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The Figuring Of Music Cultures In Literary And Visual Arts Of Tanzania: Preliminaries And Methodological Issues¹

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Entering Imaginary Worlds of Art: Imaginary Music Cultures and Music Figures

Usually when we read poems or novels and when we look at paintings or sculptures we find ourselves transported away from our “ordinary world” into “imaginary worlds” that these works of art create. The movement into these imaginary worlds becomes possible when we immerse ourselves into the works of art in question. In some of these imaginary worlds, we encounter people sing, play music instruments and dance to music. Some other times we also encounter people talk about music and their musical experiences. On my part, every time I encounter such musical moments, as it is the case when I am in my ordinary world, I pay attention and enjoy the musical experience. Most often these musical experiences call for subsequent reflections. As a student of the music cultures of Tanzania, I have witnessed in recent years the increasingly growing number of scholarly works concerning music cultures of Tanzania. However, none of the studies I know focus on the imaginary music cultures which I often encounter in the works of art. Since imaginary musical cultures are part of everyday human experiences, these imaginary music cultures need our scholarly attention for a more comprehensive understanding of music cultures in Tanzania, an attention that the present study pays.

The aim of this study, therefore, is to explore the imaginary music cultures created in and through literary and visual works of art by Tanzanian artists, and to examine how music or some of its elements such as music styles, music instruments or voice are used in the context of the imaginary music cultures within selected works of art as figures of social identities and/or relations.

This study complements the existing and the rapidly growing scholarship on music cultures of Tanzania. The premise behind these analyses is not that understanding music cultures in the imaginary worlds of art helps us to understand music cultures in the ordinary world. I do not assume that works of art are “mirrors” or “pictures” of musical reality outside the works of art themselves. Conversely, I posit that these imaginary music cultures are creatively created by artists. In other words, these imaginary music cultures are products of imagination and they exist as imaginary existents. Hence, the imaginary music cultures are only parts of a society’s complex and multifaceted music culture as it is the case with the ordinary music cultures. To understand the whole of such a complex and multifaceted music culture of a particular society we need to study both the ordinary and the imaginary music cultures. This is particularly important for ethnomusicology which purports to study, as Bruno Nettl puts it,

¹ This paper is an introduction of a book on progress concerning the figuring of music cultures in literary and visual arts of Tanzania.
“all of the musical manifestations of a society” (Nettl 2005: 13; italics in the original).

Nicholas Cook highlights the performative role of art when he refers to Benjamin Lee Whorf’s idea that “language constructs rather than represents reality” and applies it into the realm of aesthetics by pointing out that “instead of reproducing an external, pre-existing reality, the role of art is to make available new ways of ‘constituting our sense of reality’” (Cook 1998: 76).

The present project radically takes this view of art a step further and considers the imaginary music cultures in the works of art not as a new way of “constituting our sense of reality” but as another full-fledged reality in itself. This does not mean that there are neither relationships nor connections between these two kinds of realities: a musical reality in the ordinary world and a musical reality in the imaginary worlds of art. Also, it does not mean that artists do not make reference to the ordinary realities in creating their imaginary realities. Surely, there are some connections between these two kinds of realities but these connections are not unidirectional and they do not make one the photographic representation of the other. Some other times, as Roland Barthes illustrates in his often-quoted essay “The Death of the Author”, imaginary realities within the works of art (e.g. the acts of imaginary characters within a novel) do influence people’s acts or behavior in the ordinary world. Referring to a French writer Marcel Proust, Barthes writes:

Proust gave modern writing its epic. By radical reversal, instead of putting his life into his novel, as is often maintained, he made his very life a work for which his own book was the model; so that it is clear to us that Charlus does not imitate Montesquiou but that Montesquiou – in his anecdotal, historical reality – is no more than a secondary fragment, derived from Charlus (Barthes 1977: 145).

Note that even when this reversed modeling takes place the result is only “a secondary fragment” and not a photographic replica of the original character. I expand on this issue in the next section when I discuss Gadamer’s concept of fusion of horizon. For now, let me turn to the concept of figure.

My use of the concept of figure throughout this study draws from Louise Meintjes’ book Sound of Africa! Making Music Zulu in a South African Studio (2003). Meintjes construes a figure as a motive that is subjected to ornamentation, variation and repetition, and is used to realize particular social identities and relations (2003: 149). For example, she discusses how particular guitar playing techniques, instrumentation or music genres such as maskanda or mbaqanga are used by South African musicians to represent Africanness or more specifically Zuluness. These or other sonic parameters are shaped and used differently when the musicians want to represent whiteness. Meintjes points out that this way of figuring social identities takes places in and through performance of sound and by the enactment of image. As she writes:

Figures do not exist independently but must be embodied in particular individuals through the performance of sound and the enactment of image. The materialization of figures through performance at once both shapes and articulates an immediate set of social and musical relationships. … The notion of the figure in this South African case slips easily into a form representing a social type-
an African, a white person, or a Zulu. By form here I mean a set of sonic parameters shaped in a particular way and repeated with variations in multiple musical contexts. A technological, measured, and rationalized sound is interpreted as white; strong versions of strident guitar sound with percussive attack, strong upper frequencies, flanging, phrasing, and chorusing effects to give the sound some exciting impurities, and some reverb to add a bit of ring, is heard as Zulu, or in a broader context as South African (2003: 169-170).

Studying the imaginary music cultures created through works of art by Tanzanian artists one encounters a number of figures that are used to enact social types such as specific ethnicities, Tanzanianness, and Africanness as well as gendered and class identities. In this study I identify and interpret these figures in selected works of art. The works selected for these reflections are: Edwin Semzaba’s novel Marimba ya Majaliwa, Zay B’s music video “Niko Gado”, Shaaban Robert’s Wasifu wa Binti Saad, Elias Jengo’s paintings “Sindimba”, “A Dance” and “Traditional Music”, Mulokuzi’s poem “Wimbo Uliosahaulika” and Kezilahabi’s poem “Ngoma ya Kimya”.

The selection of these works of art is based, first and foremost, on my personal acquaintance. I have been reading a number of literary works by Tanzanian authors. My encounters with music cultures in the imaginary worlds of these literary works of art triggered me to conduct this study. The above mentioned works were selected because I found that among the works I had read music, music figures or musicians’ life occupied a central place in the works. This is to say that I have left a number of works that I had already read in which music either plays less significant role or is not an issue at all. It also implies that probably there are other works in which music plays a significant role but I have not had acquaintance with them. In the case of paintings, I have seen a number of other paintings, mainly by Jengo’s students, in which music is the main subject matter. Due to time constrains, perhaps these and other newly created literary and visual works of art will be studied in my future projects. It should be noted here that I do not claim that the selected works for this study do ‘represent’ all works of art by Tanzanian artists. As I have already pointed out, some similarities or connections notwithstanding, I believe that each work of art moulds an imaginary world of its own.

**Methodology: Gadamer’s Positivity of Prejudices and Fusion of Horizon**

In this study I use two concepts from a German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer namely the positivity of prejudices and the fusion of horizon to interpret how various musical figures are used within the selected works of art. Gadamer uses these concepts within his general philosophical hermeneutics.

Originally, hermeneutics began as an approach for the exegesis of biblical texts. However, since the 19th century on it has increasingly been used by scholars in other fields (especially literary criticism, classics, law and philosophy) to interpret other kinds of texts. As Gadamer points out, hermeneutics has become a method of interpreting not only written texts but also “everything that is no longer immediately situated in a world- that is, all tradition, whether art or other
spiritual creations of the past: law, religion, philosophy, and so forth is estranged from its original meaning and depends on the unlocking and mediating spirit...” (Gadamer 2011: 157). Etymologically, the concept of hermeneutics is linked to a Greek name Hermes, “the messenger of the gods” or the mediating spirit (2011: 157-158). One of the principal concerns of hermeneutic interpreters (as the messengers of gods) was how to bridge the gap between the original context of the text and the present context of the interpreter, two contexts that were variously removed from each other in terms of time, geographical distance and/or cultural orientation. This contextual difference or “alienation” (as Gadamer calls it) as well as the present contexts or conditions of interpreters were thought to distract interpreters from reaching true meanings of texts. In order to interpret a text that is removed from an interpreter’s context in terms of time or other aspects most interpreters sought ways to bridge this alienation by trying to reconstruct the original context, that is, to restore “the original occasion and circumstances” of a tradition (2011: 159). The hermeneutic philosophy of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, both discussed extensively in Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*, exemplify this trend of hermeneutics. As David Linge writes in his “Editor’s Introduction” to Gadamer’s *Philosophical Hermeneutics*:

For Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the knower’s own present situation can have only a negative value. As the source of prejudices and distortions that block valid understanding, it is precisely what the interpreter must transcend. Historical understanding, according to this theory, is the action of subjectivity purged of all prejudices, and it is achieved in direct proportion to the knower’s ability to set aside his own horizons by means of an effective historical method (Linge 2004: xiv).

Gadamer revolutionarizes the hermeneutic approach mainly by rehabilitating the value of prejudices. He argues that all understanding begins from our being ready to “let something be said to us” (Gadamer 2004: 101), and proceeds through what he calls “pre-understanding” or “fore-structure of understanding” (Gadamer 2011: 268-285). He challenges the approach advanced by Schleiermacher, Dilthey and their followers by arguing that:

It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices that constitute our being. This is a provocative formulation, for I am using it to restore to its rightful place a positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of our linguistic usage by French and English Enlightenment.... Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience something - whereby what we encounter says something to us (2004: 9).

Gadamer’s concept of prejudice (which he uses interchangeably with “pre-understanding” or “fore-structure of understanding”) can be understood in terms of Martin Heidegger’s notion of the “as-structure” of understanding as described in *Being and Time* (Heidegger 1962: 188-195). With this concept, Heidegger (one
of Gadamer’s teachers) views interpretation as a way through which we understand a newly encountered phenomenon in terms of something we already understand. As he writes:

That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretively by taking as our clue the “something as something”; and this Articulation lies before [liegt vor] our making any thematic assertion about it…. The fact that when we look at something, the explicitness of assertion can be absent, does not justify our denying that there is any Articulative interpretation in such mere seeing, and hence that there is any as-structure in it (Heidegger 1962: 190).

In explicating the notion of “as-structure” Heidegger points out that every time we interpret something as something, the interpretation we perform is founded upon that which we already possess, see and/or grasp in advance. In short, the as-structure of understanding depends upon three processes: fore-having, fore-sight and, fore-conception.

In every case this interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance-fore-having…. In every case interpretation is grounded in something we see in advance-fore sight…. In either case, the interpretation has already decided for a definite way of conceiving it either with finality or with reservations; it is grounded in something we grasp in advance-in a fore-conception…. An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us. If, when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, one likes to appeal [beruft] to what “stands there”, then one finds that what “stands there” in the first instance is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumption [Vormeinung] of the person who does the interpreting. In an interpretative approach there lies such an assumption, as that which has been “taken for granted” [“gesetzt”] with the interpretation as such-that is to say, as that which has been presented in our fore-having, our fore-sight, and our fore-conception (1962: 191-192, italics in original).

Gadamer considers his recognition that all understanding proceeds from “prejudices” or “pre understanding” and his declaration of the “positivity of prejudices” to be his point of departure for his entire hermeneutic project. In other words, he considers his defense of prejudices against what he calls “prejudices of prejudices” to be a springboard for his project in philosophical hermeneutics. With this defense of prejudices, Gadamer rejects the idea that the reconstruction of the original circumstance is the correct way to understand a true meaning of a text. As he eloquently puts it:

Reconstructing the conditions in which a work passed down to us from the past was originally constituted is undoubtedly an important aid to understanding it. But we may ask whether what we obtain is really the meaning of the work of art that we are looking for, and whether it is correct to see understanding as a second creation, the reproduction of the original production. Ultimately, this view of hermeneutics is as nonsensical as all restitution and restoration of
past life. Reconstructing the original circumstances, like all restoration, is futile undertaking in view of the historicity of our being. What is reconstructed, life brought back from the lost past, is not original (Gadamer 2011: 159; italics in original).

I am reminded of a Kiswahili saying that goes: “mjumbe hauawi” (freely translated as, a messenger is not responsible or will not be killed/punished for the bad news s/he delivers). It is normally used when one takes a message from one person and delivers it to another person and the message seems to evoke anger on the part of the recipient. In this context, the messenger defends himself or herself against the resulting recipient’s rage and/or ferocious acts by saying mjumbe hauawi which is like to say: I am only an innocent messenger, a carrier of an intact message and hence I am not responsible for the bitterness of the message². Following Gadamer’s lead, however, one is justified to put the messenger into task since the recipient’s reaction may have been influenced, at least to some extent, by the messenger’s way of presenting the message or even the fact that what the messenger delivers is not exactly the same message pronounced by the first person. Most probably, the message undergoes some changes during the process of transference, changes that have been introduced by the messenger or his/her way of presenting the message, and hence the message is not free from the messenger’s prejudices. What Gadamer’s hermeneutics does for us in such circumstances, as Paul Ricoeur points out, is to put us “on guard against the illusion or pretension of neutrality” (Ricoeur 1981: 43).

Similar criticisms against historical reconstruction and restoration have also been raised by scholars in other fields including historical musicology and philosophy of music as exemplified by the work of Richard Taruskin (1992, 2006, and 2007) and Lydia Goehr (2007). Both Taruskin and Goehr raise such criticisms with particular reference to authentic historical music performance and view performers not like “faithful neutral” messengers of the authority of the author (a composer or a musical work itself) but as interpreters whose interpretations are shaped by historically constructed imaginary museum of the musical work in question (see also José Bowen 2001). Likewise, Carol M. Babiracki’s notion of performative ethnomusicological representation and Nicholas Cook’s notion of constructivist view of musicological representation have been developed along the same critical view of scholarly musical representation as faithful and innocent messengers (see also Leo Treitler 2004). Babiracki argues that, as ethnomusicologists, we always “arrive at our interpretations in the course of field research through complex, intersubjective and dialogic processes” (Babiracki 2008: 27). Cook points out that written accounts of musical works including words and metaphors used to describe musical sounds influence readers’ experiences of the works in question, as such, the written accounts do not faithfully and innocently “picture” or “mirror” the musical reality but participate in constructing our sense of musical works (1998: 76-78).

What kinds of prejudices do we employ when we encounter music cultures in the imaginary worlds of art? Most often, when we encounter a music culture in a novel, in a painting or in a poem, we make efforts to understand it in terms of our² Sometimes it is other people present when the messenger delivers the message who defend the messenger by telling the recipient, mjumbe hauawi.
understanding of the music cultures we already know in our ordinary world. In Gadamer’s sense, these efforts, our readiness to let that music culture say something to us and our prior knowledge (including ideas and concepts) we refer to in the process of understanding this newly encountered music culture, are legitimate or positive prejudices that aid our understanding of this newly encountered music culture. These positive prejudices help us to “translate” the newly encountered music culture into the language we already understand. They help us to “transpose the key” of the newly encountered music culture into the key we are already familiar with and in which we can comfortably sing or play. They help us to “bridge” and cross the gulf that separates newly encountered imaginary musical worlds from our ordinary musical world and hence make these imaginary musical worlds intelligible to us. Gadamer writes: “Only the support of familiar and common understanding makes possible the venture into the alien, the lifting up of something out of the alien, and thus the broadening and enrichment of our own experience of the world” (2004: 15).

Gadamer uses the concept of horizon to refer to each of these historically and contextually shaped understandings. Likewise, he uses the concept of the fusion of horizon to refer to the bridging of two or more such horizons. Let me highlight two main features of Gadamer’s concept of the fusion of horizon which are pertinent to this study. The first is the fact that hermeneutic interpretation depends on ones readiness and openness to something new. But this readiness, this expectation for something new to be said to us, presupposes some form of fore-having: “Is it not our expectation and our readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined by the old that has already taken possession of us?” (Gadamer 2004: 9). Does this mean that we admit or listen only to things or perspectives that are in line with our previous understanding? This would lead to intellectual stagnation. In other words, anything completely new and different from our “pre-understanding” would be inadmissible.

A second important feature of his notion of the fusion of horizon responds to this worry. Gadamer argues that the fusion of horizon is cultivated by ones readiness to revise or correct ones pre-understanding upon encountering a new horizon. The more we read a text, the more we listen to music, or the more we engage ourselves with other people; the better we understanding the text, the music or the people. This change or improvement of our understanding is possible only if we are ready to revise our previous understanding. It is possible only if we are ready to drop what we come to realize that was wrong in our pre-understanding. It is possible only if we constantly discard what has been proven incorrect by the new horizon. Succinctly, Gadamer’s notion of the fusion of horizon is an antonym of rigidity.

**Ethnomusicology and Derrida’s Critique of Phonologism**

This study concerning how music cultures are figured in literary and visual arts of Tanzania radically broadens the narrow scope of the scholarly discourse on the music cultures of Tanzania. A quick survey of studies in the music of Tanzania confirms that most of the studies of the music of Tanzania have been generally carried out using ethnomusicological approaches³. Fieldwork of varying lengths

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³ Here I have in mind a series of ethnomusicological/anthropological work done since the 1960s such as Stephen Mbunga (1963), Henry Weman (1960) to the recent studies
(longer fieldworks are preferred), participation in music performances, first-hand observation of musical rehearsals and performances, and face to face interviews with the informants have been used in most of these studies. Through these techniques, there has been a tendency among ethnomusicologists to privilege what a French philosopher Jacques Derrida calls “presence” over some forms of “absence”. Therefore one of the four beliefs (credo) Nettl uses to define the field of ethnomusicology concerns fieldwork. He writes: “We believe that fieldwork, direct confrontation with musical creation and performance, with the people who conceive of, produce, and consume music, is essential…” (Nettl 2005: 13). The presence of the researcher at the moment of a musical articulation or at the moment of an interview marked a move away from what has been referred to as armchair research which was done by earlier ethnomusicologists (then named comparative musicologists).

Recent currents in ethnomusicology emphasizing experience-based knowledge and reflexivity on the part of the music ethnographer have intensified the zeal for presence (Kisliuk 2001, Titon 2008, Rice 2008 and Barz 2008). As a result the boundaries between Self and Other are blurred when the ethnographers become increasingly intimately engaged in the lives and musical experiences of the people they study. As Kisliuk puts it:

During our most in-depth and intimate field experiences, ethnographers and the people among whom we learn come to share the same narratives…; the deeper our commitment in the field, the more our life stories intersect with our “subject’s”, until Self-Other boundaries are blurred. The “field” becomes a heightened microcosm of life. When we begin to participate in music and dance our very being merges with the “field” through our bodies and voices, and another Self-Other boundary is dissolved (2008: 183).

Even when researchers get out of the field and begin to analyze their “data” and write ethnographies, audio and video recordings have continued to be used by researchers to bring back those moments of full presence of the researchers in the field. In this sense these audio-visual recordings play the role of a supplement. The concept of supplement is used here in Derrida’s double sense to mean both a substitute and a surplus (I expand on the concept of supplement below). The same is the case with the ethnographers’ use of fieldnotes. As Gregory Barz (2008) points out, fieldnotes act as a fulcrum between ethnographers’ experience and interpretation because they enable ethnographers to recollect their field experiences and integrate them in their ethnographies. Again we see the same zeal of being closer to experience (presence) vividly expressed in spite of the necessary alienation (i.e. both temporal and spatial distance) between the two occasions. Hence, Barz writes:

published in 2000s to the present such as Kelly Askew (2002), Frank Gunderson (2010), Laura Edmondson (2007), Gregory Barz (2003, 2004), Imani Sanga (2010), Alex Perullo (2011), Mwenda Ntarangwi (2009), to limit my list only to published full-length books in English language not to mentioned journal articles, articles in collected books and numerous unpublished dissertations/theses.
In my own experience I have found that fieldnotes are integral to both the processes of field research and ethnography—they function as an intermediary point that links the process of ethnography back to the processes of field research. With fieldnotes acting as such a fluid and malleable intermediary point, boundaries between experience and interpretation become less distinct, allowing ethnography to become more directly linked to experience, and field research to become an integral part of interpretation (2008: 210).

Again, what is expressed here is a fully fledged desire for presence, a desire that the moment of field research when the researcher was fully present and had firsthand experience of music making processes be present at the moment of writing one’s ethnography. However, due to temporal and sometimes even spatial distance this moment is no longer present at hand. It is here that fieldnotes come to play the role of a Derridian supplement that links “more directly” the ethnography and the field experiences.

Kofi Agawu (2003) observes in his pointed critique of the discourse concerning African music (mostly by ethnomusicologists) that this tendency to privilege presence is done at the cost of exclusion or marginalization of some forms of representation that seem to distance the researcher from moments of musical articulation. These forms of representation are considered to be forms of “absence”. Let me hasten to say that Agawu does not use these Derridian concepts. However, my reading of sections titled “fieldwork”, “The Autographic Turn” and “The Ethics of Self-Reflexivity” and the chapter titled “How not to Analyze African Music” in his book Representing African Music: Postcolonial Notes, Queries, Positions (2003: 41-48; 214-218; 173-197) have necessitated me to draw the association between Agawu’s arguments and Derrida’s critique of presence/absence binary opposition in western metaphysical thinking. In these sections Agawu shows that some of forms of representation have been marginalized due to the tendency among music ethnographers to privilege presence over absence or some degree of absence. The marginalized forms of representation include analyzing the music recorded by others in fervor of the music recorded by the ethnographer him/herself (that is to say the ethnographer was present at the moment of the musical articulation) and the use of types of music analysis developed by western scholars in favor of methods that seem to be derived from the music community being studied or methods designed specifically for the music culture being studied.

Derrida uses the concept of phonologism to refer to the tendency of privileging presence over absence. His critique of phonologism in western philosophical tradition is pertinent to our task of broadening the scope of ethnomusicology. The critique helps us venture beyond human musical experiences in the ordinary world into musical experiences and workings of imaginary music cultures in the imaginary worlds of art.

According to Derrida, the whole of western metaphysical philosophical tradition has been structured in terms of hierarchical binary opposition. There has been a tendency in western philosophy (from Plato’s idea of the pharmakon and Descartes’ theory of the Cogito to newer currents in the history western philosophy such as Husserl’s phenomenology, Levi-Strauss’ structuralism,
Saussure’s semiology and Rousseau’s theory of the origin of languages) to give more value to one side of the opposition. For example, presence is privileged over absence, speech over writing, and essence over appearance. In this way, writing is considered to be a mere representation of speech which is itself a representation of reality or thought. Hence, writing seems to be doubly removed from reality or thought as compared to speech. To the extent that writing seems to corrupt the self-presence of meaning in speech, it is considered to be “a secondary substitute designed for use only when speaking is impossible” (Johnson 1981: ix). As Barbara Johnson puts it: “The spoken word is given higher value because the speaker and listener are both present to the utterance simultaneously. There is no temporal or spatial distance between the speaker, speech, and listener, since the speaker hears himself speak at the same moment the listener does” (Johnson 1981: ix). For Derrida this speech-centered approach to representation (Phonologism), considers writing as something that not only interrupts the self-presence and the effectiveness of speech but also confines writing to a secondary and instrumental function of translating full speech which is fully present to itself (Derrida 1974: 97, see also Tomlinson 2007: 11-13). Derrida writes:

Between the overture and the philosophical accomplishment of phonologism (or logocentrism) the motif of presence was decisively articulated. … The logos can be as auto-affection, only through the voice: an order of the signifier by which the subject takes from itself into itself, does not borrow outside of itself the signifier that it emits and that affects it at the time. Such is at least the experience of – or consciousness- of voice: of hearing (understanding)- oneself speak (sentendre-parler). That experience lives and proclaims itself as the exclusion of writing, that is to say of the invoking of an “exterior”, “sensible”, spatial” signifier interrupting self-presence (1974: 98).

Let us note, along the lines of Johnson, that Derrida does not reverse the order of this opposition between speech and writing. On the contrary, Derrida argues that “the very possibility of opposing the two terms on the basis of presence vs. absence or immediacy vs. representation is an illusion, since speech is already structured by difference and distance as much as writing” (Johnson 1981: ix). Even a spoken word is used to stand in for the absent being or idea. As such, speech is also a form of writing. Derrida argues that both speech and writing are used as signs and that they both complement each other. To illustrate the complementary relationship between speech and writing, Derrida uses the concept of supplement. For him a supplement is at once a substitute (that which stands in for something else) and surplus (an addition and hence unnecessary). In order for writing as a supplement of speech (conceived as a full presence) to be used as a substitute of speech this speech must be substitutable in some way. It must be defiant or not-self-sufficient and hence replaceable by writing. Hence, Derrida displaces the central position and privileged status given to speech by showing that speech too is deficient and depends in some way on writing to fill the lack on its part.

In a chapter entitled “…That Dangerous Supplement…”, Derrida observes that in Roussau’s text speech (which means self-presence) is considered to be natural and closer to reality or thought while writing, as its supplement, is not only dangerous because it leads one away from reality or thought but also redemptive
and hence necessary because it helps to fill the lack and overcome the limits of speech (Derrida 1974: 151). This is also a point that Derrida makes in his reading of Plato’s text *Phaedrus* where writing is compared to the *pharmakon* or medicine which “acts as both remedy and poison” (1981: 75). Writing comes to remedy the insufficiency of speech. It is because of the necessary lack on the part of speech that the use of writing, though foreign to speech and to reality, becomes necessary.

The imaginary music cultures created in and through works of art have also been marginalized in most of ethnomusicological studies of the music of Tanzania. The problem with these works of art is that they seem to be removed from reality or truth more than other forms of representation such as written ethnomusicological descriptions of musical events or musical works. Works of art, as Gadamer points out in his essay “The Eminent Text and Its Truth”, are characterized by artistic autonomy or freedom with regard to their correspondence to reality (Gadamer 1980). Hence, when one wants to study the music cultures of Tanzania will hardly think of consulting and citing these products of imagination in one’s search for factual information. In other words, although even other forms of writing do not provide an opportunity for the researcher to be fully present at the site of musical articulation, they are normally admitted in ethnomusicological work as supplement. They are dependable sources of factual information. This is not the case with the works of art which, being products of imagination, are considered to be independent from factual information. Hence, the works of art are not granted even the secondary position or function in ethnomusicology.

My aim in studying music cultures in the imaginary worlds of art is not to convince ethnomusicologists to use these works of art or eminent texts, as Gadamer calls them, as sources of factual information about the music cultures in the ordinary world outside of art works themselves. On the contrary, I argue that the imaginary music cultures in imaginary worlds of art are part of human experiences and studying them makes our knowledge of human music cultures and experiences more comprehensive. These works of art provide us with factual information about fictional worlds. But these fictional worlds shape factual human artistic experiences.

**Itinerary of the Work in Progress**

The interpretations that I present in the book I am preparing are organized into two parts. The guiding thread in all these analyses is the way musical figuring of identities is structured in relation to desire and the resulting rivalry. Part one includes analyses of Semzaba’s novel *Marimba ya Majaliwa*, Zay B’s music video “GADO”, and Shaaban Robert *Wasifu wa Siti Binti Saad*, a biography of a Zanzibari legendary Woman taarab singer Siti Binti Saad. In these works of art, characters (be they fictional as Majaliwa and Kongoti who fight for a musical instrument –marimba- in Semzaba’s novel, “real” and living as Zay B in her music video, or real but no longer as Siti Binti Saad in a biography by Shaaban Robert) are presented as figures of social identities and relations. The social identities figured through these characters include national, gendered, class and racial identities. The main characters in these works enter into rivalry relationships with other characters because of what Rene Girard calls mimetic desire. With this concept, Girard argues that a subject’s desire for a particular object is primarily imitated from the subject’s model, someone who the subject
admires and wishes to become like him/her. In other words, one’s desire is not a simple straightforward desire for the object but it is mediated by this model (Girard 1996: 39-44). In this sense, Girard uses the concept of “triangular desire” to refer to this mediated structure of desire. A triangle in this formulation comprises three points: Subject-Model-Object.

Part two includes my interpretive analyses of Jengo’s paintings namely “Sindimba”, “A Dance” and “Traditional Music”; Mulokozi’s poem “Wimbo Uliosahaulika”; and Kezilahabi’s poem “Ngoma ya Kimya”. In these works of art, traditional music instruments, dances, and songs are used within the context of the poems and painted images as figures of African identity. The asserting of African identity through these musical figures is mainly done as a response to western or colonial cultural hegemony in which western cultural elements are conferred higher value relative to African elements. Here the objects of desire are not the cultural elements themselves but the high value normally bestowed to the western cultural elements among postcolonial subjects. In this context, the subject elevates one’s own object (not that of the model) to the status of the model’s object but this subject imitates from the model the value of the model’s object. Girard calls this kind of imitation a reversed mimesis because the subject openly displays hatred for the model but secretly desires and envies the value of the object that the model posses (1996: 40-41).

Let me confess. I am tempted to elongate these remarks beyond what is expected in a plan or an itinerary of the book. I am tempted to start writing actual interpretations of the works of art. I am tempted to illustrate the theoretical claims I have raised in these preliminary remarks with examples from actual works of art. But actual interpretations ought to commence after the closure of the introduction. For this reason, I must overcome the temptations and stop here.

References


