
Alexander B. Makulilo

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Healy also takes the opportunity to work on a wider canvas in her discussion of the international relations of the failed Somali state.

“Somalia,” without formal government institutions since 1992 and with borders that are challenged, proves an evasive object of analysis. Elmi focuses his analysis on the protracted struggle for dominance in Mogadishu and hardly mentions Somaliland, the Somali-inhabited regions of eastern Ethiopia, the tragically large Somali refugee communities in Kenya, or the powerful diasporas around the world. The contributors in the Hoehne and Luling volume examine both southern Somalia and the northern Somaliland region where Lewis did much of his early fieldwork and developed his understanding of Somali lineage structures. The Hoehne and Luling contributors reference the “globalization of the segmentary logic” (Ciabarri) and the notion of a “globalized nation” (Healy), which hint at an important set of questions unexplored in this volume. It is difficult—perhaps impossible—to understand politics in Somalia without including the roles of Somalis who reside outside the territorial limits of the state. Key economic and political actors are located in Nairobi, Dubai, London, Toronto, and Minneapolis. Recent work by Nauja Kleist, Laura Hammond, Peter Hansen, Cindy Horst and Mohamed Husein Gaas, and others demonstrates the importance of the Somali political economy that incorporates multiple transnational actors and processes.

Somali politics seems to move both very fast and agonizingly slow. On the one hand, many of the concerns about the Islamic Courts and Ethiopian intervention that are the focus of Elmi’s book have already become transformed into new challenges in the few years since this research was conducted. On the other hand, many of the authors in the Hoehne and Luling volume argue convincingly that the social structure of lineage and clan continues to shape stateless Somalia in ways similar to Lewis’s analysis of British Somaliland in the 1950s.

Terrence Lyons
George Mason University
Arlington Virginia
tlyons1@gmu.edu

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In the 1990s Africa adopted multiparty democracy. Yet even a casual observation would show that in some countries opposition parties are strong while in others they are weak and fragmented, even countries that exhibit similar institutions and electoral rules. In From Protest to Parties Adrienne LeBas attempts to unravel this puzzle by means of a comparative study of Kenya, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.
LeBas notes that in Zimbabwe and Zambia the main opposition parties are relatively strong, while in Kenya the opposition is fragmented. In explaining this state of affairs, she considers ethnicity and authoritarianism as central variables. This way of visualizing democracy and party politics in Africa is indeed not new. (See, for example, Sebastian Elischer’s “Do African Parties Contribute to Democracy? Some Findings from Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria” [Afrika Spectrum 43 (2):175–201 (2008)]. Tackling the puzzle, LeBas presents two main arguments. First, she maintains that where authoritarian states relied on alliances with corporate actors, particularly organized labor, as was the case in Zambia and Zimbabwe, they unintentionally armed their opponents with structures and resources that could later be used to mobilize large constituencies and exert an effective challenge to the state. “In countries like Zimbabwe and Zambia,” LeBas states, “... opposition parties were able to draw upon cross-ethnic mobilising structures provided by labour. In contrast, in countries like Kenya, authoritarian states relied on patronage and networks of ethnic brokerage in order to rule ... and opposition parties were prone to fragmentation along ethnic lines” (246). While this reasoning is in many ways convincing, it fails to account for a situation in which ethnicity-based conflict is almost absent but opposition parties are weak. In Tanzania, for example, about 120 tribes exist, but ethnicity has not been a divisive force, partly owing to a successful national-building project championed by the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere. And yet opposition parties in Tanzania are still relatively weak.

LeBas’s second argument is that opposition parties are more successful when they pursue strategies intended to intensify political polarization—that is, strategies that distance those parties from the incumbents. LeBas finds this strategy paradoxical since it sometimes leads to violence. This is partly true. In Zanzibar, for example, the main opposition party, the Civic United Front (CUF), applied such a strategy against the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi. The result has been twofold: the CUF has been strong, but at the same time the country has remained politically unstable.

LeBas presents original research based on primary data to support the arguments she advances. There are some areas where the book slips up, however. One serious problem is related to her methodology and data. LeBas claims her argument to be “generalizable to other late Third Wave democratizers” (5), but this is problematic since her study is limited to three cases. To develop a general theory, the author would have to use a large-n comparison and include many more cases to show pattern and trends. Similarly, the data presented are somewhat outdated. Most interviews were conducted in 2002, 2003, and 2004, with the largest share of the empirical attention devoted to Zimbabwe.

Yet to study the strengths or weaknesses of opposition parties means to situate them against the ruling parties. In their seminal work Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 1997) Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle rightly argue that a regime transition is a struggle between competing political
forces over the rules of the political game and the resources with which the game is played. What I find strange is that LeBas sidesteps this point and treats the ruling parties as passive entities: “I argue that the weakness of opposition party mobilization—not the resources or cohesiveness of the ruling party—is the primary cause of this kind of authoritarian persistence. This weakness is in turn determined by the choices of parties themselves. . . . This book suggests that differences in opposition strength are not primarily a reflection of the skills or short-run strategies of incumbents. . . . Nor should we see the deficiencies of opposition as the result of political opening” (8).

In some cases, LeBas makes claims without supporting evidence, which amounts to mere speculation. For example, she states that “in 2005, a high-profile journalist in Mali was beaten and left for dead after criticizing politicians for corruption and abuses of power on his radio show” (9) or that “the Namibian state is widely believed to have been involved in the 2003 assassination of civil society activist Bernard Shevanyenga, and opposition parties are a regular target of state harassment” (9). Such strong statements would seem to require more documentation. Finally, the book employs a number of concepts as axiomatic. LeBas makes use of such terms as “democracy,” “illiberal democracy,” “authoritarianism,” and “electoral autocracy” without sufficient clarification or definition. Despite the aforementioned gaps, however, I find the book useful to a broad range of students of African politics.

Alexander B. Makulilo
University of Dar es Salaam
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
makulilo76@yahoo.co.uk

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China and the European Union in Africa sets out the ambitious, interesting agenda of examining dynamics among three distinct, disparate players in contexts of economic investment, political diplomacy, socioeconomic development, and conflict management in twenty-first century Africa. As a collection, the volume makes an important contribution to understanding the historical contexts of politics, economics, and ideology that enter into triangular engagements among China, the EU (European Union), and Africa, underscoring the evolving and contested nature of these unfolding relationships.

Several chapters stand out for their strong contributions to the field of China–Africa studies. Early in the volume, two Chinese contributors emphasize the historical evolution and continued adaptation of China’s Africa policies. Bo Zhiyue provides a detailed historical account of how China’s policies toward Africa fit into the larger picture of China’s political development. Zhao Suisheng suggests that while China’s immediate objectives in