
| | | | | -monitoring the sea are | -kuendeleza sheria | |

within group members.

-Community approval = appointed in Village Council

-Formed under Fisheries regulations.

-recognized by community members and internationally because of contribution to household upkeep.

bordering their village

-as outlined by BMU regulations.

-income generation

-education and learning for women and children

-tailoring project

-seaweed farming.

za mipaka ya uvivu kutoenda MIMP

-approval fishers for Fishing Licences.

-conflict resolution

-to approve fishers for licence

-Prohibit destructive fishing

-link between community and District Council.

-advocacy and training women especially.

-kuambiwa ni waharibifu wa potwe tunapovua samaki usiku

-wanasiasa kuingilia sheria na usimamizi wa rasilmali.

-lack of resources for patrol and other responsibilities

-uonevu wa local fishers by Idara ya Uvuvi

-District fisheries section does not involve BMU in inspection fishing nets.

-sustainability, finacial and organizational

-low price for mwani

-manipulation by village leaders and investors who grabbed off their beach plot with market.

# APPENDIX II: A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

## 1. CBNRM in East Africa

A focus on the role of CBOs in natural resource management emerges out of the debates around community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). CBNRM started to become popular in Africa in the 1980s. It emerged from a rejection of state and market-led approaches to natural resource management and drew on wider thinking regarding people's participation in development. State-led NRM was criticised for failure to achieve conservation objectives while being top-down and protectionist in orientation in ways that were inherently inequitable, ignoring the lives and livelihoods of people. Likewise, the privatisation of control over natural resources was also criticised as being unable to pave the way for equitable and sustainable resource use.[100]

Against this background, CBNRM developed as a means to take control of resources away from state and market, placing it in the hands of the people who are dependent on those resources. The logic of this approach rested on the premise that local people will be committed to sustainable use of natural resources if they are given control over these resources, and that they could organise collectively within social forms – e.g. communities – in which effective resource management can be achieved.[101] Typically, CBNRM discourses have stressed people's long-standing capacity for sustainable resource use, particularly when living in societies deemed to be so-called 'traditional'.[102] The flip side of this argument was the contention that preventing people from managing natural resources can lead to destruction.[103] In effect, ideas on CBNRM made visible "the fact that the fate of most of the world's biological diversity lay in the hands of the poorest people in the third world and that these people could provide solutions to conservation problems rather than being perceived solely as 'the problem'".[104]

In the 1990s, the institutionalisation of approaches to CBNRM across many different resource sectors (wildlife, rangelands, forestry, water, marine, etc.) around the world led to attempts to transform 'conservation from above' into 'conservation from below' through practical programmes that place control over resources with local people and institutions.[105] Typical misgivings levelled against the CBNRM approach, especially when taken 'wholesale', are that it can neglect community diversity, and hence blur different needs and capacities, and also be weak in terms of political clout. And again, the capacity of CBNRM to sustain the rights that people have to resources or to improve the livelihoods of local people also needs to be addressed.[106] Today, the integration of CBNRM into conservation programmes across wildlife, forestry, fisheries and marine resource sectors has become well established worldwide. This has enabled academic studies and project evaluations to examine the underlying premises and the practical successes and failures of these initiatives.[107] In the following discussion we focus on conceptual concerns within CBNRM because they are important in shaping the methodology chosen for this study.

## 1.2 Communities and Collective Action

While the value of CBNRM was to provide a critique of natural resource management systems that were state and market-led, weaknesses have been identified in underlying conceptual ideas, including the notion of community. The notion of community has long been recognised as problematic in the social sciences.[108] It has been argued that the complexity of the roots and uses of the concept mean it is hard to define or measure. Many CBNRM projects have implicitly conceived communities as being small, located within bounded spatial units, socially homogeneous, and composed of members with shared norms and values.[109] Within schematic models on NRM, these communities are typically 'nested' in relation to decision-making arrangements and institutional structures of appropriate scale.[110]

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[100] See Anderson & Grove, 1987; McNeely & Pitt, 1985
[101] IIED, 1994
[102] Bromley & Cernea, 1989
[103] Western & Wright, 1994
[104] Western & Wright, 1994
[105] Wells, 1996
[106] UNEP 2005, Goal No. 1: Eradicate Extreme Poverty. UNEP , www.unep.org/GC/GC23/MDG-poverty.asp
[107] For example Hulme & Murphree, 2001
[108] Bell & Newby, 1974
[109] Agrawal & Gibson, 1999
[110] Cleaver, 2004: 13; Edwards & Stein, 1998

Beyond this research, critiques of the notion of community (see Section 2.1.3) have brought on thinking about the role of institutions in natural resource management to the fore in order to pay greater attention to the multiple actors with multiple interests which make up communities; the processes through which these actors interrelate; and, the institutional arrangements that structure their interactions.[111] Institutional analysis has been informed by an extensive body of work on collective action in common-pool resource management, as well as critiques of collective action theories.

## 1.3 Institutions and Institutional Capacities

Studies on collective action[112] identify an influential thesis proposed in 1968 by Garrett Hardin on 'The Tragedy of the Commons'. In it he argued that individuals using a scarce common-property resource are caught in a tragedy of overusing this resource; sustainable use could only be achieved through control by the state or private ownership. Hardin's thesis sparked a body of scholarship, critical of his propositions, with empirical evidence to demonstrate that collective action is possible around common-property resources.[113]

Strength of the body of work that has emerged on collective action around common-pool resources is the importance given to institutions at the local level and the way these institutions mediate people-environment relations to avoid a tragedy of the commons.[114] This approach is taken forward in the influential work of Ostrom who considers how institutions and attributes of the environment and human culture come together to produce resource management outcomes.[115] An emphasis in this work is on the question of how to build people's capacity to transform rules in order to lead to desirable collective outcomes. This led Ostrom[116] to formulate principles that underpin successful collective action.[117] From this view a model of institutions emerges in which linear change can take place, moving from weak to robust institutional forms.

Not all social scientists would agree with the conceptualisation of rational choice that underpins theories of collective action.[118] Nor would they share this approach to analysing institutions. Scholarship that has critiqued this position on institutional analysis is various and from different disciplinary perspectives but one direction it has taken is to focus on a more socially informed analysis of institutions, which reflects the complexity, diversity and ad hoc nature of institutional formation,[119] an understanding of the context in which institutions develop[120], and issues of power in the way institutions are formed and transformed.[121]

Leach *et al*.[122] proposes a conceptual framework for analysing the role of institutions in mediating environment-society relationships. They draw on the work of Sen (1980) to develop an 'extended entitlements framework' to explore "how differently positioned social actors command environmental

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[111] Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; see also Klooster 2000; Barrett *et al*. 2005

[112] Collective action can be defined as action take by a group in pursuit of the group's perceived shared interests. Work in this area is underpinned by questions of how willing an individual is to make a voluntary contribution towards a collective good rather than to follow incentives free ride on the basis of others' contributions.

[113] For outlines of the debates see McCay & Acheson, 1987 and Ostrom, 1990

[114] Institutions are commonly defined as the social 'rules of the game' that shape people's reproductive and productive behaviour (Uphoff, 1986). Typically institutions are distinguished from organizations, which are seen as players and structures or "groups of individuals bound together by some common purpose to achieve objectives" (North, 1990: 5). These players and structures (CBOs, NGOs, banks, etc.) draw on underlying institutions to give themselves meaning.

[115] Ostrom, 1990; See also Bromley *et al*., 1992; McCay & Acheson, 1987

[116] Ostrom, 1990

[117] A version of this approach has been applied to work on Beach Management Units in Kenya and Madagascar by Cinner *et al* (2008).

[118] For an overview of the literature see Stein, 1999). As Stein outlines "rational choice theory is based on the conception of rationality employed in economics. The rationality principle is based on the notion that human actors attribute different utility to different actions and goods and is accompanied by the principle that actors choose the action that maximises their utility" (Stein, 1999: 9 citing Coleman, 1994). This theory has been criticised, firstly, because it is normative in approach, assuming that rational choices are the correct choices to make; secondly, because human behaviour is placed in a framework of calculated rationality rather than the idea that people make choices on the basis of incomplete information; and, thirdly, because the rational individual is isolated from his socio-cultural context (ibid: 13).

[119] Cleaver, 2004

[120] Mosse, 1997

[121] Peters, 2001

[122] Leach *et al*., 1990

goods and services that are instrumental to their well-being" (ibid: 225). This framework enables the authors to explore how environmental change and people's access to and control over resources are socially differentiated. This enables researchers to analyse how different social actors transform parts of the environment, permitting a socially disaggregated and ecologically dynamic view. It also highlights how it is not enough to focus on community organisations, but instead a broader view is needed that reflects the institutional milieu within which resources are used, managed and contested.[123]

Although theoretically very different, the work of both Ostrom and Leach *et al* identifies institutions according to their 'formal' or 'informal' nature.[124] Cleaver[125] critiques this dichotomy, putting forward the concept of 'institutional bricolage' in which "the process of institutional formation through the practice of 'bricolage' is less purposeful, more partial, ad hoc and historically embedded than that suggested by the concept of crafting".[126] Such a view overturns simplistic assumptions about lineal institutional change, which informs descriptions of 'formal' and 'informal', 'traditional and modern', or 'robust' and 'weak' institutions. As Cleaver argues, "local resource management arrangements are a complex blend of formal and informal, traditional and modern. The evolution of collective decision-making institutions may not be the process of conscious selection mechanisms…but rather a messier process of piecing together shaped by individuals acting within the bounds of institutional constraints".[127] At a more practical level, if institutions are categorised according to whether they are formal or not, those that are not sanctioned by government (e.g. through legal mechanism) may be disregarded by projects, even though these institutions may be important in shaping actions, norms and co-operation amongst local people.[128] Sometimes a form of a bricolage is developed. For example, aiming to facilitate management through local participation, the HASHI (Hifadhi Ardhi Shinyanga) project in Shinyanga, for example, led by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism, gave considerable attention to local institutions in the regulation of resources.[129] Through the revival of local management systems – the Dagashida, and support for different local groups HASHI had been able to facilitate considerable local participation. However, such institutionalizing of local participation, common to government and donor/NGOs, has been questioned if such initiatives simply end up creating "organizations in [their] own image and by doing so circumscribe these social and political institutions' ability to act independently".[130]

The understanding of institutions used in this research is that they are regularised patterns of behaviour embedded in social relations. These patterns of behaviour draw on underlying sets of rules and are shaped by relationships between people situated within specific contexts. They are closely linked to people's everyday lives and practices, and as such they are dynamic, being maintained and transformed through people's 'investment' in them.[131] We are sympathetic to the view that institutions can be *ad hoc* in nature, with people engaged in a different institutional arrangements at any one time, rather than being distinguishable through simple dichotomies such as 'formal' and 'informal'.[132] Relations of power, political processes, and the different meanings institutions carry for different actors are also important.[133]

For our research, this perspective raises the questions: how are institutions manifest at the local level? And, how do individuals and community groups interact with these institutions around NRM issues? How are institutions for natural resource management transformed within dynamic economic, social, political and ecological contexts and what does this imply for community-level NRM?

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[123] Mosse, 1997
[124] Ostrom 1990; Leach *et al*., 1999
[125] Cleaver, 1999, 2002
[126] Cleaver, 1999: 12
[127] Cleaver, 2004: 17
[128] Fowler, 1997: 21
[129] URL http://projects.wri.org/adaptation-database/tanzania-hifadhi-ardhi-shinyanga-hashi-project. Date accessed: 21 June 2009
[130] Arnesen, 1997:24
[131] Berry, 1989
[132] Cleaver, 1999, 2004
[133] Peters, 1994; Leach *et al*., 1999

## 1.4 Multiple Use Resources and Property Rights Issues

Management considerations for coastal and marine environments need to be situated in the light of governance structures that encompass multiple resources and user groups. Typically, this environment is perceived to have the status as a 'common-pool resource' with no clear boundaries and containing resource units (seaweed, fish, trees, etc.) that are exclusive and finite.[134] Thus, one user can subtract from another users benefit of the resources system, and the exclusion of individuals and groups involves high transaction costs.

Because coastal areas are dynamic environments and do not have clear boundaries, due also to the nature of the marine environment, there is unlikely to be physical delineation of property rights, contributing to the perception that areas are 'open access' and making it difficult to exclude people from the resource base. This is particularly the case where management regimes and capacity to enforce regulations are weak.

Despite parts of the marine and coastal environment being perceived as 'open access', there will be forms of property rights attached. These property rights are central to the management of natural resources "conveying authority and shaping the incentives for management".[135] In coastal areas of the WIO, property regimes are complex, particularly where open access, public, common and private rights overlap and are claimed and/or contested by multiple users.[136] Historically, coastal resources were governed by open access and common property regimes, but colonial and post-colonial governments have created protected areas (e.g. forest reserves and marine parks) under public ownership, and resources such as land, oil and gas have increasingly been taken into private ownership. Private ownership rights are also attached to particular coastal resources, such as seaweed farms or hotel beaches. These property rights, and the property regimes within which they are located, are part of different management systems. For convenience of analysis these systems can be divided into three levels of decision-making arrangement: the constitutional level, referring to the legislative framework that surrounds the resource; typically this is a national level framework in East Africa although it may also be supra-national. Secondly, the 'meso level', where decision-making arrangements exist that determine the level of interaction amongst management authorities and user groups; and thirdly, the 'operational level' with decision-making arrangements which provide people with day-to-day rules governing use.

## 1.5 Civil Society Development

Work on CBNRM and on the potential role CBOs can play in NRM tend to draw on specialist literature on conservation and collective action, which ignores a body of thinking on civil society development. Understanding civil society's place in the changing development and environmental context that shapes the way CBOs operate can help us understand why people would - and would not - invest their time, energy and resources in the formation of community groupings for NRM. It also casts a different light on thinking about the formation of CBOs and questions of effectiveness. Civil society in East Africa, as commonly understood elsewhere in the world, denotes all non-governmental/voluntary institutions serving citizens and providing vehicles for citizens to associate and express their citizenship. Civil society is larger than the non-profit sector, and also larger than the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) sector as defined by law in any of the three East African countries, encompassing some which are registered and others which are not.[137]

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[134] Steins, 1999: 3 drawing on Ostrom, 1990

[135] Menzen-Dick & Knox, 1999: 11. A property right is "the capacity to call upon the collective to stand behind one's claim to a benefit stream" (Bromley, 1991: 15). Property rights develop as social institutions that enforce people's claims to a flow of social benefits. A property regime is "the decision-making arrangements that define the condition of access to, allocation of, and control over a range of benefits arising from a resource" (Steins, 1999: 209).

[136] Open access = no use rights attached to a specific group; Public = state ownership; common = a group of users/ community; private = individual or company ownership.

[137] Odembo, 2009

Civil society activities in these countries as discussed below can be traced back to the colonial era, driven largely by welfare or service-oriented demands, crop marketing, political engagement, credit associations and faith-based organizations, some run by indigenous populations or supported by foreigners. After independence, civil society organizations in the east African countries mushroomed in the later years, particularly as a reaction against state inefficiencies and growing poverty but also by nationally-led demands for a more democratic and transparent running of national affairs. This was buttressed by the 1990s international agenda of democracy and good governance that sought to build civil society. From an environmental angle, influential international events, such as the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 and the Rio Summit in 1992, both of which emphasised the linkages between environment and sustainable development, fed into further support for conservation NGOs. Thus substantial resources were channelled to the NGO sector in both the developmental and environmental spheres. The engagement of civil society in natural resource conservation grew rapidly as a result of these global processes. By the end of the decade, however, the ability of civil society organisations to live up to their status as a panacea for development or for environmental conservation was increasingly questioned.[138] Several developments have occurred of late, and the region is experiencing a range of successes and challenges in NRM. In the following section we briefly discuss the experiences of civil society in Kenya and Tanzania.

### *1.5.1 Civil Society in Kenya*

During the colonial period most NGOs had charitable objectives, many being religious and combining evangelism with educational and social welfare activities.[139] Others included ethnic welfare associations formed to pursue sub-national interests with the colonial government.[140] Post-World War 2 there was the formation of indigenous non-profit organisations, leading to a rise in self-help groups that aimed to foster the welfare of people affected by a decline in social services following the war. From 1948 the British colonial government attempted to organise self-help activities more systematically through the formation of the Department of Community Development.[141] These activities by the indigenous people consisted of self-help groups, funeral committees, age groups, and farming and herding groups. These organizations were entirely owned and managed by the Africans and were aimed at promoting indigenous people's welfare. The colonial administration was therefore in charge of events in the country that might have affected the non-profit sector. The colonial government's policies coupled with the struggle for independence would be a determinant of the type of non-profit organisation emerging in the colony following the war and prior to independence.

During the colonial period in Kenya, freedom of association was not entertained and the two main types of civic organizations operating were: religious/philanthropic associations and the so-called people's organizations.[142] According to Kameri-Mbote numerous social groupings were formed in the 1940s and consisted largely of women groups. These were the precursors of the present day Maendeleo Ya Wanawake Organizations (MYWOs), during this era there were four main categories of NGOs (i) the local charitable organizations, the Christian initiatives such as the Young Men Christian Associations (YMCA) and the Young Women Christian Associations (YWCA).The YWCA was operational by 1930; (ii) the indigenous ethnic welfare associations. These were mainly involved in self-help activities most of which were confined to urban areas; (iii) the secular service providing NGOs especially after the World War II. Among these organizations were the war veterans' associations and the Kenya Farmers Association (KFA); and, (iv) occupational associations and professional bodies also existed. The post-independence state using inherited colonial practices, did not tax, monitor, or control these organizations. NGOs, in turn, neither bothered much with nor criticized the state. Their various welfare operations occurred in both urban and rural locations. For the centralizing state these NGOs were generally neither a threat nor a problem.

During the struggle for independence and immediate post-independence (1960's-1980's), African civil society was in general strong, well organized and diverse and played a crucial role in achieving these victories and often provided models and infrastructure for social provision. Unfortunately, with little exception civil society activity and mobilization had declined since 1990's as the unifying focus of liberation from colonial rule ceased to exist.

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[138] Mercer, 1999; Adams & Hulme, 2001
[139] Kayinga, 1995
[140] Copestake, 1993
[141] Copestake citing Tiffen, 1992: 16
[142] Kameri-Mbote, 2000

The struggle for independence also meant that the colonial government would develop stringent and controlling policies on the activities of civil society groups. Many groups operated "underground". In the post-independence period civil society development flourished, encouraged by the state within a market-oriented environment, to a tightening of control by government from the 1980s. Emerging from colonialism, the young state was left with many development problems, which could not be matched by its scarce resources. In the early 1960s, Kenya was ravaged by floods and famine and social welfare became a principal focus for civil society organisations. It is partly for this reason that NGOs and the voluntary sector, with the encouragement of the state, took on largely a development role during the greater period of the Kenyatta era (1964-1978). In the first two decades of independence relations between the state and voluntary organisations were generally cordial. Reasons for this include the fact that in the 1960s and 1970s the state's main concern was to meet citizens' expectations and fulfil the promises made at independence.

During the Kenyatta era, Kenya developed both an NGO sector and a network of active community–based organizations. It was in this era that the self-help harambee spirit was born. Securely in power, Kenyatta was willing to allow a degree of freedom in the country and even welcomed it as long as his position was not challenged. This led many communities to develop projects, using their own money and labour, as a way of staking a claim to government assistance.[143] Although enthusiasm for the harambee movement has declined in the face of bureaucratisation and politicisation, for a long period it played a central role in community development.[144] The NGO sector in Kenya in this period was relatively uncritical of the development administration and governance situation at the time and stressed development rather than democracy. The 1960s and 1970s represented a unique phase in Kenya's history like many other African states emerging from colonialism, it had to grapple with contradictions of development generated by the colonial state. The burning development questions revolved around political equality, social justice, freedom from want and the provision of equal economic opportunities as addressed in Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965.[145] The Kenya National Council for Social Services (KNCSS) was formed in 1964 as a quasi-governmental institution under the Ministry of Culture and Social Services. The main activities of KNCSS were to coordinate NGO activities and advice the government.

The government actively encouraged self-help efforts in the generation of development. Self-help in Kenya has strong roots in African traditions and has therefore important potential for development. This marked the important beginning in the role of "Harambee" (self-help) in Kenya development process.[146] It became part of the voluntary sector in Kenya. Civil society and in particular the NGO sector, has undergone fundamental changes in post-colonial Kenya. As in the period of colonialism, the state has played a central role in defining the direction of the voluntary sector. The voluntary nature of self-help, many NGOs, both formal and community-based organizations were rapidly expanding their activities and numbers in the country. The Green Belt Movement, a grassroots non-governmental organization based in Nairobi, was established by Professor Wangari Maathai in 1977 under the auspices of the Maendeleo Ya Wanawake (National Council of Women of Kenya). It took a holistic approach to development by focusing on environmental conservation, community development and capacity building. The development role of NGOs and of the voluntary sector as a whole could be attributed to the deliberate attempt by the Kenyatta regime of encouraging them to act as supplements to his government in the development process. However, more important is that his regime made no deliberate consistent effort to emasculate NGOs and civil society.

With the death of Kenyatta in 1978, the situation changed, his successor, former vice president Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi, was less secure in his position and consequently more repressive, banning political parties in 1982 whereas Kenyatta had been content to co-opt the opposition.

It was at this time that an ideology emerged, which constrained civil society autonomy due to the development of political patronage.[147] The state was not able to provide basic services in ways that had been promised, and patronage networks became the main channels for the disbursement of development funds, linked to control of local politics. This was further entrenched when the effects of the 1980 and 1984 droughts were manifest and state service delivery was put in the spotlight. Unsurprisingly, civil society organisations reacted against these processes, generating tensions and poor relations with government.

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[143] Copestake, 1993
[144] Kayinga, 1995
[145] Matanga,2000
[146] Kanyinga, 1995
[147] Kayinga, 1995

Matanga argued that the absence of formal political organizations that could confront the state in the period between 1982 and 1991 left civil society as the only credible alternative.[148] Even after a multi-party system was re-established in late 1991, the emergent opposition parties were riddled with schisms along ethnic and personal ambitions for power. This rendered them completely weak and therefore incapable of challenging the Moi regime. This ensured a continued role for civil society in oppositional politics. However, during this regime, many NGOs and civil society movements had taken on an added role of political activism and advocacy. It can be argued that the excessive authoritarianism and personalization of power by the Moi regime partly explains the engagement of these organizations in oppositional politics and overall political advocacy. It is also significant to acknowledge the role played by international community in empowering civil society, through increased funding, to confront the Kenyan state on matters of political space.

By 1986, it was still apparent that NGOs' work in development was tremendous and yet uncoordinated. It was acknowledged that co-ordination had not been effectively done by the KNCSS. In the same year, the Ministry of Culture and Social Services therefore attempted to legislate NGOs' activities in the country by presenting another paper to the cabinet on the need for Co-ordination of NGOs in the country. The process did not take off as a Presidential Directive overtook it in 1989 directing government officers to start the process of co-ordination of NGOs under the office of the President.[149]

The major constraints at that time were related to the lack of clear national framework for appreciating NGOs' role in development; institutional capacity weakness; poor co-operation and networking; tensions between NGOs and government; and geographical mal-distribution. Kameri-Mbote, in her research on the operational environment and constraints for NGOs in Kenya gave three reasons that triggered the current law governing NGOS, first, there were newspaper reports of unscrupulous NGOS, reportedly engaging in practices of importation of luxurious vehicles for resale and others.[150] This state of affairs was perceived as telling evidence that the co-ordination of NGOs under the umbrella of the KNCSS had failed. Second, the government was concerned that the donor community especially in the implementation of civil rights interventions was focusing greater attention on NGOs. For instance, the United States of America seemed to be sending signals that most African governments were corrupt and by 1992 had adopted a policy of working more closely with NGOs. In this regard, some NGOs were perceived as potential threats to the government's sovereignty. The channelling of donor funds through the NGOs rather than through the government was seen as opening way for sharp practice as well as bringing the government into disrepute. Thirdly, there was need for Kenya to fulfil some of her international obligations. Chapter 27 of Agenda 21 creates an example of such legal obligations. This provision requires that governments of states parties take concrete measures to facilitate NGO coordination.

The KNCSS apparently failed to meet the expectations of the government and NGO sector. It was subsequently disbanded in 1990 and its activities taken over by the NGO Coordination Board established under the NGO Act 1990 which in essence was the NGO Government arm, whose main function was to monitor the registration and activities of NGOs in the country. In its brochure, the Board details its functions as thus: to register, co-ordinate and facilitate the work of all national and international NGOs operating in Kenya; to maintain a register of national and international NGOs operating in Kenya, with their precise sectors, affiliations and locations of their activities; to receive and discuss, analyse and evaluate the annual reports of NGOs; to advise the Government on the activities of NGOs and on their role in development within Kenya; to conduct regular review of the register, and to determine its consistency with reports submitted by the NGOs and the council of NGOs to provide policy guidelines for NGOs, for harmonizing their activities with the National Development plan for the country so that NGOs avoid activities which contradict national programmes; to receive, discuss and approve the code of conduct prepared by the council for the self-regulation of NGOs and their activities. Prior to the NGO Act there was no specific institutional and legislative framework to govern the NGO sector. The result is that NGOs were registered under various laws such as the Companies Act, the Societies Act, the Trustees Act and the Ministry of Culture and Social Services.

[148] Matanga, 2000
[149] Kameri-Mbote, 2000
[150] Ibid.

The office of the NGO Board was placed under the department of Provincial Administration and Internal Security in the Office of the President, lending credence to the view that the state looked upon NGOs with suspicion and mistrusted them. There was immediate reaction by NGOs towards the NGO Coordination legislation which now became the focal point of NGO-state relations as NGOs collectively fought government control. According to Copestake, the Act was a formalised mechanism for controlling NGOs.[151] NGOs reacted by organizing themselves into a lobby in order to seek major amendments to the Act. The confrontation was among the most prominent challenges mounted by civil society organizations against the single-party state in Kenya.

Matanga argues that the increased involvement of mostly urban NGOs in the criticism of the Moi regime for its democratic abuses and their fervent agitation for political liberation, did contribute to the 1990 legislation against the NGOs. For instance, in 1988, a number of NGOs, mainly the churches, had openly opposed the implementation of the new electoral system of queue-voting and thus directly challenged the authority of the regime. Another incident in the 1989, the Green belt Movement sought a court injunction to stop the ruling party KANU,[152] from building a sixty–storey building at Uhuru Park. In 1991 again it launched a similar protest that saved Jeevanjee Gardens from the fate of being turned into a multi-story parking lot. In 1998, it led a crusade against the illegal allocation of parts of the 2,000 acre Karura Forest, a vital water catchment area in the outskirts of Nairobi. The struggle was finally won in 2003 when leaders of the newly elected NARC government affirmed to the forest by planting trees in the area.

It is a case that elaborates the state-society tension and offers important lessons for the theory of civil society's role in democratization. This incident provides sound support for the civil society-democratization thesis: it shows civil society actors opposing the repressive state and pursuing actions that have important bearings on political reform in Kenya. Moreover, it reveals civil society actors that are politically conscious and have taken advantage of opportunities and resources within the broader democratization movement. The eventual success of the NGO challenge itself had important implications for the political reform movement: it allowed NGOs to operate freely and independently from state interference thus increasing the freedom of actors in civil society; and it allowed some NGOs (for example, the Green Belt Movement) to pursue more forthright political actions with a reduced risk of being outlawed.[153]

In the absence of opposition parties, civil society, and in particular religious organizations, started playing a leading role in the game of change. NGOs and civil society became very much involved in the politics of change in Kenya following the 1992 General Elections. In the absence of united and agenda-driven formal opposition, the NGOs were set to play the role of confronting the state in search of meaningful constitutional and overall political change.

In the late 1960s the Kenyan state had decentralized development planning through the introduction of District Development Committees and Provincial Planning Officers. This was further taken forward in 1983 following the development of a decentralisation strategy focused on the District Focus for Rural Development. This established local development institutions/committees at all levels from the district to the sub-location as channels of popular participation. However, administrative officers and departmental heads assumed prominent roles in the running of the committees. This led to the concentration of decision-making powers in the hands of government officials.[154]

Decentralization and devolution have important implications for governance, especially in the realm of the environment and natural resources management. Some ministries and departments with jurisdiction over valuable resources have been reluctant to redistribute associated responsibilities, authority, power, or to sanction and facilitate policy making especially in resource control decisions. The 1983-1993 National Development Plan recognized the efforts of NGOs in development activities hence strengthened their efforts through the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD),[155] noting that NGOs in collaboration with the District Development Committee (DDC) groups and local authorities would enhance the process of local participation in development projects. However, the 1997-2001 Development Plan relegates the role of NGOs to arid and semi-arid areas, development of fishing, infrastructure, development of technology and culture only, meaning that the prominence that was given to NGOs in the context of DFRD in the earlier plan has been set aside.

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[151] Copestake, 1993.
[152] KANU (Kenya African National Union) was the ruling party in Kenya from 1963 to 2002
[153] Ndegwa, 1996
[154] Kanyinga, 1995
[155] DFRD,

The government of Kenya has for a long time relied on sectoral policies in Ministries of Agriculture, Lands and Settlement, Finance and Planning, Health, Tourism etc to foster environmental conservation. The sectoral laws and policies tend to overlap or duplicate others. The Environmental Management and Coordination Act[156] was established with the aim of coordinating all the 77th statutes in different Ministerial Acts touching on the legal issues of the environment. EMCA contains policies based on the basic principles of global conventions. Like UNCED of 1992, it focused on the need for inter-national environmental plans and registrations to enforce sustainable environmental policies in all economic sectors. The six principles outlined in EMCA largely concur with some indigenous cultural and socio-religious ideals of sustainable conservation of the environment and also on the issue of involvement of all people (individual or through their civil society organization) in managing natural resources. In view of this, participation of civil society organizations in Provincial and District Environment Committees (PECs and DECs) could be considered on principle No.1, 2, 4, and 6. PECs and DECs through their networks with divisional and locational environment and development committees should find a way of working with representatives of different society organizations.

There is a wide recognition that NGOs have a significant role to play in assisting the rural poor in breaking out of their condition of poverty. Major source of strength of NGOs comes from their insistence on the empowerment of the poor as the key to the transformation of their livelihoods. There is need for mobilization of local communities and representatives of civil society in all matters of participatory planning and implementation of sustainable socio-economic programmes at grassroots level.

At this time the registration and co-ordination of NGOs was scattered across different government departments; however, the state tried to integrate NGO activities (and the harambee movement) into the DFRD through positions on District Development Committees and subordinate committees. This was widely held to be an attempt to control NGOs, with District Development Committees having to approve NGO activities; but it also opened up new opportunities for political influence and interference. However, the extent to which NGOs are integrated into the DFRD is debatable because the District Development Committees lack legal authority to enforce compliance. Also, as voluntary purveyors of resources to an area, it is relatively easy for NGOs to secure local political support for their activities, and to protect their autonomy of action at this level.

Although the 1980s were a period when the number, activities and resources of NGOs in Kenya grew exponentially with support from international donors, it was marked by a hardening of government attitudes towards civil society. It was also a time when regional disparities between civil society organisations became more marked, linked as they were to political patronage. These disparities and associated social differentiation continued to grow as the political elite accumulated wealth via the state and by means of diverting public resources to their areas.

Substantial change to civil society took place through the 1990s however, due to Kenya's transition from an autocratic regime to a pluralist one, opening the way for greater civil society voice. Current state-NGO relations in Kenya reflect competition for legitimacy. The political culture pervasive in the public sphere also permeates civil society, it is argued, reducing its effectiveness as an agent of social change.[157] Civil society is also vulnerable to the external sphere as the fortunes of civil society organisations, including NGOs and CBOs, are intimately tied to aid that is provided by international donors.[158]

### *1.5.2 Civil Society in Tanzania*

The current proliferation of CBOs in Tanzania links to past development trends in the country. Under colonial rule forms of association and social movements emerged and flowered.[159] These included religious movements (Christianity and Islam), ethnic associations for mutual welfare in urban areas, occupational associations, cooperatives, and trade unions. Community organizing around production and marketing of cash crops led to the establishment of powerful cooperative societies organized on a locality or 'tribal' basis such as the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union (KNCU) formed in 1933, and the Bahaya (Cooperative Union that came to be called the Bukoba Cooperative Union (BUCOP). These cooperatives were not only strong players in the crop market in favour of their members; the cooperatives were also channels through which local development activities such as education could be practised. Associations organized as trade unions such as the Tanganyika Sisal Plantation Workers Union (1958) came to mark the initial civic engagement practices against colonial rule and later the government.

[156] EMCA, 2000
[157] Ngunyi, 2000
[158] Owiti, 2000
[159] Kiondo, 1994

After Independence in 1961, the state sought to control civil society groups, replacing them with party-led organisations given the mandate (and monopoly) to organise people. This was necessary to quell by 'incorporating' any dissent into the mainstream. Some religious organisations retained a degree of independence, although many were also aligned with the state.[160] Certain types of grassroots groups, such as women's savings associations (upato) were apparently left largely untouched,[161] since they did not threaten the state as organized collective action. Regionally-based Cooperative Unions also became smothered into state appendages with the introduction of the Cooperatives Act of 1982 (Act No. 14), and further thwarting of community action came with the abolishion of Local Government authorities in 1972, and their re-introduction in 1984 without the resources to practise their declared autonomy, which also served to diminish local initiatives to engage in and pursue self-directed development agenda.[162]

With the Ujamaa period (post 1967), the state positioned itself as the vehicle for interaction between the people and their leaders, seeking hegemony over Tanzanian civil society.[163] Participation only became possible through the state apparatus. At a practical level, however, lack of resources and weak popular support made these party organisations unable to function effectively and participation was low.[164] In this political environment, community participation was often reduced to top-down information campaigns and mobilisation of individual labour inputs.[165] In effect, the subsequent state-directed development and monopoly in the provision of public goods and services created a serious dependency syndrome on civil society, and even traditional self-help active groups became dormant.

Under a strong, repressive state, which emphasised the importance of social as well as economic development, people embraced the idea that social services were free and development engineered from the top.[166] This reflected how to a large extent, access to funding for service provision depended less on local resource mobilisation and leadership and more on national level initiatives.[167] Donor intervention, even by apparently independent thinking NGOs, contributed to this process, as Jennings outlines in the case of how Oxfam aligned itself with the state development ideology and objectives and worked closely with government during the Ujamaa period.[168]

The political space for civil society to organise itself only opened up again following processes of economic liberalisation and structural adjustment after 1986 and moves towards multi-party democracy in the 1990s. This is seen as significant in explaining the current character of civil society organisations, including CBOs.[169] In the 1980s high unemployment and economic difficulty had stimulated the need for self-help by grassroots groups and local organisations.[170] Within the same period, liberal economic reforms ended state monopoly in dictating development, pre-empted by serious economic crises, the strength of market forces both internally and externally and international donor pressure.[171] From this period, there was a proliferation of private service providers that indicated a reorganization of activities in response to market demands and the principles of a liberalized economy, and the severity of the cost of living compelled many people to seek for some sort of organizing to survive.[172] The same way that umachinga became prominent, so were informal credit-facilities and self-help groups strengthened. The introduction of multi-partyism in 1992 opened the door to civic groups and organizations (both registered and unregistered) taking advantage of exposure and the relative freedom to associate with interest-based objectives.[173] Growth of civil society organisations was also given significant impetus by international donor decisions to fund civil society organisations as opposed to state institutions, as explained above.

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[160] Mercer, 1999
[161] Lange, 2000
[162] URT, Local Govt Authorities Act, No. 1972, Local Government Act 1983
[163] Kelsall, 2001
[164] Lange *et al*., 2000
[165] Andreasen, 2001: 263
[166] Lange *et al*: 2000: 25
[167] Therkildsen & Semboja, 1995: 22
[168] Jennings, 2001
[169] Kelsall, 2001: 139
[170] For urban areas see Tripp, 1992
[171] Mushi, 2001; Ndumbaro & Yahya-Othman, 2007
[172] Ndumbaro & Yahya-Othman, 2007
[173] Kiondo, 2004; Mushi, 2001:7

In the 1990s the number of NGOs and CBOs in Tanzania grew exponentially.[174] This was boosted by the growing tendency of international NGOs such as Action Aid and Save the Children, to operate indirectly through local civil society organisations.[175] Many organisations started up as people became aware of funding opportunities and donors fulfilled their requirements for local participation in order to implement a project.[176] In understanding this growth of NGOs, it is not only the case that stimulation was due to support from outside but also in the face of diminishing state resources, elites found a new avenue for accumulation in the NGO sector.[177] At the same time in the period 2000 to 2008, the development of Civil Society in Tanzania illustrated a wider and more focused approach to civic engagement. This period witnessed the establishment of advocacy-cum-pressure groups such as the Land Rights Organisation, HAKIARDHI, media groups in environment and other issues, rejuvenated industrial activity, for example, Chama cha Waalimu Tanzania. At the grassroots level, more service-oriented groupings developed, both state facilitated or private/individually initiated, many of these in the health or education sector, women's or youth groups.

The 2002 Tanzania Assistance Strategy estimated that there were 8,000 NGOs in existence,[178] but it is generally acknowledged that the size of the NGO sector is severely underestimated.[179] Lack of information is even greater in the case of CBOs and other grassroots organisations, many of which are unregistered and effectively invisible to government officials. However, they probably have the highest collective membership base.[180] Massive growth in the number of NGOs and their influence in development and civic engagement stimulated formulation of the NGO policy launched in 2001 and NGO Act of 2002, as the culmination of a consultation process started in 1996. Before this they could register under six different acts[181] and the registration process was complex.

The NGO Act (2002) defines a non-governmental organisation as:

> "a voluntary grouping of individuals or organisations which is autonomous, non-partisan, non profit making which is organised locally at the grassroots, national or international levels for the purpose of enhancing or promoting economic, environmental, social or cultural development or protecting environment, lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest of a group of individuals or organization, and includes a Non-Governmental Organization, established under the auspices of any religious organization or faith propagating Organization, trade union, sports club, political party, or community based organisation; but does not include a trade union, a social club or a sports club, a political party, a religious organization or a community-based organization".[182]

This definition forms a basis for classification of civil society organisations (CSOs) in Tanzania. The Tanzanian government's Directory of NGOs divides CSOs according to sectoral interest and focus: 'economic services, religious organisations, social services, professional/educational, environment, international, women, health, youth, and umbrella'.[183] Other typologies are also used: Lange *et al*.,[184] for example, distinguish between (i) organisations active in service delivery; and (ii) interest organisations. How these organisations are classified in the constitution of civil society organisations or what is placed under the banner of 'Non-Governmental Organisations' is an amalgamation of many types of groups, with different interests, objectives, ways of operating and constituencies. Given its speedy development and the challenges to contain ambiguously defined organizations, the NGO Act (2002) also serves the desire for regulation and control of the sector.

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[174] Kiondo, 1995; Andreasen, 2001
[175] REDET, n.d
[176] For a case from Zanzibar see Andreasen (2001) and Burra (2004)
[177] Kiondo, 1995
[178] TAS, 2002 cited in REDET, n.d.: 24
[179] REDET, n.d
[180] Lange, 2000
[181] As a society under Chapter 337 of the Societies Ordinance of the Laws of Tanzania (Act No 11), 1954; as a trusteeship under Chapter 375 of the provisions of the Trustees Incorporation Ordinance, 1956; as a company limited by guarantee (without share capital) under Chapter 212 of the Companies Ordinance, 1954; as a sports club under the National Sports Council of Tanzania Act, No 6, 1971; as a cooperative society under the Cooperative Act, 1976; or as a range development under the Range Development and Management Act No 51, 1964 (REDET, n.d.).
[182] URT, 2002: 4
[183] NIGP, 1994
[184] Lange *et al*., 2000

In terms of geographical concentration, it has been argued that NGOs are concentrated in particular areas of the country, particularly places where missionary activity was strong in colonial times, and places that are wealthier today, including Dar es Salaam, Kilimanjaro, Arusha, Dodoma, Mwanza, Iringa, Mbeya and Morogoro.[185] It is also suggested[186] that there are substantial differences in the type of NGOs found in urban and rural areas. Urban elite-centred organisations often focused on advocacy on behalf of the poor on particular issues such as human rights and the environment. NGOs in rural areas, on the other hand, tend to be service-oriented. Unsurprisingly given the character of the resource base, it is in rural areas that many NGOs are oriented towards natural resource management.

Responses to the NGO policy have been mixed: at the time of formulation there was a widespread concern amongst the NGO community that its principal purpose was for state regulation and control over NGO activities; increasingly, however, there has been acknowledgement that regulation is necessary and serves an important purpose in controlling the actions of bogus NGOs.

Despite massive growth in the number of NGOs and CBOs in Tanzania, they are widely characterised as weak in terms of capacity and ability to operate effectively, as well as sustainability in the long term.[187] Ambiguity in government support and limited country-based financing[188] both contribute to organisations' inability to operate effectively.

A number of important observations can be made about NGOs in Tanzania: firstly, the issue of embezzlement is a major one both in fact and in people's perception and helps to explain why local financial support for NGOs is minimal.[189] Secondly, a complex pattern of inequalities is perpetuated by the way the NGO sector has grown up, with "those in positions of power who have access to knowledge and information about NGOs and international donor preferences are gaining the most from the NGO boom, a pattern that is likely to exaggerate existing inequalities at different scales".[190] Thirdly, if one asks who is benefiting, the interests of the poorest may not be adequately represented, as it is the better off amongst the poorest who benefit.[191]

Fourthly, although some NGOs play a regular part in policy discussions, a consensus about the view of NGOs in national development is yet to develop.[192] On the one hand, government seeks to co-op the NGO sector into service provision and to direct the sector; on the other hand, NGOs are talked about as if they are independent, emerging in response to citizen concerns.[193] These positions do not necessarily sit well together. Fifthly, there are difficulties in the NGO-donor relationship, as donors place increasing emphasis on the need for effective resource use but at the same time do not put funding into the development of the organisational infrastructure. Sixthly, donors insist on accountability but this may be lacking in the donor-NGO relationship.[194] Finally, as Lange *et al* argue, it is practically impossible to draw any general conclusions concerning the role of the NGO sector in Tanzania, as it varies immensely between rural and urban areas, from region to region and even between districts within one region.[195]

The more recent and ongoing Local Government Reforms from 1994 offer the most promising environment for CBOs and community-based activities in rural Tanzania. The Local Government Reform Programme that was implemented from 2000 is empowering District and Village governments to operate as effective tools of management with informed accountability and responsibility. This includes training how to draft and en-force by-laws operational within their jurisdictions.[196] Although in practice the Natural Resources Management Policies, the Fisheries Policy and Regulations and District administrations do not effectively

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[185] REDET, n.d.
[186] Mercer, 1999; Lange, *et al*., 2000; REDET, n.d.
[187] REDET, n.d.; Burra, 2004; REPOA, 2007
[188] REDET n.d: 29 cites a ROMME Centre report, which indicates that Tanzanian NGOs receive almost 68% of funding from foreign sources with the amount increasing.
[189] Kelsall, 2001
[190] Mercer, 1999: 250
[191] Mercer, ibid
[192] REDET, date non-documented in publication.
[193] Mercer, 1999; REDET, n.d
[194] REDET, n.d
[195] Lange, *et al*., 2000
[196] URT, Local Government Act No. 6 (1999)

allow for real democratic accountability at grassroots level, new ideas and empowerment for Community-based activities is developing in the country. This is increasingly reflected in policy, to mention a few. For example, the National Land Policy 1995 and the subsequent Village Land Act No. 5 of 1999 provides for the right to own land by communities, maintaining that such rights can be protected by registering, titling and the right to sell land.[197] The Forest Act (2002) and Forest Policy (2008) also provide for communities to establish village forest reserves and encourage the Participatory Forest Management approach (PFM) that has created community responsibilities to management where their livelihoods are also protected. However, and as experience has illustrated, the state still maintains the prerogative to make ultimate decisions over resource ownership, and hence management decisions. Within the marine environment, this has allowed the state to benefit more from the revenues gained from natural resources than the people - such as in tourism or marine product processing investments.[198]

[197] URT, 1995, 1999
[198] Bryceson *et al*., 2006

# APPENDIX III: RECORD OF INTERVIEWS AND CONSULTATIONS

## Tanzania

| Respondent/group | Organization/Place | Date |
|---|---|---|
| RUFIDELTA – Rufiji Delta Development Group | Muhoro, Rufiji | 5/09/2007 & 8/09/2007 |
| Kamati ya Mazingira | Ruma Village, Rufiji | 6/09/2007 |
| Ndundutawa Salt Group | Ndundutawa | 8/09/2007 |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Mgongeni | Kilwa Kivinje, Kilwa | 17/08/2008 |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Magengeni | Kilwa Masoko | 17/08/2008 |
| Upendo | Somanga Ndumbo, Kilwa | 15/08/2008 |
| SOFIDE | Somanga Ndumbo, Kilwa | 16/08/2008 |
| SOZOCO-MAE | | 16/08/2008 |
| Nia Njema | | 18/08/2008 |
| Songambele | | 18/08/2008 |
| Kamati ya Mazingira, Jimbo village | Mafia | 31/08/2008 |
| Jibondo VG reps | Mafia | 03/09/2008 |
| BMU, Kilindoni | Mafia | 03/09/2008 |
| BMU, Dongo | Mafia | 02/09/2008 |
| Ndagoni village reps | Mafia | 02/09/2008 |
| Kitunda Familia, Ndagoni village | Mafia | 01/09/2008 |
| Chole Society for Women's Development, CSWD | Mafia | 03/09/2008 |
| | MACEMP Coordinator, Rufiji | -/09/2007 |
| | MACEMP Coordinator, Kilwa | -/08/2008 |
| | RUMAKI Official, Kilwa | -/08/2008 |
| Mr Ali Mtauna | VEO, Somanga Ndumbo, Kilwa | -/08/2008 |
| Charity Sichona | Community dev officer, Mafia | 02/9/2008 |
| Hamoud Abdullah | RUMAKI, Coordinator, Mafia | 01/9/2008 |
| Paul Kugopya | DNRO, Mafia | 02/9/2008 |
| Waziri Mkumbwa | DFsO, Mafia | 02/9/2008 |
| Village Rep | Ndagoni village | 01/9/2008 |
| Village executive Officer | Kiegeani, Mafia | 03/9/2008 |
| Ernest Tito | Cooperative Officer, Mafia | |
| Mr Melele | Ag Chief warden, MIMP, Mafia | 03/9/2008 |
| | MACEMP, Coordinator, Mafia | 04/9/2008 |
| Dr Laurean Ndumbaro | Head, Dept of Political Science | -/10/2007 |
| Mr Katemba | Cooperatives dept | -/10/2007 |

## Kenya

| Respondent/group | Organization/Place | Date |
|---|---|---|
| MTMCG members | MTMCG Msambweni | 10/08/2007 |
| MTMCG Executive Committee | MTMCG Msambweni | 10/08/2007 |
| Chief | Mkunguni | 11/08/2007 |
| Beach Management unit | Mkunguni | 11/08/2007 |
| Fisheries Officer | Msambweni | 11/08/2007 |
| Beach Management Unit | Gazi | 12/08/2007 |
| Gazi Women Group | Gazi | 13/08/2007 |
| Village Chairman | Gazi | 13/08/2007 |
| Dishon Murage-Marine Program Coordinator | EAWLS | 08/07/2008 |
| Nancy-Project Officer | PACT | 08/07/2008 |
| Mr. Tuda Arthur-Senior Warden | KWS, Mombasa | 08/07/2008 |
| Nina Mwambiji-Research Scientist | KMFRI, Mombasa | 09/07/2008 |
| Stanley Baya-Project Coordinator | A Rocha Kenya | 14/07/2008 |
| Mr Maurice Otieno-Provincial Director of Environment | NEMA Coast Province | 16/07/2008 |
| Mr.Benson Wemali-Chairman<br>Mike Chabari-Welfare Officer | Civil Society Organisatin and Collaboration Network, NEMA Mombasa | 16/07/2008 |
| Mr.C.M Kibocha-District Social Services Development Officer<br>Miss Elca Wabusya-Project Officer | Social Services Department of Municipal Council of Mombasa (MCM) | 16/07/2008 |
| Dr.Hadley Becha-Deputy Director & Head of Conservation Programmes | MoGCCD-Mombasa | 17/07/2008 |
| Samuel Arak, Acting District Fisheries Officer | Forest Action Network (FAN) | 19/07/2008 |
| Maimuna Abdalla,Community Social Services Officer | EAWLS | 19/07/2008 |
| Omar Ahmed, Assistant Chief | Fisheries Department - Kipini | 08/08/2008 |
| Beach Management unit | MoGSSS-Kipini | 08/08/2008 |
| Tana Friends of Marine Environment (TAFMEN) | Kipini | 08/08/2008 |
| Bilisa Integrated Relief Organization (BIRO) | Kipini | 08/08/2008 |
| Mphengele Muungano Group | Kipini | 09/08/2008 |
| Chief | Garsen-Lower Tana Delta | 17/08/2008 |
| Village headmen | Garsen-Lower Tana Delta | 18/08/2008 |
| GECOFO | Dumi-Lower Tana Delta | 18/08/2008 |
| MCCG | Garsen-Lower Tana Delta | 18/08/2008 |
| Mida Fishers Group | Garsen-Lower Tana Delta | 19/08/2008 |
| Chief | Gede-Watamu | 19/08/2008 |
| GECOFA | Gede-Watamu | 20-23/08/2008 |
| Mkangagani Conservation Group | Gede-Watamu | 20-23/08/2008 |
| District Social Services Officer | Gede-Watamu | 24/08/2008 |
| Provincial Director | Gede-Watamu | 24/08/2008 |
| Pascal Magiri-Warden-Senior Park Warden | Msambweni | 13/06/2009 |
| Mwinyi Kingi-District Social Development Officer | MoGSSD-Mombasa | 15/06/2009 |
| District Social Services Officer | KWS - Watamu | 17/06/2009 |
| Divisional Social Services Officer | MoGSSD-Malindi | 18/06/2009 |
| Chief | MoGSSD- Lower Tana Delta | 20/06/2009 |
| | MoGSSD- Garsen-Lower Tana Delta. | 20/06/2009 |
| | Garsen-Lower Tana Delta | 21/06/2009 |




The Executive Secretary
Western Indian Ocean Marine
Science Association (WIOMSA)
Mizingani Street,
House No. 13644/10
P. O. Box 3298, Zanzibar,
United Republic of Tanzania
Phone: +255 24 2233472
Fax: +255 24 2233852
E-mail: secretary@wiomsa.org
Web: www.wiomsa.org