Multiparty Elections and Party Support in Tanzania

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Abstract
Multiparty elections in Tanzania have been characterized by the dominance of the ruling party and the erratic rise and fall of opposition parties. This trend has been largely influenced by, among others, such factors as institutionalization, age, personality sex, history and low level of civic competence. However, the results of the 2010 general elections suggest a new development that challenges the eminence of the aforementioned factors, which have for almost two decades favoured the ruling party. This new development is reflected in the 2010 elections that witnessed some of the areas that were an enclave of the incumbent party offering a relatively strong support to opposition parties, particularly Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA). The 2010 general elections’ results prompt a need for an enquiry to establish whether or not this is the beginning of a new chapter in which both the ruling party and opposition parties stand an equal chance of winning the elections.

Keywords
Elections, political parties, strongholds, support, voters, votes

Introduction
Tanzania got her political independence in 1961 under a multiparty political system. However, in 1965 the constitution was changed in favour of a one-party system that made the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) the only political party in the country (Kweka, 1995). Some scholars have in fact argued that from 1961 to 1964 Tanzania was a de facto one-party state as TANU was already in control of the country’s political processes (Baregu, 1997: 54). Multiparty politics was reintroduced in 1992 after the national assembly passed The Political Parties Act No.5 of 1992. The reintroduction of multiparty politics was a fulfilment of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank conditions, among other forces, which required the country to undertake economic and political liberalization (Bagenda, 1994; Gibbon, 1995; Havnevick, 1993). Three years after the reintroduction of multipartism, the first multiparty general elections were held in 1995. In spite of being in their infancy, opposition political parties did relatively well in those elections and forced the ruling party to push for the change of electoral rules from absolute majority to simple majority. It was the

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National Convention for Construction and Reform – Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi) under the leadership of Augustine Mrema that posed a real threat to the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), as it performed relatively better at both presidential and parliamentary levels. For instance, while CCM secured 61.82 per cent of the presidential votes, NCCR-Mageuzi got 27.77 per cent of the vote nationwide. The same performance trend was reflected in the share of nationwide parliamentary votes in which CCM garnered 59.22 per cent of the votes and NCCR-Mageuzi obtained 21.83 per cent. With this promising performance of the opposition side during the 1995 general elections, there were expectations from the general public that with time these parties would continue gaining more popularity and thus increase their challenge to the incumbent party.

However, in the subsequent 2000 and 2005 general elections, opposition parties did not fulfil that public hope. The ruling party managed to resuscitate its hegemony, hence turning the country into what Chege (2007) calls a one-dominant party system. For instance, in the 2000 general elections, the then main opposition political party, the Civic United Front (CUF), won only two constituencies, while in 2005 it did not secure any in mainland Tanzania. There have been different views over the poor performance of opposition parties, one of which links poor performance of opposition political parties with the lack of a strong voter base compared with the ruling party. Other views explaining the weakness of opposition parties in Tanzania, which are, however, not dealt with in this paper, include intraparty conflicts and the absence of social cleavages in Tanzania. As regards voter support, CCM is said to have a comparative institutionalization advantage in the sense that its long stay in power has enabled it to not only consolidate its presence across the country but also establish itself as a stable and strong political unit. With the exception of the CUF in Zanzibar (Pemba), Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) in Karatu and Moshi urban constituencies and the United Democratic Party (UDP) in Bariadi East Constituency, it has been very difficult to label many constituencies as opposition strongholds. This is especially so because of their capricious performance in elections, as many constituencies that were once under the control of opposition political parties were taken by the ruling party in the 2000 and 2005 elections. Some of those constituencies that were under opposition control after 1995 but were regained by the ruling party in 2000 included Moshi rural, Iringa Urban, Ubungo, Rombo, Mbeya Urban, Vunjo, Rorya and Bunda. The constituencies that were recaptured by the ruling party in the 2005 elections include Kigoma Urban, Hai, Bariadi West, Kisesa and Kigamboni.

In contrast to the poor performance of opposition parties in the 2000 and 2005 elections, there was a renaissance of these parties in the country’s 2010 general elections. These parties were able to reclaim some of the constituencies that had fallen into the hands of the incumbent party and captured new ones as well, suggesting that the ruling party’s dominance in elections was seriously put to the test. For instance, CHADEMA managed to reclaim seven constituencies that were retaken by the ruling party in the 2000 and 2005 elections. These included Ubungo, Kisesa, Mbeya Urban, Iringa Urban, Hai, Rombo and Arusha. Some of the constituencies that fell into the hands of opposition parties for the first time included Ukerewe, Musoma Urban, Kawe, Maswa East, Maswa West and Kishapu, just to mention some. The performance of opposition parties in the last elections significantly disqualified the institutionalization argument in explaining CCM’s performance in previous general elections, as opposition parties, particularly CHADEMA, managed to garner much support from voters in almost all parts of the country. The resurrection of opposition parties in 2010 clearly marked the unstable and zigzagging trend of opposition parties since Tanzania reintroduced multiparty politics.

Unstable electoral performance on the side of opposition parties and the periodic rise and fall of the ruling party’s popularity prompts a need for the study of the variables that have explained political parties’ support. As Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) argue, a party’s ability to survive reflects its ability to maintain support in the population. This paper therefore seeks to identify the nature and forms of
political parties’ support under a multiparty system, with specific attention directed to answering the question of whether or not current political developments in the country allow for electoral constituencies to be defined as party strongholds. For the purpose of maintaining focus and clarity, the attention of the discussion is directed to political parties that have had a representation in the national assembly despite ups and downs in their electoral performance. These include Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), the Civic United Front (CUF), the United Democratic Party (UDP), the Tanzania Labour Party (TLP) and the National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi (NCCR-Mageuzi). Prior to this analysis, the following section provides an overview of political parties’ performance in Tanzania’s past four multiparty elections.

**Political Parties’ Performance in Tanzania’s Multiparty Elections**

Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics, Tanzania has held four general elections. In all these elections, CCM has emerged victorious while the performance of opposition parties has largely been inconsistent. The elements of inconsistency are verified by the rise and fall of opposition parties’ voter support as marked by their fragile status. For instance, while NCCR-Mageuzi was the leading opposition in 1995, it failed to consolidate its leadership thus paving the way for CUF’s rise as the country’s main opposition party. Like its predecessor, CUF was overtaken by CHADEMA in the 2010 general elections and it remains uncertain whether the same trend won’t recur.

The 1995 general elections were the first multiparty elections since the country reintroduced plural politics. In these elections, a lot of pertinent issues were observed. First, there was much urban support for opposition parties in the country, particularly the then main opposition party, NCCR-Mageuzi, which, however, relied on the popularity of its chairman and presidential candidate Augustine Mrema. NCCR-Mageuzi also secured much support from the middle-level businessmen who were still discontented with the government’s decisions on issues such as the anti economic sabotage crackdown in 1980s (TEMCO, 2001). Mrema enjoyed that support mainly because these businesspeople wanted an overhaul of the status quo. As NCCR-Mageuzi was by then the most popular opposition party there was the expectation that it could topple the incumbent party from power.

It was, however, clear that although opposition parties had a promising debut, the ruling party still retained much support, especially in rural areas. This may partly be explained by the fact that the elections were held only three years after the reintroduction of plural politics, and many people, especially in rural areas, were still relatively uninformed about the changes in the political system. This situation was partly attributed to the fact that during these elections opposition parties were yet to effectively penetrate into remote areas as compared with CCM that was well established across all parts of the country. As Mushi and Mukandala (1997) point out, in the 1995 general elections, opposition parties were sparsely present countrywide. They show, for instance, that in Dodoma region the structure of most opposition parties ended at the regional level. Similarly, the nomination of candidates in regions such as Arusha was done at the regional level as most opposition parties such as CHADEMA were yet to establish themselves at the grassroots (Mushi and Mukandala, 1997). In other regions such as Kilimanjaro and Singida only CHADEMA and NCCR had adequate presence.

Things were different though for CCM as it used its nationwide networks to solicit electoral support. The only exception was Kilimanjaro region in which various constituencies such as Sihhi, Hai, Moshi Rural, Moshi Urban, Vunjo and Rombo were under the control of opposition parties. As Pietillä et al. (2002) point out, NCCR-Mageuzi dominated the political scene in Kilimanjaro region in the 1995 general elections by winning five out of nine constituencies.

The 2000 general elections were held at a time when the 1995 triumphant debut of opposition parties in competitive politics was dwindling. CCM thus managed to garner many votes nationwide.
For instance, while CCM secured 66.3 per cent of presidential votes in the Lake Zone, its closest rival CUF had 14.1 per cent. In southern highlands CCM got 81.1 per cent and CUF had 6 per cent. The same trend was witnessed in the central zone in which CCM got 75.2 per cent, leaving CUF with 19.4 per cent. In the Coastal Zone CCM obtained 62.6 per cent of votes and CUF secured 27.7 per cent. Similarly, in the northern zone the ruling party obtained 71.2 per cent while CUF got 12.2 per cent. CCM led the race in the southern zone as it gained 87 per cent of the vote, while CUF got 10.3 per cent.

One of the factors that explained CUF’s frail position during the 2000 elections was the party’s alleged link with Islamism. For instance, the TEMCO report shows that in one of CCM’s campaign rallies, one of the party elders urged Muslims not to vote for CUF on the grounds that it was a religious party whose purpose was to divide the country and cause war and bloodshed (TEMCO, 2001: 90). This accusation couldn’t be substantiated as, according to the country’s constitution, religious parties are not allowed. Nonetheless, from a political perspective it can be argued that labelling CUF as an Islamic party during the 2000 general elections might have scared off non-Muslim voters. This postulation seems to be borne out by the fact that CUF has had much support in areas whose residents are predominantly Muslim. Some of these areas include Zanzibar, Lindi region, Mtwara region and the Coastal region.

Unlike the 1995 and 2000 general elections, the 2005 elections told a very sad story in the history of opposition parties. Having failed to effectively establish themselves, these parties perpetuated the consolidation of single-party hegemony. With its very popular candidate, Jakaya Kikwete, CCM performed very well in the elections, with a resounding victory of 80.28 per cent of nationwide presidential votes. The party also secured a majority of parliamentary seats. It was noted that Kikwete’s popularity surpassed stronghold considerations, as the ruling party enjoyed much support even in areas that were previously pro-opposition. For instance, CCM won eight out of nine constituencies in Kilimanjaro region which was once the stronghold of the opposition. It should, however, be noted that the Kikwete factor was partly supported by the fact that the popularity of opposition parties in those areas had started to plummet even before the elections. During the 2005 elections only CHADEMA, UDP and the TLP in the case of Tanzania’s mainland won constituency seats. While CHADEMA won in Karatu, Moshi Urban, Kigoma North and Mpanda central constituencies, TLP won in Biharamuro West constituency and UDP won in the Bariadi East constituency.

Unlike the 2000 and 2005 general elections, the 2010 elections marked a new chapter in the country’s political history. Having performed very well in the 2005 general elections, the ruling party went to these elections determined to win a resounding victory. There was little optimism that opposition parties could really challenge the ruling party given their unpromising performance in previous elections. Quite contrary to this perception, CHADEMA emerged as a new opposition force in the 2010 elections. It should be remembered that the party had kept a low profile during the period of nominating candidates, to the extent that people thought that it could not participate in the presidential race. This belief was supported by the fact that Dr Wilbrod Slaa who was declared as the party’s presidential candidate had earlier picked up the nomination forms to contest for and defend his parliamentary seat in Karatu constituency where he served for 15 consecutive years. The emergence of CHADEMA as the country’s new opposition force is attributed to various events that ensued in the period between 2005 and 2010.

One of those events was the publicity role that was played by the party’s chairman and 2005 presidential candidate Mr Freeman Mbowe. Although the overall performance of CHADEMA in the 2005 polls was relatively poor, that candidate strongly spread the party’s slogans of social-economic and political transformation that particularly attracted the youths. The campaign effect was further bolstered by the party’s launch of a nationwide campaign popularly known as Operation Sangara
whose purpose was to unveil the evils of the incumbent government to the electorate. The main issues addressed during Operation Sangara included corruption, irresponsibility of government leaders, poverty and a message of hope that Tanzania without CCM was possible. This was a successful campaign as it captured the attention of many people in both rural and urban areas.

With much support from both rural and urban areas especially from the youths, CHADEMA performed better and lowered the ruling party’s percentage of presidential votes from 80.28 per cent in 2005 to 61 per cent in 2010. CCM’s victory was, however, vehemently challenged by CHADEMA who claimed that the elections were rigged. However, those claims went unheeded and the process of inaugurating the winner went ahead as planned. In Tanzania once the National Electoral Commission (NEC) declares a presidential candidate to have won the election no one can legally challenge the outcome, for the country’s constitution does not allow presidential results to be disputed in courts of law or anywhere else. Article 41(7) of the URT constitution provides that when a candidate is declared by the Electoral Commission to have been duly elected no court of law shall have any jurisdiction to inquire into the election of that candidate.

The results from the 2010 general elections indicate the following: (a) that the influence of the institutionalization factor as a determinant of a party’s electability was very minimal; and (b) that the contagious effect, especially among the youths, was crucial in reshaping people’s orientation towards the political system, both in urban and rural areas in favour of CHADEMA. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that the party got many votes in both rural and urban areas. For instance, unlike in the 2005 general elections in which opposition parties won in 26 constituencies, with only seven seats from the Tanzanian mainland, in the last elections opposition parties won 50 constituency seats with 30 seats from Tanzanian mainland. Percentagewise CCM had 60.4 per cent of the parliamentary votes, CHADEMA 24.8 per cent, and CUF 9.8 per cent, with the last 5 per cent shared among the remaining parties (TEMCO, 2011: 201). As this section has provided a sketch of parties’ performance in general elections, it is the task of the next section to identify the factors that have been determining the support of political parties in elections.

Determinants of Parties’ Support

The nature of political parties’ support has tended to vary according to time and space; in some countries parties enjoy stable popular support, whereas in other contexts there are higher volatility rates. Bogaards (2008) indicates that while the volatility rate in Africa is 20 per cent, in Western Europe it is 8 per cent. The rate is even higher in new democracies in Eastern Europe in which it stands at 25.6 per cent (Bogaards, 2008: 122). Explanations regarding disparities in party electoral support have varied among scholars. While Mueller (2007), for example, links the support to political parties with the party’s selection of a candidate possessing competitive advantage both during intra and inter party competitions, Lebo and Young (2009) have associated party support with ideology and protest. Using the United Kingdom as an example, they argue that the Liberal Democrats have benefited much from the protest among the supporters of the Labour and Conservative Parties, to the extent that it is seen by many scholars as lacking a stable base of partisan support and as forming instead a reservoir of protest against the two larger parties (Lebo and Young, 2009: 76). In East Africa, party support is shaped by numerous factors as the discussion below shows.

Political Parties’ Support in other East African Countries

Chege (2007) reiterates that in ethnically divided societies such as Kenya, political parties’ formations are ethnically disposed. This is indeed substantiated by the fact that on the eve of their formation,
the Kenya African National Union (KANU) represented an alliance between the Kikuyu and the Luo, while the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was the party of smaller groups such as Luhya, Maasai, Mijikenda and Kalenjin (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990: 49). Included in the list of smaller groups are the Kamba and Somali tribes (Norman and Rodger, 1994: 30). Even when Oginga Odinga formed the Kenya People’s Union (KPU) after defecting from KANU he still relied heavily on support from the Luo region (Norman and Rodger, 1994: 50). It was only during the single-party era up to 1991 when multiparty politics was reinstated that ethnic politics was put on hold. KANU became the only party with which all Kenyans could identify. This was nonetheless a short-lived experience as ethnic politics resurfaced with the reintroduction of plural politics (Oloo, 2007: 98). Parties such as the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD-Kenya) and the Democratic Party (DP) relied heavily on the Luo and Kikuyu tribes respectively. The same factor also explains the former ruling party KANU, whose support currently comes from the Kalenjin tribe.

It was on the basis of ethnic concerns that the former president of Kenya, Daniel Arap Moi accused the National Development Party (NDP) of being a Luo party, FORD-Kenya of being a Bukisu party and the Democratic Party of being a Kikuyu Party (Oloo, 2007). While the leaders of these parties denied these allegations, the results of the 1992 and 1997 general elections testified to Moi’s accusations, as these parties, with the exception of FORD-Kenya (in the 1992 elections) got many votes from their regional or ethnic strongholds. The main saviour of ethnic politics in Kenya has been the formation of coalitions of parties such as the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and the Party of National Unity (PNU).

As in Kenya, ethnic politics is common in Rwanda and Burundi. For instance, the Association pour la Promotion Sociale de la Masse (APROSOMA) was formed in 1959 for the purpose of promoting Hutu interests and getting rid of Tutsi dominance in Rwanda (Republic of Rwanda, 2010: 79). On the other hand, the Tutsi were represented by two parties, namely the Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR) and the Rassemblement Démocratique Rwandais (RADER), formed in 1959. Even when President Juvénal Habyarimana created the National Revolutionary Movement for Development (MRND) in 1975 ethnicity remained the driving force (Republic of Rwanda, 2010: 89). It is even yet to be established whether the current ruling Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) is a catch-all party or still has ethnic elements. As Jefremovas (1997: 102) argues, RPF was faced with an identity challenge, particularly on membership and inclusiveness, by the time it took office in 1994. The same concern was raised by Mamdani (1996) as quoted by Jefremovas (1997) who argued that the superior–subordinate mentality between the Hutu and Tutsi was still noticeable. Jefremovas (1997) further reiterates that although RPF promised to curb such tendencies, many Hutu (who had a subordinate status) remain sceptical. Similar views are advanced by Ingelaere (2010) who argues that in spite of the continuous reiteration by the incumbent government that it is committed to eradicating ethnicity, the problem remains conspicuous. For instance, Ingelaere (2010) shows that ethnicity is well reflected in local governance structures in which appointed positions (paid) are dominated by Tutsis while elected ones (unpaid) are occupied by the Hutu.

In Burundi, party support is largely ethnic. Political Parties such as the National Council for the Defence of Democracy – Forces for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) and the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) are predominantly Hutu. On the other hand, the Movement for the Rehabilitation of Citizens – Rurenzangemero (MRC-Rurenzangemero), the Party for National Recovery (PARENA) and the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) draw much of their support from the Tutsi community.

Uganda is well versed in ethnic politics (Chege, 2007: 33). For example, the Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC) was formed by ethnic groups from the north in combination with some of the eastern and western Bantu peoples who were opposed to Baganda. They were also united by a religious factor
as they belonged to the Protestant Church. On the other hand, the predominantly Catholic Democratic Party (DP) enjoyed support from the Baganda community (Berg-Schlosser and Siegler, 1990: 114). The same observation is made in the European Union’s Election Observation Mission (EU-EOM) report which states that the DP was formed by Buganda Catholics and that central Uganda is the party’s main stronghold (EU-EOM, 2011: 11). Kabaka Yekka also relied on support from traditionally-minded Anglican voters in Buganda (EU-EOM, 2011). Up to the present, ethnic elements of political parties support can still be observed. For instance, in the 2006 parliamentary elections in which the National Resistance Movement (NRM) won 191 of the 273 contested seats, much of the party’s support came from western Uganda where Museveni comes from (Chege, 2007: 34). Likewise, Kizza Besigye’s Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) garnered many votes from northern and eastern Uganda (Chege, 2007). The EU-EOM report similarly indicates that the FDC has strongest support in the north of the country, around Kampala and in pockets of the east and west of the country (EU-EOM 2011: 11). The political situation in Uganda and Rwanda however shows that the political support that the incumbent parties have been getting is a mixture of pessimism and fear as there are no signs of a possible political change through popular votes.

Political Parties’ Support in Tanzania

Tanzania’s experience of political parties support is to a great extent different from the rest of other east African countries. This is mainly due to the fact that the ruling party, CCM, has been in power for so long compared to other parties in east Africa. In addition, while most political parties in Tanzania are multiethnic, in other east African countries ethnicity is a crucial factor in explaining political parties’ support.

The nature of political parties’ support in Tanzania can be traced back to the 1950s. During this period, political parties participated in elections under a parity principle that was designed to ensure the representation of all races in the Legislative Council. As most of the voters were predominantly black, the colonial state was worried that other races could not be represented in decision-making bodies. This concern was well founded, as between 1960 and 1965 there emerged various parties with a racist orientation. For instance, the African National Congress (ANC) was opposed to the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU)’s position on race relations in Tanzania, with the ANC holding the view that Tanzania should be completely African. The ANC also called for the nationalization of the civil service (Kweka, 1995). Other racist parties included the People’s Democratic Party and the people’s Convention Party which attacked government policies on citizenship, Africanization and ownership of land (Kweka, 1995).

It was, however, clear that TANU had a higher command of popular support than other parties, and this was reflected in the first free elections to the legislative council in 1960 in which TANU defeated the rival parties, taking all seats except one which was won by Mr Sarwat, a pro-TANU independent candidate (Hyden and Leys, 1972: 26). Following the abolition of multiparty politics in 1965 and the declaration that Tanzania was a one-party state, TANU remained the sole party on the Tanzanian mainland, while the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) remained the only party in Zanzibar. TANU and ASP were later united in 1977 to make CCM, the only party in the two parts of the United Republic of Tanzania. Under the single-party system people had no opportunity to decide which party to support. Electoral processes were also centralized as it was the top echelons of the party that had the final say in all critical issues such as the nomination of candidates. For instance, during the nomination processes the party’s National Executive Committee (NEC) vetoed some of the preferences of the Annual District Congress (ADC). In 1965 the NEC approved the choices of the ADC by 83.7 per cent, while in 1970 and 1975 the percentages were 72.8 and 52.8 respectively (McHenry, 1983: 340).
Elections were therefore a mere reflection of conservatism in which voters had no choices, be it ideological or in terms of issues, as all candidates were required to campaign within an ideological consensus embodied in the party’s programme (Van Donge and Liviga, 1989: 47). This trend did not end until the reintroduction of multipartism in Tanzania in 1992.

As pointed out earlier, the ruling party continues to win elections since the reintroduction of plural politics in the country. The basis upon which this dominance is built is, however, not clearly articulated as there are various factors that could have acted to its disadvantage, as identified by Ishiyama and Quinn (2006: 321–324). The first one is organizational adaptations which allow ruling parties to compete successfully in the newly competitive environments (this factor is also referred to as the internalist perspective). The second determining factor is externalist and focuses on the characteristics of the previous authoritarian regime, with the view that the endowments the successor party inherited from the past regime affect its ability to adapt to new political circumstances. Other factors mentioned include the performance of the economy, ethnicity, constitutional features of the political system such as electoral rules, and the competitive environment.

Most of the factors identified above mainly explain why the incumbent party has remained in power but do not provide a comprehensive view of the party’s electoral support. For instance, it is indubitable that the country’s electoral system, the first past the post (FPTP) system in which the winner takes all seats, has been favouring the ruling party by guaranteeing its majority in the country’s national assembly. It is also true that in some cases the ruling party has been using coercive instruments such as the police and military to consolidate its domination of the country’s electoral processes. Irrespective of these advantages, there are key factors in which the ruling party’s performance has to a great extent been poor. For instance, the country’s economy has not been doing well, particularly in the area of poverty eradication. Similarly, since the reintroduction of multipartism nothing significant can be observed as regards the party’s preparedness to effectively compete in new political arrangements. It is because of this failure that the survival of CCM has partly been relying on the use of extraneous forces to silence the opposition.

Notwithstanding the above reality, the experience from the past four elections indicates that various factors such as age, ethno-personality (the rainbow factor), history, sex and low level of civic competence are crucial in explaining political parties’ support in Tanzania.

Age

Electoral politics in Tanzania portrays a concoction of conservatism and reformism in which the former is said to be embraced by the country’s older generation while the latter stands for the country’s youths. Good performance of the ruling party in previous elections, especially in rural areas, has been in some instances associated with age, as most of the elderly link the ruling party with the country’s history. This is particularly so in association with the country’s first president, the late Julius Nyerere who was the founder of CCM. Nyerere was a highly respected figure, and the use of his name to solicit public support is thought to be highly effective; thus supporting the opposition was regarded by most elderly people as being anti Nyerere. To some youths, Nyerere remains a respected name but this nevertheless does not shape their political orientation as some of them were born during the multi-party era and thus have little to do with Nyerere’s single party legacy. The decrease of CCM’s nationwide vote share in the 2010 general elections is attributed to its failure to mobilize youth support, as opposed to its close rival CHADEMA whose capitalization on a youth enlistment strategy proved to be very fruitful. It should, however, be noted that the youth factor does not only reflect CHADEMA’s pro-youth strategy but also reflects the shrinking popularity of the incumbent president, who enjoyed substantial youth support during the 1995 general elections. This support was linked to the 1995 intraparty nomination of CCM’s presidential candidate in which Kikwete, despite being the most popular candidate, was not
nominated on the grounds that he was then still too young to become the head of state. So he had to put his presidential ambitions on hold, thus giving way to Mr Benjamin William Mkapa who was nominated. Since the first phase president, Julius Nyerere, blessed the decision the voters begrudgingly respected it but Kikwete retained the sympathy of both young people and adults. This eventually guaranteed him a landslide victory in the 2005 general elections. However, having failed to address the interests of many of the people who supported him (including the young people), it was easy for CHADEMA to capitalize on his weaknesses. More importantly, unlike during the previous general elections, young people seem to have actively participated in all electoral processes and thus heavily influenced the 2010 electoral results. Unfortunately, neither election observation reports nor the country’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) provide a detailed breakdown of registration figures based on aspects such as age, education and gender. As a result, NEC figures which show the increase of registered voters from 15,942,824 in 2005 to 18,014,667 in 2010 do not help in providing youth-related information.

The Rainbow Factor

This is a combination of three aspects, namely ethnicity, home-ground advantage and personality. Ethnicity is not a crucial factor in Tanzania’s electoral politics but it has had some influence in some cases, in combination with other factors. For instance, in Shinyanga region, particularly in Bariadi district, UDP and NCCR-Mageuzi were sometimes identified with the Sukuma and Chagga people respectively during the 1995 elections in which UDP campaigners were heard urging the electorate to vote for a fellow Sukuma as president and reject his NCCR-Mageuzi counterpart who was not an indigenous person (TEMCO, 1997: 102). Likewise, UDP’s survival is largely anchored on a blend of the personal attributes of the party’s chairperson, ethnic support and sympathy for the homeboy. Although almost all parties have in some cases been associated with ethnic sentiments, it is the UDP whose survival heavily relies on ethnic support. Ethnic support can be established by looking at UDP’s share of the vote nationwide. Figure 1 shows that in 2000 UDP performed relatively better in the Lake Zone as compared to other zones. For instance, while the party secured 240,312 votes in that zone, it got less than 40,000 votes in other zones.

![Figure 1](image-url)

**Figure 1.** A zonal perspective of UDP support in the 2000 general elections

*Source: Compiled from the TEMCO report for the 2000 general elections*
A close look at the UDP performance in the Lake Zone, depicted in Figure 2, further demonstrates that its base is mainly in two regions, namely Shinyanga and Mwanza whose most of their inhabitants are wasukuma, a tribe to which the party’s chairman belongs. While the party garnered 132,104 and 83,678 votes in Shinyanga and Mwanza respectively, it got less than 15,000 votes in Mara and Kagera regions. It is on this basis that, although UDP put up a presidential candidate in the 1995 general elections, it was generally viewed as a regional party (Mwase and Raphael, 2001: 250).

It can as well be noted that although its share of votes has been plunging over the years, its chairperson still has majority support in his home-grown constituency. The ethnic element as regards to UDP’s support emerges from the reality that since its formation the party has principally confined its operations within the sukumaland. Having pulled out from the presidential race since 2005 the party seems to lack a strategy of increasing its support outside the Lake Zone. The same style that was used by its chairman and presidential candidate to limit UDP’s operations to the Lake Zone is still embraced.

Although capitalizing on one ethnic group paid dividend in the 1995 election, as Figure 3 indicates, the party’s future remains uncertain as its share of parliamentary seats in its long-time stronghold continues to decrease. Unlike in 1995 when it won three seats, in the 2010 elections it only secured one. It is imperative to note that ethnicity is not an independent variable that can fully explain party support in Tanzania which depends on a combination with other factors, such as the personality of candidates. While the personality factor has to a great extent determined UDP’s survival, other parties have benefited from it as well. For instance in 1995 it was observed that NCCR’s performance relied heavily on the popularity of its presidential candidate Augustine Mrema. A similar trend was the case in the 2005 general elections in which the ruling party’s performance was reinforced by the popularity of its presidential candidate Jakaya Kikwete. The popularity of CUF in Pemba is also partly associated with the personality of its secretary general, Seif Shariff Hamad. Moreover, the popularity of CHADEMA is also attributed to the personality of its presidential candidate Dr Wilbrod Slaa. Slaa had acquired great esteem in Tanzania even before the elections, due particularly to his active role in the 2005–2010 parliament. His uncovering of scandals such as the misuse of the External Payments Account (EPA), the signing of the bogus treaty between the government of Tanzania and the fake Richmond Company for power generation, and the publication of a list of corrupt people, famously known as the List of Shame, all increased his popularity. In explaining the personality of Dr Slaa, the EU-EOM notes;
Wilbrod Slaa, CHADEMA’s presidential candidate, is an outspoken opposition leader, a former catholic priest who left the ruling party in the early days of the re-introduction of the multi-party system. The vocal lawmaker and CHADEMA’s secretary general is known for his hard line stance against corruption. He became a national public figure in 2007 when he disclosed the so called ‘list of shame’ of allegedly corrupt ministers and ruling party officials earning him the reputation of an anti-graft crusader. Dr. Slaa, as he is popularly called, enjoyed the support of youth groups, particularly university students, the middle and lower classes and was seen as a voice for change attracting new voters to his vision of a new country. (EU-EOM, 2010: 9)

History

The support for some parties in elections is also a result of the history this country has passed through. It should be remembered that Tanzania is a product of the union in 1964 between two formerly independent states, namely Tanganyika and Zanzibar, under the leadership of the then presidents Julius Nyerere (Tanganyika) and Abeid Aman Karume (Zanzibar). The constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 provides for the existence of both the Union Government and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. Article 2(1) of the URT constitution provides that the territory of the United Republic consists of the whole of the area of mainland Tanzania and the whole of the area of Tanzania Zanzibar, and includes the territorial waters. Article 34(1), (2) and (3) of the constitution provides for the existence and authority of the government of the United Republic. On the other hand, article 102(1) of the same constitution provides that there shall be an executive for Zanzibar which shall be known as the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and which shall have authority in Zanzibar over all non union matters. Zanzibar is an archipelago with two main islands, namely Unguja and Pemba. It has its own constitution, president, cabinet, parliament and electoral rules (Yoon, 2008: 62). It is, however, the union government that has monopoly of sovereign powers. Since the reintroduction of multiparty politics in the country, two parties, namely CCM and CUF have dominated Zanzibar. This dominance has nonetheless been geographically defined, as CUF enjoys strong support in Pemba while CCM has a solid backing in Unguja.

On the basis of the above political arrangements in Zanzibar, Rasul (2006) describes Pemba as a fortified opposition enclave. Zanzibar has passed through different periods that for many years...
left its residents with a sense of distrust and hatred. The source of the hatred was a claim that there is an unequal share of resources and political power between the two main islands. Citizens from Pemba have always complained of discrimination in public offices, which are allegedly dominated by people from Unguja. Voting has therefore been the means by which people can express their anger. The nature of support for these parties could be described as closed, as experience shows that there is nothing that, for instance, CCM could do to persuade a CUF supporter to change his/her voting behaviour. The same pattern explains the orientation of CCM supporters towards CUF. As Chege (2007: 30–31) argues, Zanzibar represents a unique situation in having a two-party system that reflects a sharp ethnic cleavage between Africans in Zanzibar represented by the former Afro-Shirazi party that was replaced by CCM in 1977, and the Zanzibaris of Oman origin in alliance with Africans from Pemba Island who are represented by the Civic United Front.

However, the 2010 general elections left most analysts of Zanzibar politics with a lot of unanswered questions when the two former bitter foes managed to strike a peaceful deal that led to the formation of the government of national unity. More interesting was the increase of CUF’s support in both parts of Zanzibar. While CUF was able to win in all constituencies in Pemba, it increased its share of seats in Unguja from one in the 2005 general elections to four in the 2010 elections. One question thrown up by these new political developments in Zanzibar is whether or not the CCM–CUF accord that led to the formation of the government of national unity marks the beginning of an end to polarized politics in the island.

Sex

Tanzania’s electoral politics shows that sex has been one of the determinants of parties’ support which is nonetheless skewed in favour of the ruling party. Women have been a strong constituency of the ruling party both in rural and urban areas. For instance, it was observed that in the 2000 general elections there was a more balanced representation of men and women at CCM campaign meetings than was the case for the opposition parties, whose supporters were mainly men (TEMCO, 2001: 149). There are numerous reasons that might explain women’s support for the ruling party. One of these is that for some of the educated women who have preferred to pursue a political career, supporting the incumbent party is a good option. This is basically due to the fact that given CCM’s resounding victory in previous elections it has had a lion’s share of special seats for women, a path which the majority of elite women in the country use to get into the parliament. Similar views are advanced by Yoon (2008: 73) who reiterates that women’s special seats have been the most convenient ladder for most women into parliament. The system of special seats for women is a gender quota used to redress severe gender gaps in parliamentary representation (Yoon, 2008). In Tanzania, these seats are 30 per cent of the total number of elected constituency members and are apportioned to parties according to their percentages of presidential popular votes.

A related factor for that support is the country’s electoral and political set-up that marginalizes women in both intra party and inter party competitions. Multiparty elections in Tanzania have been characterized by excessive use of money for soliciting support and thus those who are financially weak stand a very limited chance of being nominated. As is the case in most other African countries, most women in Tanzania have a weak resources (financial) base, attributable to patriarchy, culture and other related factors that for many years have given women a subordinate position in both the political and economic realms. With all these impediments, the possibility of women challenging their male counterparts has been slim. This situation thus forces many women to rely on special seats.

Similarly, the support of the ruling party in rural areas by both men and women has been influenced by materialism as many of party supporters eagerly await the election period in order to stockpile a lot of gifts from political aspirants. However, from a comparative perspective, the flow of gifts such
as T-shirts, caps and Khangas, particularly from the ruling party have been targeting women more than men. This is strategically done because previous experience had shown that a majority of men, especially in urban areas, tended to ignore the voter registration process and would only become active participants during the campaign period. This in any case could not help the parties of their preference to win elections as the majority of their supporters had not registered and thus were not eligible to vote, as compared to women. The sex aspect in political parties’ support is further reflected in the REDET opinion poll results issued in April 2010. The results indicated that 52.2 per cent of the respondents who preferred the CCM presidential candidate were women, while 58 per cent of the respondents who said they would vote for CHADEMA were men, and out of those whose preference was for CUF 56 per cent were male (REDET, 2010: 6).

Low Level of Civic Competence

Although the level of civic competence among Tanzanians is rising, due to various factors such as the expansion of private media and the increase in number of civil society organizations, many Tanzanians, especially in rural areas, are still politically incompetent. As a result, they are not well informed about political developments in the country, especially the operations of opposition politics. Agents of civic education such as the media and civil society organizations are largely concentrated in urban areas and there are no elaborate outreach programmes to disseminate civic education to remote areas. During the election periods, both public and private media have been providing voter information that is not worthy of being called civic education (TEMCO, 2006). It is on this basis that the Commonwealth observation report for Tanzania’s 1995 general elections blamed the NEC for its failure to provide civic education, thereby subjecting the citizens to biased information concerning the elections. Similar observations were raised in both the TEMCO 2000 and 2005 general elections observation reports. The presentation of information to voters has not been neutral and misinformation continues to confuse the public.

Even the public media cannot escape this malfeasance as it has always been biased in favour of the incumbent party. Lack of political information has, however, stood the ruling party in good stead, and this was observed in the 1995 general elections. For instance, CCM was said to use threats and scare-mongering to minimize public support for opposition parties. As the elections were held one year after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the incumbent party used this incident to scare the voters. It used speeches and screening of video-taped films depicting ethnic massacres in Rwanda and Burundi with a message to voters that once in power the opposition was going to create a situation of grave insecurity culminating in bloodshed (TEMCO, 1997: 100). The use of threats also continues to guarantee CCM much support from the business community as businesspersons fear repression if they do not support the incumbent party. Both the TEMCO reports for 2000 and 2005 general elections attest to this observation.

Religion

In addition to the above main determinants of political parties’ support in Tanzania, religion is mentioned especially during the time of elections as one of the determinants. In spite of the fact that some religious leaders were participating in elections by supporting certain political parties, there was no religious divide among the voters in the country. Nevertheless, religious influence in elections in the country can no longer be ignored. Although there was no direct association of any party with religious inclination, it was evident that some candidates were associated with religious identity. While in the 2000 and 2005 general elections CUF was alleged to be the Muslim party, in the last elections it was CHADEMA’s turn. All the attacks were directed to the party’s presidential candidate Dr Wilbrod
Slaa who was described by his opponents as an agent of the Catholic Church. His opponents, particularly from the ruling party, backed by its supporting media, labelled CHADEMA’s presidential candidate as ‘the priest’, referring to his previous position in the Roman Catholic Church. Even CUF, a previous victim of a false religious label, seemed to support such labelling. The allegations associating CHADEMA with Catholicism were further echoed by some segments of the Muslim community. It was on this basis that some Muslim clerics issued various statements blaming Catholic bishops for supporting CHADEMA, a party that they conceived as anti-Islam.

In spite of the fact that the above factors have been central in explaining political parties’ support in multiparty elections, political developments during the 2010 general elections marked significant changes in the nature of party support as discussed in the next section.

### Parties’ Strongholds or No One’s Constituency?

The above section has identified various factors that have determined political parties’ support during elections. However, from the 2010 results of the country’s general elections, it seems that the influence of some factors such as history, age and sex, that for decades remained beneficial to the ruling party, is waning. Several factors account for this trend, one of which is the growing gap between the rich and the poor. For instance, before the country’s last elections there was public discontent that much of what had been promised by the ruling party during the 2005 general election campaigns, such as better life for all citizens and a blessed Tanzania, did not materialize. Opposition parties, particularly CHADEMA, have been capitalizing on these weaknesses by promising alternative options for development. As a result, many of previous strongholds of the incumbent party are now open territories that are permeable to the advantage of the opposition. On the other hand, there are new constituencies such as the enlightened youths, the unemployed and university academics that have emerged as supportive of opposition parties. With various factors such as the rise in poverty, both in rural and urban areas, the ruling party is increasingly losing its support. Even its heavy reliance on women as a faithful constituency is currently being tested. As educated women’s support for the ruling party is in some instances associated with the pursuance of a political career, CHADEMA’s improved performance in the 2010 general elections, which significantly increased its share of special seats in the parliament, offers women two parallel entry points into the national assembly. As Figure 4 indicates, although CCM retains a majority share of women’s special seats, the number of women’s special seats for opposition parties increased substantially in 2010. For instance, while CHADEMA had only six special seats for women members of parliament in 2005, that number increased to 25 in the 2010 general elections. While the total number of special seats for CUF and CHADEMA was 17 and whereas that of the ruling party was 58 following the 2005 general elections, the results for the 2010 elections indicate that special seats for the two parties rose to 35 while that of the ruling party increased to 67 in 2010, as indicated in Figure 4. This increase implies the de-monopolization of these seats in favour of opposition parties.

Although it is still premature to predict the future of the country’s electoral politics, some observations from the 2010 general elections can be made. The first observation is that the dominance of party strongholds is substantially diminishing, thereby giving all political parties relatively equal penetration chances in many constituencies. A good example can be drawn from the performance of NCCR-Mageuzi in the 2010 elections in which it managed to win in four constituencies, all in Kigoma region. Even though the party still retains a minor party status, its performance in these elections indicates a new political trend that gives minor parties a voice during elections. It should be remembered that in the 2000 and 2005 general elections NCCR-Mageuzi did not win any constituency seats and was thus not represented in the parliament, even through the special seats arrangement. This observation however does not apply to Zanzibar where politics remains the affair of only two parties, namely CCM and CUF.
The second observation is that some constituencies that have managed to retain their symbolic stronghold largely base this on the influence of the candidates and not support for the party. Candidates’ influential powers rely heavily on the resources criterion that is gaining more prominence in shaping voters’ behaviour in Tanzania. The power of the purse is currently one of the tickets to pass the nomination and election test in both intra party and inter party competitions. This phenomenon is prevalent in both the ruling and opposition parties. On the opposition side, a poor financial resource base has been forcing them in some instances to rely on volunteerism in which those who can privately finance election expenses are given greater priority. It is because of this new culture that many businessmen and senior university academics are venturing into a political career. The influx of business people into politics even shook the fourth phase president who appealed for the separation of business and politics, a call, however, that was short lived.

In addition, while the previous elections saw a battle between the opposition parties and the ruling party, the 2010 elections ushered in a second battle, one involving opposition parties. The current encounter is between NCCR-Mageuzi and CUF on the one hand and CHADEMA on the other. As pointed out earlier, unlike the current misunderstanding between opposition parties, the declining hegemony of NCCR-Mageuzi as the main opposition party and the takeover by CUF did not result in an intensive animosity between the two. CUF’s discontent springs mainly from its loss of majority as the strong opposition party in the parliament, for which it blames CHADEMA. The war between the two sides has been advantageous to the ruling party that is curiously playing a divide-and-rule strategy. It was for instance on this basis that CUF, through the backing of CCM, forced the change of parliamentary regulations in 2011 that deprived the dominant opposition party in the parliament of the right to form the shadow cabinet with or without the inclusion of other opposition parties which have representation in the national assembly. Prior to this amendment of the regulations, the opposition party with a majority in the parliament had the right to include or not to include other opposition parties in its cabinet. With the new regulations, the main opposition party in the parliament is required to include other parties that have representatives in the parliament.

As pointed out earlier in this paper, the contagious effect is also a decisive factor in defining political parties’ support during elections in Tanzania. The 2010 general elections were characterized by young people’s euphoria with a pro-opposition stance. As the media reported the increasing support for CHADEMA, especially in urban areas, other parts of the country were not left unaffected.

**Figure 4.** Special seats distribution in Tanzania
*Source: Compiled from TEMCO election reports.*
The party became popular even in remote areas where it had been unpopular in previous elections. This spill-over effect has seriously alarmed the ruling party as its future is at stake. The main source of panic is the inconclusive debates explaining lower turnout in the 2010 elections. With a 42 per cent turnout, different propositions over this state of affair are raised. One of them is that many people who did not vote were either undecided voters or anti-CCM but were not hopeful that opposition parties could perform better in elections. The counter proposition has been that those who did not show up on polling day were CCM supporters whose belief was that there was nothing that could change the country’s landscape in favour of the opposition.

In explaining low voter turnout during the 2010 elections, the EU-EOM mentions various possible factors, namely: an apathy and strong belief among the population that CCM was going to win regardless of voters turnout; lack of capacity of the opposition to convince voters; lack of interest in a country historically dominated by one party; a long campaign period dominated by the ruling party; and inadequate voter education (EU-EOM, 2010: 3). With this unresolved enigma, the what if questions regarding the inclination of those who did not turn up to vote puts the ruling party at a crossroads, as there are still no conclusions to be drawn on whether any increase in voter turnout stands to benefit it or the opposition parties.

A further factor contributing to CCM’s shaky future is the increasing deterioration of the party’s internal discipline. With less than a year since the country held the general elections, senior party officials are surprisingly preoccupied with succession politics, particularly with the question of the presidential candidate in the 2015 elections. The party is factionalized, with different groups that seem to have diverse political orientations competing in an uncivilized manner. Defamation and open accusations continue to shape the relations among party leaders. It is this climate of endless confrontation, witch hunting and internal disorder that led to the resignation of both the party’s Central Committee (CC) and secretariat in April 2011, with an exception of the president who is also the chairman of the CC.

Conclusion

Throughout this paper I have indicated that since Tanzania reintroduced plural politics in 1992 the ruling party has been emerging as victorious in the general elections. On the other hand, the performance of opposition parties in elections seems to be sporadic and capricious, especially looking at the trend of their performance in elections since 1995. It is the fragile nature of their performance that makes it difficult to predict whether their improved performance in 2010 will be maintained in the next general elections. A concern is that the improved performance of opposition parties during the 2010 general elections might have been a short-lived experience that is likely to recede. While most of the factors that have been favouring the ruling party such as institutionalization, age and history seem to be losing influence in the country’s electoral politics, it remains uncertain whether new developments will continue to favour the opposition or the incumbent party.

It is vital to note also that the experience from the 2010 elections in Tanzania suggests a continuation of a political trend that has characterized electoral politics in Africa as marked by the following features. The first feature is the increase of disunity among opposition parties, which in the end benefits the ruling party. For instance, as we pointed out earlier in this paper, KANU’s survival in office in the 1992 and 1997 general elections was a result of lack of cooperation among opposition parties whose combined votes were more than those of the ruling party. Current misunderstandings between CUF and NCCR-Mageuzi on one hand and CHADEMA on the other suggest a similar trajectory.

Second, there is an increase in reliance on security forces to silence the opposition, as has been the case in other African countries such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, Cameroun, Ivory Coast and Gambia, where the ruling parties are not willing to leave office peacefully. It was observed that in most of the constituencies where opposition parties were popular excessive force was used to silence pro-opposition
supporters who were dissatisfied with the processes of counting and declaration of results. Constituencies such as Tandahimba, Karagwe and Shinyanga can serve as the best examples of this.

Third, as the European Union Election Observation Mission’s report indicates, most of opposition parties did not make thorough pre-elections preparations. With the exception of CHADEMA, opposition parties were inactive before the elections and did not do much to mobilize voters’ support. As this paper has indicated, there was a great chance for the opposition parties to increase their share of seats in the national parliament following the decrease of the popularity of the incumbent party. This was not realized due to poor preparation within opposition parties. It can thus be argued that although the 2010 general elections in Tanzania marked a resurrection of opposition parties’ support, there are still a lot of unanswered questions, particularly in explaining the nature of political parties’ competition in the forthcoming elections.

References


