Self-reliance and Self-sufficiency: nationalist reaction to globalist imposition*

by
Issa G. Shivji
Mwalimu Nyerere Professor of Pan-African Studies
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
issashivji@gmail.com

Introduction

This paper makes an attempt to compare and contrast Julius Nyerere's philosophy and doctrine of Self-reliance and King Bhumibol's philosophy of Sufficiency Economy. Tanzania and Thailand are undoubtedly very different countries and societies. Yet, inserted as they are, in the global system of world capitalism, (or globalisation as it is fashionably called these days), there are remarkable similarities. The thesis of this paper is indeed that both were, at different periods and in different socio-economic contexts, reactions to globalist imposition of neo-liberal policies. The paper does not aim to give any elaborate introduction or analysis of self-reliance or sufficiency economy. Its aim is simply to raise some issues for discussion. In section one and two, I give a very skeleton background to Nyerere's philosophy of self-reliance and the way it was translated into policy. I do not do the same for the concept of sufficiency economy on the assumption that the participants of this conference (except me perhaps!) are familiar with it.

In the last section, the paper draws out some comparisons and also raises a question on the validity of these philosophies, in particular their political practice, as providing a possible alternative framework to globalist capitalism.

---

* Paper for the International Conference on 'The Meaning of Sufficiency Economy: Theory and Practice in Society, Economy and Business', to take place on 16-17, February 2012, Bangkok, on the occasion of King Bhumibol's 84th birthday.

I am grateful to Natasha Shivji for her assistance with research for this paper.

Background to Self-reliance

Julius Nyerere belonged to the Bandung generation of African Asian nationalists. The post-world war independence movement in Africa and Asia was born in the womb of the so-called Cold War and the intense rivalry between the two ideological and military blocs, that is, NATO and Warsaw Pact. While in Europe it was a "cold" war - a war of words, so to speak - it was not so in the third world which was embroiled in hot wars from Korea to South Africa.

Following Ghana's independence in 1957 under Kwame Nkrumah, within a few years, many African countries, which were colonised by the erstwhile European powers, became independent. Tanganyika under Julius Nyerere was one of them. It got its independence from Britain in 1961. The first generation African nationalists were nurtured in the cradle of Pan-African ideology. On its independence, Ghana's Nkrumah declared that his country's independence was incomplete without the independence of the remaining African colonies. Accra became the home of All Africa People's Conferences to help, plan and assist liberation movements. Liberation, therefore, was the first and foremost pre-occupation of African nationalists among whom Nyerere was leading and unwavering. Some of the leading African nationalists went further. Acutely aware that the independent African states on their own were fragile and would not be able to withstand the designs of the former colonial powers and rising American imperialism, they fervently argued for African unity, whose genesis lies in the ideology of Pan-Africanism. On African liberation, African leaders had greater consensus than on unity. One continental-government passionately advocated by Kwame Nkrumah had little support. The newly independent states did not want to lose their newly acquired sovereignty, however fragile and dependent, but also, political leaders did not want to forego their privileges and the prospect of accumulation that the newly acquired state positions offered. Reflecting on the situation then, on the 40th independence anniversary of Ghana in 1997, Nyerere summed it up thus:

> Nkrumah was opposed to balkanisation as much as he was opposed to colonialism in Africa. To him and to a number of us, the two -

> balkanisation and colonialism - were twins. Genuine liberation of Africa had to attack both twins. A struggle against colonialism must go hand in hand with a struggle against the balkanisation of Africa.
>
> Kwame Nkrumah was the great crusader of African unity. He wanted the Accra Summit of 1965 to establish a union government for the whole of independent Africa. But we failed. .... The major reason was linked to the first: already too many of us had a vested interest in keeping Africa divided.
>
> ...
>
> Once you multiply national anthems, national flags and national passports, seats of the United Nations, and individuals entitled to a 21-gun salute, not to speak of a host of ministers, prime ministers and envoys, you would have a whole army of powerful people with vested interests in keeping Africa balkanised. That was what Nkrumah encountered in 1965.
>
> After the failure to establish the union government at the Accra Summit, I heard one head of state express with relief that he was happy to be returning home to his country still head of state**. (**Nyerere 1997**)**

African unity would per force mean anti-imperialist unity because there were external interests too with vested interest in the balkanization of Africa. Indeed, one of the preoccupations of the post-independence African leaders was political survival against the machinations of colonial and imperial powers. Between January 1956 and the end of 1985 there were sixty successful coups in Africa, that is, an average of two every year (Hutchful 1991, 183). Nkrumah himself was overthrown by a CIA engineered coup in 1966. If Nyerere survived until he voluntary retired in 1985, it was through making compromises.

Having failed to achieve immediate unity of African states, as Nkrumah wanted, his fellow pan-Africanists, including Nyerere, settled to develop their own countries. Nyerere argued that his country, like many other African countries, faced the twin task of building the nation from motley of ethnic groups and to develop economically to satisfy the 'great expectations' that independence had aroused. In absence of a developed bourgeoisie, both these tasks fell on the state. But the state itself was a colonial state inherited from colonialism. It was essentially a despotic state structured to control and facilitate exploitation of material and human

resources in the interest of metropolitan powers. Economic development meant restructuring the colonial, vertically integrated economy into a nationally integrated economy responding to the logic of internal accumulation. Nation building entailed a national ideology and vision, which would unite the ethnically and regionally fragmented population. Both these tasks required concomitant politics and therefore a *transformed* state. For many an African countries it was the failure to transform the state, institutionally, politically and socially, that proved to be the Achilles' heel. Tanzania, under Nyerere, tried but did not quite succeed.

In the first few years of independence, like many other African countries, Tanzania followed the World Bank devised path of development - concentration and expansion of production of raw materials for export (sisal, cotton, coffee etc) to earn foreign exchange; import substitution industrialization, creation of facilitative legal and fiscal environment to attract foreign investment, modernization of agriculture by creating model farmers and hoping that their example would trickle down, etc. By 1966, it was becoming clear that none of these was succeeding but meanwhile, the new political elite was settling in the saddles of the former colonial master. This ran against Nyerere's nationalist grain. Through his party, he spearheaded a change of direction in 1967, which was embodied in the document called the Arusha Declaration. The Arusha Declaration was a policy statement on Socialism and Self-reliance.

Philosophical and political basis of self-reliance

The pragmatic genesis of the doctrine of self-reliance is self-evident. It was the failure of the earlier policies that were heavily based on donor dependence and foreign investment. The philosophical and political basis derived from Nyerere's own vision on the future of his country. Nyerere's philosophy rested on two pillars: *equality* and *freedom.* Let me discuss each one of these in turn.

Equality: The concept of 'equality' in Nyerere's philosophy is different from the notion of bourgeois equality. Bourgeois equality refers to equality of all individuals. In practical terms it is translated into *legal* equality or *equality of rights*. That is to

say all individuals are equal and possess equal rights. In Nyerere's philosophy all human beings, as opposed to individual beings, are equal (not born equal or have equal opportunities). Thus Nyererist notion is embedded more in human collectivity rather than the abstracted individual of bourgeois individualism.

Secondly, the Nyerere equality goes beyond legal equality by drawing in the notions of equity and justice. And since the notion is premised on the human being as a social being, Nyerere's equality would per force import the notion of *social* justice as opposed to legal justice only. Therefore, philosophically, whereas bourgeois equality is compatible, and in fact premised on, class inequality of capitalist society, Nyerere equality would logically have to import the notion of classless society. It is not surprising therefore that, at least philosophically, Nyerere was an advocate of socialism and classless society. Explicitly, Nyerere argued that his variant of socialism, or *Ujamaa*, was derived from traditional African society (Nyerere 1968: Introduction). In his own words,

> The word 'ujamaa' was chosen for special reasons. First, it is an African word and thus emphasizes the African-ness of the policies we intend to follow. Second, its literal meaning is 'family-hood', so that it brings to the mind of our people the idea of mutual involvement in the family as we know it.
>
> By the use of the word 'ujamaa', therefore, we state that for us socialism involves building on the foundation of our past, and building also to our own design. We are not importing a foreign ideology into Tanzania and trying to smother our distinct social patterns with it. (Ibid., 2)

Nyerere was astute enough to concede that 'Socialism is international; its ideas and beliefs relate to man in society, not just to Tanzanian man in Tanzania, or African man in Africa.' (ibid.). But he emphasized that the international character of socialism did not mean and ought not to mean that all societies aspiring to build socialism would and should follow and must fit into one single pattern.

Logically, Nyerere's philosophical doctrine is plausible but historically it is flawed. This was pointed out by his young critiques based at the University of Dar es Salaam in the debates of the '60s and '70s. First, historical evidence showed that traditional

African societies were not socially undifferentiated. They had social statuses, hierarchies and even class differentiation. Secondly, the Tanzanian society in which Nyerere aspired to build socialism was integrated in the world capitalist system. It would therefore have to confront imperialist-capitalist vested interests. Thirdly, within the Tanzanian society itself, vested capitalist interests (however budding) had been created which would oppose building of socialism. Fourthly, that the state that Nyerere headed was essentially a colonial state structured by the colonial power and geared to protect vested interests. The state therefore could not possibly be the agency to spearhead socialist construction. Finally, socialism could not be built without class struggle which Nyererist doctrine refused to recognise (Cliffe & Saul 1972, Shivji 1976, Othman 1980 , Mwansasu & Pratt 1979 , Coulson 1982).

What the young failed to appreciate then was that Nyerere was not simply a philosopher. He was also a 'king', in the sense that he was a political leader at the head of the state. In his philosophical doctrine, therefore, he is actually asserting his political positions. First, Nyerere was a fervent nationalist/pan-Africanist. His assertion of African-ness is illustrative of that position. Second, in the climate of super-power rivalry, by asserting the uniqueness of ujamaa, Nyerere is distancing his politics and state from cold-war blocs. In diplomatic terms this is what was translated into his foreign policy of non-alignment on the one hand, and strong support of African unity, on the other. Third, as a head of state, Nyerere could not possibly subscribe to the theories of class struggle, which would translate into opposing vested political interests based in the state.

Yet, in political practice, Nyerere had to make compromises with dominant powers to survive. It is also important to note that Nyerere's ujamaa was a variant of social democracy compatible with the overall system of capitalism, albeit with a welfarist face.

***

Freedom: The second central premise of Nyerere's philosophy is 'freedom'. The first three volumes of the collection of his speeches are titled: *Freedom and Unity* (1966),

Freedom and Socialism (1968) and *Freedom and Development* (1973).* Nyererist concept of 'freedom' operates at three levels, freedom from external domination, freedom from oppression, and individual freedom. While he subscribed to individual freedoms or human rights he argued that they could not override collective right of the people to be free because only in a free society human dignity could be realized. In his words, 'We have to work towards a position where each person realizes that his rights in society - above the basic needs of every human being - must come second to the over-riding need of human dignity for all; ...' (Nyerere 1966: 17).

As a fervent nationalist and independence leader the first political meaning of freedom was, needless to say, independence from colonialism. On this he did not compromise. Because no society can be free if it is ruled by an outside power. Nyerere was a great supporter of African liberation. He supported African liberation movements materially, militarily where necessary and also politically. Dar es Salaam was the headquarters of OAU's (Organisation of African unity, the predecessor of the African Union - AU) liberation committee. He also supported morally and politically freedom movements and struggle against oppression on other continents whether it was Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia under in the Soviet bloc or Cuba or Vietnam under in the US sphere. The underlying bedrock of this sense of freedom is the right of people's to self-determination which was the basis of independence movement in the formerly colonised countries and also the basis of the various United Nations declarations. In effect, it meant the right of a people to make their own decisions. For many African leaders, the right of self-determination was completed once a country got its formal independence in the sense of recovering state sovereignty. Not so for Nyerere. Like Kwame Nkrumah (see his *Neo-colonialism* 1965), he argued that the threat of being dominated by foreign powers continued and in fact operated in many African countries even after regaining state sovereignty to the extent that

* The second set of three volumes was produced after his death by the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation called: *Freedom and Libration* (2011), *Freedom and A New World Economic Order* (2011) and *Freedom and Non-Alignment* (2011)

African governments were not free to make their own decisions. Only two years after independence Nyerere warned of the second scramble for Africa.

> The question is still being asked 'Who is going to control Africa?' Those who are asking it do not expect the answer to be 'The Africans'. The events in the Congo have demonstrated that it is possible for a colonial power to leave by the front door, and the same or different external forces to come in by the back. For let us make no mistake; as we are emerging successfully from the first 'Scramble for Africa', so we are entering a new phase, the phase of the Second Scramble for Africa, and, I believe, for Asia.
>
> As I have said elsewhere, this second Scramble will be conducted in a different manner from the first, but its purpose will be the same - to get control of our continent. This time we will not be subject to military invasions from countries outside our continent; foreign powers have no intention of fighting each other in this second Scramble. They will incite African to fight African, Asian to fight Asian, but always in their interests. The imperialists, old and new, will exploit the differences within African nations and between African nations, within Asian nations and between Asian nations. (Nyerere 1963, 1966: 205)

Nyerere sought to translate his ujamaa philosophy into a policy document on socialism and self-reliance. The doctrine of self-reliance followed from his philosophy on equality and freedom. A country/people cannot be free and freely make its own decisions if does not rely on itself, relying on its own material and human resources to develop in freedom. In many ways, therefore, self-reliance proclaimed by the Arusha Declaration was a political summing-up of the ideology of ujamaa based on equality and freedom. The Declaration argued that the Government had placed too much emphasis on money to develop when it was poor. And if the country got money for development from foreign nations and investors, it would compromise its independence and freedom to choose its own policies. The Declaration asked rhetorically:

> How can we depend upon foreign governments and companies for the major part of our development without giving to those governments and countries a great part of our freedom to act as we please? The truth is that we cannot. (Nyerere 1967, 1968: 241)

Some of the concrete measures taken to operationalise the policy of socialism and self-reliance were:

- *Nationalization of the major means of production*. Thus large plantations like sisal, banks and insurance companies, some import-substitution industries, mining firms and wholesale trade came under state ownership to be controlled by statutory corporations called parastatals. By later 1980s there were over 400 parastatals which in turn spawned a big bureaucracy.

- *Villagisation programme.* This entailed a massive resettlement of peasants and small producers in clustered villages.

- *Creation of state crop authorities.* The function of these bodies was to buy and market peasant crops. They had a monopoly of buying the produce which enabled them to pay very low prices to peasants thus retaining a surplus to support a huge parastatal bureaucracy.

- *Leadership code.* Certain conditions were imposed on all political, party and parastatal leaders to bar them from using their positions to accumulate private wealth. Thus a political leader was barred from taking shares or directorships in private companies, from owning property for rental purpose, and from getting two or more salaries.

Towards the end of the 70s the policies of the Arusha Declaration began to run into problems for reasons that we need not go into here. The last term of President Nyerere was a difficult economic and political period in the country and its economy plunged into crisis, which happened in many African countries. It was under such conditions that erstwhile international financial institutions having adopted the so-called 'Washington consensus' imposed its free market polices and conditionalities. Following Nyerere's voluntary retirement from presidency, the successor governments adopted neo-liberal polices and gradually abandoned the Arusha Declaration including the policy self-reliance and the leadership code.

Neo-liberalism and its discontents

Nyerere's prophetic words on the Second Scramble became dramatically truer in the neo-liberal phase. Fifty years of post-colonial Africa can be neatly divided in two phases, the nationalist, 1960-1985, and the neo-liberal, 1986-2005. In spite of the continued struggles for liberation and the concerted efforts of imperialism to dominate and exploit the continent, imperialism was on the defensive during the nationalist phase. It is during the neo-liberal phase that imperialism sought to rehabilitate itself morally. Nyerere stepped down in 1985 after putting up some fight against IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). Within a period of some 25 years, Africa went through three generation of SAPs with the conditionalities of Reganomics free market being imposed by world institutions. The neo-liberal policies of cutting subsidies, control of prices of staple food products and cost-sharing policies in the social services had devastating effects on education, health, water, electricity sectors. Life expectancy went down while infant mortality went up. The component of social wage that was in-built in subsidized public services was cut off. Peasants were left to the vagaries of private merchants. Unemployment rose with de-industrialization. Private foreign investment went into the mining and natural resources sector. The manufacturing sector shrank while the financial and mining sector became the fastest growing sectors in the economy. Yet the mining sector which earns the country about 40 per cent of its foreign exchange contributes only 3 percent to the GDP while employing 0.01 per cent of the labour force. The GDP growth rates have hovered around 6-7 per cent over the last 10 years but poverty has increased by over 4 million people between 2001 and 2007.

The privatisation of the public sector became the bee-hive of corruption with politicians using state positions to wreak unheard of rents. A new class of rentiers, real estate and financial speculators, and 'ten percent' contract signers emerged. In short, while the economy grew the people were impoverished. Over the last five years, as the world capitalist system has plunged into a systemic crisis, the Tanzanian economy and polity finds itself slipping into a deep crisis of massive discontent and hopelessness of the populace, increasingly expressing itself in loss of

political legitimacy and trust in the institutions of the state. As the neo-liberal polices of the last 20 years are in deep crisis, there is a resurgence of interest in the polices of the Arusha Declaration, in particular, the doctrine of self-reliance. While I cannot go into details about this new wave of interest in Nyererist philosophy and politics, let me end this section with a quote from what he said in an answer to the question on his thought on the Arusha Declaration. This was in 1999, just a few months before he passed away.

> I still travel around with it. I read it over and over to see what I would change. Maybe I would improve on the Kiswahili that was used but the Declaration is still valid: I would not change a thing. Tanzania had been independent for a short time before we began to see a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots in our country. A privileged group was emerging from the political leaders and bureaucrats who had been poor under colonial rule but were now beginning to use their positions in the Party and the Government to enrich themselves. This kind of development would alienate the leadership from the people. So we articulated a new national objective: we stressed that development is about all our people and not just a small and privileged minority. The Arusha Declaration was what made Tanzania distinctly Tanzania. We stated what we stood for, we laid down a code of conduct for our leaders and we made an effort to achieve our goals...I still think that in the end Tanzania will return to the values and basic principles of the Arusha Declaration.

Summing up: philosophies of Self-reliance and Sufficiency Economy

As I read the discourse in Thailand on the King's philosophy of Sufficiency Economy (SE), I was struck by the similarity it bears with Nyerere's philosophy of Self-Reliance (SR). Yet, philosophically and politically, they begin from different points of departure. In this conclusion, I attempt to draw a few comparisons, albeit somewhat hesitatingly, since my knowledge of the *political and economic practice* of the King's philosophy is rather perfunctory.

Firstly, the philosophical basis of SE is Buddhism which is also its spiritual inspiration. It emphasizes austere life style at individual, family and community level. SR, on the other hand, draws its inspiration from the community life of African tradition. Interestingly, though not surprisingly, both concede that these philosophies have to take account of modern technological and scientific developments and economic structures based on them. Understandably, the proponents of the philosophy do not say it explicitly, but scholars have variously shown that the so-called African traditions (and I would venture to add even Buddhism and localism in Thailand) are re-constructed ideologies. This is true of all ancient ideologies. Modern proponents therefore use the traditional cultural resource more for inspiration rather than practice it. The past can obviously not be re-enacted. The reference to the past is much more to deploy cultural resources to garner political legitimacy for the proponent's doctrine. The doctrine itself arises from real-life issues facing the present. And this brings me to my second point.

Secondly, both societies with its own specific peculiarities are inserted in the overall context of imperialist-capitalist domination of the world whose centre resides in the North, in particular in Europe and the US. In that context, in my view, both SR and SE are a kind of nationalist reaction/response to globalist neo-liberalism propagated and imposed by the West. In neither case, however, the basic assumptions of the global capitalist system are challenged and that has been the main Left critique of both, as far as I can ascertain.

SE was first expounded by the King in 1974 but was not quite taken up at intellectual and political level until after the financial crash of 1997 (Chalapati 2008, Hewison 1999). Thai economy experienced a real boom in the period 1987-1997. This boom was based on export-led growth on the one hand, and massive foreign investment, on the other. Many of the policies followed were typically free-market, neo-liberalist. Admittedly, the structure of the economy changed spectacularly between 1960 to 1997 with agriculture declining and manufacturing rising. Agriculture contributed 40 per cent of GDP in 1960 and employed 80 per cent of the population. By 1997 employment in agriculture had declined to 48 per cent while

manufacturing contributed 35 per cent to GDP. By mid-1990s, manufactured exports accounted for some 80 per cent of total exports while it was only 1 per cent in 1960 (Hewison 1999: 6).

The equivalent period in Tanzania was 1995-2005 when the country fully adopted neo-liberal policies. The annual growth rate of GDP was around 5-7 per cent. Agriculture, which contributed half of the GDP in the 70s and 80s and more than half of export earnings, fell to about 26 per cent and 14 per cent respectively. The neo-liberal growth of the Tanzanian economy was also export-led but with one major difference. It was based on the growth of the exploitation of mineral resources unlike Thailand which was based on the export of manufactured goods. Thus export of minerals contributes more than one-third of Tanzania's export earnings but employs less than half of one percent of the labour force while agriculture which contributes only around 14 per cent of exports employs over 75 per cent of the labour force. And yet the mining sector, although registering the fastest growth rate, contributes less then 3 per cent of the GDP. The mining sector is based and propelled by foreign investment. Between 1997 and 2009, annual average of foreign investment was some US$439 but 95 per cent of it went into mining (Tanzania *Economic Surveys*). Unlike Thailand, where the structural change of the economy has been fundamental, in Tanzania it is not so. Instead of relying on the production and export of primary agriculture produce, the economy now relies on the export of primary mineral and natural resources products.

In both cases, SR in the case of Tanzania, and SE in the case of Thailand, were abandoned during the neo-liberal period. In fact, the IFIs and Western countries held up Thailand and other Asian "tigers" as an example to be followed by Africa. The 1997 crash in Thailand has undoubtedly brought back the debate on SE while the deep crisis of the economy and politics in Tanzania which has become dramatic over the last five or so years is just beginning to raise discussion on revisiting Nyerere's doctrine of self-reliance and socialism. To be sure, just as in Thailand, there are various versions of SR, varying from demagogic and populist to developmentalist and statist.

Thirdly, in both cases, SE and SR, as philosophies, with policy implication, were propounded from the top by heads of state and carried with it the popularity of their charismatic leaders, in one case Nyerere and in the other King Bhumibol. There is one interesting difference though. Unlike the King, Nyerere was an executive head of state. The political practice of his philosophy was radically nationalist and anti-imperialist. The King's philosophy is expressed much more on a moral plane, and scrupulously avoids the political terrain. By definition, it is moderate, advocating, the 'middle path', avoiding extremes and focusing on balance, etc. Its political nationalism is muted.

There is also another interesting point of comparison. Whereas Nyerere's self-reliance derived from his philosophical outlook based on equality and social justice, entailing some kind of socialism, the King's philosophy seems to lie comfortably side by side with capitalist class division and bourgeois ideology of equality. It advocates more the notions of morality and ethics rather then notions of social justice and equity.

In both cases though the state bureaucracy has appropriated and co-opted these philosophies. In the case of Tanzania, to a certain case, Nyerere's philosophy of ujamaa was popular with the masses at large but not so popular with business circles. I am not sure if that is also the case with the philosophy of SE .

Finally, neither philosophically nor politically, and much less economically, SR and SE challenge the dominant neo-liberal model as advocated, propagated and imposed by the West. Official documents pertaining to King's philosophy of the 'middle path' emphasize 'moderation' and balance and make it clear that it is not meant to resist globalization or 'modernization'. (Modernization, in the historical and political context of many 'third world' countries, means Westernization.) On the other hand, Nyerere's Tanzania continued to rely on foreign aid and foreign multinationals in spite of his philosophy of self-reliance and socialism. Foreign aid to Tanzania doubled during the six years after the Arusha Declaration as compared to the six years before the Arusha Declaration. Although the commanding heights of the economy were nationalized following the Arusha Declaration, the parastatals thus

created went into joint ventures and management contracts with foreign multinationals. And under neo-liberalism, after the crisis of the 1980s, the public sector was dismantled with public enterprises being sold off to foreign capital at fire sale prices. This is exactly what happened in Thailand too after the 1997 crash. In both countries, the knee-jerk reaction of the business elites has been to advocate indigenization of the economy. (This is called *uzawa* in Tanzania; I don't know what is the Thai equivalent.)

Given the current deep crisis of the world capitalist system, or globalization as the pundits would have it, the question is: does SE or SR provide an alternative, systemic model of development and sustainable, just and equitable progress in countries like Thailand or Tanzania, or, is their role simply to adjust and adapt to the dominant model and give the dominant model respectability and acceptability in the eyes of the masses? In both countries, some writers have even expressed the fear that the nationalist reaction to neo-liberalism could degenerate into narrow chauvinism, localism, 'ethnicism', racism and religious fundamentalism (see, for instance, Shivji 2006: Part V & Hewison 1999, Rigg & Ritchie 2002). In Africa, including Tanzania, there is some debate, albeit marginal, that the progressive response to globalization lies in Pan-Africanism (Shivji 2006). I am not sure if there is such a Left debate in Thailand, except for the critiques produced by Westerners.

Whatever be the case, and however it is expressed, one thing seems to be certain, the certainties and triumphalism of globalist neo-liberalism have been severely shaken since the US and Europe entered into deep crisis beginning in the middle of 2000s. There is a resurgence of radical thought, both of the Left and the Right. The re-emergence of interest in Self-reliance in Tanzania and Sufficiency Economy in Thailand are but an expression, at once, of the crisis of neo-liberalism and the search for alternatives to capitalist imperialism that has dominated the world for the last five centuries.

***

References

Chalapati, Supaporn 2008, 'Sufficiency Economy as a Response to the Problem of Poverty in Thailand', in *Asian Social Science*, vol. 4, no. 7.

Cliffe, L. & John S. Saul (eds.)1972, *Socialism in Tanzania: An Interdisciplinary Reader*, Nairobi: East African Publishing House, vol 1 & vol 2.

Coulson A., 1982, *Tanzania: A Political Economy,* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hewison, Kevin 1999, 'Localism in Thailand: a study of globalisation and its discontents', Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalism, (University of Warwick) Working Paper, No. 39/99.

Hutchful, E., 1991, 'Reconstructing Political Systems: Militarism and Constitutionalism,' in Shivji, I. G., ed. *State and Constitutionalism: An African Debate on Democracy*, Harare: SAPES.

Mwansasu, B., & Cranford Pratt eds., 1979, *Towards Socialism in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House)

Nkrumah, Kwame, 1965, *Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism*, London: Heinemann.

Nyerere, J. K. 1968, *Freedom and Socialism,* London: OUP.

Nyerere, J. K. 1973, *Freedom and Development*, London: OUP.

Nyerere, J. K. 1997, 'Without unity, there is no future for Africa', Speech delivered in Accra, 6 March 1997, on the occasion of Ghana's 40th independence anniversary, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5391/is_200602/ai_n21408880/pr int

Nyerere, J. K. 2011, *Freedom and A New World Economic Order*, Dar es Salaam: OUP.

Nyerere, J. K. 2011, *Freedom and Liberation*, Dar es Salaam: OUP.

Nyerere, J. K. 2011, *Freedom and Non-Alignment*, Dar es Salaam: OUP.

Nyerere, J. K., 1967, *Freedom and Unity*: *a selection from writings and speeches*, Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press.

Othman, H. M, 1980, *The State In Tanzania: Who Controls it and Whose Interests does it Serve?*, Dar es Salaam: Dar es Salaam University Press.

Rigg, J. & Ritchie, M., 2002, 'Production, Consumption and Imagination in Rural Thailand', in *Journal of Rural Studies*, vol. 18, Issue 4, October 2002.

Shivji, I. G. 1976, *Class Struggles in Tanzania,* London: Heinemann.

Shivji, I. G. 2006, *Let the People Speak: Tanzania Down the Road to Neo-Liberalism*, Dakar: CODESRIA

Tanzania, United Republic (various years) *Economic Surveys*, Dar es Salaam: Government Printer.